

Lands *69

R1000



General Burgoyne addressing the Indians at their War Feast, in Canada.

69 Burgoyne

UNTRY

under

URGOYNE

ign of 1777,

the Army

pal Actions.

PRINTED FOR J. ALMON, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

MDCCLXXX.

A MAP of the COUNTRY
in which the Army under
Lt GENERAL BURGOYNE
acted in the Campaign of 1777,
shewing the Marches of the Army
& the Places of the principal Actions.


Drawn by Mr. MEDCALFE
&
Engraved by Wm. FADEN.

Scale of Statute Miles.
5 10 15 20

LAKE CHAM PLAIN

River Chambly
Lake Nealy
R. à la Colle
Plan Per
R. Bouquet
Powers Plains
Lake Dunmore
Moore's Saw Mill
Ticonderoga
Saw Mills
Mount Hope
Pt Independance
Wesel
Otter Creek
Connecticut River
Hubertson
Fort Ps
Castleton
Castleton River
GEORGE
Skeensborough
Pultney
Fort William Henry
Fort George
Open Woods Plains
Kingsbury
Fort Edward
Hudson's River
Falls
Snook Creek
Moses Kill
White Creek
Black Creek
Rupert
Pawlet
Weathersfield
Springfield
No 4 or Charlestown
Rockingham
Black River
Manchester
Townshend
Sunderland
Arlington
Fort Miller
Stoney Pt
Fort Hardy
Schuylers House
Fish Kill
Batten Kill
Saratoga
Freemans Farm
Sept 19th
Bremus Heights
Oct 7th
Still Water
Cambridge
Shaftesborough
Wallamscoick
Sankoick
Anthony's Kill
Benningt on
Mohawks R.
Cohos Falls
Half Moon
Lansingburg
Pownal
Massachusets Fort
Williamston
ALBANY
Deerfield R.
Connecticut River

don. Published as the Act directs. Febr 1st 1780. by Wm Faden. Charing Cross.



London. Published as the Act directs, Feb.y 1.st 1780, by W.m Faden, Charing Cross.

A

STATE

OF THE

EXPEDITION

FROM

CANADA,

AS LAID BEFORE THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE,

AND VERIFIED BY EVIDENCE;

WITH A

COLLECTION OF AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

AND

AN ADDITION OF MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE PREVENTED FROM APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE BY THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT.

WRITTEN AND COLLECTED BY HIMSELF,

AND

DEDICATED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY HE COMMANDED.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. ALMON, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
MDCCLXXX.

TO

MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS,

AND THE

OTHER OFFICERS

WHO SERVED IN THE ARMY COMMANDED BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE,

UPON AN

EXPEDITION FROM CANADA.

GENTLEMEN,

PROPRIETY and affection alike incline me to inſcribe to you the following undertaking. We are mutual and peculiar ſufferers by the event of the campaign in 1777. You were witneſſes and judges of my actions; but I owed you an account of the principles which directed them.

Another motive for this Addreſs is to avail myſelf of a proper public opportunity to repeat to you, what I have omitted no occaſion of expreſſing in Parliament, in correſpondence, and in converſation—the fulleſt approbation of your ſervices. My errors may have been numberleſs; your conduct has been uniform—faithful, gallant and indefatigable. Debarred of the power of doing you juſtice before the King, theſe teſtimonies are the only means to which my eſteem and gratitude can reſort.

After vindicating myſelf as a commanding officer from any inattention to your intereſt or fame, I next throw myſelf upon your judgment for my conduct as a friend.

You will find by this publication, and ſome others, which though not addreſſed to you will probably engage your curioſity, that I have been accuſed of ſhrinking from the common captivity.

I have been ſupported under that aſperſion by the conſciouſneſs I did not deſerve it, and the confidence that you (to whom chiefly upon that charge I was reſponſible) would not adopt it. After the fortunes we have run together, it is not ſurely unworthy of belief, that I ſhould rather have deſired, than avoided to partake the cloſing ſcene: uniting with a due ſenſe of perſonal attachments, the preſervation of my military fortune, and a retreat from the diſtractions of my country. The defence of your honour and my own, at one time, and reſiſtance to an affront * which my nature could not bear, at another, alone detained me here.

In regard to my political tranſactions, I have ſtated them, and I wiſh them to be conſidered by my friends, apart from my miltary conduct. I bear very high reſpect to ſome eminent and ill-treated characters in our profeſſion, who in deference to the tranquility of government, have ſilently reſigned the ſtations which they could no longer hold with ſecurity to their honour, or benefit to the ſtate. But the option is not left to thoſe, who having a voice in Parliament are obliged to act as citizens as well as ſoldiers. The number of officers altogether of the army and navy, who with known love to their country and profeſſional ſpirit equally conſpicuous, have voluntarily withdrawn themſelves from employment within theſe two years, exceeds all precedent. I do not place my name in the liſt with the ſame pretenſions; but it is not arrogant to emulate where we cannot compare; and I am deſirous of following the high examples before me in no point more than in that of avoiding to diſturb the zeal of thoſe who are now employed. The officers who have held it their duty to take part in oppoſition, have acted openly and directly in their place in Parliament; but they may

* The part of my treatment which I call an affront upon this and other occaſions, is the refuſal of my ſervice in this country, even at the head of my own regiment, or as a volunteer, in the time of exigency, and when other officers *preciſely in my own ſituation* were employed. My complaint of this partiality has never been officially anſwered; it has only been evaded by anonymous writers, who have laid it down as a poſition, that I meant to allude to the example of Lord Harrington (with which it certainly has nothing to do) and then have taken a merit in refuting me. The particular example to which I appeal is that of Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton, of the 86th regiment, appointed to that regiment, employed in it for the defence of Plymouth, and actually now embarking with it for foreign ſervice, under the ſame terms of the convention, and the ſame terms of parole to the Congreſs verbatim with myſelf. Other objections, and of a nature that could not be afterwards ſupported, were tried againſt the Duke of Rutland's recommendation of this excellent officer: but the objection of parole, though fully known to be preciſely the ſame with that which was ſo peremptorily urged againſt my pretenſions, was never mentioned.

defy malice to ſhew an inſtance wherein they have not encouraged ardour in their profeſſion. They contemplate with one and the ſame ſentiment the great ſupply of honourable men to occupy their places.

You, Gentlemen, ſtand high in that deſcription; your trials have made you of ſterling value; and perhaps it will be better diſcerned by men in power, when no longer viewed through the unfavourable medium of my friendſhip. If my exhortations retain their former weight, let me be permitted earneſtly to apply them upon this occaſion. The examples of generals or admirals who decline employment, reſpect only ſimilar caſes; your honour is ſecure: look not at profeſſional diſappointments; but point all your views to the true glory of your King and country, and truſt for the reward.

O ſocii (neque enim ignari ſumus ante Malorum)
O paſſi graviora: dabit Deus his quoque finem.

This paſſage will bring to the remembrance of ſome among you a hard hour when we before quoted it together, and not without ſome *cheer of mind.*—— May the end of your enduring be near! And with every other wiſh and ſentiment that can denote eſteem, I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt faithful and moſt obedient

humble ſervant,

J. BURGOYNE.

Hertford-Street,
Jan. 1, 1780.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN it becomes neceſſary for men who have acted critical parts in public ſtations to make an appeal to the world in their own juſtification, there are many prudential conſiderations which might lead them to commit the care of it to friends, or, which is in many reſpects the ſame thing, to defend themſelves under an aſſumed character. The charge of vanity uſually made on egotiſm is thus eluded: a fuller ſcope may be given to ſelf-love and particular reſentment: even the lower vexations which attend an author are to a great degree avoided: the ill-nature of criticiſm is ſeldom awakened by anonymous writings, and the venal pens of party loſe half their gall when the object of it is not perſonally and directly in queſtion.

But there are ſituations, in which, not only general aſſent ſeems to juſtify a man in ſpeaking of himſelf, but in which alſo no little conſideration ought to be admitted to the mind. Such will be the caſe, if I am not deceived, when the intereſts of the public are blended with thoſe of the individual; and when his very errors may ſerve as inſtruction to others. Misfortunes which awaken ſenſibility will be a further, and a perſuaſive call, upon the *attention* of the public; and it will amount to a claim upon their *juſtice*, if he can ſhew that he has been injuriouſly treated.

Upon maturely weighing theſe and ſeveral other circumſtances, after I had been denied a profeſſional examination of my conduct, and diſappointed of a parliamentary one, I determined to lay before the public a ſtate of the expedition from Canada, in 1777, in my own name. And my firſt deſign was to do it under the title, and with the latitude of Memoirs; as a mode by which I could beſt open the principles of my actions, and introduce, with moſt propriety, collateral characters, incidents, and diſcuſſions, as they might occaſionally tend to illuſtrate the main ſubject.

However, in the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, the enquiry which had not been agreed to the year before, took place. I had preſſed it, and I entered into it under all the diſadvantages which attend a ſtruggle with power, and the

the prejudice that power can raiſe againſt the perſons it means to deſtroy. The utmoſt that power could do was done; the Paliament was prorogued pending the proceedings. But though by this contrivance, a final and formal adjudication by that auguſt aſſembly was avoided, their minutes ſtand a ſacred record of truth and juſtice, and the moſt ſatisfactory reliance to which my wiſhes could aſpire, in offering my actions to the judgment of my country at large.

From that time, therefore, I reſolved to publiſh, inſtead of Memoirs, the Proceedings preciſely as they paſſed in Parliament, and to continue my defence by ſuch Obſervations and Comments upon the Evidence, as I ſhould have had a right, and was prepared to make, had the proceedings in the houſe continued.*

Poſſibly in this latter part ſome colour of my original deſign may remain. The ſcenes I have been engaged in are uncommon, and it is a natural deſire to place them in a full light. The intereſts concerned make that deſire more urgent; and I dare believe they will be beſt guarded by being moſt explained.

* The order in which the committee in the Houſe of Commons proceeded was, to hear Sir William Howe's Narrative, reſpecting his conduct whilſt in command in America, and ſuch evidence as he thought proper to bring in ſupport of it. They next heard my Narrative and Evidence, reſpecting the conduct of the expedition from Canada. Lord George Germain then opened a defence on his part, and ſummoned witneſſes to ſupport it. According to the arrangement made by the committee, Sir William Howe and myſelf were afterwards to be heard in reply; but the proceedings were ended by the prorogation of Parliament before the examination of Lord George's ſecond witneſs, Mr. Galloway, was cloſed, and there were ſixteen or eighteen more upon his liſt. The order in which the following papers are placed is—1ſt. The Prefatory Speech. 2d. The Narrative. 3d. Minutes of the verbal evidence. 4th. Review of the evidence, with Remarks and Explanations, &c. 5th. An Appendix, containing the written evidence.

The SPEECH of Lieutenant General BURGOYNE, prefatory to his NARRATIVE.

MR. MONTAGU,

BEFORE I enter upon the narrative, which the precedent of your late proceedings authoriſes me to lay before you, I think it a duty to the committee, to promiſe that I ſhall trouble them with little other matter than ſuch as may be neceſſary to elucidate the tranſactions of the campaign 1777, in that quarter where I commanded.

I ſhall keep in mind, that to explain the cauſes of the diſaſter at Saratoga is the principal point to which all my evidence ought to lead: but at the ſame time, I ſhall take confidence in the juſtice and benevolence of my hearers, that where arguments in exculpation of the commander can aptly be combined with a faithful repreſentation of facts, they will not be deemed foreign to the main object under their conſideration.

Upon theſe ideas, though ſome introductory explanations are requiſite, I ſhall ſuppreſs the inclination I at firſt conceived, of ſtating my conduct from the time, when, conjointly with my honourable friend who took the lead in this enquiry,* I was called to the unſolicited and unwelcome ſervice in America: nor will I enumerate the complicated circumſtances of private misfortune and ill health under which I purſued it. Prudence, as well as other propriety, is, I confeſs, conſulted in this ſuppreſſion; for were it ſeen, that an officer had blended with the reſpect due to authority, warm, though diſintereſted perſonal attachments; that under a perſuaſion of the honour and integrity of the king's ſervants, he had united to his zeal for the public cauſe an intereſt in their private credit and ambition; would it not be conceived, that his guilt muſt have been atrocious, beyond all excuſe or palliation, to induce the very men to whom his endeavours, and his faculties, ſuch as they were, had been thus devoted, not only completely to deſert him, but to preclude him, as far as in them lay, from every means of defence, and if poſſible, to ruin him in the opinion of the king, the army, and the country?

An earneſt deſire to ſave, as much as poſſible, the time of the committee, would alſo diſſuade me from recurring to any points previous to my inſtructions which have been diſcuſſed upon former occaſions; but I find that great ſtreſs is ſtill laid to my prejudice upon a paper which found its way to the houſe during my abſence: I mean the private letter to the noble lord, ſecretary for the American department, dated 1ſt January, 1777.*

The noble Lord has frequently ſtated that letter to have ſlipped inadvertently into the parcel deſtined for the houſe, and I give credit in that particular to his aſſertion; becauſe,

* See Appendix No. I.

* Sir William Howe.

becauſe, whatever other impreſſions he might have found it his intereſt to make reſpecting me, he certainly would not have thought that the imputation on me which that letter tended to fix, a proper one for *him* to put forward: it is a notorious fact, or I would not mention it, that it has been held a reflection upon my character (by the part of the public with whom the noble lord is unpopular) that I addreſſed him as a patron and friend.

This is an imputation to which I muſt plead guilty; for at the time I wrote that letter, I certainly did hold that noble lord as my friend, and I had acted to deſerve he ſhould be ſo. The next ill tendency of that paper was, as the noble lord well knows, to impreſs the public with an opinion, that I was endeavouring to ſupplant Sir Guy Carleton in the command of the northern army—an action abhorrent to the honour of an officer and the liberality of a gentleman; and of which, thank God, I can prove the falſehood, by irrefragable evidence upon your table, and in a very ſmall compaſs. I need only refer to the diſpatches to Sir Guy Carleton by his aid de-camp, dated 22d Auguſt, 1776,* four months before I came home, to ſhew that it was at that time determined, that Sir Guy Carleton ſhould remain in Canada; and that determination was made, as I have been informed, not only upon the political reaſoning which appears in that diſpatch, but alſo, upon great law opinions, that he could not, under the commiſſion he then held under the great ſeal, paſs the frontiers of his province. Sir, this confutation was urged by me laſt year; and were collateral proof neceſſary to my juſtification upon this ſubject, I could bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen, who had imbibed impreſſions not very favourable to the military proceedings of Sir Guy Carleton in the campaign of 1776: I could ſhew that I ſeized numberleſs, indeed I ſeized every poſſible occaſion to vindicate the judgment, the aſſiduity, the activity of that highly reſpectable officer, careleſs how ill I paid my court, earneſt to meet every attack againſt his fame.

* See Appendix No. II.

I beg leave alſo to call the attention of the committee very particularly to one other paper, the date of which is previous to my departure from England: it is entitled, "Thoughts for conducting the War from the Side of Canada, by Lieutenant "General Burgoyne."* Sir, it will be in the recollection of the committee, whether, when the conduct of the war was under conſideration laſt year in my abſence, it was not underſtood, that the plan of the northern expedition was formed upon that paper as produced upon your table? If ſo, I muſt aſk the noble lord, why he ſuffered that error to prevail? The noble lord knew, (and it was peculiarly his duty to declare it) that the two propoſals, the firſt of turning the expedition eventually towards Connecticut; and the ſecond, of embarking the army in the river St. Lawrence, in order to effect a junction with Sir William Howe by ſea, in caſe the attempt by land appeared "impracticable, or too hazardous," were eraſed while the paper was in his lordſhip's hands.

* No. III.

From

From that paper, as it appeared without erasures, naturally arose the conclusion, that the plan I had to execute was completely my own; upon that paper were founded, as naturally, the doubts which have been entertained upon the peremptory tenor of my instructions. I must again ask the noble lord, upon what principle of justice he suffered those impressions to exist in this house? Why, in a debate in which he took a part, did he conceal, that the circumstances in reality were totally different from those upon which gentlemen reasoned; that the discretion reserved in the paper before the house was taken away, and consequently, that my orders were rendered absolute in the strictest sense by his own alterations?

Let any gentleman who has supposed I had an implied latitude for my conduct, now compare this circumstance with the wording of the letter to Sir Guy Carleton, dated March 26, 1777, with a copy of which I was furnished, and extracts from which were afterwards the only orders I had to act upon. *

I shall take no particular notice of what is called the saving clause, in the latter part of the orders, except to give the flattest contradiction to the supposition that I dictated it—a supposition that I know is not yet abandoned by the men who first suggested it. I have spoke to it very fully upon a former occasion;† and I do not wish, when it can be avoided, to enforce or reiterate the charges of duplicity and treachery which must ensue, if that clause could be supposed to have reference to any conduct previous to my arrival at Albany. The circumstance of forbidding me the latitude in the two particulars I had proposed in my plan, and many other circumstances, clearly indicating the decided intentions and expectations of the ministers, rendered the sense of the whole order taken together clear and distinct, and shewed that the clause which is pretended to have left me a discretion as to my main object, had no sort of relation to that object. That clause evidently related not to my forcing my way, or not forcing it, to Albany, the place of my destination, but to such collateral and eventual operations as might be advisable in the course of my march. It related to the making impression upon the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, in such manner as exigencies might require, and in my judgment might seem most proper, previous to receiving orders from Sir William Howe, "of my junction with whom I was never to lose view."

* See Appendix No. IV.

Notwithstanding there has been so much discussion in debate and print upon the interpretation of absolute orders, the committee, I am confident, will absolve me, though, at the expence of a few moments more, I should continue a subject upon which the merit or blame of the future proceedings in great measure rests.

I do not admit the position, that there can be no case in which an officer acting at a distance is bound at every hazard to pursue orders, that appear absolute *and decisive*.

† The debate upon Mr. Vyner's motion, May 28, 1778; the speech was published.

It is eaſy to conceive circumſtances, which might juſtify a ſtate in hazarding an army, for the ſake of facilitating great and deciſive objects. Gentlemen, converſant in military hiſtory, will recollect many examples of this principle: upon a former occaſion, I ſtated a ſuppoſed caſe;* and I now entreat leave to add a real example of peremptory orders, which happened in the courſe of my own ſervice. I have ever retained the impreſſion, that the circumſtance I am going to relate, made upon my mind at the time; and to thoſe few who may ſtill think, that in any part of my conduct, I raſhly riſked my peace, my intereſt or my fame, to forward the wiſhes of others, this prepoſſeſſion may in ſome meaſure account for, and excuſe my imprudence.

In the campaign of 1762, in Portugal, the Count La Lippe, a name, which, if it finds a due hiſtorian, will ſtand among the firſt in military fame, was placed at the head of about 6000 Britiſh troops, and a Portugueſe army, the greater part of which was little better than nominal, to defend an extenſive frontier againſt the whole force of Spain, and a large body of the veteran troops of France. The ſalvation of Portugal depended ſolely on the capacity of that great man, which united the deepeſt political reaſoning with exquiſite military addreſs.

I had the honour to be entruſted with the defence of the moſt important paſs upon the Tagus, and my orders were peremptory to maintain it againſt any numbers, and to the laſt man.

A ſelect corps of the enemy, greatly ſuperior to mine, were encamped within ſight on the other ſide the river, and our advanced poſts were within half muſquet ſhot.

In this ſituation, I received intelligence from Count La Lippe, of a deſign of the enemy to paſs the Tagus in force, about ſix miles above me, and to take poſſeſſion of the open country in my rear, with a large corps of cavalry, by which means all communication, ſupply, or ſafe retreat, would be cut off.

Together with this intelligence, the Count's letter expreſſed, "That every delay "to the enemy in getting poſſeſſion of the paſs I guarded, was ſo material to his "other plans and operations, that it juſtified a deviation from ſyſtematic rules; that, "therefore, after taking timely precautions to ſecure the retreat of my cavalry, I "muſt abide the conſequence with the infantry; that at the laſt extremity, I muſt "abandon my cannon, camp, &c. and with ſuch proviſion as the men could carry

* The caſe alluded to was put in a former debate, as follows: ſuppoſe the Britiſh army that invaded Britany in 1758, had gained a complete victory over the Duke D'Aiguillon; to have marched rapidly towards Paris, abandoning the communication with the fleet, expoſing the army poſſibly to great want of proviſion, and to the impracticability of retreat, would certainly have been a meaſure conſummately deſperate and unjuſtifiable, if tried upon military ſyſtem: yet, will any man ſay, that if that meaſure muſt evidently have produced ſuch alarm and confuſion in the heart of France, as to have compelled the recall of her whole force from Germany, or ſuch part of it, as would have given uncontrouled ſcope to the armies under the King of Pruſſia and Prince Ferdinand, that the miniſter of England would not have been judicious, though at the palpable riſk of the army, as far as capture was concerned, in ordering the general to proceed by the moſt *vigorous exertions*, and to force his way to Paris?

"upon

" upon their backs, throw myſelf into the mountains upon my left, and endea-
" vour, by ſmall and diſperſed parties, to gain a rendezvous at the northern part
" of the province." I muſt obſerve, that when theſe peremptory orders were given, the commander was at a diſtance that made all timely communication of circumſtances as impoſſible, as if the Atlantic had been between us; and I cannot cloſe the example without mentioning the concluding part of Count La Lippe's letter. " He participated," he ſaid, " in the feelings with which an officer would be ſtruck
" for his reputation, in ſuffering himſelf to be cut, and reduced to ſacrifice his camp,
" his baggage, and twenty pieces of cannon. But *be at eaſe*," continued that great and generous man, " *I will take the meaſure entirely upon myſelf, perſevere as I have*
" *directed, and be confident of my defence and protection.*" This was a ſaving clauſe of a nature very different from thoſe it is the practice in the preſent day to pen; and if any man doubts the quotation, I can bring poſitive evidence to the truth of it verbatim.

Thus much, Sir, I thought it incumbent upon me to ſtate in argument againſt the poſition that has been inſiſted upon, that no orders can be worded ſo peremptorily at a diſtance, as not to admit of an implied latitude, in caſe of unforeſeen and inſurmountable difficulties: but to prevent all future cavil, upon this ſubject, I requeſt the committee to recollect, what I have again and again repeated; that I by no means put my defence, in paſſing the Hudſon's River, ſolely upon this reaſoning. On the contrary, ſuppoſing for the argument's ſake, I ſhould concede (which I never have done, nor mean to do) to the noble Lord, and to every other gentleman, all they can deſire to aſſume upon implied latitude in given caſes, I ſhould equally prove that no ſuch caſe did exiſt, as would have juſtified me upon their own principle, in departing from the letter of the orders under which I acted.

Having thus cleared my way to the time of my leaving England, to take upon me the command of the Northern expedition; I ſhall now lay before the committee a narrative of its progreſs, in as conciſe and ſimple terms, as the nature of the ſubject will allow, endeavouring to imitate the perſpicuity of the honourable gentleman who took the lead in this buſineſs, and not without hope of my endeavours producing the ſame effect; and that, in the opinion of the houſe, my language, as has been expreſſed of his, will be deemed the language of truth.

NARRATIVE.

NARRATIVE.

IT is my intention, for the more ready comprehenſion of the whole ſubject, to divide it into three periods. The firſt, from my appointment to the command, to the end of my purſuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga; the ſecond, from that time to the paſſage of the Hudſon's River; and the third to the ſigning the convention.

I left London on the 27th of March, and upon my departure from Plymouth, finding the Albion man of war ready to ſail for New-York, I wrote to Sir W. Howe by that conveyance, upon the ſubject of my expedition, and the nature of my orders. I arrived at Quebec the 6th of May. Sir Guy Carleton immediately put under my command the troops deſtined for the expedition, and committed to my management the preparatory arrangements. From thence I wrote a ſecond letter to Sir William Howe, wherein I repeated that I was entruſted with the command of the army deſtined to march from Canada, and that my orders were to force a junction with his excellency.

I expreſſed alſo my wiſhes, "that a latitude had been left me for a diverſion to-"wards Connecticut, but that ſuch an idea being out of queſtion, by my orders "being preciſe to force the junction, it was only mentioned to introduce the idea "ſtill reſting upon my mind; viz. to give the change to the enemy if I could, and "by every feint in my power to eſtabliſh a ſuſpicion, that I ſtill pointed towards "Connecticut."

"But," I repeated, "that under the preſent preciſion of my orders, I ſhould really "have no view but that of joining him, nor think myſelf juſtified by any temp-"tation to delay the moſt expeditious means I could find to effect that purpoſe."

I proceeded to Montreal on the 12th, and as my letters, lately laid before the houſe from that place,* and from Quebec, will ſhew the ſtate of things, I ſhould not reſt a moment upon this period, were it not to add one more public teſtimony, to thoſe I am not conſcious of having omitted upon any occaſion, of the aſſiduous and cordial manner in which the different ſervices were forwarded by Sir Guy Carleton. I ſhould think it as diſhonourable to ſeek, as I know it would be impoſſible to find excuſe for any fault of mine in any failure on the part of Sir Guy Carleton, or of any perſons who acted under him, in any matter reſpecting the expedition. Had that officer been acting for himſelf, or for his brother, he could not have ſhewn more indefatigable zeal than he did, to comply with and expedite my requiſitions and deſires.

* See Appendix No. V.

Certain

Certain parts of the expected force, nevertheleſs, fell ſhort. The Canadian troops, ſtated in the plan at 2000, conſiſted only of three companies, intended to be of 100 men each, but in reality not amounting to more than 150 upon the whole; nor could they be augmented. The corvées, which are detachments of provincials without arms, to repair roads, convey proviſions, or any other temporary employments for the king's ſervice, could not be obtained in ſufficient number, nor kept to their employments, although Sir Guy Carleton uſed every poſſible exertion and encouragement for the purpoſe. Drivers for the proviſion carts, and other carriages, could not be fully ſupplied by the contractor, though no expence was ſpared; a circumſtance which occaſioned much inconvenience afterwards.

To theſe unavoidable diſappointments were added the difficulties occaſioned by bad weather, which rendered the roads almoſt impracticable at the carrying places, and conſequently the paſſage of the batteaux, artillery, and baggage exceedingly dilatory: we had beſides a great deal of contrary wind. Notwithſtanding all impediments the army aſſembled between the 17th and 20th of June, at Cumberland Point, upon Lake Champlain.

On the 21ſt I held a conference with the Iroquois, Algonchins, Abenekies, and Outawas, Indians, in all about four hundred.

This conference appears in your papers*. I thought at the time that the cordiality of the Indians over the whole continent might be depended upon, and their firſt operations tended to perſuade me into a belief of their utility. The prieſt to whom they ſeemed devoted, and the Britiſh officers employed to conduct them, and to whoſe controul they engaged to ſubmit, gained advantages, and ſpread terror without barbarity. The firſt party ſent out made ſeveral of the enemy priſoners in the heat of action, and treated them with European humanity.

* See Appendix No. VI.

During the movement of the different corps to this general rendezvous, I wrote a third letter to Sir William Howe. The chief purport of it was to give him "intelligence of my ſituation at the time, and of my expectation of being before Ticonderoga between the 20th and 25th inſtant; that I did not apprehend the effective ſtrength of the army would amount to above 6500 men; that I meant to apply to Sir Guy Carleton to ſend a garriſon to Ticonderoga when it ſhould be reduced, but that I was apprehenſive he would not think himſelf authoriſed by the King's orders to comply; that whenever, therefore, I might be able to effect the junction, Sir William would not expect me to bring near the original number. I repeated my perſeverance in the idea of giving jealouſy on the ſide of Connecticut, and at the ſame time my aſſurances, that I ſhould make no manœuvre that could procraſtinate the great object of a junction."

I ſtate theſe different letters to Sir William Howe merely to ſhew that my conception of the preciſion of my orders was not upon after-thought, and taken up as an excuſe

excuſe when I found the expedition had failed; but a fixed decided ſentiment coeval with my knowledge of my command.

For a further proof of the ſame fact, I beg leave to ſtate an extract from my orders to the army at Crown Point, June 30th. The words were theſe.

"The army embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy. The ſervices required "of this particular expedition are critical and conſpicuous. During our progreſs oc- "caſions may occur, in which, nor difficulty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded. "This army muſt not retreat." Were it neceſſary, I could bring abundant collateral proof to the ſame effect, and ſhew that the idea of forcing a way to Albany by vigorous exertions againſt any oppoſition we might meet, was general and fixt through the whole army.

My proceedings from the time of aſſembling the army as before deſcribed, to the date of my public diſpatch from Skeneſborough, comprehending the manœuvres which forced the enemy from Ticonderoga, and the actions at Skeneſborough, Huberton, and Fort Anne, are related at full in that diſpatch.*

* See Appendix No. VII.

It is the leſs neceſſary to give the Committee further trouble upon this ſubject, becauſe I believe no enemy can be found to arraign my conduct in thoſe days of ſucceſs; or if there were one, he could not deprive me of the conſolation, that I had his Majeſty's full approbation and applauſe, of which it is known to many, I had a very honourable and diſtinguiſhed proof.

All therefore that is neceſſary before I quit this firſt period of the campaign, is to give a preciſe ſtate of the effective ſtrength of the army, at the time it aſſembled.

On the 1ſt July, the day we encamped before Ticonderoga, the troops conſiſted of

Britiſh rank and file	-	3724
German ditto	-	3016
		6740 regulars, excluſive of artillery-men.
Canadians and Provincials, about		250
Indians about	-	400
		650

In regard to the artillery, I think this the proper place to rectify the miſrepreſentations that have prevailed reſpecting the quantity employed. It has been ſtated as far beyond the neceſſary proportion for the number of troops, an incumbrance to their movements, and one cauſe of what has been called the ſlow progreſs of the expedition.

In order to juſtify this charge, a view of the whole maſs has been preſented to the public without any explanation of its diſtinct allotments; and many have been led to believe, that the whole was attached to the army throughout the campaign, and

fell into the enemy's hands at laſt—The intention of this repreſentation is obvious: the allegation is falſe.

The facts, as I ſhall prove them to the committee, are as follow. The whole original train furniſhed by Sir Guy Carleton conſiſted of ſixteen heavy twenty-four pounders; ten heavy twelve-pounders; eight medium twelve-pounders; two light twenty-four pounders; one light twelve-pounder; twenty-ſix light ſix pounders; ſeventeen light three-pounders; ſix eight-inch howitzers; ſix five and a half inch howitzers; two thirteen-inch mortars; two ten-inch mortars; ſix eight-inch mortars; twelve five and a half-inch mortars; and twenty-four four and two fifth-inch mortars. Of theſe two heavy twenty-four pounders were ſent on board a ſhip for the defence of Lake Champlain, and the other fourteen were ſent back to St. John's. Of the heavy twelve-pounders, ſix were left at Ticonderoga, four ditto in the Royal George; four medium twelve-pounders at Fort George; one light twelve-pounder at Ticonderoga; two light ſix-pounders at Fort George; four light ſix-pounders at St. John's; four light three-pounders at Ticonderoga; five light three-pounders at St. John's; two eight-inch howitzers at Fort George; two ditto at St. John's; two five and a half inch howitzers at Fort George; two thirteen-inch mortars in the Royal George; two ten-inch mortars in ditto; four eight-inch mortars in ditto; four five and a half inch mortars at Ticonderoga; four royal mortars in the Royal George; twelve cohorns at Ticonderoga; and eight cohorns in the Royal George.

The field-train therefore that proceeded with the army conſiſted of four medium twelve-pounders; two light twenty-four pounders; eighteen light ſix-pounders; ſix light three-pounders; two eight-inch howitzers; four five and a half-inch howitzers; two eight-inch mortars, and four royals.

The carrying the twenty-four pounders (though they were but two) has been ſpoken of as an error, and it is neceſſary therefore to inform the committee that they were of a conſtruction lighter by 800 weight than medium twelves, and to all intents and purpoſes field artillery.

This artillery was diſtributed as follows.

Fraſer's corps, eſtimated at three battalions.

Ten pieces, viz.

Four light ſix-pounders.

Four light three-pounders, conſtructed for being occaſionally carried on horſeback.

Two royal howitzers.

German reſerve, under Colonel Breyman, eſtimated at two battalions.

Two light ſix-pounders.

Two light three-pounders, and ſerved by the Heſſe Hanau artillery men.

The line of Britiſh, four battalions

Germans, five battalions.

Total, nine battalions.

Three brigades of artillery, of four ſix-pounders each; viz. one brigade for each wing, and one for the center.

From hence it appears that to fourteen battalions there were allotted twenty-ſix pieces of light artillery. The cuſtomary allotment is two pieces per battalion, conſequently the proportion of artillery was leſs than upon common ſervices.

The forming artillery into brigades, in preference to detaching two guns to each battalion, has been conſtantly practiſed in moſt ſervices during laſt war under the ableſt men, and it is productive of many advantages, as the brigades by that means, either ſingly or united, fall under the command of a proportionable number of officers. The ſervice is carried on with greater regularity, and the effect of the fire becomes much more formidable than when ſcattered along the front of the line.

This mode of ſervice was recommended by Major-general Phillips, and adopted without heſitation by me, my own judgment being confirmed by an officer of his great ſkill and experience.

The park artillery conſiſted of ten pieces, viz.

2 light twenty-four pounders.
4 medium twelve-pounders.
2 eight-inch howitzers.
2 royal howitzers.

I underſtood this proportion of field artillery to be the ſame as that propoſed by Sir Guy Carleton had he commanded; it was the proportion recommended by General Phillips, and I formed my opinion conformably to the ſentiments of thoſe reſpectable officers upon the following reaſons, viz. that artillery was extremely formidable to raw troops; that in a country of poſts it was eſſentially neceſſary againſt the beſt troops; that it was yet more applicable to the enemy we were to combat, becauſe the mode of defence they invariably adopted, and at which they were beyond all other nations expert, was that of entrenchment covered with ſtrong abbatis, againſt which the cannon, of the nature of the heavieſt above deſcribed, and howitzers might often be effectual, when to diſlodge them by any other means might be attended with continued and important loſſes.

In theſe general ideas of the uſe of artillery againſt the rebel forces, I have the happineſs to obſerve, from the papers before you, the concurrence of Sir William Howe, who ſtates ſimilar ideas very fully in one of his requiſitions to the ſecretary of ſtate: but further reaſons for not diminiſhing the proportion of guns of ſuperior calibre to ſix-pounders in this train, were, firſt, their uſe againſt block-houſes (a ſpecies of fortification peculiar to America); ſecondly, a probability that gun-boats might be requiſite for the ſecurity of the water tranſport, on ſome parts of the

Hudſon's River; but principally the intention of fortifying a camp at Albany, in caſe I ſhould reach that place, ſhould meet with a ſufficiency of proviſion there, (as I was led to expect) and ſhould find it expedient to paſs the winter there, without communication with New-York.

With reſpect to the quantity of ammunition attached to this artillery, it is to be obſerved, that the number of rounds accompanying the light pieces, and which were carried in ſmall carts, were not more than ſufficient for a day's action.

Light ſix-pounders	—	124 rounds each.
Light three-pounders	—	300 rounds.
Royal howitzers	—	90 rounds.

The different reſerves of ammunition were chiefly conveyed by water in ſcows and batteaux; it certainly would not have been adviſable, after a communication with Canada was at an end, to depend upon precarious ſupplies from the ſouthward, and therefore it became neceſſary (as far as the ſervice would allow) to carry forward ſuch ſtores, as there was every appearance of an abſolute want of, during the courſe of an active campaign.

Had the enemy eſtabliſhed themſelves in force upon the iſlands at the mouth of the Mohawk river, or on other ground equally advantageous, to have diſputed the paſſage of that, or of the Hudſon's River, or had they even waited an aſſault in their works at Still-Water, it is probable, that recourſe muſt have been had to artillery of the heavier nature; in the latter caſe eſpecially they muſt have been uſed in order to derive any advantage from our ſeizing a poſt upon their left flank: I have ſince known, that they had iron twelve and nine-pounders mounted upon thoſe works, which were in other reſpects very formidable.

The Britiſh artillery-men, rank and file, were	—	—		245
Recruits, under command of Lieutenant Nutt, of the 33d regiment, attached to the ſervice of the artillery	—	—	—	150
Heſſian artillery-men, rank and file	—	—		78
				473

Add theſe numbers to the former ſtate of the army, and it will be found, that the regular ſtrength when at the greateſt conſiſted of 7213.

I come now to the ſecond period of the campaign, comprehending the tranſactions from the time the purſuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga ceaſed, and the corps of Brigadier-general Fraſer, and the 9th regiment, rejoined the army, after the reſpective actions of Huberton and Fort Anne, to the time when the army paſſed the Hudſon's river to attack the enemy near Still-Water.

It had proved impoſſible immediately to follow the quick retreat of the enemy farther, from the nature of the country, and the neceſſity of waiting a freſh ſupply of

of proviſions. But it appeared evident to me, that could a rapid progreſs towards Albany be effected, during their diſperſion and panic, it would be deciſive on the ſucceſs of the expedition.

Queſtion has been made by thoſe who began at this period to arraign my military conduct, whether it would not have been more expedient for the purpoſe of rapidity, to have fallen back to Ticonderoga, in order to take the convenient route by Lake George, than to have perſevered in the laborious and difficult courſe by land to Fort Edward? My motives for preferring the latter were theſe: I conſidered not only the general impreſſions which a retrograde motion is apt to make upon the minds both of enemies and friends, but alſo, that the natural conduct of the enemy in that caſe would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not then be cut off, in order to oblige me to open trenches, and conſequently to delay me, and in the mean time they would have deſtroyed the road from Fort George to Fort Edward. On the other hand, by perſiſting to penetrate by the ſhort cut from Fort Anne, of which I was then maſter, to Fort Edward, though it was attended with great labour, and many alert ſituations, the troops were improved in the very eſſential point of wood ſervice; I effectually diſlodged the enemy from Fort George without a blow; and ſeeing me maſter of one communication, they did not think it worth while to deſtroy the other.

The great number of boats alſo, which muſt neceſſarily have been employed for the tranſport of the troops over Lake George, were by this courſe ſpared for the tranſport of the proviſion, artillery, and ammunition.

The ſucceſs anſwered this reaſoning in every point; for by the vigilance of General Phillips, to whom I had committed the important part of forwarding all the neceſſaries from Ticonderoga, a great embarkation arrived at Fort George on July 29th. I took poſſeſſion of the country near Fort Edward on the ſame day, and independently of other advantages, I found myſelf much more forward in point of time than I could poſſibly have been by the other route.

Another material motive, which could not be known by ſtrangers who have reaſoned upon this movement, was, that during the time that my army was employed in clearing Wood-Creek and cutting roads, and the corps under Major-general Phillips working to paſs the tranſports over Lake George, I was enabled to detach a large corps to my left, under Major-general Reideſel, and thereby aſſiſt my purpoſe of giving jealouſy to Connecticut, and keeping in check the whole country called the Hampſhire Grants.

It was at this time Major-general Reideſel conceived the purpoſe of mounting his regiment of dragoons. In the country he traverſed during his detached command, he found the people frightened and ſubmiſſive. He was induſtrious and expert in procuring

procuring intelligence in parts of the country more remote than Bennington, and entertained no doubt of ſucceſs, were an expedition formed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Baum.

On the arrival of the army at Fort Edward, the great object of attention was the tranſports from Fort George. The diſtance was about ſixteen miles, the roads wanting great repair, the weather unfavourable, the cattle and carriages ſcarce; part of the latter inconvenience was occaſioned by the number of both that were neceſſarily detained at Ticonderoga, for the purpoſe of dragging the boats and the proviſions over the carrying places, between Lake Champlain and Lake George; another part of the inconvenience was cauſed by the unavoidable delays, in bringing the different diviſions of horſes as they were collected in Canada through the deſart, for ſuch moſt of the country is between St. John's and Ticonderoga.

It was ſoon found, that in the ſituation of the tranſport ſervice at that time, the army could barely be victualled from day to day, and that there was no proſpect of eſtabliſhing a magazine in due time for purſuing preſent advantages. The idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this difficulty, combined with the intelligence reported by General Reideſel, and with all I had otherwiſe received.

I knew that Bennington was the great depoſit of corn, flour, and ſtore cattle; that it was guarded only by militia; and every day's account tended to confirm the perſuaſion of the loyalty of one deſcription of the inhabitants and the panic of the other. Thoſe who knew the country beſt were the moſt ſanguine in this perſuaſion.

Had my intelligence been worſe founded, I ſhould not have heſitated to try this expedition with ſuch troops, and under ſuch inſtructions as I gave to the commanding officer, for ſo great a purpoſe as that of a ſupply ſufficient to enable the army to follow at the heels of a broken and diſconcerted enemy. The German troops employed were of the beſt I had of that nation. The number of Britiſh was ſmall; but it was the ſelect light corps of the army, compoſed of choſen men from all the regiments, and commanded by Captain Fraſer, one of the moſt diſtinguiſhed officers in his line of ſervice that ever I met with. The inſtructions recommended the utmoſt caution reſpecting poſts and ſecurity of retreat, attention againſt expoſing the ſolid part of the detachment to affront, or committing it in any inſtance, without a moral certainty of ſucceſs. I touch with tenderneſs and with great reluctance points that relate to the dead. My defence compels me to ſay, my cautions were not obſerved, nor the reinforcement advanced with the alacrity I had a right to expect. The men who commanded in both inſtances were brave and experienced officers. I have ever imputed their failure partly to deluſion in reſpect to the enemy, and partly to ſurpriſe and conſequent confuſion in the troops.

For further explanation of my motives, and the circumſtances attending the conduct

duct of the expedition, I beg leave to refer the committee to the letter laid before the houſe laſt year, and more particularly to the private letter laid before the houſe lately.*

* See Appendix No. VIII.

The ſame letter will ſhew the only reſource that remained for proceeding towards Albany, after the diſappointment of this expedition, viz. to preſs forward a neceſſary ſupply of proviſion, and other indiſpenſible articles, from Fort George. I ſhall bring proof to your bar to this point, and I truſt I ſhall ſhew beyond a doubt, that no poſſible exertion was omitted. It is not uncommon for gentlemen, unacquainted with the peculiarities of the country to which I am alluding, to calculate the tranſport of magazines, by meaſuring the diſtance upon a map, and then applying the reſources of carriage, as practiſed in other countries. I requeſt permiſſion to ſhew their miſtake. The firſt ſtage from Fort George to Fort Edward is by land. The diſtance and the roads were deſcribed before. At Fort Edward the Hudſon's River becomes navigable for a certain extent, and it is the conſtant practice in all tranſports to reſume the water carriage. Were it not, new impediments would ariſe from hills, worſe roads, and ſuch an increaſed diſtance, as would prevent the cattle returning to Fort George the ſame day. About ſix miles below Fort Edward lie the falls of Fort Miller, where there is another carrying-place, which, though of no conſiderable length, makes it neceſſary to unload the boats, to place the contents in carts, and to replace them in freſh boats, at the place the river again admits of navigation. The boats unloaded, return to Fort Edward againſt a rapid ſtream.

Upon this ſhort ſtate of facts, gentlemen will judge of our embarraſſments. In the firſt place, it was neceſſary to bring forward to Fort Edward fourſcore or a hundred boats, as mere carriage-veſſels for the proviſions, each boat made a hard day's work for ſix or more horſes, including the return of the horſes. At the next carrying-place, as above deſcribed, it was neceſſary to place a conſiderable relay of horſes to draw over, firſt, a portion of carriage boats, and afterwards the proviſion, as it arrived. I have not mentioned the great number of other boats neceſſary to be brought forward, to form bridges, to carry baggage and ammunition, and the number of carriages framed to tranſport the boats themſelves at the enſuing carrying-places, as we ſhould proceed to Albany. This will be ſhewn in detail at the bar, if the committee chuſe to hear it; and I pledge myſelf, it will appear, that the diligence in this ſervice was extreme; that it was performed in the moſt expeditious manner poſſible, regard being had to our reſources, and that no delay was occaſioned by the artillery, becauſe the horſes appropriated to it were ſupernumerary to thoſe for which we had carts, and the artillery, not already with the army, at laſt was all brought up by its own horſes in two days.

On the 13th of September, the ſtore of proviſion, amounting to about thirty day's conſumption, was completed. I have ſtated, in my letter to the ſecretary of ſtate, my reaſons againſt proceeding with leſs quantity. And it is now time to enter upon the

the conſideration of that object, which is held by ſome to be concluſive upon the executive part of the campaign, the paſſage of the Hudſon's River.

Two errors, reſpecting this paſſage, though of oppoſite and incompatible natures, are ſuppoſed to have contributed to the ill ſucceſs that enſued; the one, the error of delay, the other, that of precipitation. In defence againſt the firſt, I refer to my effort at Bennington to procure ſupplies, and to the impediments, I have juſt now ſtated, after that effort failed. Againſt the latter, I refer to the reaſons laid down in my private letter to the ſecretary of ſtate, dated 20th of Auguſt. * The ſtate of things at this important criſis, and my reaſoning upon it, are expreſſed ſtill more at large in my diſpatch from Albany; I will now only touch them ſhortly. On the one hand, my communications were at an end; my retreat was inſecure; the enemy was collected in force; they were ſtrongly poſted; Colonel St. Leger was retiring from Fort Stanwix. Theſe were difficulties, but none of them inſurmountable. On the other hand, I had diſlodged the enemy repeatedly, when before in force, and more ſtrongly poſted; my army was conſcious of having the ſuperiority, and eager to advance; I expected co-operation; no letters from Sir William Howe removed that expectation; that to Sir Guy Carleton had never weighed upon my mind, becauſe it was dated early in April, and conſequently long before the ſecretary of ſtate's inſtructions, which I muſt have ſuppoſed to relate to co-operation, could be received. The letter of 17th July,* mentioned that General's return to my aſſiſtance, ſhould Waſhington turn his force towards me; indicated, as I thought, an expectation of my arrival at Albany; and informed me, that Sir Henry Clinton was left at New-York, and would act as occurrences might direct. I did *not* know Sir Henry Clinton's force. I *did* know, that conſiderable reinforcement might be then expected at New-York from England. After all, ſhould co-operation from below fail, the whole force of Colonel St. Leger, and Sir William Johnſon, was to be expected from above, in time to facilitate a retreat, though not in time to aſſiſt my advance. Under theſe different ſuggeſtions, and thoſe that are more copiouſly ſtated in the diſpatch, to which I have referred, I read again my orders (I believe for an hundredth time) and I was decided.

And I am ſtill convinced, that no proof that could have been brought from appearances, intelligence or reaſoning, could have juſtified me to my country, have ſaved me from the condemnation of my profeſſion, or produced pardon within my own breaſt, had I not advanced, and tried a battle with the enemy.

I will conclude this ſubject, with again aſſerting upon my honour, what I hope to ſupport by evidence, though it is impoſſible to bring poſitive proof to a negative, that neither General Fraſer, nor General Phillips, ever offered, as has been reported, nor can be ſuppoſed to have conceived any objection againſt the paſſage of the Hudſon's River.

* See Appendix No. IX.

* No. X.

This

This reſolution being taken, I truſt, the manner of approaching the enemy, when explained by witneſſes, will not be diſgraceful to me as a ſoldier. The action, which enſued on the 19th of September, verified my opinion of the valour of my army; and I muſt, in truth, acknowledge, a very reſpectable ſhare of that quality in the army of the enemy. To the general deſcription given in my diſpatch, it will be fit to add, by evidence, the peculiar merits of the troops in that action. The honour of three Britiſh regiments, in continual and cloſe fire for four hours, all of them ſuffering conſiderable loſs, and one remaining with leſs than ſixty men, and four or five officers, ought not to loſe its due applauſe, becauſe it is ſaid, their opponents were irregulars and militia.

A victory was at laſt obtained, but the cloſe of day unavoidably prevented any immediate advantages. On the day following, it was known from priſoners and deſerters, that the enemy were in a poſt ſtrongly fortified; but from the thickneſs of the wood, it was impoſſible to catch a view of any part of their poſition. All that could be done, therefore, was to take up ground as near them, as the nature of the country would admit with regard to military arrangement. It appears from the diſpatch already alluded to, that the army remained in this poſition till the 9th of October, when the ſecond action enſued, employed in fortifying their camp, and watching the enemy, whoſe numbers it was now known, had been greatly ſuperior to ours in the action.

It may here be aſked, why, as ſoon as it became palpable that no uſe could be made of the victory, I did not retreat?

It will be ſhewn, that on the ſecond day after the action, I received intelligence from Sir Henry Clinton, of his intention to attack the highlands about that time, and I was hourly in expectation, I thought a juſtly founded one, of that meaſure operating to diſlodge Mr. Gates entirely, or to oblige him to detach a large portion of his force. Either of theſe caſes would probably have opened my way to Albany. In theſe circumſtances, could the preference upon theſe alternatives admit of a moment's reflection? To wait ſo fair a proſpect of effecting at laſt the great purpoſe of the campaign, or to put a victorious army, under all the diſadvantages of a beaten one, by a difficult and diſgraceful retreat; relinquiſhing the long expected cooperation, in the very hour of its promiſe, and leaving Sir Henry Clinton's army, and probably Sir William Howe's, expoſed, with ſo much of the ſeaſon of the campaign to run, to the whole force of Mr. Gates, after he ſhould have ſeen me on the other ſide of Hudſon's River.

Some of the ſame conſiderations, and other concomitant circumſtances, will, in part, ſerve to account for my not attacking the enemy during this interval; for in this ſituation, as in former ones, my conduct has been arraigned upon oppoſite principles.

The

The committee will obſerve, that after receiving intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton's deſign, different meſſengers were diſpatched by different routes, to inform that officer of my ſituation, and of the time I thought I could continue in it. To have hazarded a repulſe, under ſo reaſonable an expectation of a powerful diverſion, would, in my opinion, have been very unjuſtifiable; but when I add, that from the backwardneſs, or defection, of the few Indians that remained, the numbers of rifle-men, and other irregulars employed on the enemy's out-poſts, and the ſtrength and darkneſs of the ſurrounding woods, it had not yet been practicable to gain any competent knowledge of their poſition, I truſt every man will go with me in the ſentiment, that all theſe circumſtances conſidered, an attack would have been conſummate raſhneſs.

Another very powerful reaſon, that operated on the ſide of delay, was the ſtate of my ſick and wounded. Numbers of the latter were recovering faſt; many excellent officers in particular; and the more I delayed the ſtronger I grew. The time alſo entitled me to expect Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger's corps would be arrived at Ticonderoga, and ſecret means had been long concerted to enable him to make an effort to join me, with probability of ſucceſs.

Upon mature conſideration of theſe and other circumſtances attending this period, come to my knowledge ſince, I am clearly of opinion, that had the reinforcements from England arrived in time, to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have effected the ſtroke he afterwards ſo gallantly made in the highlands, any time between the two actions, I ſhould have made my way.

The diſpatch alluded to, proceeds to ſtate the reaſon that induced me to make the movement on the 7th October. I ſhall only add, to obviate a ſuppoſed error, in not advancing my whole line, that the part remaining in my camp, operated as effectually to keep the enemy's right wing in check, from ſupporting their left, as if it had moved, with this additional advantage, that it prevented the danger of their advancing by the plain, near the river, and falling upon my rear.

I have reaſon to believe my diſappointment on that day proceeded from an uncommon circumſtance in the conduct of the enemy. Mr. Gates, as I have been informed, had determined to receive the attack in his lines; Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreſeeing the danger of being turned, advanced without conſultation with his general, and gave, inſtead of receiving battle. The ſtroke might have been fatal on his part had he failed. But confident I am, upon minute examination of the ground ſince, that had the other idea been purſued, I ſhould in a few hours have gained a poſition, that in ſpite of the enemy's numbers, would have put them in my power.

Diſagreeable as is the neceſſity, I muſt here again, in juſtice to my own army, recur to the vigour and obſtinacy with which they were fought by the enemy. A more determined perſeverance than they ſhewed in the attack upon the lines, though they were

finally repulſed by the corps under Lord Balcarras, I believe, is not in any officer's experience. It will be the buſineſs of evidence to prove, that in the part, where Colonel Breyman was killed, and the enemy penetrated, the miſchief could not be repaired, nor under it the camp be longer tenable.

The tranſactions of the enſuing night, the day of the eighth, and the whole progreſs of the retreat to Saratoga, will be laid before the committee minutely in the courſe of my evidence, as well as every circumſtance, from the time the army arrived there to the ſigning the convention. I have only to premiſe, that, I truſt, I ſhall be able to prove, to the ſatisfaction of the committee, that even in this ſituation, I had the chance of a favourable event. The enemy had intended to attack by the plain of Saratoga. On the morning of the 11th, a conſiderable column had actually paſſed the Fiſh Kill for that purpoſe during the fog, which at that ſeaſon was regular till ſometime after ſun riſe. The intention was prevented taking place, by intelligence one of their generals received from a deſerter, that I had a line formed behind the bruſh-wood, to ſupport the poſt of artillery, which was their immediate object of attack. The general inſtantly retreated his column, and prevented a general action, which my poſition, compared with the propoſed one of the enemy, gave me reaſon to hope would have been to my advantage.

I have likewiſe a ſatisfactory confidence, that I ſhall demonſtrate that the intelligence I ſtated to the councils of war, reſpecting the ſtrength of the enemy, did not fall ſhort in any part, and in ſome parts much exceeded my own belief, particularly on the only poſſible routes of my retreat; and that thoſe poſts were not taken up during my ſtay at Saratoga, as has been reported, but ſome of them previous to the action of the 7th, and the reſt immediately after it.

I ſhall cloſe the whole of this by delivering at your table, from the hands of my ſecretary, an authenticated return of the force of General Gates, ſigned by himſelf, and the truth of it will be ſupported from ocular teſtimony, by every officer of the Britiſh army. Many of them are now in England, and after what has been inſinuated, not to ſay charged in this Houſe, it becomes the duty of the accuſers, not only to examine cloſely the officers I have called, but to produce any other witneſſes, that in their thoughts may be qualified to ſpeak to the good or bad order of the rebel troops, when they marched by in their preſence, and to their behaviour, when oppoſed to our troops in action.

I cannot cloſe this long treſpaſs upon the patience of the committee, without expreſſing one humble hope, that in forming a judgment upon the whole, or any diſtinct part of theſe tranſactions, they will be conſidered as they muſt have appeared at the time; for, I believe, where war is concerned, few men in command would ſtand acquitted,

quitted, if any after-knowledge of facts and circumſtances were brought in argument againſt deciſions of the moment, and apparent exigencies of the occaſion.

I ſubmit all I have ſaid, ſome of it, I fear, not ſufficiently prepared or arranged, with true reſpect to the committee. I ſhall not mention *all* the diſadvantages, under which I have preſſed this buſineſs upon their attention. I have cauſe to regret the abſence of a moſt confidential friend in Major General Phillips; zealous advocates, I truſt, in Major General Reideſel and Brigadier Hamilton. Much of my vindication is in the grave with General Fraſer; much with Colonel Ackland your late member. I truſt my zeal, in promoting this enquiry, as I have done, will be one mark of the ſenſe I bear of the general character of this houſe; that however men may be biaſſed by political attachments upon common occaſions, when the honour of an individual is committed to their hands, they will alone be guided by truth and juſtice. And the next inference I ſhould wiſh to be drawn, from my earneſtneſs for a public appeal, is this; that however others may impute errors to my conduct, I am myſelf conſcious of the rectitude of my intentions.

EVIDENCE.

Jovis 20° die Maij, 1779.

Committee to conſider of the ſeveral Papers which were preſented to the Houſe by Mr. De Grey, upon the 19th Day of March laſt, purſuant to their Addreſs to his Majeſty.

Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair.

SIR GUY CARLETON was called in and examined by General Burgoyne as follows:

1. Q. DO you recollect having received a letter from the ſecretary of ſtate, mentioning the reaſons that made it expedient for you to remain in the province of Quebec?

A. Yes, very well.

2. Q. What was the date of it?

A. I think the 12th of Auguſt, 1776—I am ſure it was in Auguſt.

3. Q. Was not the date of that letter long before the return of General Burgoyne from Canada to Great Britain?

A. Yes.

4. Q. During the winter, preceding the campaign of 1777, was not the artillery prepared at Montreal for field ſervice, upon the ſuppoſition that you was to command the army beyond the frontiers of the province?

A. It was.

5. Q. Was the proportion allotted to General Burgoyne for field ſervice more than was intended, had you ſo commanded?

A. I don't preciſely recollect that—It does not ſtrike me there was any great difference.

6. Q. Was the quantity of artillery decided on in concert with Major-General Phillips, and on his recommendation?

A. The artillery I had prepared for the campaign, on a ſuppoſition I was to go myſelf, was in concert with General Phillips. That department, as well as others, was put under the command of General Burgoyne on his arrival; and, I ſuppoſe, he followed the ſame method ſo far as regarded the artillery.

7. Q. Did General Burgoyne apply to you for troops from Canada to garriſon Ticonderoga when he advanced?

A. He did.

8. Q. What was the purport of your anſwer?

A. That I did not think myſelf juſtified to grant it by my orders—My anſwer will appear more preciſely by a copy of my anſwer to General Burgoyne.

Q. Do

Q. Do you recollect that General Burgoyne informed you of the motives on which he proceeded from Skeneſborough to Fort Edward by land in preference to the route by Ticonderoga and Lake George? 9.

A. I do.

Q. Did you concur in his ſentiments? 10.

A. I remember my anſwer was an anſwer of approbation.

Q. Do you know of any circumſtance of General Burgoyne's military conduct, while under your command, that you diſapproved? 11.

A. I had no reaſon to diſapprove of any part of his conduct while under my command. [*Withdrew.*

Again called in, and examined by other Members of the Committee.

Q. Whether, when you propoſed to take that train of artillery with you that you have mentioned, it was with a view to the reduction of the forts at Ticonderoga; or whether you propoſed to have taken with you the ſame train of artillery in caſe you had marched forward in the country toward Albany? 12.

A. It was with an intention to reduce the forts and lines at Ticonderoga; the train of artillery was calculated for that ſervice.

Q. Whether you know what proportion of artillery was carried forward by the army under General Burgoyne's command after the reduction of Ticonderoga? 13. By Gen. Burgoyne.

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Would you not, in caſe you had reduced Ticonderoga and marched forwards towards Albany, have carried with you a train of field artillery? 14.

A. I probably ſhould have taken artillery with me.

Q. Had you foreſeen a neceſſity of fortifying a camp at Albany, would you not have carried ſome guns of the calibre of twelve pounders and light twenty-fours? 15.

A. It is really a very difficult matter off hand to run into all the minute operations of a campaign; every meaſure of that ſort muſt have been a matter of conſideration and deliberation, and there are a thouſand circumſtances that might have determined me upon the ſpot—I don't wiſh to conceal from this Houſe any thing that I would have done—but I hope they will conſider, that every gentleman may have different ideas of the ſtate and ſituation of the army, as expreſſed by the queſtion aſked, and the leaſt inaccuracy of expreſſion on my part may convey ideas very different from what I could wiſh—In general, ſo conſiderable a corps as that was, very ſeldom moves without artillery, but the preciſe number muſt depend on a variety of circumſtances, which the diſcretion and judgment of the officer who commands muſt determine.

Q. Were not the orders you received from government poſitive, for General Burgoyne to march to Albany? 16.

A. The orders have been publiſhed I underſtand—Every gentleman in this Houſe muſt be a judge of thoſe orders whether they were poſitive or not.

Q. Did you not receive a letter, dated the 5th of April, from Sir William Howe, informing you that he could not ſend any force to aſſiſt the operations of General Burgoyne's army? 17.

A. I received a letter from Sir William Howe relative to his operations, a copy of which was ſent to General Burgoyne—I think it was not juſt in thoſe terms, but a copy of the letter is on the table.

Q. Whether

18. Q. Whether on that information, you conſidered that you had any diſcretionary power to detain General Burgoyne after that information?

A. Certainly not.

19. Q. Whether in caſe of any difficulty that General Burgoyne might meet with on his march, there was any latitude given to him (General Burgoyne) to retreat?

A. I ſaid before, that the orders were before the Houſe, who are competent to judge on that point.

20. Q. Did you yourſelf underſtand thoſe orders to General Burgoyne to be poſitive?

A. That is giving an opinion upon what perhaps may be a queſtion in the Houſe; whereas I have already ſaid, the Houſe are as competent to judge as I am.

21. Q. Is the Committee to underſtand from that anſwer, that you have any objection of giving your opinion on that queſtion?

A. I have an objection to give an opinion on almoſt all points.

22. Q. Did you give it in orders to General Burgoyne, in caſe he met with any difficulties during his march in Canada, under your command, not to proceed?

A. I ſhould have taken care that General Burgoyne met with no difficulties in his march in Canada; nor do I well ſee how he could.

23. Q. Where do the boundaries of the province of Canada end?

A. Between the Illinois and Point au Fer.

24. Q. Is the fortreſs of Ticonderoga in Canada?

A. No.

25. Q. Did your commiſſion, as commander in chief of the troops in the northern diviſion, extend beyond the boundaries of Canada to Ticonderoga?

A. That commiſſion as commander in chief, I underſtood, did extend ſo far; but by the orders already alluded to, or by thoſe which General Burgoyne brought out in the ſpring 1777, I underſtood that my command was reſtrained to the limits of the province, and that General Burgoyne was entirely from under my command, as ſoon as he paſſed the limits of the province.

26. Q. Did you apply to the ſecretary of ſtate for a reinforcement of 4000 men, as neceſſary for the campaign of 1777?

A. I recollect when General Burgoyne was coming home in the fall of 1776, as I was perfectly ſatisfied with his conduct in the preceding campaign, I talked over with him, in confidence, what I thought neceſſary for the following campaign; among other things I deſired him to make a memorandum to demand 4000 men, as a reinforcement for the enſuing campaign, or at leaſt for four battalions. I think I have ſeen thoſe memorandums were accurately ſtated and laid before the Houſe.

27. Q. What part of that 4000 men which you thought neceſſary for the campaign of 1777, was actually ſent out to Canada in that year?

A. I do not accurately remember how many—I think a very ſmall part—You may have a very preciſe account from the returns.

28. Q. Of that ſmall part ſent in 1777, did not a certain proportion arrive very late in the year?

A. Yes, a part arrived late.

Q. After you had received your orders from the ſecretary of ſtate, did you apprehend that General Burgoyne, as long as he was within the province of Canada, was poſitively under your command? 29.

A. Yes, I did: as long as he was in the province of Canada, I looked on him to be poſitively under my command; but the load of the expedition being on his ſhoulders, I thought it proper that he, in all things ſhould direct; and therefore I gave out immediate orders, that not only the troops he was to command out of the province, but all the departments neceſſary for the aſſiſting his expedition, ſhould comply immediately, and without delay, with every requiſition and order he ſhould give. The reaſon of my doing ſo was, that no time might be loſt. I only required that they ſhould report to me what orders they had received from General Burgoyne. I believe thoſe orders are alſo on the table.

Q. Will you explain to the Committee what you mean by the words, *load of the expedition lying on General Burgoyne's ſhoulders?* 30.

A. I had no particular meaning; they are words I ſhould have uſed on any expedition of importance.

Q. If General Burgoyne had met with very conſiderable difficulties to impede his progreſs within the province of Canada, would you have thought yourſelf juſtifiable in giving any orders to General Burgoyne, different from thoſe tranſmitted to General Burgoyne, through you, from the ſecretary of ſtate? 31.

A. Had there been any difficulties in Canada, I would not have given him up the command.

Q. Having given up the command to General Burgoyne, and having ordered all the troops to obey him, only reporting their proceedings to you, would you after that, have thought yourſelf juſtifiable to change the order to General Burgoyne, upon his meeting with great difficulties on the frontiers of the neighbouring provinces? 32.

A. I really did not mean to evade the queſtion in the leaſt. It did not appear to me poſſible that there could be any difficulties. I don't mean to ſay there could not, from the nature of the country, be difficulties in the march that might occaſion delay, but by the nature of the queſtion I underſtood difficulties from the enemy. In that caſe I ſhould not have thought myſelf juſtifiable in giving up the command.

Q. If you had heard, that on the frontiers, and within the province of Canada, there was the greateſt reaſon to think, that the reſiſtance of General Burgoyne's army was ſo great as to make it, in your opinion, exceedingly difficult for that General to force his way to Albany, would you think yourſelf juſtifiable in giving different orders to General Burgoyne, from thoſe given by the ſecretary of ſtate; or would you have thought the ſecretary of ſtate's orders for General Burgoyne's army ſo peremptory that it would not be proper for you to interfere? 33.

A. If I underſtood the queſtion as it now ſtands, it is what I would have done, had the province been invaded, or cloſe on the point of being invaded, and the enemy entering the province.

Q. The queſtion does not mean an invading army, but a reſiſtance from the enemy to the progreſs of General Burgoyne's army, in the caſe ſtated in the laſt queſtion? 34.

A. In

A. In that caſe, that an enemy ſhould be found (within the limits of my command) I ſhould have ordered all the troops deſtined for the defence of the province, to have immediately joined thoſe deſtined for General Burgoyne, and have reaſſumed the command of all, until thoſe obſtructions had been removed, within the limits of my authority.

35. Q. Suppoſe no enemy within the province of Canada, but poſted in ſuch a manner upon the line of communication with Albany, as to make it exceeding difficult for General Burgoyne to obey the orders given to him, would you think yourſelf juſtifiable in giving different orders to General Burgoyne, from thoſe given by the ſecretary of ſtate; or would you have thought the ſecretary of ſtate's orders for General Burgoyne's army ſo peremptory that it would not be proper for you to interfere?

A. I could not change General Burgoyne's orders one tittle, that was my opinion; he received his orders from the ſame power that gave me my authority; when once he paſſed the limits of my command, I neither could give him orders, nor would he be juſtified in obeying them.

36. Q. Do you mean the latter part of that anſwer as an anſwer to a queſtion which ſuppoſes General Burgoyne within the limits of the province of Canada?

A. No: while he was within the limits of the province of Canada, I would have given General Burgoyne orders in all caſes of difficulty and danger. There being no ſuch caſe when General Burgoyne arrived in Canada, in 1777, nor a poſſibility of an event of that ſort, I put the troops and all things under his command, which concerned his expedition, that he might arrange and combine their motions according to his own plan of operation for the campaign, that no time might be loſt by any unneceſſary applications to me, which the ſtrict forms of my command might otherwiſe require. [*Withdrew.*

Again called in.

37. Q. Should you, if you had been in General Burgoyne's ſituation, and acting under the orders which you know he received, have thought yourſelf bound to purſue them implicitly, or at liberty to deviate from them?

A. I ſhould certainly have thought myſelf bound to have obeyed them to the utmoſt of my power; but, to ſay as a military man, that in all caſes poſſible, I muſt have gone on, is a very nice thing to ſay indeed; it muſt have thrown me, and I ſuppoſe every officer, into a moſt unpleaſant and anxious ſituation, to have debated within himſelf, whether he was or was not to go on. Every man muſt decide for himſelf. What I would have done, I really don't know; the particular ſituation, and a man's own particular feelings, muſt determine the point. If I might be indulged, I would beg leave to ſay, that I did not mean to evade any queſtion; I meant to anſwer directly; yet queſtions may be put to me, of ſo delicate a nature, and perhaps no man in the world is in a more delicate ſituation, with reſpect to the preſent caſe in queſtion, and the buſineſs of this Committee, than I am; when ſuch queſtions are put to me, I ſhall pray the indulgence of the Committee, to be excuſed anſwering them

them, but I will not evade them. As I now underſtand the meaning of the right honourable member in the former queſtions to be, Whether I ſhould have taken upon me to ſuperſede the King's orders, ſuppoſing I knew of any unſurmountable difficulties in the way, as that I had information of 20,000 men at Ticonderoga, before General Burgoyne left the province of Canada, I ſhould have told General Burgoyne my information? But it was General Burgoyne who was to carry the orders into execution, and not me, and therefore it was upon his own judgment he was to determine; I ſhould have given him my opinion, but I think I had no right to give him orders under thoſe circumſtances.

Q. Who was it that made the arrangement and diſtribution of the troops that were to be left for the defence of Canada, independent of thoſe under the command of General Burgoyne? 38.

A. The orders that are before the Houſe are very full, and I thought very clear. The Committee will ſee in thoſe orders the troops that were deſtined for General Burgoyne's expedition, and the troops that were to remain for the defence of the province.

Q. Who made that diſtribution? 39.

A. It came to me from the ſecretary of ſtate.

Q. Did not the orders from the ſecretary of ſtate go to the detail of the ſmalleſt poſts within the province? 40.

A. The letter is before the Committee.

Queſtion repeated.

A. I ſhould beg for the letter to be read; I don't wiſh to avoid any queſtion, but I wiſh to be accurate. 41.

Q. Was the diſtribution of the troops preſcribed to you by the ſecretary of ſtate, or left to your diſcretion? 42.

A. In mentioning the number of troops which were to remain in that province, it was there ſaid that thoſe troops would be ſufficient for garriſoning ſuch and ſuch places, particularizing them.

Q. Did you ever know an inſtance, in your military life, of a miniſter making a diſtribution of troops for the defence of a province, without taking the opinion or leaving a great deal to the diſcretion of the governor of that province, that governor being an acting military officer of very high rank? 43.

A. I never had the honour to correſpond with a ſecretary of ſtate till I was appointed to the command of that province.

Q. Whether you was conſulted upon the practicability of penetrating from the frontiers of Canada to Albany by force, with the ſtrength allotted to General Burgoyne for that purpoſe? 44.

A. No; I was not.

Q. Are you acquainted with the paſſage from New York to Canada by the Hudſon's River. 45.

A. I have gone that way.

Q. Have you obſerved it with a view to military operations? 46.

A. No; I never made the tour having any military operations in view.

47. Q. Are you acquainted with the forces which Sir William Howe had under his immediate command at and about New York, on the 17th of July, 1777?

A. I am not.

48. Q. Suppoſing Sir William Howe had 12,000 effective men, beſides a ſufficient force lodged in New York, Staten Iſland, and Long Iſland, to defend them againſt General Waſhington's army, ſuppoſing General Waſhington's army in the Jerſies, near Quibble Town, and that Sir William Howe had received accounts of General Burgoyne's ſucceſs at Ticonderoga, and was acquainted with the orders under which General Burgoyne acted; is it your opinion that the beſt movement Sir William Howe could have made for the purpoſes of forwarding the execution of the orders, under which General Burgoyne acted, would have been to have ſailed with his army from New York to Cheſapeak Bay?

A. Had I had the honour to have commanded on that ſide, I do not know what I ſhould have done myſelf.

49. Q. After you received the letter from Sir William Howe, informing you of his intended expedition to the ſouthward, whether you did expect that Sir William Howe's army could co-operate on the Hudſon's River with the northern army that ſeaſon?

A. I don't know.

50. Q. Whether you thought, after the receipt of that letter, that it was probable there would be a co-operation from the ſouthern army?

A. I took it for granted, that Sir William Howe knew what he was about, and would do what he thought beſt for the public ſervice. I really was ſo little informed of all the particular circumſtances of his ſituation and of the provinces under his command, that I could form no judgment of the propriety or impropriety of his conduct, or of the effects of his meaſures.

51. Q. Did your information lead you to believe, that the inhabitants between Saratoga and Albany, were ſo well affected to his Majeſty and Great Britain, as that there would be much advantage derived from their aſſiſtance to the King's army in the proſecution of General Burgoyne's expedition?

A. I had frequent accounts from that part of the country, that there were numbers ready to take arms and join the King's troops if they ſhould penetrate ſo far.

52. Q. Do you mean, by *penetrating ſo far*, to Albany, or to the length the army got?

A. The whole extent of the inhabited country, according to the information brought to me.

53. Q. Had you no information that a formidable militia might be raiſed in that country to oppoſe his Majeſty's arms?

A. Yes; I had ſuch information.

54. Q. Did you think that the force which General Burgoyne carried with him from Ticonderoga towards Albany was ſufficient to oppoſe ſuch force?

A. I really muſt beg leave to be excuſed anſwering that queſtion.

55. Q. If you had been conſulted reſpecting General Burgoyne's expedition, knowing the nature of that country, and the force General Burgoyne had, would you or not have adviſed ſuch an enterprize?

A. If

A. If I had had the honour to command in that campaign as I had in the former, I don't preciſely know what I ſhould have done myſelf.

Q. Did you give any advice for employing the ſavages? 56.

A. I don't recollect that I ſaid any thing about them. [*Withdrew.*

Jovis 27° die Maii, 1779.

EARL of BALCARRAS called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. IN what ſtation did your Lordſhip ſerve in the campaigns in America, in 1776, and 1777? 1.

A. I commanded the Britiſh light infantry.

Q. Was the Britiſh light infantry continually attached to the corps under the command of Brigadier General Fraſer? 2.

A. Yes.

Q. Had you occaſion to obſerve that General Burgoyne and General Fraſer lived together in friendſhip and confidence? 3.

A. Yes, I had.

Q. Had you reaſon to believe that General Fraſer was conſulted by Genaral Burgoyne in all material operations? 4.

A. I had reaſon to believe that General Fraſer was conſulted in many material operations.

Q. Does your Lordſhip know or believe that the proportion of artillery, attached to General Fraſer's corps through the whole campaign, was according to his requiſitions and deſires? 5.

A. I underſtood from General Fraſer, that the proportion of artillery allotted to him was agreeable to his own requiſitions.

Q. Do you recollect the number of killed and wounded in General Fraſer's corps, at the affair of Huberton? 6.

A. I don't recollect exactly; I think it was about 150.

Q. What was your opinion of the behaviour of the enemy on that day? 7.

A. Circumſtanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard preſſed in their retreat, they certainly behaved with great gallantry.

Q. Was it practicable, the nature of the country, the fatigue of the King's troops, the care of the wounded, and other circumſtances conſidered, to have purſued the enemy farther after that action? 8.

A. It was not

9. Q. Do you recollect on what day General Fraſer's corps rejoined the army at Skeneſborough?

A. On the 9th of July; I think that it was on that day.

10. Q. On what day was the action at Huberton?

A. On the 7th of July.

11. Q. Do you recollect the difficulties of removing the wounded from Huberton to the hoſpital at Ticonderoga?

A. From the diſtance and badneſs of the roads, the difficulties attending the removing of the hoſpital muſt have been very great.

12. Q. Was it practicable, unleſs the wounded had been left expoſed to the enemy, to have rejoined the army ſooner?

A. It was not.

13. Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect how the army was employed between that time and the march to Fort Edward?

A. The Britiſh were employed in opening the country and making roads to Fort Anne; the Germans under General Reideſel were detached about fourteen miles to the left.

14. Q. Do you recollect the poſt the enemy abandoned upon the aſcent from the Low Country to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne to Fort Edward?

A. I do recollect ſuch a place.

15. Q. Had the enemy maintained their ground on that poſt, do you apprehend that a conſiderable portion of artillery would have been neceſſary to diſlodge them?

A. Artillery would certainly have been of great uſe to diſlodge the enemy.

16. Q. Did you ever ſee an inſtance, during your ſervice in America, that the rebels continued twenty-four hours on the ſame place without entrenching; and was it not alſo their general practice to add abbaties to their entrenchments?

A. The rebels were always indefatigable in ſecuriug themſelves by entrenchments, and in general they added an abbatis to thoſe entrenchments.

17. Q. Do you remember the poſition the enemy abandoned at Schuyler's Iſland?

A. I do remember to have paſſed ſuch an poſt once.

18. Q. Does you Lordſhip think that poſition could have been forced without a numerous artillery or heavy loſs?

A. I do not think it could.

19. Q. From the nature of that country, do you think that poſt could have been turned?

A. Not without greatly riſquing the boats and portable magazines.

20. Q. Is it poſſible at any time in that country, and with a ſmall army, to quit the navigable rivers, without leaving the boats and portable magazines expoſed?

A. I imagine it is not.

21. Q. Did you live in habits of intimacy and communication with General Fraſer?

A. I did.

22. Q. Was General Fraſer of a warmth and openneſs of temper that generally made him communicative of his ſentiments, when they differed from the ſentiments of thoſe with whom he acted?

A. General

A. General Fraſer's temper was warm, open, and communicative, but reſerved in matters of confidence.

Q. Did you ever hear General Fraſer expreſs diſapprobation of the meaſure of paſ- 23.
ſing Hudſon's River?

A. I never did.

Q. Was not a bridge conſtructed of rafts, and ſome boats thrown over that 24.
river, a little before the time of the attack on Bennington?

A. There was.

Q. Did not General Fraſer's corps paſs the river by that bridge, and take poſt on 25.
the heights of Saratoga?

A. It did.

Q. Do you remember that bridge being carried away by the torrents and bad 26.
weather, whereby the communication was cut off between that corps and the main body of the army?

A. I do.

Q. Was General Fraſer's corps recalled after that action, and obliged to repaſs 27.
the river in boats and ſcowls?

A. It was.

Q. Do you remember General Fraſer expreſſing his ſorrow for being obliged to re- 28.
turn back over the Hudſon's River?

A. I remember General Fraſer mentioning it with regret.

Q. Had the rear guard of General Fraſer's corps been attacked during that paſ- 29.
ſage over the river, would not a powerful fire of artillery from the oppoſite ſhore have been of great uſe, if not the only means of protecting them?

A. If the enemy had attacked General Fraſer, they would have found him in a very bad poſture; it was impoſſible to take a better, and, as they could not be ſupported by the line, the only means of ſafety muſt have been to get under cover of the fire of our artillery.

Q. Was there not an expectation and impatience of the troops in general to paſs 30.
Hudſon's River, and advance on the enemy?

A. There was.

Q. Was there not a general confidence and alacrity on the occaſion? 31.

A. There was.

Q. From theſe circumſtances, and your other knowledge of the army, do you not 32.
believe that to have made no further attempt on the enemy would have cauſed diſappointment and dejection in the troops, and reflections on the general?

A. The troops were in the higheſt ſpirits, and wiſhed to be led on.

Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect the march up to the enemy on the morning of 33.
the 19th of September?

A. I do.

Q. Was the combination of the march ſuch, as, that notwithſtanding the paſ- 34.
ſage of the ravines and the thickneſs of the woods, the column of General Fraſer's march, and that of the Britiſh line, led by General Burgoyne, were in a ſituation to ſupport each other, and ſpeedily to form in line of battle, at the time the enemy began the attack?

A. After

A. After the columns had paſſed the ravines, they arrived at their reſpective poſts with great preciſion in point of time, and every fortunate circumſtance attended the forming of the line.

35. Q. How long did that action laſt?

A. The Britiſh were attacked partially about one o'clock. The action was general at three, and ended at ſeven o'clock.

36. Q. From the nature of the country, was it poſſible to diſcern the enemy's poſition or movements, to form any judgment what attacks were in force, and what were feints?

A. I think not.

37. Q. Did we remain maſters of the field of battle?

A. We did.

38. Q. Had the field of battle been well diſputed by the enemy?

A. The enemy behaved with great obſtinacy and courage.

39. Q. Was it too dark to purſue with effect at the time the action ended?

A. It was.

40. Q. Did the King's troops take up ground nearer to the enemy, the morning after the action?

A. It was rather nearer to the enemy.

41. Q. How near were the out-poſts of General Fraſer's corps to the out-poſts of the enemy from that time to the action of the 7th of October?

A. I ſhould imagine within half a mile.

42. Q. From the nature of the country, and the ſituation of the enemy's out-poſts, was it poſſible to reconnoitre their poſition?

A. From the nature of the country, the difficulties attending reconnoitering muſt have been very great.

43. Q. Were not the riflemen, and other irregulars, employed by the enemy at out-poſts and on ſcouts, an overmatch for the Indian or provincial troops that were with the army at that time?

A. They were.

44. Q. Was not General Fraſer's corps continually at work during the interval abovementioned, in ſecuring their own poſts, and opening the front to oppoſe the enemy?

A. They were.

45. Q. After General Fraſer received his wound, on the 7th of October, on whom did the command of his corps devolve?

A. On me.

46. Q. Was you in a ſituation on that day, to obſerve the general diſpoſition of the army, made by General Burgoyne, previous to the action?

A. I remember two redoubts having been erected on the left, to cover the boats and proviſions to enable General Burgoyne to make a detachment from his army.

47. Q. Was you in a ſituation to obſerve the diſpoſition made immediately before the attack by the enemy?

A. I only recollect the ſituation of the two battalions of the advanced corps.

Q. After

Q. After the retreat to the lines, were the lines attacked, and with what degree of vigour? 48.

A. The lines were attacked, and with as much fury as the fire of ſmall arms can admit.

Q. Does your Lordſhip remember that part of the lines where you commanded, being viſited by General Burgoyne during the attack? 49.

A. I don't recollect to have ſeen General Burgoyne.

Q. Was the cannon of great uſe in the repulſe of the enemy in your poſt? 50.

A. Of very great uſe.

Q. Do you think that poſt would have been tenable next morning, the enemy having poſſeſſion of Colonel Briemen's poſt? 51.

A. I do not think it would.

Q. Would the poſſeſſion of the poſt by the enemy, together with the poſſeſſion of Colonel Briemen's poſts, have laid open the flank and rear of the camp of the line? 52.

A. It would.

Q. Was the retreat in the night, and the new diſpoſition of the whole army made in good order and without loſs? 53.

A. It was.

Q. Did the army remain under arms, and in momentary expectation of battle, the whole of the day of the 8th? 54.

A. It did.

Q. Do you remember the confuſion and difficulties attending the line of baggage in the retreat, in the night of the 8th? 55.

A. I do.

Q. Was not the retreat nevertheleſs made in good order by the troops, and without loſs? 56.

A. It was.

Q. Does your Lordſhip remember the weather, the ſtate of the roads, the ſtate of the cattle, and the difficulty of paſſing the Fiſh Kiln, in the retreat to Saratoga, in the day and night of the 9th? 57.

A. It rained inceſſantly, conſequently the roads were bad; the cattle were nearly ſtarved for want of forage, and the bridge over the Fiſh Kill had been deſtroyed by the enemy; the troops were obliged to ford the river.

Q. Had there been no enemy to oppoſe us, or no bridges or roads to repair, would it have been poſſible, from the ſtate of the fatigue of the troops, to have continued the march farther immediately after the arrival at Saratoga? 58.

A. The troops were greatly fatigued, and the artillery had been left on the other ſide of the Fiſh Kill.

Q. Why were they left on the other ſide of the Fiſh Kill? 59.

A. The bridge had been deſtroyed by the enemy; it was exceeding dark, and I do not know whether the ford was paſſable for the artillery without being firſt examined.

Q. Do you remember the enemy opening a battery on the oppoſite ſide of Hudſon's River, and the circumſtances attending the opening that battery? 60.

A. The

A. The corps I commanded was at that time poſted, and they fired on us at that time, but I do not know from what direction.

61. Q. Does your Lordſhip remember the ſhot from that battery going over the table when you and ſeveral officers were at dinner?

A. I did not dine with General Burgoyne that day—I recollect hearing a cannon ſhot had diſcompoſed the company at the general's table.

62. Q. Conſequently muſt not that battery have commanded the ford over the Hudſon's River?

A. I believe I ſaid, I did not recollect from what direction the ſhot came, but they had a battery which commanded that ford.

63. Q. Do you recollect on what day you was called, with other commanders of corps, to the firſt council of war?

A. On the 13th of October.

64. Q. Was there a ſpot in the whole poſition to be found for holding that council, which was not expoſed to cannon or rifle-ſhot?

A. We were not ſo fortunate as to find one.

65. Q. Do you recollect that General Burgoyne, after ſtating to the council the difficulties of the ſituation, declare, that nothing ſhould induce him to propoſe terms to the enemy without the general concurrence of the generals and field officers of the army, and that he was ready to take the lead in any meaſure that they ſhould think for the honour of the Britiſh arms, or words to that effect?

A. I remember words to that effect.

66. Q. Was the concurrence unanimous for treating on honourable terms?

A. I hope I ſhall ſtand juſtified with the members of that council, when I have the honour to declare to this Houſe, that our ſituation appeared to them ſo decided as not to admit of one diſſenting voice.

67. Q. When Colonel Kingſton brought back the firſt propoſition, wherein it was ſpecified by Major General Gates, that the army ſhould lay down their arms in their entrenchments and ſurrender priſoners of war, does your Lordſhip remember, that General Burgoyne, when he read them to the council, declared, he would not ſet his hand to thoſe conditions, or words to that effect?

A. I think the words of the propoſal from General Gates were, That the Britiſh army ſhould be ordered, by word of command from their adjutant general, to lay down their arms in the entrenchments. It was rejected with diſdain by General Burgone, and the council concurred in his indignation.

68. Q. Were the counter propoſals, penned by General Burgoyne, unanimouſly approved?

A. They were.

69. Q. When thoſe propoſals had been agreed to by General Gates, but copies not ſigned by either party, do you remember General Burgoyne informing the council of intelligence he had received from a ſpy in the night, and ſubmitting to their conſideration, whether it was conſiſtent with public faith, and if ſo, expedient to ſuſpend the execution of the treaty and truſt to events?

A. I do remember it.

70. Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect what was the reſult of that conſideration?

A. The determination of the council, on the queſtion being put, was, that the public faith was *bona fide* plighted.

Q. Though that was the opinion of the majority, was there not a difference of opinion in the council? 71.

A. There was.

Q. Were the opinions of the ſeveral commanding officers aſked reſpecting the condition of their reſpective corps, and what might be expected from them ſeverally in deſperate caſes? 72.

A. It was.

Q. Was there not on that queſtion alſo difference of opinion? 73.

A. There was.

Q. After the Convention took place, did your Lordſhip ſee the army of General Gates paſs in review before General Burgoyne and General Phillips? 74.

A. I did.

Q. From the manner and ſilence of their march, the order obſerved in keeping their diviſions, and an apparent attention to their officers, did that army appear diſciplined? 75.

A. They marched in good order and were ſilent, and ſeemed to pay attention to their officers. Theſe are eſſential points of diſcipline, but I ſaw nothing farther of it.

Q. From the general behaviour of the rebel troops in the different actions in which you was preſent in the courſe of the campaign, did you think them diſciplined and reſpectable troops? 76.

A. When I anſwered the laſt queſtion, I ſpoke to the manœuvre I ſaw upon the ſpot. At all times when I was oppoſed to the rebels, they fought with great courage and obſtinacy.

Q. Judging by your eye, and the time the rebel army was marching in review, did you form any judgment of their number? 77.

A. It requires great experience to make a computation of numbers by ſeeing them paſs: as far as I could judge on the occaſion, they ſeemed to me to amount to thirteen or fourteen thouſand rank and file under arms.

Q. Has your Lordſhip reaſon to know or believe, that the troops that paſſed in review were excluſive of thoſe corps that had been poſted on the other ſide of the Hudſon's River? 78.

A. They were excluſive of thoſe corps.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occaſionally.

Q. What was the general opinion of the army of General Burgoyne's behaviour in action and in difficulty? 79.

A. It appeared to me, that General Burgoyne always poſſeſſed himſelf in every ſituation of danger and difficulty, and, I may venture to ſay, it appeared ſo to the army.

Q. Had General Burgoyne the confidence of the army? 80.

A. He had.

Q. After the arrival of the troops at Cambridge, were the officers and ſoldiers of 81.

the army ſatisfied with the general's efforts to contribute to their comfort, and redreſs their grievances?

A. They were.

82. Q. Was the army ſatisfied with the general's behaviour at the court martial held on Colonel Henley?

A. He carried on that proſecution in perſon, and as ſuch they were ſatisfied with him.

83. Q. Did your Lordſhip ever hear any officer or ſoldier of that army expreſs any diſſatisfaction at the general's returning to England?

A. I did not.

84. Q. Does your Lordſhip think that the officers of that army wiſh to have their reſpective merits ſtated to their Sovereign, by the general in perſon who had the honour of commanding them?

A. It was the wiſh of that army that General Burgoyne ſhould go to Europe, to juſtify not only his own conduct, but the conduct of the army he commanded.

85. Q. Does your Lordſhip apprehend, that the return of General Burgoyne to that army, under perſonal diſgrace, and without any diſtribution of preferment among the diſtinguiſhed officers of that army, would be any ſort of conſolation to the troops under captivity?

A. General Burgoyne, at all times, ſhared the dangers and afflictions of that army in common with every ſoldier; as ſuch they looked on him as their friend, and certainly would have received him in perſon, or any accounts of him, with every mark of affection.

86. Q. Your Lordſhip having ſaid that if the rebels had maintained their poſt, at the aſcent from the Low Countries to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne to Fort Edward, artillery would have been of great uſe to diſlodge them; will your Lordſhip ſay what kind of artillery, of what calibre, would have been neceſſary for that purpoſe?

A. Any of the artillery officers now under the order of the Houſe can give a much more ſatisfactory anſwer to that queſtion than I poſſibly can.

87. Q. Did you ſee that poſt?

A. I think I ſaid I did ſee it.

88. Q. With what kind of work was that poſt fortified?

A. I ſpoke of it merely from its ſituation.

89. Q. Were there then any works or none?

A. I don't recollect there were any works.

90. Q. If the army, after taking Ticonderoga, had been embarked, and proceeded directly to South Bay, would there have been any occaſion to have attacked the poſt at Pitch Pine Plains at all?

A. The army did proceed by South Bay, excepting a detachment of General Fraſer's corps, and ſome Germans to ſupport him; and the army aſſembled at Skeneſborough on the 9th or 10th of July.

91. Q. Was it neceſſary to go to the poſt at Pitch Pine Plains, in order to go to South Bay?

A. They had no ſort of connection with each other.

92. Q. Might not the army have proceeded to Fort Edward, and omitted the attack of that paſs, ſuppoſing it had been meant to be defended?

A. There

A. There were two routes to Fort Edward. General Burgoyne might ſtill go the ſame route without any neceſſity of attacking that poſt, as there might have been many different ways of diſlodging the enemy from that poſt without attacking it.

Q. In how many inſtances do you remember the rebels defending their entrench- 93.
ments after they had made them?

A. We never got a view of any of their entrenchments but ſuch as they had voluntarily abandoned.

Q. Is it then to be underſtood that they never defended any entrenchments? 94.

A. They never did.

Q. Did you ever hear General Fraſer expreſs his approbation of the paſſing of the 95.
Hudſon's River?

A. I never did.

Q. Did you ever hear General Fraſer expreſs his approbation of the Bennington 96.
expedition?

A. That detachment was made, and the buſineſs concluded, before I ever heard of the project or execution.

Q. Have you occaſion to know, when the firſt detachment was ſent out under Co- 97.
lonel Baume, where they were ordered to rejoin General Burgoyne, after they had performed the ſervice they were ſent on?

A. I don't know.

Q. Whether, in your Lordſhip's opinion, after the loſs the rebels had ſuſtained over 98.
night, in the action of the 19th of September, if they had been attacked briſkly at break of day, the next day, there was a probability that they could have ſtood their ground?

A. I have not heſitated to give an opinion upon ſuppoſed matters, which muſt have been attended with evident and demonſtrable conſequences; but I beg the indulgence of the Houſe in declining to give any opinion upon any queſtion relative to ſpeculation or judgment. Had any general officer of that army under General Burgoyne been preſent in this country, I ſhould have confined myſelf merely to the manœuvres of the corps I commanded. As there is no general officer here, I wiſh to give this Houſe every information conſiſtent with my rank in the army.

Q. Had you any information that might indicate to you that the rebels were pre- 99.
pared to decamp after the action of the 19th of September?

A. I was ignorant of any ſuch intelligence being received.

Q. Had you any information of their baggage being packed up? 100.

A. I have already anſwered, that I had no information at all about it.

Q. In the action of the 7th of October, on which ſide did the rebels force our lines 101.
and make a lodgement?

A. The lines to the right were ſtormed and carried.

Q. Were the lines attacked to the left? 102.

A. To the left of that poſt they were, but not to the left of the army.

Q. Did not the poſſeſſion of Fort Edward, and the country thereabouts, cut off 103.
the retreat of any garriſon that might have been in Fort George?

A. It undoubtedly did.

Q. Had the army proceeded to Fort George by Ticonderoga and Lake George, 104.
might not the enemy have remained at Fort George till the trenches were opened, and have ſtill had their retreat ſecure?

A. That is a matter of opinion upon ſpeculation.

105. Q. Do you not think that the Britiſh army, being well provided with artillery, was a probable reaſon for their not defending entrenchments?

A. The reaſon they did not defend their entrenchments was, that they always marched out of them and attacked us.

106. Q. Does your Lordſhip think it would have been adviſeable, in point of prudence, or juſt to brave troops, who had ſuffered ſevere loſs, to attack an enemy the morning after that loſs, poſted within entrenchments, which it was impoſſible to reconnoitre?

A. That attempt was tried on the 7th of October, and did not ſucceed.

107. Q. Were not the enemy reinforced between the 19th of September and the 7th of October?

A. I think it is likely they were.

108. Q. Were they likely to be in better ſpirits to repel an attack the day after they had been repulſed with great loſs, or when they had been reinforced, and ſeen an army lie three weeks inactive in their camp?

A. I do not judge of the ſpirit of the enemy but when I was oppoſed to them myſelf.

109. Q. On the firſt day of the action, when the enemy was repulſed on the 19th of September, had not our army ſuffered very conſiderably?

A. They ſuffered very conſiderable loſs.

110. Q. Was not the army recruited, and in better order, on the 7th of October, than they were on the 20th of September?

A. Numbers of the men who had been wounded and diſabled in the action of the 19th, joined their corps on the 7th of October.

111. Q. Was the behaviour of the enemy, oppoſed to your Lordſhip, in the actions you have ſeen, ſuch as to make them contemptible in the eye of a ſoldier?

A. I have already mentioned, that they fought at all times with courage and obſtinacy.

112. Q. Whether the behaviour of the enemy was ſuch as to make advantages obtained by them over his Majeſty's troops more humiliating and diſgraceful to the Britiſh arms than the ſame advantages obtained by an equal number of any other troops?

A. I myſelf felt more humiliation until I conſidered that thoſe advantages proceeded from the nature of the country, and not from the want of zeal or bravery in the Britiſh troops.

113. Q. Whether the enemy's troops were ſuch bad troops as to make it more diſgraceful to have an advantage obtained by them over the King's troops than by the like number of any other enemy over a like number of his Majeſty's troops in the ſame circumſtances of country?

A. The advantages gained by the rebels over the Britiſh troops proceeded from their local ſituation, and not from the want of courage in the Britiſh troops. We were taught by experience that neither their attacks nor reſiſtance was to be deſpiſed.

114. Q. Did you ever ſerve againſt any other troops?

A. I commenced my ſervice in America.

Q. Whether

Q. Whether the army under General Burgoyne, in general, expected co-operation in their efforts to go to Albany, from the army under the command of Sir William Howe? 115.

A. General Burgoyne gave it out in general orders, that he had every reaſon to believe that powerful armies were acting in co-operation with the army he had the honour to command.

Q. Do you know at what time that order was given out? 116.

A. The adjutant general's books will ſhew it: I think it was about the 3d of October.

Q. Does your Lordſhip believe that if the army under General Howe had co-operated up the North River with the army under General Burgoyne, that the army under General Burgoyne would have been obliged to have made the convention it did? 117.

A. That is a matter of judgment. The army looked forward to that co-operation, which they were led to underſtand, by the orders General Burgoyne had given out, with pleaſure.

Q. What was the general opinion of the officers of the army in which you ſerved, on that ſubject of co-operation? 118.

A. I do not think my rank in the army entitles me to give my opinion on that ſubject; I ſhall ſtill leſs preſume to give that of others.

[*Withdrew.*

Then he was called in again, and ſeveral parts of the examination, particularly that which immediately follows the place where it is ſaid that his Lordſhip was examined by other members of the Committee, were read, and then the laſt queſtion which was put to his Lordſhip immediately before he withdrew, was repeated, with this addition, "To the beſt of your recollection and information." 119.

A. I have already declined anſwering that queſtion.

Q. When did you firſt know that there was to be no co-operation from General Howe's army, and that Sir William Howe had carried his army to Cheſapeak Bay? 120.

A. I did not know that we were to expect no co-operation, until after the convention was ſigned.

Q. When did you firſt hear that Sir William Howe was gone to the ſouthward? 121.

A. It was reported ſo in the army about the beginning of the campaign, before we croſſed the river.

Q. When was that report firſt confirmed ſo as to make it a matter of belief? 122.

A. I never knew it was confirmed at all.

Q. Whether you yourſelf was not ſurpriſed or diſappointed, or both, when you firſt underſtood that there was not to be any co-operation from Sir William Howe, but that Sir William Howe's army was gone to Cheſapeak Bay? 123.

[*Withdrew.*

Again

Again called in.

124. Q. Whether you yourſelf was ſurpriſed or diſappointed, or both, when you firſt heard that Sir William Howe's army was gone to Cheſapeak Bay?

A. I neither knew the object of the campaign nor its expectations, and therefore cannot ſpeak to any manœuvre of which I could not know the tendency.

125. Q. Did the army in general expreſs themſelves pleaſed at the news of Sir William Howe's being gone to Cheſapeak Bay?

A. The anſwer to the laſt queſtion, as it relates to me in particular, relates to them in general.

126. Q. Whether your Lordſhip, as a matter of fact, in the conſideration you had in the army, on the news of Sir William Howe's being gone to Cheſapeak Bay, heard thoſe you converſed with expreſs themſelves pleaſed, or talk of that expedition to Cheſapeak, as a powerful co-operation with General Burgoyne?

A. I think that queſtion is fully anſwered in the two preceding ones.

127. Q. Whether you did not think General Howe's fighting General Waſhington's grand army, at the battle of Brandywine, was a very capital co-operation with the army under General Burgoyne?

A. I was not at Brandywine.

128. Q. Whether you was not ſurpriſed when you returned home to this country, to learn that the ſecretary of ſtate for the American department, had information from General Howe, of his intentions of going to the ſouthward, before General Burgoyne departed from this country, and never communicated that information to General Burgoyne before his departure for Canada?

A. I have the honour to ſtand before this Houſe as a military man, and not as a politician, and cannot anſwer any queſtion but thoſe relative to my own profeſſion.

129. Q. What was your Lordſhip's opinion of the ſpirit of your own corps?

A. The opinion I gave in the council of war, relative to the ſpirit of the corps I commanded was, that they were willing and zealous to undertake any enterpriſe that General Burgoyne would pleaſe to employ them upon.

130. Q. When advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, did you apprehend the treaty of convention had gone ſo far that it could not be broken?

A. My opinion was, with reſpect to that queſtion, that all military negotiations were fair and juſtifiable, to make delays and to gain time; I therefore thought and declared my ſentiments, that General Burgoyne was at full liberty to break off that treaty in the ſtage it then was; and I could not conceive that the public faith was engaged, until the treaty was actually ſigned and exchanged.

131. By General Burgoyne. Q. Whether the opinion of General Burgoyne, of General Phillips, of Brigadier Hamilton, and ſeveral other officers, did not coincide with your opinion in all the matters compriſed in the laſt queſtion?

A. As General Burgoyne ſeems deſirous that I ſhould anſwer that queſtion, I declare his ſentiments were the ſame with thoſe I have now delivered. I hope that

the other members of that council, will ſoon be in a ſituation to ſtand forward and to declare the opinion they gave on that and every other queſtion.

Q. When the queſtion relative to the point of public faith was decided, by the majority of the council, was not the concurrence for ſigning the convention unanimous? 132. By General Burgoyne.

A. It was.

Q. What day was it firſt known that Sir Henry Clinton had taken the highlands, and was coming up the North River? 133.

A. In the night of the 16th of October. [*Withdrew.*

CAPTAIN MONEY called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. WAS not you deputy quarter maſter general of the army under General Burgoyne, in 1777? 1.

A. I was.

Q. After Lieutenant Colonel Carleton returned to Canada, was you the ſuperior officer in that department? 2.

A. I was.

Q. As ſuch, did you make it your buſineſs from the beginning of the campaign to get a knowledge of the country? 3.

A. Whenever there was any occaſion to obtain the knowledge of any particular part of the country, a party was always ſent with me for that purpoſe, but the woods were ſo thick that it was impoſſible to go without a party.

Q. Was you well acquainted with the country between Skeneſborough and Fort Edward? 4.

A. I was.

Q. How long was the army employed in making the roads practicable between Skeneſborough and Fort Edward? 5.

A. About ſix or ſeven days in making the road between Skeneſborough and Fort Anne, and between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. I do not believe the army was delayed an hour on that account; there was a very good road made by the rebels the year before, between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, in which road the rebels had cut down ſome few trees which took the provincials in our army ſome few hours to clear.

Q. Does not the poſſeſſion of the country in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward, neceſſarily prevent the retreat of a garriſon that might be in Fort George? 6.

A. It

A. It prevents the getting off any artillery or ſtores; but a garriſon might get through the woods, in caſe we were in the poſſeſſion of the ground in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward.

7. Q. Did not the garriſon of Fort George evacuate the fort upon the approach of the King's troops toward Fort Edward?

A. I heard they did; I was not near enough to ſee.

8. Q. Had the army taken their route by South Bay, Ticonderoga, and Lake George, how many bateaux do you imagine it would have taken to carry the troops ſolely over Lake George, excluſive of proviſions and ſtores?

A. I think between three and four hundred, which bateaux muſt have been carried up out of Lake Champlain to Lake George.

9. Q. What time would it have taken, as you imagine, to have drawn thoſe bateaux over the land, between Lake Champlain and Lake George, with the horſes then at Ticonderoga?

A. I ſuppoſe a fortnight—Four hundred bateaux.

10. Q. Though there were no troops paſſed over Lake George, how long did it take before the firſt tranſport of proviſions arrived at Fort George?

A. I can't recollect preciſely.

11. Q. Conſidering the length of time it took to tranſport the proviſions, without the troops, over Lake George, was not the army forwarder in their way to Albany, in point of time, by the route they took, than they could have been by the route of Ticonderoga and Lake George?

A. I have already ſaid, that it would take a fortnight to tranſport the 400 bateaux from Lake Champlain to Lake George; it therefore would have delayed the army a fortnight longer than they were delayed to have returned from Skeneſborough by Ticonderoga, and gone acroſs Lake George.

12. Q. Was you commiſſary of horſe, as well as deputy quarter maſter general?

A. It was.

13. Q. What is the nature of that department?

A. It was to take charge of all the horſes furniſhed by contract for General Burgoyne's army, by any letter of inſtructions from General Burgoyne. I am directed to give proper orders and directions to the drivers, furniſhed by that contract, for the purpoſe of tranſporting proviſions and ſtores brought to Fort George, for the uſe of the army.

14. Q. Did you report from time to time to Major General Phillips, and take orders from him, as well as from General Burgoyne?

A. Yes.

15. Q. Were not the orders from both the generals invariable, preciſe, and preſſing, for uſing all poſſible diligence in forwarding the tranſport of proviſions?

A. They were. There was one order which I will read, as it will fully anſwer that queſtion: it is dated Auguſt the 18th, Duer-Camp, and is in theſe words; "It having been a practice for officers to order to be taken from the proviſion train, "in the ſervice of the King for this army, the carts and horſes, for the carrying "baggage and other purpoſes, to avoid for the future the danger and inconve- "niencies to the ſervice, it is in the moſt poſitive manner ordered, that no cart or "horſe are to be uſed but for the public tranſport of the army; nor is any officer,

" accidentally coming to any particular poſt, to interfere with the proviſion train, " in any other manner than to give it every aid and aſſiſtance, which he is on all " occaſions to do."

Q. Was not the tranſport of merchandize, and even ſutler's ſtores, as well as of officers' baggage, poſitively forbid till the tranſport of proviſion ſhould be over? 16.

A. There was ſuch an order, and a ſeizure made of two barrels of Madeira, and two barrels of rum, which were ordered to the hoſpital.

Q. Do you recollect General Burgoyne's expreſſing, at ſeveral times, particular anxiety on the ſubject of expediting the tranſport of proviſions? 17.

A. I do remember once to have heard General Burgoyne expreſs his concern at our not being able to bring forward a greater quantity of proviſion to enable him to proceed with the army.—I do recollect to have heard him ſay with very great earneſtneſs to General Phillips and Colonel Carleton, that one month's proviſion at that particular time (it was about the latter end of Auguſt) would be worth 100,000l. to Great Britain.

Q. Do you think that the commiſſary of the waggons, and other carriages, was authoriſed to buy or hire ox-teams wherever they could be had, and that all draught cattle taken, were appropriated to the tranſport? 18.

A. He received ſuch directions.

Q. How many carts and ox-teams could be muſtered at any one time? 19.

A. I think only 180 carts could at any one time be muſtered; the number of ox-carts I really forget, but I believe between 20 and 30.

Q. About how many days proviſion for the troops, and all other perſons fed from the King's ſtores, could that number of carriages convey? 20.

A. There never was any trial made, but if I may preſume to judge from the proportion brought forward, over and above the daily conſumption of the army, ſhould ſuppoſe all thoſe carriages would not carry more than four days proviſions at moſt. I am ſpeaking at random, as no trial was made.

Q. Did it not ſometimes happen, from accidents of weather, and roads, and the tired ſtate of the cattle, that not more than one day's proviſion could be brought forward in a day? 21.

A. It did.

Q. How many hours did it take, one hour with another, to draw a bateau from Fort George to Fort Edward? 22.

A. In general about ſix.

Q. Was not the unloading the carts at Fort Edward, and embarking the contents in bateaux, unloading the bateaux at the upper falls of Fort Miller, and a ſecond time unloading them at the lower falls, dilatory as it was, a more expeditious method than it would have been to have carried the proviſions the whole way in carts? 23.

A. I do apprehend it was not poſſible, in the feeble ſtate I found the horſes furniſhed by contract, to have brought forward the daily conſumption of proviſions for that army down to Fort Miller. In the month of Auguſt, in the latter end of that month, at which time I was appointed a commiſſary general of horſe, I made, on

the firſt of September, a general muſter, and found 30 horſes unſerviceable, from fatigue and hard labour.

24. Q. Was the tranſport of proviſions at any time impeded by the bringing forward the artillery from Fort George?

A. The artillery had a ſeparate contract for horſes, with which they brought forward their own ſtores. I don't recollect that any part of the proviſion train were ever employed in bringing forward artillery or artillery ſtores.

25. Q. Was it poſſible, with the means we had, to collect a month's ſtore of proviſions ſooner than it was collected?

A. I believe not, without the utter ruin of the horſes furniſhed by contract for the purpoſe of tranſporting ſtores.

26. Q. Was you preſent in the action of the 19th of September?

A. I was.

27. Q. Did the enemy diſpute the field that day with obſtinacy?

A. They did, and the fire was much heavier than ever I ſaw it any where, unleſs at the affair of Fort Anne.

28. Q. Do you know how long the regiments of the Britiſh line were under that fire?

A. The three Britiſh regiments (the 20th, 21ſt, and 62d) were engaged from three o'clock in the afternoon till ſeven in the evening; and whilſt I was a priſoner I heard the rebel quarter-maſter general ſay, they had nine different regiments in the field, oppoſed to the three Britiſh I have named.

29. Q. Do you know the loſs the three Britiſh regiments ſuſtained?

A. I can't ſay.

30. Q. Do you remember the ſtrength of the 62d regiment when they came out of the action?

A. I can't ſpeak to the particular ſtrength of the regiment when they came out of action; but I heard that they were not 100 rank and file.

31. Q. How many officers were left in that regiment at the end of the action?

A. I can't anſwer that queſtion.

32. Q. From the general ſtate of the three Britiſh regiments, do you think that they would have been in a proper condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning?

A. Certainly not; nor to go on any ſervice whatever.

33. Q. About what time of the day did the enemy finally give way?

A. They gave way very often; finally about ſeven in the evening.

34. Q. Was it practicable, at that time of the evening, and in that kind of country, to have purſued?

A. I ſhould think not.

35. Q. Was you not often employed, between the day of that action and the action of the 7th of October, to reconnoitre?

A. I was.

36. Q. Was you able to obtain a view of the enemy's poſition?

A. I obtained a view of the poſition of the right of the rebel entrenchments.

37. Q. What was the nature of their poſition to the right, with regard to entrenchments?

A. They

A. They were poſted on a hill that came very near the river. On the top of the hill was a ſtrong breaſt-work, at the foot an abbatis.

Q. Did it appear to you that that wing of the enemy was attackable? 38.

A. It is a queſtion that is ſcarcely in my line of ſervice to anſwer; but as there are no general officers, nor older officers than myſelf, who ſerved under General Burgoyne, I hope no military man will think me preſuming to give my opinion on that ſubject. I do think that we could not have attacked the right wing of the rebel entrenchments without riſking the loſs of the whole army, and with little probability of ſucceſs.

Q. Could you obtain a view of the left wing of the enemy? 39.

A. I never ſaw the left wing of the enemy's entrenchments till I was taken priſoner and conducted through their works.

Q. On the 7th of October was you in a ſituation to ſee the enemy advancing to the attack of your left? 40.

A. Yes.

Q. Did they advance under a well ſerved fire of grape-ſhot from our artillery? 41.

A. I was in a ſituation that gave me an opportunity of ſeeing the directions of the rebels' columns; and I was very much aſtoniſhed to hear the ſhot from the enemy fly ſo thick, after our cannonade had laſted a quarter of an hour.

Q. When the Britiſh grenadiers were forced laſt from their poſt, what enſued? 42.

A. I did not ſee the Britiſh grenadiers forced back. I ſaw them on their march, as I apprehended, taking a different poſition; at that time ſeveral of them broke their ranks, but on ſome aid du camps calling to them for ſhame, to continue their rank, they marched away to their ſtation in good order. A battalion of Brunſwickers that were on the left of the artillery quitted their ground as ſoon as the firing began, and, to the beſt of my recollection, I did not ſee they left a man behind them on the ground. I would add, that after ſome difficulty that battalion was brought to make a ſtand in the rear of the artillery, but in no order.

Q. Was not that battalion brought to that ſtand by the activity and exhortation of 43.
Major General Reideſel?

A. I did not ſee General Reideſel endeavour to ſtop the battalion; but I ſaw an aid du camp of his and a brigade major, with their drawn ſwords, keeping them up. I did ſee General Reideſel immediately afterwards, on the right of the artillery, with the battalion perfectly formed, and in good order.

Q. Do you imagine that the giving way of the battalion you firſt deſcribed was 44.
the cauſe that the artillery on that ſpot was taken, and yourſelf and Major Williams being made priſoners?

A. I believe it contributed, in ſome meaſure, towards the loſs of the action on that day; but before Sir Francis Clarke died of his wounds, he told me that he received his wound in bringing orders for the artillery and the whole of the detachment to return to camp; and to the circumſtance of Sir Francis Clarke's being wounded, I do attribute the loſs of the artillery, if not the loſs of the whole army?

Q. Had you an opportunity, after you was priſoner, to ſee the left of the enemy's 45.
entrenchments?

A. I had.

46. Q. Was the ground within cannon ſhot of the left open and commanding it?
A. All the ground I ſaw was cleared and entrenched.

47. Q. Was there not ground within cannon ſhot that would have commanded that entrenchment on the left?
A. There was.

48. Q. Had we gained poſſeſſion of that ground, and been able to erect batteries of our heavieſt guns, would not the whole line of the enemy have been enfiladed?
A. The ground alluded to was entrenched, and commanded the whole of the rebel camp and lines. If the army had got poſſeſſion of that ground, I do not believe the rebels would have ſtaid one hour in their camp.

49. Q. Did you ever hear, in converſation with the rebel officers, that General Arnold, foreſeeing that inconvenience, had marched out of his lines, and attacked, without orders from General Gates?
A. I did hear that General Arnold had marched out on the 7th of October, without orders from General Gates. I did alſo hear that he adviſed the going out to meet General Burgoyne on his march, and engaging him before he approached their lines; and the reaſon he gave was this: If General Burgoyne ſhould ever come near enough their lines to be able to make uſe of his artillery, that he would certainly poſſeſs himſelf of their camp; that their troops in that caſe would never ſtand any where; but if, on the other hand, the rebels ſhould be defeated in the woods, the troops would, after that, have confidence in their works, for which reaſon Arnold adviſed riſking an action in the woods before General Burgoyne came near enough to ſee their works.

Examined by other Members of the Committee, and by General Burgoyne occaſionally.

50. Q. Did not your ſituation, as deputy quarter maſter general, lead you to mix very much with the different officers of the army?
A. It did.

51. Q. What do you apprehend to have been the general opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne's conduct, as well in action as in the many trying occaſions which have been ſtated by you at the bar?
A. They entertained a very high opinion of General Burgoyne's conduct.

52. Q. Had General Burgoyne the full confidence of the army under his command to the laſt moment?
A. He certainly had.

53. Q. What was the army's opinion of the rebels after their retreat from Ticonderoga?
A. The army in general did not think, after they had evacuated Ticonderoga, that they would make a ſtand any where.

54. Q. What was the reaſon given in your army for the expedition to Bennington?
A. I believe I cannot anſwer that queſtion better than by reading an abſtract of the General's orders the day after that action.

" *Auguſt* 17, *Duer Camp.*

" It was endeavoured, among other objects, by the expedition which marched to " the left, to provide ſuch a ſupply of cattle as would have enabled the army to proceed " without waiting the arrival of the magazines. That attempt having failed of ſucceſs, " through the chances of war, the troops muſt neceſſarily halt ſome days for bringing " forward the tranſports."

Q. Why did the army remain from the 16th of Auguſt to the 13th of September, before they croſſed the Hudſon's River to engage the rebels as Stillwater? 55.

Q. To bring forward a ſufficient quantity of proviſions and artillery, to enable the general to give up his communication.

Q. What was the opinion of the army on their croſſing the Hudſon's River? 56.

A. They did think it was their indiſpenſible duty to proceed forward and fight the rebels, which we heard were then at Stillwater.

Q. Did you ever forage to the right of General Fraſer's camp before the 7th of Auguſt? 57.

A. We never foraged to the right of the camp at Freeman's Farm, at any one time; on the 7th of October, while the troops were in the field, General Fraſer ordered all the batmen and drivers, belonging to his brigade, to come and forage in the rear of the troops.

Q. Do you know what was General Fraſer's opinion on your foraging to the right? 58.

A. I do know that General Fraſer mentioned to me, on the 5th of October, that there was forage on the right of his camp; but at that time the ground on which that forage was to be met with was in poſſeſſion of the rebels' advanced poſt.

Q. Do you think your army would have been loſt, if even the expedition from New York had taken place a few days ſooner? 59.

A. If the troops had arrived at New York ſoon enough to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have made his expedition up the North River a week ſooner, I do conceive that our army would not have been loſt.

Q. What was the opinion of the rebels on Sir William Howe's going to the ſouthward? 60.

A. I was not acquainted enough with the rebel leaders, to hear their opinion on that queſtion. I do not think that the peaſants of the country were judges of the propriety of Sir William Howe's conduct.

Q. What was the opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne's army, after it was loſt, relative to the croſſing Hudſon's River. 61.

A. They did think that the alternative of retreating with their army to Canada, or proceeding to Stillwater, under the neceſſity of giving up his communication, to be an unfortunate ſituation; but I never heard any officers ſay that they thought General Burgoyne had done wrong; many ſaid, that if they had retreated without riſking an action, at the time Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he ever have forgiven himſelf.

Q. Was you at New York after the loſs of General Burgoyne's army? 62.

A. Yes.

A. Yes.

63. Q. What was the opinion or the language of the military at that place, relative to Sir William Howe's expedition to Penſylvania?

A. Whatever opinion was formed of Sir William Howe's expedition to Penſylvania, or is formed previous to this enquiry, ſuch an opinion muſt have been ill-founded, as Sir William Howe's reaſons were not known, nor his inſtructions communicated to the public.

64. Q. From your laſt anſwer, is the committee to underſtand that the opinions that were formed reſpecting Sir William Howe's expedition to Philadelphia, before this enquiry, were not in favour of that expedition?

Queſtion objected to. [*Withdrew.*

Again called in.

65. Q. You have ſaid that the army thought it their indiſpenſible duty to paſs over Hudſon's River—Why did they think that that meaſure was particularly their indiſpenſible duty?

A. If the Hudſon's River had not been there, the army would have thought it their indiſpenſible duty to have gone and riſked an action before they returned to Canada. If I recollect right, I ſaid, that if the army had returned to Canada, without fighting, that the army would never have forgiven the general, nor the general have forgiven himſelf.

66. Q. Do you know the nature of the country, between the place where we paſſed the Hudſon's River and Albany, on the eaſt ſide of the river?

A. Yes, I do.

67. Q. Could the army have taken that route, in order to paſs the river oppoſite or near to Albany?

A. The army could not have taken that route, as part of the way was a ſwamp, and on the right of the rebel entrenchments was a mountain very rugged, and not paſſable nearer than two miles from the river.

68. Q. Was it not a neceſſary conſequence then, that the boats muſt have been abandoned, if the army had taken that route?

A. I think I have ſaid the army could not take that route; if the army had marched on the eaſt of the Hudſon's River, they could not have marched near enough to have covered their proviſion bateaux from the rebel force, on the weſt ſide of the river.

69. Q. Did the army under General Burgoyne, on their approach to Albany, expect a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe, upon the North River?

A. They did; and this is the order of General Burgoyne, given October the 3d at Freeman's Farm:

" There is reaſon to be aſſured, that other powerful armies are actually in co-
" operation with theſe troops; and although the preſent ſupply of proviſion is ample,
" it is highly deſirable, to prepare for any continuance in the field that the King's
" ſervice may require, without the delay of bringing forward further ſtores for
" thoſe

" thoſe purpoſes; the ration of bread or flour is, for the preſent, fixed at one " pound."

Q. Are you acquainted with the North River, from New York to Albany? 70.

A. I am not.

Q. How many days march from Fort Edward to Albany, if no interruption from an enemy? 71.

A. I cannot anſwer that queſtion, unleſs I am to ſuppoſe that a bridge was ready formed for the troops to paſs over, on ſome part of Hudſon's River, between Batten Kill and Fort Edward, or that there were veſſels ready to tranſport the troops over Hudſon's River.

Q. Is the diſtance ſo great between Fort Edward and Albany, that the army could not carry proviſions with them to ſupport them during the march? 72.

A. Certainly Albany is not at ſo great a diſtance from Fort Edward, but that a corps of troops might certainly carry proviſions ſufficient for the march to Albany.

Q. Was it not underſtood, that if you had arrived at Albany, that the army would find plenty of proviſions there? 73.

A. It was generally believed, and I believe it myſelf firmly, that if the army had got to Albany, we ſhould have found a number of loyal ſubjects, that would have joined and done every thing in their power to have eſtabliſhed the army at that place.

Q. Muſt not the army, to march from Fort Edward to Albany, have neceſſarily carried a number of boats to form a bridge to paſs the river? 74.

A. There was no paſſing the river well without a bridge of boats, and there were not ſcouls enough on that river, to make a bridge.

Q. Would not the neceſſary delay, ariſing from carrying forward thoſe boats, and throwing a bridge, fit to paſs an army, have conſumed more time than it was poſſible for that army to ſubſiſt with ſuch proviſion as they could carry with them? 75.

A. I ſhould think it would.

Q. You will give the committee what information you can, reſpecting a road from Fort Edward to Albany, on the left ſide of the river. 76.

A. I have anſwered that fully.

Q. Whether by taking a pretty large circuit, the army would have reached Albany, and avoided the ſwamps you mentioned? 77.

A. Certainly not on the eaſt ſide of the river, becauſe the enemy being on the oppoſite ſhore, would certainly have oppoſed General Burgoyne's army croſſing the Hudſon's River at Albany, the river being three times the width it is at Saratoga.

[*Withdrew.*

Martis

Martis 1° die Junii, 1779.

Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair.

EARL OF HARRINGTON called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

1. Q. IN what capacity did your Lordſhip ſerve in America in the campaign 1777?

A. I was captain in the 29th regiment of foot, and went on the expedition with General Burgoyne, with the command of the grenadier company; I was afterwards appointed ſupernumerary aid du camp to the general.

2. Q. While acting as captain of the grenadier company, was you at the action of Huberton?

A. I was.

3. Q. What was the behaviour of the enemy on that day?

A. They behaved in the beginning of the action, with a great deal of ſpirit; but on the Britiſh troops ruſhing on them with their bayonets, they gave way in great confuſion.

4. Q. From the nature of the country, was it practicable to purſue the enemy further than they were purſued on that occaſion?

A. Certainly not.—I think we ran ſome riſque even in purſuing them ſo far.

5. Q. At what time of the campaign was it that General Burgoyne requeſted your Lordſhip to act as his aid du camp?

A. I think about the 12th of July.

6. Q. Was you preſent a few days after that time, at a council held with the Indians of the remote nations, then juſt arrived, under the conduct of Major Campbell and Mr. St. Luc?

7. A. Yes.

Q. Was you preſent at a former council of the Indians held at Lake Champlain?

8. A. Yes.

Q. What was the tenor of General Burgoyne's ſpeeches and injunctions at both thoſe councils reſpecting the reſtraint of barbarities?

A. He abſolutely forbid their ſcalping, except their dead priſoners, which they inſiſted on doing, and he held out rewards to them for bringing in priſoners, and enjoined them to treat them well.

Q. Do

Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoyne, ſoon after the laſt council, upon a viſit to an out poſt near Fort Anne? 9.

A. I perfectly recollect it.

Q. Had General Burgoyne a conſiderable eſcort of Indians with him? 10.

A. He had.

Q. Did part of that eſcort, on a ſcout from that poſt, fall in with and take a part of the enemy, who were laid in ambuſh for the purpoſe of killing or taking the general, and thoſe who were with him? 11.

A. They did.

Q. What were the ſentiments of the captain taken on that occaſion reſpecting his treatment from the Indians? 12.

A. He ſaid he was treated with much humanity, and I perfectly remember that priſoners brought in on many other occaſions by the Indians, declared that they had been uſed with the ſame degree of humanity.

Q. Does your Lordſhip remember General Burgoyne's receiving at Fort Anne, the news of the murder of Miſs M'Rea? 13.

A. I do.

Q. Did General Burgoyne repair immediately to the Indian camp, and call them to council, aſſiſted by Brigadier General Fraſer? 14.

A. He did.

Q. What paſſed at that council? 15.

A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with death, inſiſted that he ſhould be delivered up; and there were many gentlemen of the army, and I own I was one of the number, who feared that he would put that threat in execution. Motives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it; and if he had not pardoned the man, which he did, I believe the total defection of the Indians would have enſued, and the conſequences, on their return through Canada, might have been dreadful; not to ſpeak of the weight they would have thrown into the oppoſite ſcale, had they gone over to the enemy, which I rather imagine would have been the caſe.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's reſtraining the Indian parties from going out without a Britiſh officer or proper conductor, who were to be reſponſible for their behaviour? 16.

A. I do.

Q. Do you remember Mr. St. Luc's reporting diſcontents amongſt the Indians, ſoon after our arrival at Fort Edward? 17.

A. I do.

Q. How long was that after enforcing the reſtraints above mentioned? 18.

A. I can't exactly ſay; I ſhould imagine about three weeks or a month.

Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect General Burgoyne's telling Mr. St. Luc, that he had rather loſe every Indian, than connive at their enormities, or uſing language to that effect? 19.

A. I do.

Q. Does your Lordſhip remember what paſſed in council with the Indians at Fort Edward? 20.

A. To the beſt of my recollection, much the ſame exhortation to act with humanity, and much the ſame rewards were offered for ſaving their priſoners.

21. Q. Do you recollect the circumſtance of the Indians deſiring to return home at that time?

A. I do, perfectly well.

22. Q. Do you remember that many quitted the army without leave?

A. I do, immediately after the council, and the next morning.

23. Q. Was it not the general opinion that the defection of the Indians, then and afterwards, was cauſed by the reſtraint upon their cruelties and habits of plunder?

A. It was.

24. Q. Had you reaſon to believe that the expedition to Bennington was much deſired by General Reideſel, and that it was his wiſh to have it conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Baume?

A. It was always imagined in the army, that it was his wiſh, and that Colonel Baume was appointed to the command of it in compliment to him.

25. Q. Did you know the corps of Britiſh, commanded by Captain Fraſer, which made part of that expedition?

A. They were volunteers from the Britiſh regiments, and alſo ſtood very high in the opinion of the army, from their gallant behaviour on all occaſions.

26. Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's viſiting the detachment after it was aſſembled, and conferring with Colonel Baume?

A. I do.

27. Q. Did Colonel Baume appear ſatisfied with the ſtrength of his corps?

A. I converſed with Colonel Baume, and with ſeveral officers under his command, and they appeared perfectly ſatisfied, at leaſt I heard no complaint from them; the only anxiety they expreſſed was, leſt the deſtination of that corps ſhould become known to the enemy.

28. Q. Does your Lordſhip remember General Burgoyne's receiving, in the night, a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Baume, expreſſing he found the enemy in greater force than he expected?

A. I do.

29. Q. Do you remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Burgoyne's aid du camp, being ſent with orders to Colonel Breyman to march immediately to ſupport him?

A. I do.

30. Q. Did you communicate the ſame order to General Reideſel at the ſame time?

A. I did.

31. Q. Was Colonel Breyman the neareſt corps for the purpoſe of that ſupport?

A. It was.

32. Q. Did Brigadier General Fraſer at all times treat your Lordſhip with great confidence?

A. I was

A. I was often with General Fraſer, and he frequently talked without reſerve upon matters which he was not particularly bound to conceal. There were certain matters of intelligence which it would have been improper for him to mention to any body. In this caſe I cannot boaſt ſo much of his confidence, as to ſuppoſe that he would have opened his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed from the reſt of his friends.

Q. Have you not frequently been preſent when General Burgoyne and General Fraſer diſcuſſed the object of the campaign, and converſed freely on the circumſtances of the time? 33.

A. I have.

Q. Did your Lordſhip ever, in preſence or abſence of General Burgoyne, hear General Fraſer expreſs a diſapprobation of paſſing the Hudſon's River? 34.

A. I never did?

Q. Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our way to Albany was prevalent throughout the army? 35.

A. In every converſation I had with different officers of the army, I never remember once to have heard it doubted, but that we were to force our way.

Q. Did the army paſs the Hudſon's River with alacrity? 36.

A. It is impoſſible for any army to have been in higher ſpirits than they were at that time, or more deſirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy.

Q. Do you not conceive, that to have remained poſted behind the Hudſon's River, at the time the army paſſed it and advanced, would have caſt a damp on the ſpirits of that army and a reflection on their General? 37.

A. From the eagerneſs of the army to advance and the great uneaſineſs that was diſcernible through it on every delay, I apprehended that it could not have been otherwiſe; and I think that General Burgoyne's character would not have ſtood very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy, had he halted at Fort Edward.

Q. Do you recollect the march up to the enemy on the 19th of September? 38.

A. I do.

Q. Will you pleaſe to deſcribe it? 39.

A. The army marched in three diviſions; the German line flanking, the artillery and baggage purſued the courſe of the river through the meadows, and formed the left hand diviſion; the Britiſh line marched parallel to it at ſome diſtance through the woods, and formed the centre diviſion; General Fraſer's corps, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour through the woods, and formed the right hand diviſion or column. Beyond this, on the right, there were, as I underſtand, flanking parties of light infantry and Provincials?

Q. Was the country, over which the army paſſed, interſected with a deep ravine? 40.

A. It was one of the deepeſt I ever ſaw.

Q. Which column was firſt attacked? 41.

A. The advanced party, conſiſting of the picquets of the centre column, being ſent forwards,

forwards, under the command of Major Forbes, to explore the way by which that column was to paſs, fell in with a conſiderable body of the rebels, poſted in a houſe and behind fences, which they attacked, and after a great deal of fire, the detachment nearly drove in the body of rebels; but on finding that the woods quite round them were filled with the enemy, they were obliged to retire to the main body.

42. Q. Was the march ſo performed that when General Burgoyne formed the line of the Britiſh infantry, General Fraſer's corps were ready upon their right to ſupport them?

A. General Fraſer, on hearing the fire of Major Forbes's party, detached two companies to ſupport them, which came up juſt after that engagement was over; and on their appearance the enemy finding that our troops were in ſtrength, quitted the poſt they had before occupied, and, immediately after this, the whole line was formed with the utmoſt regularity. I would explain, that when I ſpeak of the line, I do not include the left hand column which was compoſed of Germans, and which did not come into the line or into action till late in the day.

43. Q. How long did the action laſt?

A. From three o'clock, I think, till very near eight.

44. Q. How long were the 20th, 21ſt, and 62d regiments engaged?

A. During the greateſt part of that time.

45. Q. Was the action well diſputed by the enemy?

A. It was, very obſtinately.

46. Q. Was your Lordſhip near the perſon of General Burgoyne during that action, except when you were employed to carry orders?

A. Yes.

47. Q. Were not different attempts made by the General's orders to charge the enemy with bayonets, and did not thoſe attempts fail by the heavineſs of the enemy's fire and thickneſs of the woods?

A. There were many attempts made for that purpoſe, and they all failed except the laſt, when the Britiſh troops finally drove them out of the field.

48. Q. When part of the German troops did get into action that day under General Reideſel, how did they behave?

A. I heard their behaviour ſpoke of in the higheſt terms; they marched up to the enemy with great coolneſs and ſteadineſs, and gave them, as I was told, three vollies by word of command from their officers.

49. Q. Can your Lordſhip ſpeak to the loſs ſuſtained by the three Britiſh regiments, the 62d in particular?

A. The loſs was very conſiderable; but I don't recollect the numbers.

50. Q. Were thoſe three Britiſh regiments in a condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning?

A. Their numbers were ſo reduced, that I apprehend they were not.

51. Q. From the loſs of killed and wounded, particularly of officers, would it have been deſirable to have brought thoſe three regiments into action for the next ten days?

A. In leſs than ten days the ſtate of thoſe regiments certainly would not have been

been much mended; I therefore apprehend, that if they were not in a condition to be brought into action the next morning, their inability would have ſtill continued for thoſe ten days.

Q. Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy's entrenchments before the redoubts were conſtructed that commanded the plain near the river, would not all the bateaux, ſtores, and hoſpitals have been expoſed to attack? 52.

A. It certainly would have been ſo.

Q. Do you recollect the ſcarcity of forage on the weſt-ſide of the river? 53.

A. I do perfectly.

Q. Would not the bridge of boats, conſtructed for the purpoſe of foraging to the eaſt ſide, have alſo been expoſed before the redoubts, above mentioned, were raiſed? 54.

A. They certainly would, had it not been for thoſe redoubts and a work called the *Tête du pont*, which was raiſed for the protection of the bridge.

Q. Do you recollect how long it took to raiſe thoſe redoubts, to throw the bridge, and raiſe the *Tête du pont?* 55.

A. If I recollect right, the bridge itſelf was finiſhed in one night; the making and compleating the other works took ſome days.

Q. Does your Lordſhip remember General Burgoyne mentioning to you in confidence, the receipt of a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, and his hourly expectation of his attacking the Highlands, and his opinion that his ſucceſs there muſt diſlodge the enemy without attacking their entrenchments? 56.

A. I perfectly recollect the General's mentioning all this to me.

Q. Was you near General Burgoyne in the action of the 7th of October? 57.

A. I was.

Q. Do you recollect what orders you carried? 58.

A. I do.

Q. What were they? 59.

A. The firſt orders I recollect to have carried, were to poſt fifty men under the command of a captain of the 20th regiment, to the left of the detachment of the army, in order, in ſome meaſure, to join them to the advanced works of General Fraſer's camp, and, in caſe of any accident, to protect the detachment, ſhould they find it neceſſary, to retire thither.

The next orders I carried were to Major General Phillips, at the end of the action, acquainting him, that as that detachment ſeemed much diſordered from the enemy having turned both their flanks, that it was neceſſary to draw it as ſoon as poſſible back to the camp, which ſeemed menaced with an attack; the care of this General Burgoyne committed to General Phillips, while he himſelf returned to the camp, in order to take proper meaſures for its defence. On our return thither the works of the camp were actually attacked as General Burgoyne had foreſeen, and I was then employed to collect what troops I ſhould meet, and to order them to thoſe parts where they were moſt wanted. Soon after this, the enemy having got round the right of our camp, we expected an attack upon our rear, and I then was diſpatched with orders from General Burgoyne to Brigadier General Hamilton, for all the works in

the rear of the camp, which had been previouſly conſtructed, to be manned with ſuch ſoldiers as he could ſpare from the defence of the front.

60. Q. Does your Lordſhip know what orders Sir Francis Clarke was charged with, at the time he received his wound?

A. I met Sir Francis Clarke as I was ſearching for General Phillips, and acquainted him with my orders, telling him at the ſame time, that as the thickneſs of the wood might prevent my finding General Phillips directly, I wiſhed he would aſſiſt me, in order that no time might be loſt in delivering thoſe orders; that was the laſt time I ſaw Sir Francis Clarke, and I believe that ſoon afterwards he received the wound of which he died?

61. Q. Was it dark before General Burgoyne had a certainty that Col. Breyman was killed, and his poſt carried by the enemy?

A. It was ſo dark that the officer, who I believe firſt brought the intelligence of it, ſeeing a number of men round the fires of that camp, took them for Germans, and was not convinced of his error till he was fired upon by them, as they proved to be a party of the enemy who had forced the works.

62. Q. Did General Burgoyne uſe any efforts to rally the Germans who were returning from the action, and to perſuade them to recover Colonel Breyman's poſt?

A. He certainly did his utmoſt endeavours for that purpoſe, which however were ineffectual from the darkneſs of the night, and the entire confuſion in which they were.

63. Q. Were any other troops at hand that could have been ſpared for that purpoſe?

A. There certainly were not; every regiment was occupied in defence of its own lines which were not certainly overmanned.

64. Q. In the heat of the action do you recollect ſeeing General Reideſel about the time that the Germans, on the left of the Britiſh artillery, were giving way?

A. I do.

65. Q. Was not General Reideſel exerting himſelf to reſtore order in his troops?

A. General Reideſel appeared to me to have behaved, on that occaſion, in every way as became a brave and intelligent officer.

66. Q. Was the retreat of the army in the night of the 7th made in good order, and a new poſition taken by the time it was day-light?

A. It certainly was.

67. Q. Was the army under arms the whole day of the 8th, and in continual expectation of action?

A. They were, and indeed were cannonaded during the greateſt part of that day, and the advanced corps in particular, who were poſted on a hill, were under almoſt a continual fire from the rifleмen of the enemy.

68. Q. Do you recollect the circumſtance of General Fraſer's funeral on the afternoon of that day?

A. I do, perfectly well; the redoubt in which he was buried was very heavily cannonaded during the ceremony, and even previous to this they fired at thoſe who attended

attended the corpſe on its way thither, which I ſuppoſe was accidental, and proceeded from the enemy's ſeeing a number of people together.

Q. Who were the chief perſons who attended that funeral? 69.

A. All the generals of the army, their aid du camps, and I believe all thoſe who were not attached to any particular poſt, which at that time were very few.

Q. Was the retreat of the army on the night of the 8th, and on the day and part of the night of the 9th, made in good order? 70.

A. It was made in perfect good order.

Q. What was the weather on the day of the 9th? 71.

A. Exceeding wet. 72.

Q. What was the ſtate of the troops, in point of fatigue, when they arrived at Saratoga?

A. They certainly muſt have been much fatigued, from the length of time they had been under arms, and more particularly ſo from the badneſs of the roads, occaſioned by the rains.

Q. When it was day-light the next morning, did you ſee any part of the enemy upon the plain at Saratoga, on the ground where our artillery was afterwards poſted? 73.

A. I don't recollect.

Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect ſeeing a corps of the enemy on the other ſide the Hudſon's River oppoſite to Saratoga? 74.

A. Perfectly well; and they ſeemed in force.

Q. Do you remember the circumſtance of a battery opening from that corps? 75.

A. I do perfectly well. The general, General Phillips, and ſeveral other gentlemen were at dinner. We were all obliged to remove, from finding ourſelves in the range of that battery.

Q. We being in the range of that battery, muſt it not neceſſarily have commanded the ford on the Hudſon's River? 76.

A. It certainly did command that ford.

Q. Do you recollect Lieut. Col. Sutherland being ſent with a detachment of regulars and provincials from Saratoga, to cover a party of workmen employed to repair bridges, and render the road practicable? 77.

A. I perfectly recollect it.

Q. Do you recollect for what reaſon Colonel Sutherland and the regulars were recalled? 78.

A. I underſtood it was on the apprehenſion of an action.

Q. Does your Lordſhip recollect different ſcouts bringing reports of the enemy's being in poſſeſſion of the country between Saratoga and Fort Edward, on both ſides of the river? 79.

A. I do.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne's mentioning, in confidence to you, different ideas of forcing the ford over Hudſon's River; of cutting away by the enemy's right, and attempting a rapid march to Albany; or by a night march to gain the fords above Fort Edward? 80.

A. I do perfectly remember that he mentioned to me all thoſe ideas.

Q. Did

81. Q. Did you ever hear of an offer made by General Phillips to make his way to Ticonderoga with a body of troops?

A. No.

82. Q. In the intimacy in which you lived with Major General Phillips, myſelf, and the officers in General Phillips's family, do you not think you ſhould have heard of ſuch an offer had it been made?

A. I apprehend that I ſhould have heard of it.

83. Q. Did your Lordſhip hear of General Phillips offering to attempt an eſcape through the woods, with one or two guides, for the purpoſe of putting himſelf at the head of the troops at Ticonderoga, for the future defence of that place?

A. I heard it mentioned ſince I came to England, in ſome common converſation; but I never heard it hinted at while I was in America.

84. Q. The day before the council of the generals and field officers was called, can your Lordſhip ſpeak of the ſtate of things in general at Saratoga?

A. The ſtate of our army was certainly as bad as poſſible. Their numbers were few, their proviſions ſhort, and their poſition not a good one, owing to the nature of the country, which roſe to the diſtance of ſome miles, one hill overtopping that which was next to it.

85. Q. Do you know any officer of that army who, in that ſituation, thought we had a right to more than honourable terms?

A. Our ſituation, in the apprehenſion of every one there with whom I converſed, did not entitle us to more.

86. Q. Did the army in general look on the terms obtained, namely, the power of ſerving their country in other places, to be advantageous as well as honourable, and more than they had a right to expect?

A. I believe they certainly did; and that few perſons in the army expected ſo good terms as thoſe which were granted.

Examined by other Members of the Committee, and by General Burgoyne occaſionally.

87. Q. Did the Indians leave the army till after the battle of Bennington?

A. Great numbers did, and at many different times.

88. Q. Were not ſome Indians on the expedition to Bennington?

A. There were.

89. Q. Was the expedition originally ſent out to Bennington?

A. My ſituation in the army not entitling me to be in the council of war, and not being employed on that expedition, I was of courſe not entruſted with the orders that were given to Col. Baume.

90. Q. Have you reaſon to ſuppoſe that General Reideſel or Colonel Baume had a particular knowledge of that part of the country, ſo as to make it particularly proper to give Colonel Baume the command of that expedition?

A. I believe there was no officer in that army of ſufficient rank to have commanded ſuch an expedition, who ever had been in that particular part of the country.

Q. The

Q. The intention of the expedition being, as appears by the papers on the table, to ſound the diſpoſition of the people of that country, was that part of the country peopled with Germans, as many other parts of the country are? 91.

A. I can't exactly ſpeak to the deſcription of the people of that country, as I was never there myſelf; but there were employed on that expedition numbers of provincials, many of whom were of that very country; and I apprehend that the common ſoldiers of a regular army are not the immediate people who are expected to ſound the minds of any country to which they are ſent.

Q. As your Lordſhip mentioned the alacrity with which the army paſſed the Hudſon's River, did the army in general think themſelves at that time inadequate to the purpoſe of forcing their way to Albany? 92.

A. The opinions of an army, who cannot be acquainted with the intelligence that has been received, are often erroneous. The army was in high ſpirits, and did not, I believe, doubt of reaching Albany.

Q. Did the General then doubt of reaching Albany? 93.

A. I really don't know.

Q. Were the rebels' entrenchments completed on the 19th of September? 94.

A. I never ſaw the entrenchments at all.

Q. How was our army employed between the 19th of September and the 7th of October? 95.

A. The army itſelf was employed in ſtrengthening its poſition.

Q. Did it take the army eighteen days to ſtrengthen its poſition before it made any movement? 96.

A. I can't exactly ſay. They were working all the time.

Q. What works were executed in that time? 97.

A. There were numbers of redoubts erected; the tête-du-pont; lines before the camp; outworks to the lines, in which guards and picquets were placed; and batteries.

Q. How many redoubts were erected? 98.

A. I think in all there muſt have been five or ſix.

Q. Was the erecting thoſe works full employment for eighteen days? 99.

A. I am not an engineer, or I certainly ſhould endeavour to anſwer that queſtion.

Q. Were all thoſe works neceſſary, in your opinion, for an army that meant to march forward and attack the enemy? 100.

A. They were neceſſary in our particular ſituation, being within half a mile of the enemy, to whom we were oppoſed, and being inferior in numbers.

Q. Does your Lordſhip know whether the enemy thought it neceſſary to fortify themſelves with redoubts? 101.

A. I don't know what the ſpecies of their fortification was; but I have been always told that great labour had been employed on their works; and what ſmall part I ſaw of them convinced me of it.

Q. Had you not information from deſerters or friends what the enemy was doing? 102.

A. My ſituation in that army did not entitle me to receive that intelligence. When any perſon came to me to inform me that he had been employed in gaining ſuch intelligence, my duty was to bring him to the General.

103. Q. Was it not a matter of notoriety in the army, that the enemy received reinforcement between the 19th of September and the 7th of October?

A. The manner of receiving intelligence in an army ſeldom tranſpires; the army might gueſs, but I believe they knew nothing.

104. Q. Was it not underſtood that the rebels had ſuffered a much greater loſs than the king's troops on the 19th of September?

A. It was.

105. Q. Was not the whole, or nearly the whole, of the rebel army engaged?

A. I don't know; I apprehend the whole was not engaged.

106. Q. Was our army in general, in your apprehenſion, in as good a condition on the 20th of September as the rebel army, who had ſuffered much more?

A. The rebel army was ſo numerous that their loſs was not equally felt with ours.

107. Q. What number had you reaſon to ſuppoſe the rebel army conſiſted of on the 19th of September?

A. I always underſtood they were very numerous. I never heard their numbers exactly.

108. Q. Was not the ſcarcity of forage foreſeen by every body?

A. Thoſe with whom I converſed did not foreſee it to the extent in which we experienced it.

109. Q. Was it prudent, in your Lordſhip's opinion, to bring, or attempt to bring, upwards of fourteen hundred horſes to attend the army, in a country ſo deſtitute of forage?

A. I never heard that the horſes in our army were thought too numerous. On all occaſions a ſcarcity of them was complained of.

110. Q. Do you know how many horſes were allowed for the baggage of each regiment?

A. I don't know.

111. Q. Does your Lordſhip know how many horſes were employed about the train of artillery?

A. I don't recollect; but the returns are on the table.

112. Q. Was the heavy artillery brought back from Stillwater, on the retreat of the army to Saratoga?

A. We had loſt ſome ſmall part of it, and the reſt was brought to Saratoga.

113. Q. Did the bringing back of that artillery delay that retreat or not?

A. An army with cannon certainly cannot march ſo rapidly as one without cannon; but cannon always creates a delay which armies have been content to put up with.

114. Q. Was it neceſſary, in your opinion, in the ſituation in which the army retreated, to make their retreat as expeditious as poſſible?

A. The army appeared to me that it did make its retreat as expeditious as poſſible.

115. Q. Would the leaving of heavy artillery behind, in your opinion, have made a difference of four miles in the march?

A. I can't conceive that it would. The enemy were in force behind us; not having numbers to contend with them, it would have been a very deſperate circumſtance to have abandoned our cannon, in caſe of an attack.

Q. Were the heavy artillery, in effect, of any uſe in that retreat? 116.

A. I don't recollect as it happened, that they were of any other uſe than that of their not being turned againſt us.

Q. Might not thoſe cannon have been ſpiked, and their trunnions have been knocked off, to have rendered them uſeleſs? 117.

A. I underſtand that the ſpikes in cannon are eaſily removed, and that it is not an eaſy matter, I believe almoſt an impoſſibility, with any tools that are carried in an army, to knock off the trunnions of braſs cannon.

Q. Might not the retreat have been accelerated by leaving behind a great part of the baggage? 118.

A. I don't think it would. I do not remember that we were ſtopt on account of any particular impediment.

Q. Does your Lordſhip know at what time intelligence was received in General Burgoyne's army of the failure of Colonel St. Leger's expedition? 119.

A. I think it muſt have been in the month of Auguſt.

Q. Was not that before the paſſing of Hudſon's River? 120.

A. I don't recollect the exact date of receiving that intelligence.

Q. Was it in the month of Auguſt? 121.

A. I cannot tell. I heard of it ſome time after by accident.

Q. Was there any heavy artillery with the army, properly ſo called? 122.

A There was none of the heavy ſort; we had medium twelve-pounders, and two twenty-four pounders, which we took from the enemy at Quebec, which were very much lighter than thoſe twelve-pounders.

Q. From the ſtate of the fatigue of the troops, when they arrived at Saratoga, do you apprehend they could have continued their march though there had been no artillery? 123. By Gen. Burgoyne.

A. The army was certainly very much fatigued. I believe they could have got but very little further. They certainly were not in a ſtate for a long march.

Q. If the battle expected at Saratoga had been on the plain, would not the heavieſt artillery we had have been one of our beſt dependencies? 124. By General Burgoyne.

A. It certainly would; it would have given us a manifeſt ſuperiority in that particular.

Q. If the army had not been provided with the number of horſes they had, by what means would their proviſions or bateaux have been tranſported in places where the river was not navigable? 125. By General Burgoyne.

A. The tranſportation of the bateaux and proviſions could not certainly have been carried on.

Q. Were there not ſuch places on the Hudſon's River between Fort Edward and Albany? 126. By General Burgoyne.

A. There were.

Q. Is it not at any rate a principal object with every army, and of a retreating one in particular, to preſerve their artillery if it be poſſible, even at the expence of ſome labour and delay; and for the uſe they might be of to them afterwards, as well as on the retreat? 127. By other members.

A. I apprehend the cannon are ſeldom abandoned, but through abſolute neceſſity.

128. Q. Whether in general you can inform the committee, whether the army had a confidence in the general?

A. They certainly had a confidence in the general, and I do not believe that they have altered their opinion.

129. Q. Did the army then in general, and the officers in particular, entertain a favourable opinion of the general's conduct, capacity, and attachment to them in the various ſcenes in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very trying occaſions?

A. I don't recollect that any officer, with whom I have had converſation, has ever expreſſed himſelf in different terms, and I believe there never was an army more deſervedly pleaſed with the conduct of their general.

130. Q. Whether the army expreſſed any diſſatisfaction at the general's return home; that is, whether they thought he came with any purpoſes not friendly to them, or looked on themſelves as deſerted by him?

A. I was not with the army when General Burgoyne came away; but I have converſed with many officers who have come from it, and they expreſs no diſſatisfaction on that head, much leſs looked on or conſidered General Burgoyne's intentions as inimical to them.

131. Q. What was the ſtate of the American artillery, and how was it ſerved?

A. Except on a few occaſions, I do not remember their having made much uſe of their cannon; I thought on thoſe occaſions that they ſerved them ſlowly, but not ill.

132. Q. Whether all circumſtances conſidered at the time of the affair of Saratoga, the retreat of the army was practicable, either with or without artillery?

A. I thought it was impracticable.

133. Q. Whether after the convention at Saratoga you went to Albany?

A. Yes.

134. Q. Whether you had any opportunity of obſerving the nature of the country, if it was ſtrong or woody, clear or open?

A. Very ſtrong and woody, and a great number of hills.

135. Q. What was the diſtance?

A. I don't exactly recollect; about thirty-two miles.

136. Q. Was the ſituation of Albany a ſtrong ſituation, or was it commanded by hills round it?

A. The ſituation of Albany was in a bottom very much commanded.

137. Q. If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence might they have drawn their ſubſiſtence, if the country had been againſt them?

A. I don't know enough of the country to anſwer that queſtion.

138. Q. Muſt they not have drawn their ſubſiſtence from New York?

A. I apprehend ſo, if they were not maſters of the Mohawk country.

139. Q. Had you any opportunity of obſerving the extent of clear or cultivated country round Albany?

A. I can't very juſtly deſcribe it, not having gone out of the town of Albany, from the time I came into it, till I embarked for New York.

Q. Do

Q. Do you think that, circumſtanced as the army was after the engagement of the 19th of September, it would have been more advantageous to have returned than to have ſtayed and fortified the camp? 140.

A. As matters have turned out, it certainly might; but I believe no one thought ſo at that time. [*Withdrew.*

MAJOR FORBES called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

Q. WAS you major of the 9th regiment, and preſent with that regiment in the action near Fort Anne? 1.

A. I was.

Q. What was the behaviour of the enemy on that occaſion? 2.

A. At half paſt ten in the morning, they attacked us in front with a heavy and well-directed fire; a large body of them paſſed the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood acroſs the creek on the left flank of the regiment; they then began to re-croſs the creek, and attack us in the rear: we then found it neceſſary to change our ground, to prevent the regiments being ſurrounded; we took poſt on the top of a high hill to our right. As ſoon as we had taken poſt, the enemy made a very vigorous attack, which continued for upwards of two hours; and they certainly would have forced us, had it not been for ſome Indians that arrived and gave the Indian whoop, which we anſwered with three cheers; the rebels ſoon after that gave way.

Q. What command had you on the 19th of September? 3.

A. I commanded the picquets of the Britiſh.

Q. Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree of vigour? 4.

A. I was attacked with great vigour from behind railed fences, and a houſe, by a body of riflemen and light infantry.

Q. Was you wounded in that affair? 5.

A. Very early in the day.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne bringing up the Britiſh line to ſupport you, and forming at the firſt opening of the wood? 6.

A. I do.

Q. Did General Fraſer's corps arrive preciſely in time to occupy the heights on the right of the Britiſh line when the action began? 7.

A. It did, and two companies of light infantry came to my ſupport.

Q. Where did General Burgoyne poſt the 9th regiment? 8.

A. As

A. As ſoon as they came out of the wood, they filed off to the right, and were drawn off at a ſmall diſtance from the left of General Fraſer's corps, with orders to occupy two houſes, one company in each, and defend them to the laſt extremity.

9. Q. Had you an opportunity in that ſituation to obſerve the ſtreſs of the action?

A. I had while we remained in that poſition.

10. Q. What was the progreſs of it?

A. The twenty-firſt and ſixty-ſecond regiments were drawn up on our left, and were attacked about three o'clock on the ſame ground where the picquets had been attacked. About that time I heard a great deal of firing to my right with the advanced corps; an officer came up to General Burgoyne, and acquainted him that the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the ſixty-ſecond regiment, on which he diſpatched an aid-de-camp with orders to the twentieth regiment to form on the left of the ſixty-ſecond; immediately after, ſome companies of the light infantry came to occupy the ground the ninth were drawn up on; the ninth were then ordered behind a deep ravine, to form a corps-de-reſerve I ſaw nothing of the action after that.

11. Q. What was the ſtrength of the ninth regiment on that day before they ſuſtained any loſs?

A. On the 15th of the month the weekly return was given in, and, to the beſt of my recollection, they were two hundred and fifty and odd rank and file fit for duty.

12. Q. What was the ſtrength of the other regiments in the Britiſh line?

A. I cannot ſpeak with any certainty, as I did not ſee the returns; but on talking with different commanding officers: the four Britiſh regiments were about one thouſand one hundred, and the advanced corps about one thouſand two hundred.

13. Q. Where was the twenty-fourth regiment?

A. With the advanced corps.

14. Q. Where was the forty-ſeventh regiment?

A. Six companies of the forty-ſeventh regiment that were with that army, were employed as a guard to the bateaux and proviſions, and two with the advanced corps.

15. Q. Where were the other two companies of that regiment left?

A. One at Fort George, and another on an iſland in Lake George.

16. Q. Of the eleven hundred which compoſed the line on that day, do you know how many were loſt and diſabled in the action?

A. I have heard the ſurgeon of the hoſpital ſay, that there were more than five hundred of the whole in the hoſpital, but I can't ſpeak to how many of the line.

17. Q. Can you ſay how many were killed?

A. I can't.

18. Q. Can you ſay how many officers were killed and wounded?

A. I can't immediately.

Q. Were

Q. Were the Britiſh troops in a condition to have attacked an enemy in intrenchments after the action? 19.

A. After the action of the 19th, I went to the hoſpital to get my wounds dreſſed, and did not join the regiment till the 8th of October; I can't therefore give an opinion of my own: but I have heard ſeveral officers ſay, they did not think it would have been prudent or right from the loſs they had ſuſtained the day before.

Q. Did the regiments begin to be encreaſed in their ſtrength from the recovered men to any conſiderable degree in leſs than eight or ten days? 20.

A. Not that I know of. I was at the hoſpital at the time.

Q. Being in the hoſpital, had you occaſion to know that the regiments were ſtronger from the receipt of their recovered men on the 7th of October, than they were at any time between the 19th of September and that day? 21.

A. I know that ſeveral men were diſcharged from the hoſpitals ſo far recovered as to enable them to do their duty.

Q. At what time did the troops arrive at Saratoga? 22.

A. About eight o'clock at night on the 9th.

Q. Do you know how long the troops had then been under arms, and without repoſe or regular refreſhment? 23.

A. From the 7th in the morning.

Q. Had they been in action, or in continual expectation of action, during that whole time? 24.

A. I was in the front of the army, and I heard a great deal of firing in the rear, and we conſtantly expected and looked for an attack.

Q. Did the battery of the enemy on the other ſide of the river at Saratoga command the fort on that river? 25.

A. It did.

Q. Was the ground ſuch on our ſide as would have enabled our artillery to have ſilenced that battery? 26.

A. It did not appear to me that it could.

Q. Had the paſſage of the ford been effected, and the army have proceeded towards Fort Edward, on the eaſt ſide of the river, muſt they not neceſſarily have paſſed Batten Hill? 27.

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Do you remember the ford at Batten-Hill? 28.

A. Yes.

Q. Would it have been poſſible for the army to have paſſed that ford without artillery to cover them, and the enemy poſted on the other ſide? 29.

A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of ſeeing the twentieth regiment paſs that ford without an enemy to oppoſe them, and they took a conſiderable time, owing to the depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, and the ſtones being remarkable ſlippery, ſo that ſeveral of them fell into the river.

Q. Was you preſent at all the councils of war to which the field officers of the army were called at Saratoga? 30.

A. I was.

Q. Do

31. Q. Do you remember whether General Burgoyne ſtated the difficulties of the time, and that he mentioned his readineſs to undertake any meaſure they ſhould think for the honour of the Britiſh arms ?

A. I do remember it.

32. Q. Was the council unanimous to treat with the enemy on honourable terms?

A. They were.

33. Q. When the firſt terms propoſed by General Gates were read to them, were they unanimous to reject them ?

A. They were.

34. Q. After it was decided by a majority of the council that the treaty could not be ſuſpended without breach of faith, were not the council then unanimous to ſign it on that day ?

A. As the majority of the council had given it as their opinion that the public faith was pledged, the council thought that there was no time to be loſt, and that it ought to be ſigned immediately.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occaſionally.

35. Q. Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was completely entrenched on the 19th of September ?

A. I don't know.

36. Q. Had you any reaſon to believe from information that they completed their entrenchments afterwards ?

A. I underſtood they had—I don't ſpeak from authority.

37. Q. Had you reaſon to think that the rebels received conſiderable reinforcements between the 19th of September and the 7th of October ?

A. I did not hear that they had.

38. Q. Suppoſing the rebels to have received reinforcements, could any acceſſion of ſtrength to our army from the recovery of any number you can ſuppoſe of the 500 that were in the hoſpital, be equal to a reinforcement of even 500 men received by the enemy ?

A. I cannot take upon me to ſay.

39. Q. From being in the hoſpital yourſelf, how many of the 500 do you judge joined the army ?

A. I can't pretend to ſay.

40. Q. Do you judge in your own opinion, putting all the circumſtances you can together, whether the enemy were more likely to be forced on the 20th of September or a day or two after, than on the 7th of October ?

A. It is impoſſible for me to judge—I did not know their ſtrength on the 19th of September, or what reinforcements they received before the 7th of October.

41. Q. Did you apprehend the army might have made their retreat good to Canada immediately after the action of the 19th of September ?

A. That

A. That depended entirely on circumſtances.

Q. Judging from the circumſtances you then knew, what is your opinion? 42.

A. I was not more acquainted with the circumſtances of the 19th of September than with thoſe of the 7th of October.

Q. If the army had had three weeks more proviſions when they began their retreat, would not that have been a material circumſtance to them towards making good their retreat? 43.

A. The army could have defended themſelves longer in their entrenchments at Saratoga if they had had more proviſions.

Q. Had you known, immediately after the action of the 19th of September, that a letter had been received from Sir Henry Clinton, mentioning his intention to attack the highlands about that time, would you have thought either a retreat or an immediate attack on the enemy adviſeable? 44. By General Burgoyne.

A. Certainly not.

Q. Do you know whether a council of war was called on the 20th of September, or immediately after the engagement of the 19th of September? 45. By other Members.

A. I don't know that there was.

Q. Did the army in which you ſerved, in its approach to Albany, expect a co-operation from Sir William Howe on the North River? 46.

A. We did.

Q. Do you believe if the army under Sir William Howe, inſtead of going by ſea up the Cheſapeak to Philadelphia, had operated upon the North River to effect a junction with General Burgoyne's army, conſidering alſo the panic that prevailed after the taking of Ticonderoga, that the army under General Burgoyne would have been made priſoners? 47.

A. I ſhould think not.

Q. Did you expect any great oppoſition from the rebel army after the taking Ticonderoga? 48.

A. I did not.

Q. Upon what grounds did you ſo poſitively expect a co-operation with Sir William Howe's army? 49.

A. From General Burgoyne's orders.

Q. Did you ever ſee General Burgoyne's orders? 50.

A. Every day during the campaign.

Q. By what orders of General Burgoyne did you expect a co-operation? 51.

A. Early in October General Burgoyne gave it out in orders that there were powerful armies of the King's then co-operating with ours.

Q. Did not thoſe orders give ſpirits to General Burgoyne's army? 52.

A. Situated as our army was, every proſpect of reinforcement muſt certainly give us ſpirits.

Q. Did you ever hear of any co-operation before thoſe orders of General Burgoyne's in October? 53.

A. It was generally talked of in the army, but not by authority.

Q. Whether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River had taken place in time, it would not have been looked on as a very advantageous co-operation with General Burgoyne's army? 54.

A. It might have been attended with very good conſequences.

55. Q. What ſituation in general, and particularly with regard to proviſions, was General Burgoyne's army in, at the time you mentioned thoſe encouraging hopes of co-operation in his orders?

A. The army was put on ſhort allowance at that time.

56. Q. Whether in military affairs a powerful diverſion, if well executed, is not known often to anſwer very effectually the purpoſes of co-operation?

A. Certainly very good effects have accrued from powerful diverſions.

57. Q. If there had been a council of war on the 20th of September, or immediately after the engagement of the 19th, ſhould you have known of it?

A. I think I muſt have heard of it.

58. Q. Whether, conſidering the circumſtances of Sir William Howe's having carried his army to Cheſapeak Bay, you ſuppoſed, or ever heard it ſuppoſed, that Sir Henry Clinton would have attempted his operations up the North River ſooner than he did, or previous to the arrival of his reinforcement from Europe?

A. Not knowing Sir Henry Clinton's ſtrength, or his orders, nor the force the enemy had to oppoſe him, it is impoſſible for me to anſwer that queſtion.

59. Q. What effect had it on the ſpirits of General Burgoyne's army when they found there was to be no co-operation between that army and the army of Sir William Howe?

A. We never knew but that there was to be a co-operation.

[*Withdrew.*

CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD, of the Artillery, called in, and examined by General Burgoyne.

1. Q. IN what capacity did you ſerve in the campaign in America in 1776 and 1777?

A. I was major of brigade of the royal artillery.

2. Q. Was you employed by General Phillips, on your return to England, after the campaign of 1776, to ſolicit a further ſupply of artillery for the ſervice of the enſuing campaign?

A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John's, in the month of November, 1776, I was charged with a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, wherein he recommended it

it to make a demand of a further ſupply of artillery and ſtores for the complete equipment of an additional number of gun-boats for the ſervice of Lake Champlain in the enſuing campaign, and likewiſe for the boats themſelves to be ſent out in frame-work. Sir Guy Carleton, on peruſing the letter, diſapproved of the boats being ſent out, but approved of the demand of the ſtores and artillery agreeable to General Phillips's requeſt, and they were accordingly ſent out in the beginning of the year 1777.

Q. At what time did you join the army in the campaign of 1777? 3.

A. I joined the army at Ticonderoga on the 23d of July.

Q. Did you live in the family of General Phillips, and had you occaſion to know his ſentiments reſpecting the artillery department? 4.

A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequent occaſion to know his ſentiments on the ſubject of the artillery in the courſe of my duty as brigade-major.

Q. Did you know, or had you reaſon to believe, that the proportion of artillery employed that campaign was according to the opinion and recommendation of General Phillips? 5.

A. I can have no doubt but that an officer of General Phillips's rank and extenſive experience muſt have determined that point.

Q. What was the diſtribution of the artillery after the enemy evacuated Ticonderoga? 6.

A. The light brigade of artillery proceeded with the army by the way of Skeneſborough; the park brigade and ſtores were conveyed acroſs Lake George in bateaux.

Q. Was not a conſiderable portion of artillery of the heavieſt kind either left at St. John's, ſent back from Ticonderoga, or diſpoſed of in veſſels? 7.

A. It was: there were left at Ticonderoga ſix heavy twelve-pounders, one light twelve-pounder, four light three-pounders, four royal mortars and twelve cohorns. Left on board the Royal George, two heavy twenty-four-pounders, two thirteen-inch mortars, two ten-inch mortars, four eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars and eight cohorns. Sent back to St. John's in the Radau, fourteen heavy twenty-four-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort George, four medium twelve-pounders, two light ſix-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, two royal howitzers. With Colonel St. Leger's expedition to Fort Stanwix were ſent two light ſix-pounders, two light three-pounders, four cohorns. Left at St. John's, four light ſix-pounders, five light three-pounders, four cohorn mortars: that was the diſtribution of artillery that remained after the army had quitted Fort George. The quantity of artillery brought forward with the army were four medium twelve-pounders, two light twenty-four-pounders, eighteen light ſix-pounders, ſix light three-pounders, two eighteen-inch howitzers, four royal howitzers, two eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars.

Q. Was not that park artillery, tho' conſiſting of ſome twenty-four-pounders and ſome twelve pounders, properly field artillery? 8.

A. They certainly were, and have ever been conſidered as ſuch on all field ſervices. Heavy artillery is of a diſtinct nature, and conſiderably heavier than guns of the ſame calibre which we had in the army.

9. Q. Have you ever known a leſs proportion than the brigaded artillery, which was attached to the line and to the advanced corps, allotted to the ſame number of troops?

A. The proportion of field artillery certainly ſhould vary both in quantity and nature according to the variety of circumſtances under which the army is to act; the uſual allotment of light field pieces are two to each battalion; and from a calculation of the number and ſtrength of General Burgoyne's army, I do not conceive that our light field artillery exceeded that proportion.

10. Q. What do you apprehend was the propoſed uſe of artillery in the country in which we were to act?

A. To diſlodge the enemy from ſuch poſts as every where preſent themſelves in that part of the country, and from which it may be impoſſible to diſlodge them without artillery of a more conſiderable calibre than light ſix-pounders.

11. Q. Do you remember the poſition which the enemy evacuated at Schuyler's Iſland?

A. I do perfectly.

12. Q. Had that poſition been maintained, would not artillery of the heavieſt nature we had have been particularly ſerviceable?

A. Provided the poſt could not have been turned, and the enemy had made uſe of every advantage which the ground gave them, I have no doubt but the park artillery would have been abſolutely neceſſary.

13. Q. Had the paſſage of the Hudſon's River, or of Batten Kill been diſputed, would artillery of that nature have been ſerviceable?

A. Doubtleſs it would.

14. Q. Had the enemy taken a poſition at the Forks of the Mohawk River, would artillery of that nature have been ſerviceable?

A. From the imperfect manner in which I ſaw that ground, it appeared capable of being made extremely defenſible, and, of courſe, that ſort of artillery would have been ſerviceable.

15. Q. Had the army reached Albany, and it had been found expedient to fortify a camp there for the winter, would artillery of that nature have been neceſſary?

A. There can be no doubt of it.

16. Q. What do you apprehend to be the chief uſe of howitzers and ſmall mortars in the field.

A. I apprehend they are of infinite ſervice againſt all kinds of log work, abbaties, and againſt entrenchments. The ſmall mortars are particularly uſeful againſt redoubts and other works where the enemy are confined within a ſmall ſpace.

17. Q. Are not log works a ſpecies of fortification peculiar to that country?

A. I never ſaw any elſewhere.

18. Q. Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake George to the place where the army croſſed the Hudſon's River any impediment to the tranſport of proviſions?

A. The tranſport of our artillery and ſtores were conſtantly made by horſes attached

attached to our department, and therefore I do not conceive it did in any manner interfere with the tranſport of proviſions—I mean to confine myſelf in this anſwer to the tranſport from Fort George to the Hudſon's River; for after croſſing the river we had ſome oxen and horſes attached to the ſervice of the artillery, which I believe were before employed in bringing forward proviſions and bateaux.

Q. What time did it take to bring forward the park artillery from Fort George to the bridge of boats over the Hudſon's River? 19.

A. The light brigade and the artillery of the park, with their proper proportion of ſtores and ammunition, had their horſes, carriages, and drivers conſtantly attached to them; it therefore required no more time to carry thoſe ſtores than was neceſſary for the carriages themſelves to paſs from Fort George to the Hudſon's River; but with reſpect to the reſerve which was afterwards tranſported by water in bateaux, I believe two days with all our carriages would eaſily have conveyed them to the Hudſon's River.

Q. Do you remember the poſition of the King's troops from the time of the attack on the 19th of September to the attack on the 7th of October? 20.

A. Yes.

Q. Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy's entrenchments without previouſly conſtructing redoubts on the heights that commanded the plain, would not the bateaux, proviſions and hoſpital have been left open to an attack from the enemy's right? 21.

A. They would have been left expoſed undoubtedly.

Q. Were not the largeſt guns we had the propereſt pieces of artillery for thoſe redoubts? 22.

A. I think it was a ſervice that was exactaly adapted to them.

Q. Do you remember the diſpoſition made by General Burgoyne on the 7th of October? 23.

A. I do.

Q. At what time was you wounded in that attack? 24.

A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it commenced.

Q. What circumſtance of the action did you obſerve before you was wounded, particularly reſpecting the artillery and the enemy's advancing under the fire of the artillery, and what happened to the troops poſted immediately on the left of the artillery? 25.

A. The ground on which the artillery was poſted was a clear ſpot, in a great meaſure ſurrounded by woods, the ſkirts of which on our left was diſtant about two hundred yards where the attack firſt began. The two medium twelve-pounders were poſted on a ſmall eminence, nearly in the center of this cleared ſpot between the German picquets and a detachment of the Heſſe Hanau regiment. On the enemy's column approaching, the fire of the twelve-pounders and the four ſixes was immediately directed towards the enemy's column, notwithſtanding which, they drew up along the ſkirts of the wood behind trees, and after driving in the Germans, kept a pretty warm fire of muſketry on the guns and the troops poſted about them; ſoon after this I heard a firing on the right towards

towards a cleared ſpot, ſeparated from us by a wood on which the light infantry were poſted on very commanding ground. On their retreating, as alſo the twenty-fourth regiment who was drawn up in the wood on our right, the enemy made their appearance on an eminence on our right, and cut off the retreat of the artillery—At this moment I received my wound, and therefore can give no farther account of the circumſtances of that day's action.

Examined by other Members of the Committee.

26. Q. What was the number of horſes in general employed for the artillery after the march from Ticonderoga?

A. The whole number of horſes detached with the Britiſh artillery, previous to the paſſing the Hudſon's River, was about four hundred.

27. Q. How many would have been neceſſary for the field pieces attached to the battalions only?

A. Eighteen ſix-pounders at four horſes each; ſix three-pounders at three horſes each, and two royal howitzers at three horſes each: the remainder were for park artillery, ammunition, and ſtores of all kinds to accommodate the army on its march.

28. Q. Was the forage for theſe horſes procured in the country on their march, or brought from a diſtance?

A. A quantity of oats was brought forward from Canada, but with reſpect to other forage they were under the neceſſity of collecting it in the neighbourhood of the encampment.

29. Q. How many waggons might the bringing on that quantity of oats employ?

A. I believe the quantity of oats after paſſing Fort Edward was ſo trifling that I don't believe it loaded one waggon.

30. Q. After the army arrived at Fort Edward, did any delay or not ariſe to its forward progreſs from bringing on the park artillery, waiting for horſes and drivers for that purpoſe, or to provide forage?

A. The park artillery remained at Fort Edward no longer than was neceſſary during the time the army remained in that neighbourhood: I do not know of any delay whatever from the want of horſes and drivers. Had the park artillery moved forwards ſooner, no end could have been anſwered by it, before the bridge was thrown over the Hudſon's River.

31. Q. Were there any gun-boats ſent out to Quebec for the campaign 1776?

A. There were.

32. Q. Were there a ſufficient number ſent out, in your opinion?

A. It appeared that the naval force was ſuperior to that of the rebels, from the event of that engagement; and therefore I conclude, that for the uſes of that campaign there were a ſufficient number.

33. Q. Did you apprehend, before the event of the action on the lakes, that the number was ſufficient, and went out in time?

A. We

A. We had received very exaggerated accounts of the rebel force on the lakes, and therefore uncommon exertions were uſed to render our force as formidable as poſſible; and probably ſome time was loſt, and the campaign in ſome degree retarded, from that circumſtance.

Q. Would the campaign have been retarded ſo long if a greater number of gun-boats had been ſent out? 34.

A. Certainly not.

Q. What number of artificers were ſent to Canada for the campaign in 1776? 35.

A. I don't immediately recollect the exact number; but I think Colonel Chriſtie engaged about two hundred. I know of no others being ſent out.

Q. Do you know of more being aſked for by the artillery or engineers, as neceſſary for the campaign? 36.

A. I did hear of ſome ſuch intention; but at this diſtance of time I cannot particularly anſwer that queſtion.

Q. Whether the number of artificers ſent out for that campaign were, in any degree, ſufficient for the purpoſe of carrying it on? 37.

A. Certainly not. We were under the neceſſity of collecting all the artificers that could be met with in Canada for the armament of St. John's only, moſt of the bateaux being built by private contract.

Q. Were not the operations of that campaign conſiderably retarded, for want of the number of artificers that were aſked for and not granted? 38.

A. Had the number of artificers been greater, there can be no doubt but the work would have gone on much faſter. With reſpect to the artificers being demanded, I have already ſaid I do not recollect the number.

Q. Were there not horſes neceſſary for conveying the ſtores and ammunition neceſſary for the field train; and how many? 39.

A. The beſt anſwer to that queſtion will, I apprehend, be a ſtate of the number of horſes actually attached to the ſeveral brigades of artillery, ſince the allotment of ſtores and ammunition were exactly proportioned to the number of pieces which they accompanied.——

Anſwer interrupted going into the detail.

[The brigade attached to the advanced corps of light artillery conſiſted of eighty-five——]

Q. How many horſes might have been ſpared, if the heavy park of artillery had not attended the army? 40.

A. It would have made a difference of two hundred and thirty-ſeven horſes.

Q. Was the army furniſhed with carts to have employed thoſe two hundred and thirty-ſeven horſes? 41.

A. I really cannot anſwer that queſtion of my own knowledge.

[*Withdrew.*

Jovis

Jovis 3° die Junii, 1779.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KINGSTON called in, and examined by General Burgoyne.

1. Q. IN what capacity did you act in the campaign of 1777?
A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of Quebec; I acted as adjutant general of the army under General Burgoyne, and alſo as ſecretary to General Burgoyne.
2. Q. Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with which General Burgoyne treated you, lead you to the knowledge of the material circumſtances attending that campaign?
A. I looked on myſelf to be in the entire confidence of the general.
3. Q. Did General Burgoyne give any orders for the augmentation of artillery deſtined for this expedition, after his arrival in Canada?
A. There was no ſuch order went through me; nor did I hear of any ſuch order being given.
4. Q. Have you reaſon to believe that the proportion of artillery employed was according to the opinion and recommendation of Major General Phillips?
A. I believe General Burgoyne had the greateſt confidence in General Phillips's knowledge and abilities; and I believe the proportion of artillery to have been arranged between General Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, becauſe I don't know of any directions given by General Burgoyne upon that head.
5. Q. What were the orders given, at the opening of the campaign, reſpecting the incumbrances of baggage?

[*The witneſs refers to the orderly book, which he had with him.*

Read the orders.

They are the original orders, written by myſelf at the time.

[*Reads.*] "Extracts from orders iſſued by Lieutenant General Burgoyne at Montreal, dated 30th May, 1777.

"The regiments deſtined for the expedition under General Burgoyne are to "leave in their reſpective ſtores their blanket coats, legging, and all baggage "that can be ſpared during the ſummer months; the officers are depended on "not to encumber the ſervice with more baggage than ſhall be abſolutely ne-"ceſſary for a campaign where the movements may be expected to be ſudden "and alert; the portion of bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on thoſe "principles."

6. Q. Were thoſe orders afterwards enforced?

A. Orders

A. Orders were iſſued again to the ſame purport, dated Skeneſborough Houſe, July 12.

[*Reads.*] "It is obſerved that the injunction given, before the army took the field, "relative to the baggage of officers, has not been complied with; and that the regi- "ments in general are encumbered with much more baggage than they can poſſibly be "ſupplied with means of conveying, when they quit the lake and rivers; warning is "therefore again given to the officers, to convey by the bateaux, which will ſoon "return to Ticonderoga, the baggage that is not indiſpenſibly neceſſary to them; "or upon the firſt ſudden movement, it muſt inevitably be left upon the ground. "Such gentlemen as ſerved in America the laſt war may remember that the officers "took up with ſoldiers' tents, and often confined their baggage to a knapſack for "months together."

Q. Have you a letter from General Burgoyne to General Reideſel, on the ſubject of the incumbrance of baggage? 8.

A. I have an extract of it, taken from the original letter in the letter-book. It is as follows:

Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne to Major General Reideſel, dated Head Quarters at Skeneſborough, the 18th July, 1777.

"Je vous ſupplie de faire en ſorte, que l'eſprit de l'ordre par rapport "à le renvoye des baggages des officiers à Ticonderoga aye lieu.

"Les baggages des officiers Britanniques ſont deja renvoyés, et il n'en "reſte à pluſieurs qu'une petite tente, et un valiſe. C'eſt réelement pour "l'intereſt de l'officier à la fin, que je ſuis ſi porté à cet article."

TRANSLATION.

"I requeſt you to take meaſures that the ſpirit of the order reſpecting "the ſending back officers' baggage to Ticonderoga may have due force.

"The baggage of the Britiſh officers is already gone, and many of them "have only retained a ſmall tent and one cloak bag. It is really for the in- "tereſt of the officers, in the end, that I am ſo preſſing upon this ſubject."

Q. When the contract was made for horſes and carts at Montreal, was it the general opinion of the perſons of beſt intelligence conſulted, that the number was more or leſs than neceſſary for the ſervice on which we were going? 9.

A. In general converſation on that ſubject I remember to have heard it ſaid, that though they were inſufficient, we might expect to find additional ſupplies in the country. I have extracts of letters here that paſſed between General Burgoyne and General Phillips on that ſubject. They are extracted from the original letter copy-book. See Appendix.

Q. Have you the returns, or extracts of the returns, of the ſtrength of the army at all the different periods of the campaign? 10.

A. I have extracts from the returns.

11. Q. What was the ſtrength of the regular troops, at the higheſt, at the opening of the campaign, rank and file, fit for duty?

A. The firſt returns I received on the firſt of July,

The Britiſh were	3576	fit for duty.
Germans	2919	do.
	6489	

I ſpeak ſolely of the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne.

12. Q. What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps under Lieutenant Nutt, attached to the ſervice of the artillery?

Britiſh artillery	257
Germans	100
Recruits under Lieut. Nutt	154

13. Q. Were there any other troops in the army that could be called regulars?

A. There were Canadians, Provincials, and Indians; but I never conſidered them as regulars, becauſe they were not diſciplined.

14. Q. Can you ſtate about what was the number of the Canadians?

A. The Canadians were 148 the higheſt number.

15. Q. The Provincials?

A. I would be underſtood to ſpeak to the opening of the campaign the firſt of July. They were low then, and encreaſed afterwards. They were then 83.

16. Q. The Indians?

A. Between three and four hundred. It was very difficult to collect what their number was exactly.

17. Q. Was the army ever ſo high in numbers, Provincials and Indians excepted, as at that period?

A. I believe it never was. On the 3d of September additional companies joined the Britiſh, to the amount of about 300 men; but from killed and wounded, and the garriſon left at Ticonderoga, the army was at no time equal to its firſt number.

18. Q. What was the force left at Ticonderoga?

A. The firſt garriſon conſiſted of 462 Britiſh, rank and file, 448 Germans, rank and file; making 910 in the whole.

19. Q. Do you remember the difficulties which attended moving the wounded to Ticonderoga, after the action at Huberton?

A. I remember to have heard they were very great. Different propoſitions were made for the removing them, ſuch as biers and hand-barrows, which were ſo very incommodious, that I remember to have been told that the wounded would rather be left where they were than move in the then ſtate of their wounds by ſuch conveyances.

20. Q. Do you know what were General Burgoyne's motives for detaching General Reideſel with a large corps of troops to the country in the neighbourhood of Caſtleton?

A. I don't remember to have been preſent when General Reideſel received his orders or inſtructions; but I underſtood it was to create an alarm towards the Connecticut, to give encouragement to the loyal inhabitants, if any ſuch there were, and to protect thoſe that were wounded at Huberton or thereabouts.

Q. Was

Q. Was the removal of thoſe wounded effected long before General Reideſel was recalled from Caſtleton? 21.

A. I believe not; for I am not quite certain that the whole were moved when General Reideſel returned to the army at Skeneſborough, a day or two before the firſt diviſion of the army moved towards Fort Anne.

Q. Have you any papers written by General Burgoyne between the time he was at Montreal and the time he left Skeneſborough, explanatory of the motives on which he acted? 22.

A. I have. They are extracts from the original letter-book. See Appendix.

Q. Are you acquainted with any facts that will aſcertain whether, on the army's arriving at Fort Edward, it was forwarder in its progreſs towards Albany, in point of time, than it would have been had it taken the route by Ticonderoga and Lake George? 23.

A. In anſwer to that queſtion I have to ſay, the army, by taking that route, was a-head of the tranſport of proviſions, which, for the greater part, went from Ticonderoga by the route of Lake George.

Q. At our firſt arrival at Fort Edward, and previous to the roads being mended, in what proportion did proviſions arrive at our camp? 24.

A. Very little more than for the immediate conſumption.

Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francis Clarke? 25.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know them to be his hand-writing? 26.

A. I am fully convinced of it, having ſeen him enter many of the articles in theſe books.

Q. Has there been any alteration or addition ſince you had them? 27.

A. None.

Q. What was the character of Sir Francis Clarke reſpecting his accuracy? 28.

A. I never ſaw an officer more attentive to the duties of his ſtation than Sir Francis Clarke, and always found him exceedingly accurate in the remarks he made.

Q. Are there any memorandums reſpecting the arrival of proviſions at that time? 29.

A. There are ſeveral.

Q. You will read two or three? 30.

A. [*Reads.*]—"Fifth Auguſt. Victualling of the army out this day. and from "difficulties of the roads and tranſports, no proviſion came in this night."

"Sixth Auguſt.—At ten o'clock this morning, not quite enough proviſions arrived "for the conſumption of two days."

Q. Was it in general underſtood, from the combined intelligence received by General Reideſel, while he was detached to Caſtletown, and that received by General Burgoyne from the Provincials in his camp, that there were many well affected inhabitants towards Bennington, who would ſhew themſelves on the approach of troops; and that there was dejection and ſubmiſſion among the party attached to the congreſs in that country? 31.

A. I did hear ſeveral reports to that purpoſe.

32. Q. Have you the original rough draft of the expedition to Bennington, as preſented to General Burgoyne from General Reideſel; with General Burgoyne's alterations and additions?

A. I have the original rough draft of the propoſals for the expedition to Bennington; but not being preſent at the time, I can't ſay whether thoſe propoſals were delivered by General Reideſel or not; but I know of alterations made in thoſe propoſals by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge of his hand-writing.

See Appendix. *Note*, The witneſs delivered in to the Committee the original rough draft of the Inſtructions, with a fair copy.

33. Q. Whether you have reaſon to know that all the eraſures and alterations in that plan were made before the expedition took place?

A. I believe they were, from the reading of it.

34. Q. Do you remember taking this plan to General Phillips the day General Burgoyne went to Fort George to inſpect the tranſport of proviſions?

A. I do remember it very well; it was the rough draft I took.

35. Q. What were General Phillips's ſentiments upon it?

A. I remember General Phillips and I had a long converſation on the ſlowneſs of the arrival of the tranſport of proviſions; and he ſaid he looked on this as a very good idea; that he ſaw no objection, and aſked me if I knew of any.

36. Q. Do you remember ſhewing the plan to General Fraſer?

A. I do very well.

37. Q. What did he expreſs on the ſubject?

A. He deſired me to leave it with him till the afternoon for his conſideration. He came himſelf to my tent the next morning early; he expreſſed himſelf to me in a manner that conveyed a diſapprobation of the Germans being employed in it. I think I obſerved to him that ſince the honour gained by the advanced corps at Huberton, I believed General Reideſel was deſirous of having the Germans employed. I mentioned to General Fraſer my ideas of proviſions being obtained by that expedition, and the army thereby enabled to get quicker on to Albany than waiting for the ſlow tranſport from Fort George. General Fraſer ſaid ſomething about Germans, which I don't recollect; which brought this remark from me. I deſired General Fraſer, from the friendſhip he had for General Burgoyne, if he ſaw any real objection to this plan, to expreſs himſelf fully and freely to General Burgoyne himſelf; that the ſcouts of the army and the guides were attached to his the advanced corps, and he might, through them, perhaps know more of the nature of the country than I did; and therefore I preſſed him to mention his objections, if he had any, to General Burgoyne. I think he ſaid, but am not quite certain, "the Germans are "not a very active people; but it may do." I preſſed him at parting to go to General Burgoyne, if he thought it would not do. He ſaid No, and went off.

38. Q. Were not many of the Provincials in the army of the country about Bennington, and towards the Connecticut?

A. I can't pretend to ſay they were from that country; but I underſtood many of them were well acquainted with that country.

Q. Do

Q. Do you remember Captain Sherwood in particular? 39.

A. I do very well.

Q. Was he of that country? 40.

A. I underſtood he was of that neighbourhood.

Q. Did you ever hear Colonel Skeene, or any other Provincial, conſulted on an expedition into that country, expreſs any apprehenſion of its ſucceſs? 41.

A. I never did. Sir Francis Clarke told me he had received favourable accounts from Colonel Skeene; and I believe after part of the expedition had taken place.

Q. Are there any memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke's, reſpecting the expedition to Bennington? 42.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there any that marks the diſtance between Batten Kill and Bennington? 43.

A. Yes; it is his hand-writing.

[*Reads.*] "From the mouth of Batten Kill, Eaſt, for two miles; then ſtrike off "South Eaſt for about fifteen miles to Cambridge; and ſo on about twelve miles "to Bennington." 44.

Q. Have you the original letters, written from Colonel Baume to General Burgoyne, while he was on the expedition? See the Appendix.

A. They are here. [*He delivered them in to the Committee.*

Q. Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's marking the time when Colonel Breyman was ordered to march to ſupport Colonel Baume? 45.

A. [*Reads.*] "15th Auguſt. Expreſs arrived from Sancoick; at five in the morning; corps de reſerve ordered to march.

"16th Auguſt. During the night, expreſs arrived from Sancoick with an account "of the repulſe this evening of a detachment of ours on an expedition.

"Sunday, 17th Auguſt. The general went up to the twentieth regiment, advanced on the road to Sancoick, and met the corps de reſerve, the men of that "expedition returning all day."

Q. Do you recollect what time of the day it was General Burgoyne met Colonel Breyman on his return on the 17th? 46.

A. I think it was ſometime between one and three o'clock.

Q. Have you the inſtructions given by General Burgoyne to Colonel Skeene on that expedition? 47.

A. Here is a copy of them. See the Appendix.

Q. Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's, of any intelligence received from Colonel St. Leger about this time?

A. There is of the 12th of Auguſt.

[*Reads.*] "This morning received intelligence of an action near Fort Stanwix."

Q. After the failure of the expedition to Bennington, can you ſpeak to the efforts made for forwarding proviſions? 49.

A. I know that very great efforts were made both before and after. I underſtood that General Burgoyne and General Phillips had been both at different times at Fort George to forward the proviſions, and I believe ſubſequent to the ill news from Bennington. The quarter-maſter-general (I mean Captain Money) was ſent by

by General Burgoyne to Fort Edward, and I believe to Fort George, to collect all horſes and teams poſſible, and to make every exertion to bring forward the proviſions.

50. Q. Have you the calculation, made by the commiſſary-general, of the carriages and horſes neceſſary for different given quantities of proviſions?

See the Appendix. A. It is here. I believe it is the original.

51. Q. Did the march of the artillery from Fort George to the bridge of boats over Hudſon's River, interfere with the tranſport of proviſions?

A. I have had many converſations with General Phillips and the quarter-maſter-general about the tranſport of proviſions, and never remember to have heard from them, or any other perſon, that the march of the artillery interfered in any manner with the tranſport of proviſions.

52. Q. About what time did the additional companies arrive?

A. The 3d of September.

53. Q. What was the ſtate of the army when we paſſed the Hudſon's River?

A. My return goes to the 1ſt of September.

Britiſh, fit for duty under arms, 2635 rank and file.
Germans — 1711

The 300 additional did not join the army till the 3d of September, ſo that this return is excluſive of them.

54. Q. What was the ſtrength of the artillery and Lieutenant Nutt's corps at that time?

A. I believe there was very little variation in either of them from the former return.

55. Q. Have you General Burgoyne's application to Sir Guy Carleton for a garriſon from Canada for Ticonderoga, before he paſſed the Hudſon's River?

See the Appendix. A. I have extracts from letters of General Burgoyne to Sir Guy Carleton, the 11th of July, 1777, and the 29th of July, 1777.

56. Q. Was there any conſiderable alteration in the ſtrength of the army between the return of the 1ſt of September, and the action on the 19th?

A. There was a ſkirmiſh or two, but the loſs was not material in that interval.

57. Q. In the courſe of the ſervice, did you ever know any inſtance of a day of action, where there was not ſome deductions from the effective ſtrength upon paper, for baggage guards, bat-men, care of the ſick, and other indiſpenſible regimental contingencies?

A. I apprehend there muſt always be deductions of that ſort.

58. Q. In the ſervice of our campaign, was there not a conſiderable additional deduction for the care and defence of the bateaux and movable magazines?

A. It muſt of courſe make an additional drain from the army.

59. Q. Was not all we had of the forty-ſeventh regiment appropriated to that particular ſervice?

60. A. It generally was; I believe always ſo.

Q. Theſe deductions conſidered, about what number do you compute the Britiſh line to have conſiſted of on the day of the action of the 19th.

A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that day amounted to little more than one thouſand one hundred men on the ſpot under arms in the action.

Q. What loſs did the Britiſh ſuſtain in that action? 61.

A. Killed, wounded, and priſoners, rather more than leſs than five hundred.

Q. Can you ſpeak particularly to the loſs of the line? 62.

A. I believe about ſeventy-ſix killed rank and file, and between two hundred and forty and two hundred and fifty wounded, and about twenty-eight or thirty miſſing and priſoners.

Q. Do you recollect the ſtrength of the 20th regiment when they made their laſt charge on the enemy? 63.

A. I do very well. I was by General Phillips when the orders were given for that charge; he was then in the front of the line: the ranks appeared to be very thin, the regiment were much fatigued with the length of the action, but moved on to the charge with ſpirit.

Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne going up to the ſixty-ſecond regiment immediately after the firing ceaſed, and the report that was made to him by the commanding officer of the ſtate of that regiment? 64.

A. I remember it, and the officer reporting the great loſs they had ſuſtained in the action; I ſaw them, and they appeared to be very conſiderably reduced in number.

Q. Do you remember the officer mentioning that they had not above fifty or ſixty men in the regiment? 65.

A. I can't ſpeak poſitively to that; but in my own judgment they did not exceed that number.

Q. Were not both the field-officers wounded? 66.

A. Colonel Anſtruther and Major Harnage were both wounded, and a great many other officers were killed and wounded, and the regiment ſuffered greatly.

Q. To what degree did the men of the artillery ſuffer in that action? 67.

A. I think, but am not quite certain, that the number that were with four guns amounted to forty-eight. I ſaw Captain Jones, who was a very gallant man, and commanded thoſe four guns, killed, and ſome other officers wounded, and I believe about thirty-ſix of the men were killed and wounded. I ſhould in juſtice to the artillery ſay, that I think it is not in the power of men to keep a better fire, both of round and grape-ſhot, than was ſucceſſively maintained for ſeveral hours that day.

Q. From your experience in the ſervice, do you conceive it would have occurred to any officer, to engage troops, if he could poſſibly avoid it, in the ſituation in which the Britiſh line was the day after that action? 68.

A. The experience of an officer of my inferior rank does not lead to much; but I ſhould have been ſorry to have given orders to thoſe regiments, after the gallant ſufferings of that day, to have attacked an army reported, both from our ſpies and our priſoners, to be very near if not more than four times the number of our whole force: add to this, the country was a very thick wood, and the

the ſituation of the rebel camp, I believe, could not by any means be reconnoitred within that ſpace of time.

69. Q. Do you remember General Burgoyne receiving a letter from Sir Henry Clinton the day but one after that action, informing him, that he intended about that time an attack on Fort Montgomery?

A. I do remember his receiving a letter from Sir Henry Clinton about that time; it was the 22d of September.

70. Q. Do you imagine that any officer knowing of that letter would have entertained thoughts of immediately renewing an attack upon the enemy?

A. As far as an opinion of an officer of my inferior rank goes, I ſhould not have thought of it, nor did I hear any officer of any rank expreſs ſuch an idea at that time.

71. Q. From what you knew of the country, did you not believe that a ſucceſsful attack from Sir Henry Clinton during the time we lay at that camp, would either have diſlodged General Gates entirely, or have obliged him to detach conſiderably from his army?

A. I remember our ſcouts giving information, that a bridge was laid over the Hudſon's River, very near the enemy's camp; and it was the opinion of ſome very confidential men that were employed in that army in that capacity, and were much under the direction of General Fraſer, that on the approach of Sir Henry Clinton's army, the army of Mr. Gates could not ſtand us, but would croſs the river, and go towards New England. Whether the idea was right or wrong, I can't tell.

72. Q. Did you ever hear ſuch perſons, or any others, expreſs an idea, that the enemy would have taken the ſame meaſure on our advancing to attack them without that co-operation?

A. I don't remember to have heard any ſuch thing.

73. Q. Do you imagine that any officer knowing of Sir Henry Clinton's letters, would have thought it proper to retreat after the action of the 19th of September?

A. I never heard any officer expreſs an idea of that ſort. I don't know what officers might be within the knowledge of ſuch a letter; but I lived intimately with General Phillips, General Fraſer, and with Mr. Twiſs, the engineer; whether the letter was in their knowledge or not, I don't know: but I never heard them expreſs ſuch an idea.

74. Q. Did you ever hear any officer of that army, though unacquainted with the letter, before or ſince the time, expreſs a diſapprobation of the meaſure of remaining in that camp without either attacking or retreating?

A. Neither then or at any time while I remained in America, and of courſe not ſince.

75. Q. From your converſation with the chief engineer, and from other circumſtances, have you reaſon to know, that every poſſible means were uſed after the action of the 19th, to obtain a knowledge of the ground on the enemy's left?

A. I

A. I had frequent converſations with the chief engineer on that ſubject. I believe his attention was given to that point almoſt every day, and a knowledge of that ground I underſtood to be very difficult to be obtained.

Q. Was not the right of the enemy deemed impracticable. 76.

A. I had no opportunity myſelf of ſeeing the right of the enemy; but I underſtood from others, that the poſition was too ſtrong to be attacked with any proſpect of ſucceſs.

Q. Were there not frequent conſultations held between General Burgoyne, General Phillips and General Fraſer, previous to the movement up to the enemy on the 7th of October? 77.

A. I underſtood there was ſcarce a day paſſed without ſuch conſultation; I believe no day after the action of the 19th.

Q. Did you conceive that the chief purpoſe of that movement was to attain a knowledge of the left of the enemy's poſition, and if expedient to attack them there? 78.

A. I underſtood it was.

Q. Did it appear to you, that the force left in camp, under General Hamilton, was more than ſufficient to keep the enemy in check? 79.

A. I don't think it was.

Q. From the intimacy and confidence in which you lived with General Burgoyne and General Fraſer, do you imagine any diſagreement of opinion could have ſubſiſted between them without your knowledge? 80.

A. I think I muſt have heard of it.

Q. Do you know any inſtance, but more eſpecially reſpecting the periods of paſſing the Hudſon's River, the action of the 19th of September, and that of the 7th of October, wherein General Fraſer expreſſed a diſapprobation of General Burgoyne's meaſures? 81.

A. I do not: but I would beg leave to obſerve, that upon the plan to Bennington, General Fraſer had expreſſed a different opinion, with reſpect to employing the Germans. At the time of paſſing the Hudſon's River, and after it was croſſed, I had a great deal of converſation with General Fraſer: he ſeemed to expreſs ſatisfaction in the manner in which the troops had paſſed.

Q. In the action of the 7th of October, after the German troops on the left of the artillery had given way, did you obſerve General Phillips and General Reideſel in perſon? 82.

A. I was with General Phillips at different times, and I ſaw General Reideſel more than once; they were both very active, and exerted themſelves very much to form the broken troops, and to make the retreat as regular as the circumſtances would permit.

Q. What was the laſt time you ſaw Sir Francis Clarke in that action, and do you know what orders he was carrying? 83.

A. It was after the retreat was become very general. Sir Francis Clarke aſked me, if I had given any orders to the artillery to retreat? I told him, that as there was a major-general of the artillery in the field, who was confeſſed by the army to be a very excellent officer, I would not take on myſelf, as ad-

jutant-general, to give orders to any part of the artillery. Sir Francis Clarke told me, that a diſpoſition had been made for a general retreat, and that he was going with orders from General Burgoyne to bring off the artillery. About the inſtant we were parting, a very heavy fire came upon us from the enemy, and I have ſince had reaſon to believe, that Sir Francis Clarke received his wound at that time.

84. Q. On the day of the 8th, do you remember the enemy forming a line in the meadows, and making a demonſtration of attacking us?

A. I do remember it very well, and that there was a great deal of cannonading from the enemy.

85. Q. Do you remember alſo a cannonading in the afternoon, about the time of General Fraſer's funeral?

A. I think I ſhall never forget that circumſtance. General Fraſer, I underſtood had deſired to be buried privately, in one of the redoubts that had been raiſed for the protection of our magazines and ſtores; as the corpſe was paſſing by, General Burgoyne, General Phillips, and I believe General Reideſel, and ſeveral other officers, out of reſpect to General Fraſer's memory, and to do him honour in the eyes of the army, notwithſtanding his requeſt, attended his funeral into the redoubt. The enemy were in this inſtance, I thought, very defective in point of humanity; they pointed a gun or two at that very redoubt, and kept up a briſk cannonade during the whole of the funeral ſervice, which was performed with great ſolemnity and very deliberately by Mr. Brudenel, the chaplain. I never ſaw ſo affecting a ſight.

86. Q. Do you remember on the march to Saratoga ſeeing a corps of the enemy at work on the plain of Saratoga?

A. I do very well; a working party, and what appeared to be a battalion or more drawn up as a covering party.

87. Q. Was that the corps that afterwards took poſt on the oppoſite ſide of the river?

A. I believe it was the ſame corps I ſaw afterwards paſſing the ford.

88. Q. After the arrival of the army at Saratoga, was Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland detached with a command to cover a party of workmen to repair bridges and roads, in order to continue the retreat on the weſt ſide of the river?

A. He was ordered with a party to repair bridges and roads on the weſt ſide.

89. Q. Do you remember on what account Colonel Sutherland and the party were recalled?

A. I believe it was on information given by our ſcouts, that the enemy were preparing to attack us in great force.

90. Q. Have you further reaſon to know that a geneaal attack on that day was really intended by the enemy?

A. There was particular caution ſent round to all the troops to be prepared for that attack, as it was expected it would be attempted under cover of a very thick fog then prevailing. After the convention had taken place, a general officer in the rebel ſervice acquainted me, that ſuch an attack was intended,

and from information, I believe from deſerters, or from their own ſcouts, that our army was exceedingly well prepared to receive them, that they would be very much expoſed when they came on the plain to our artillery, he not only retreated with his command, but ſent word to another general officer to retreat alſo. The other general officer was his ſenior; but he had taken that upon him, from the fear of the conſequences of ſuch an attack, of which he ſent word to General Gates, who approved and confirmed his order.

Q. Previous to the council of war to which the field officers were called, do you remember it being determined in the council of the generals, to try a night march, abandoning the carriages and baggage, and orders being given for the delivery of as much proviſions as the men could carry? 91.

A. I do remember ſuch a determination very well.

Q. What prevented the execution of it? 92.

A. I underſtood there were ſuch difficulties in getting out the proviſions, that the delivery of the neceſſary proviſions could not be accompliſhed.

Q. Had we intelligence the next day from different ſcouts, that the enemy was in poſſeſſion of the country in force, on both ſides the Hudſon's River, between us and Fort Edward? 93.

A. I underſtood, from ſome of the ſcouts that we had been accuſtomed moſt to depend on, that the enemy were ſo poſted.

Q. Have you reaſon to know that the intelligence General Burgoyne ſtated to the council of war on this ſubject was true? 94.

A. I was aſſured by one of the general officers who conducted us towards Boſton that troops of theirs were in the poſition that our ſcouts had given us information of.

Q. Did you learn at the ſame time at what period thoſe poſts were taken up by the enemy, whether before or after our arrival at Saratoga? 95.

A. I have extracts of minutes made at that time, from the mouth of the general officer I mentioned.

[*Reads.*]—"When the king's army was returning to Saratoga, a brigade of "fifteen hundred men were poſted on the eaſt ſide of the Hudſon's River, to diſpute "the ford, and two thouſand men more were poſted between us and Fort Edward, "on the ſame ſide of the river."—Fourteen hundred more alſo were poſted oppoſite to Saratoga, a little above the other party I mentioned before, to prevent our paſſing the Hudſon's River. Fifteen hundred of thoſe I have mentioned were poſted on or before the 5th of October. The others, I remember very well now to have heard, were poſted previous to the 7th of October.

Q. Have you an extract of the laſt council of war at which the field officers aſſiſted? 96.

A. The extract is true, excepting the names of the officers, and the votes they gave. I have the original paper, with the names of the officers that compoſed the council; and I believe their opinions. [*The extract produced.* See Appendix.

Q. Did you ever hear of a propoſal made by General Phillips, to make a way from Saratoga to Ticonderoga with a body of troops? 97.

A. Never with a body of troops; but I remember to have heard General Phillips make an offer, which I thought a very ſpirited one, to riſk his life in attempting, with one or two of our beſt guides, to find a paſſage to Ticonderoga, and do his utmoſt for the defence of that garriſon, as an artillery officer, ſhould the enemy attack that fortreſs after the convention ſhould take place.

98. Q. Have you the return of General Gates's army, ſigned by himſelf?

A. I have; but I have forgot to bring the original. I have the extract.

For the original return, ſee the Appendix, No. XVI.

[*Reads.*] "Copy from General Gates's return, from his camp at Saratoga; 16th October, 1777.

"Brigadiers	12
"Colonels	44
"Lieutenant Colonels	45
"Majors	49
"Captains	344
"Firſt Lieutenants	332
"Second Lieutenants	326
"Enſigns	345
"Chaplains	5
"Adjutants	42
"Quarter-maſters	44
"Paymaſters	30
"Surgeons	37
"Mates	43
"Serjeants	1392
"Drummers	636
"Preſent fit for duty	13,216."

I underſtand theſe laſt are rank and file, becauſe the others are mentioned before.

"Sick preſent	622
"Sick abſent	731
"On command	3875
"On furlow	180."

I believe that the men on command were explained to me by General Gates to have been detached from his army, in the rear and upon the flanks of the king's troops, previous to the convention.

99. Q. Do you apprehend that that return includes the corps that were on the other ſide of the Hudſon's River, immediately oppoſite to Saratoga?

A. I do recollect the name of one of the general officers who was on the other ſide of the Hudſon's River, included in Mr. Gates's return, and therefore I imagine the men under his command are included alſo. When I ſay one, I do not mean to have underſtood that the other two general officers, the one who was ſtationed with a party oppoſite to Saratoga, and the one who was ſtationed on the ſame ſide of the water, between us and Fort Edward, are not alſo included in General Gates's return.

Q. Do

Q. Do the returns to which you referred of our army ſtate the effective ſtrength, at the time of ſigning the convention? 100.

A. They do ſtate the rough number, collected at that time, of men preſent and under arms.

State the numbers. 101.

The Britiſh appeared to have been 1905
Germans — 1594

I can't be anſwerable for the correctneſs of thoſe numbers, as they were taken in a great hurry.

Q. Can there poſſibly be a miſtake of many hundreds? 102.

A. I can ſtate from a monthly return of the firſt of November, fit for duty,

Britiſh — — 2086
Germans — — 1633 } Rank and file.

There might be people recovered from their wounds who were diſcharged from the hoſpital, and had joined the corps; or there might have been a miſtake in the return, juſt before the convention, in the confuſion of the army at that time.

Q. Do you remember what paſſed reſpecting the military cheſt, while the treaty of Saratoga was depending? 103.

A. I do remember that it was ſtrongly recommended to the commanding officers of corps to take ſums of money from the paymaſter general, on account of ſubſiſtence then due to their regiments; and I believe a great deal of money was ſo diſtributed, and regularly accounted for to the paymaſter general on the ſubſequent ſettlement of the pay of the army.

Q. What became of the reſt of the money in the military cheſt? 104.

A. It was taken by the paymaſter general to Albany.

Q. Did any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy? 105.

A. Not a ſhilling that I ever heard of.

Q. Was any proportion of it loſt, embezzled, or ſecreted? 106.

A. If any ſuch thing had happened, I think the paymaſter general would have applied to me immediately. Never having heard, then or at any time after, of any loſs having been ſuſtained, I do not believe there was any loſs ſuffered in the retreat or after it.

Q. Was the ſecret ſervice account, during the campaign, kept by you? 107.

A. It was.

Q. Could you produce the ſeveral articles of that account, if called on for it? 108.

A. I have either a copy of it at home of my own, or from the paymaſter general.

Q. Did General Burgoyne ever appropriate any part of that expenditure to the extraordinaries of his own expences, or to any other purpoſe for his own uſe? 109.

A. Never that I know of.

Q. Muſt not you have known it if it had been ſo? 110.

A. Certainly.

Q. Were there not occaſions where General Burgoyne paid, from his own purſe, expences that, in the opinion of others, he might have been juſtified in placing to the public account? 111.

A. I

A. I remember to have been told by other gentlemen, that expences of that ſort General Burgoyne had been at, ought to have been charged in that manner.

112. Q. What was the nature of thoſe expences?

A. They were preſents to people who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves, and in acts of charity to women who had loſt their huſbands, and other occaſions which it was very proper for a general officer to give, and very proper to put into a public account.

113. Q. Had not General Burgoyne, from his ſituation, all the expences attending a Commander in Chief?

A. He certainly had, from being obliged to keep a public table for the entertainment and refreſhment of officers and others coming to head quarters, on duty or buſineſs; and I know thoſe expences to have been very great, from the exceeding high price of all the articles of life in that part of the world.

114. Q. Did General Burgoyne ever receive more than the appointment of a lieutenant general?

A. Never.

115. Q. Was there not a board of general officers appointed at Cambridge, to inſpect all the accounts of the campaign; and did not General Burgoyne regulate the payment of the battalions by the report of that board?

A. There was ſuch a board, and the payments were regulated according to the report of that board.

116. Q. Upon the whole of what you know of General Burgoyne's receipts and expences, do you believe he was, in his own purſe, a gainer or a ſufferer in the campaign 1777?

A. I really believe his appointments were not equal to his expences in that campaign.

Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occaſionally.

117. Q. What were the numbers of the effective Britiſh, at the opening of the campaign 1777, including officers and non-commiſſioned officers?

A. I have not thoſe returns; but they were ſent to the Commander in Chief, and my extracts are for the rank and file.

118. Q. Can you anſwer that queſtion with reſpect to the Germans?

A. My extracts are the ſame both for the Britiſh and the Germans.

119. Q. What was the greateſt number of Provincials in the army at any time in the campaign?

A. I believe the only queſtion that has been aſked reſpecting them was at the beginning of the campaign; they were then eighty-three. On the firſt of September they amounted to about ſix hundred and eighty, which was the greateſt number they ever amounted to.

120. Q. What do you mean by Provincials?

A. I

A. I underſtand them to be inhabitants of that country, aſſembled under officers who were to have had different commiſſions, provided they had ever amounted to certain numbers.

Q. Do you include Canadians under the name of Provincials? 121.

A. I believe, in the former part of my evidence, the Canadians were ſtated to be one hundred and forty-eight, and diſtinguiſhed from the Provincials.

Q. Was General Burgoyne's ſecond order of the twelfth of July, relating to the baggage, ſtrictly complied with? 122.

A. I conceive it was the duty of the commanding officers of regiments to enforce an obſervance and obedience to the general orders.

Q. Was it actually enforced in ſuch a manner to the degree you thought it ſhould have been? 123.

A. I am not quite poſitive whether there was not another order iſſued afterwards.

[*Queſtion repeated.*] 124.

A. I never had any report made to me by a commanding officer of any corps, of that order not being complied with.

Q. What was your own ocular obſervation of the quantity of baggage carried with the army; and did it appear to you that that order could have been fairly complied with? 125.

A. I own I don't recollect, not hearing any complaint nor attending to it. The quarter maſter general of the army muſt naturally know more of the baggage than the adjutant general.

Q. Do you know what allowance of waggons was made to a regiment? 126.

A. I don't recollect any waggons that we had to allow.

Q. Was none of the baggage brought down in wheeled carriages? 127.

A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and carts of the country people for their own uſe; but I do not remember any of the king's carts or waggons being appropriated to the carriage of officers' baggage. It might be, but I don't recollect it.

Q. Can you ſay, in a general way, how many horſes might be employed in carrying the baggage of the army, including officers' horſes? 128.

A. I never had any information upon that ſubject; it did not belong to my department, and I had much buſineſs on my hands. 129.

Q. How was the regimental baggage carried?

A. I believe chiefly in bateaux.

Q. How was it carried when there was no water-carriage? 130.

A. I can't ſpeak to that point, having had no information on that ſubject; and when I ſpeak of bateaux, I ſpeak generally, having *had* no information on the ſubject.

Q. Can you ſay, in a general way, how many women attended the army? 131.

A. I had really ſo much to do that I had not much leiſure to pay much attention to the ladies; and I know very little of their beauty or their numbers.

Q. Would not the feeding of two thouſand women be a conſiderable object with reſpect to the proviſions of the army? 132.

A. I

A. I ſhould have been very ſorry to have had two thouſand women to have experienced that.

133. Q. How many women were there, if not two thouſand?

A. I would wiſh to give the houſe every information in my power, w hencan ſpeak with any degree of accuracy or tolerable gueſs. I have ſeen the commiſſary of proviſions return, and I think the number of women returned, as victualled from the ſtores, were very very few.

134. Q. Do you think that a corps of dragoons mounted would have been of great uſe to the army?

A. I own, I very much wiſhed thoſe few dragoons we had could have been mounted, becauſe, though in that part of America that I ſaw they might not have been neceſſary or uſeful to have made a charge, I think thoſe light dragoons might be always applied to very uſeful ſervices.

135. Q. How many had you of thoſe dragoons?

A. They are included in the ſtrength of the Germans, and I really do not remember their particular number.

136. Q. If none or leſs of the park of artillery had been brought forward, would there not have been horſes to have mounted thoſe dragoons?

A. I believe there might have been horſes enough taken from the artillery, or from the proviſion train, to have mounted thoſe dragoons, if it had been thought more expedient to have employed the horſes in that manner; but they were hired or contracted for, for the ſpecial purpoſes of carrying proviſions, and bringing on the artillery, and never meant by the perſons who furniſhed the contract for the dragoon ſervice.

137. Q. If a ſmaller quantity of baggage had been carried, might not the officers have ſpared ſome of their baggage horſes for mounting the dragoons?

A. I never met with an officer who had horſes to ſpare. I know Sir Francis Clarke and myſelf wiſhed to buy horſes to carry our own ſervants; cared very little what expence we were at, and yet I could not obtain any.

138. Q. Do you know of any corps or party finding their way back to Canada?

A. I never heard of any corps finding its way there; and I underſtood from the guides who were with us, previous to the convention's taking place, that if that was attempted, we muſt break into ſmall parties, and go by what is called Indian paths.

139. Q. Suppoſing there was a ſmall party that found its way to Canada by Indian paths, do you think it would have been poſſible for an army to have done the ſame?

A. My idea of that muſt be founded upon the report of thoſe guides who had ſerved us very faithfully as ſcouts upon former occaſions, and who informed me that we muſt break into very ſmall parties, to have any chance of making our way through the woods to Canada; and I remember that when General Phillips offered to attempt to find his way to Ticonderoga, it was talked of and looked on to be as deſperate as gallant.

140. Q. If any party did make its way to Canada, do you not ſuppoſe it muſt be

be that party of provincials that ran away while they were employed to repair roads. and that were never heard of afterwards?

A. I remember ſome were reported to have run away who were making roads, and it is likely to have been that party.

Q. When you mentioned the higheſt number of provincials, did you mean that they were all armed? 141.

A. I know that they were not all armed. We had not arms for them.

Q. Of thoſe that were armed, ſome reſpectable perſons excepted, were they much to be depended upon? 142.

A. A very great part of them were ſuch as I ſhould have placed very little dependence upon.

Q. Before the army left Canada, was there not a ſtrict order, that not more than three women a company ſhould be ſuffered to embark? 143.

A. I do know there was ſuch an order iſſued, and I never heard any complaint of its having been broke through. I don't recollect the date of that order, or I would have turned to my book, and ſtated to the houſe, upon the firſt queſtion relative to the number of women that were employed on our expedition.

Q. Is it not the cuſtom in all armies victualled from the king's ſtores, to prohibit the delivery of proviſions to any women over and above the number allowed by order? 144.

A. It was cuſtomary in all places where I ſerved in the laſt war, and very ſtrong and peremptory orders were given on that ſubject to the commiſſaries in our army.

Q. Do you not then believe, that all women who followed your army were fed from the ration of the men they followed, or found their proviſion in the country? 145.

A. I remember, upon aſking the commiſſaries how there came to be ſo few women in the provincial returns, I was told, it was the cuſtom for them to be ſupplied out of the men's rations.

Q. Were the women conveyed on baggage carts or horſes, or did they walk a-foot? 146.

A. I never heard of the women's being conveyed on baggage carts or the king's horſes.

Q. If the women neither employed the king's horſes, nor conſumed his proviſions, do you think they were more of impediment, or of comfort to the king's troops? 147.

A. I never underſtood from my converſation with the commanding officers, or others, that the women were any impediment.

Q. If after the taking of Ticonderoga there was any doubt in the army in which you ſerved, of their being able to reach Albany? 148.

A. I don't remember to have heard any doubts expreſſed upon that ſubject, meaning ſoon after the taking Ticonderoga.

Q. Was it generally underſtood in the army, that it was was well ſupplied with all the neceſſaries, appointments for war, and articles proper for forwarding the expedition to Albany? 149.

A. I always underſtood that the army had been very well ſupplied with every thing.

150. Q. Do you believe, if the ſecretary of ſtate had ordered the army under General Howe to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne for the North River, with a view to have formed the junction of the two armies, that the diſaſter which befel General Burgoyne's army could have happened?

A. If a junction could have been formed, I ſhould apprehend that Mr. Gates's army might have been diſlodged, and that the misfortune at Saratoga would not have happened. This is only matter of opinion.

151. Q. Do you apprehend, that if the army under Sir William Howe had operated on the North River, with a view to effect a junction, that ſuch a junction would have taken place?

A. I had an opinion while in America, that if the expedition which came up the Hudſon's River under General Vaughan, could have have been there about the time of our action of the 19th of September, that Mr. Gates would have found it difficult to have kept his army together, if he had not croſſed over the Hudſon's River towards New England. But this is mere matter of private opinion.

152. Q. If you are of opinion, that the troops under General Vaughan would have had ſo powerful an effect, even ſo late as September, what effect do you think Sir William Howe's army, aſſiſted by all the fleet and craft, would have had as early as the beginning of July, immediately after the impreſſion which took place among the enemy after the defeat at Ticonderoga?

A. I did not know what force there was under the command of General Vaughan, nor do I even now know; but I ſhould think moſt certainly, that a great army upon the Hudſon's River near Albany, would have contributed very much to our making our way to Albany.

153. Q. Have you ever conſidered what were the cauſes of the failure of the expedition under General Burgoyne, and to what do you impute it?

A. I looked upon our force not to be equal to the forcing our way to Albany without ſome co-operation.

154. Q. Where then did you expect that co-operation?

A. I had no where to expect it from, but up the Hudſon's River from New York; and the ſucceſs of Colonel St. Leger's expedition would have been of uſe certainly.

155. Q. If General Waſhington's army had not been diverted, would it not have impeded, or ſtopped the progreſs of any army up the Hudſon's River.

A. I don't know the ſtrength of General Waſhington's army, nor the nature of the country between Albany and New York; and therefore I cannot form any judgment of what would have happened.

156. Q. Are you not of opinion that there are very ſtrong paſſes or poſts on that river?

A. I found them very ſtrong between Ticonderoga and Albany, and from reports of military men of high reputation in the ſervice, I have underſtood there were many very ſtrong poſts between New York and Albany.

157. Q. From whence is the account of the ſtrength of Mr. Gates's army taken?

A. From a return voluntarily given by General Gates to me for my own ſatisfaction when at Albany, and that return was ſigned by General Gartes.

Q. Have you that return ? 158.

A. I gave it to General Burgoyne ; I ſaw it to-day ; he has it.

Q. Was it by conſent of General Gates that the ſoldiers after the convention retained their cartouch-boxes ? 159.

A. They retained their belts, and I really don't recollect whether their cartouch boxes were in general retained or not : but talking with Mr. Gates when the king's troops marched by with the accoutrements on, Mr Gates aſked me (we had been old acquaintance formerly) whether it was not cuſtomary on field days for arms and accoutrements to go together ? I told him, there was nothing ſaid in the convention that I had agreed to with him relating to the accoutrements, and that he could have no right to any thing but what was ſtipulated in that treaty. He replied, " You are perfectly right;" and turned to ſome of the officers in their ſervice by, and ſaid, " If we meant to have had them, we ought " to have inſerted them in the convention." [*Withdrew.*

REMARK:

Review of the Evidence; its ſeveral Parts compared with the prefatory Speech and Narrative; and additional Remarks and Explanations.

THE noble Lord who is at iſſue with me upon this occaſion has, in a great meaſure, deprived me of the benefit of a reply, properly ſo called, becauſe he has produced no defence. His Lordſhip certainly has been accuſed by me in many inſtances of a very ſerious nature. If he is really willing that his political, and my military conduct ſhould be tried by facts alone, I certainly have not ſhewn leſs inclination than his Lordſhip for that teſt; but, taxed as I avow he has been by me, with proceedings derogatory to the obligations which ought to ſubſiſt between man and man, I really expected, as I believe did the Houſe of Commons and the public, to have heard from him ſome juſtification in thoſe reſpects. Inſtead of that, the noble Lord, in opening the ſubjects to which he propoſed to call evidence, touched ſo ſlightly upon the branch of the enquiry in which we are parties, that a ſtranger would hardly have thought there ſubſiſted a diſpute between us. His Lordſhip contradicted nothing that I have alledged reſpecting his conduct or my own; he ſtated no circumſtance of blame againſt me, except he meant as ſuch the enterprize of Bennington, which he qualified with the epithet "fatal," and pronounced to be the cauſe of all the ſubſequent misfortunes. He paſſed entirely over the tranſactions at Saratoga. Of forty officers or more, belonging to the Convention troops, then in England, one only was propoſed to be called on his Lordſhip's part, *viz.* Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland, of the 47th regiment, upon parole from the Congreſs, and acting with a corps of the Fencible Men in North Britain; but, upon further reflection, his Lordſhip thought proper to diſpenſe with the attendance of this officer; and the only witneſs under order of the Houſe was Mr. Skene. No man was better qualified to give an account of the proceedings at Bennington; and I heartily lament that the public is deprived of his teſtimony.

The conduct of Lord G. Germain, during the enquiry.

But although I am thus left in poſſeſſion of the evidence, uncontroverted by the noble Lord, I avail myſelf of my right of cloſing the cauſe, for the following purpoſes: firſt, to collect from the minutes (which, in an enquiry of this nature, are unavoidably prolix and diſarranged) the ſcattered parts, and apply them to facts, under diſtinct and ſeparate heads. Next, to examine whether the facts (which, from the ſilence of the noble Lord, I am to aſſume as admitted by him) are in any reſpect invalidated by the croſs examination of the witneſſes by other gentlemen. And laſtly,

Claim of G. Burgoyne to cloſe the cauſe.

Mode of proceeding.

laſtly, to explain ſuch circumſtances, and anſwer ſuch new and collateral objections, as have been pointed at in the ſame croſs examination, and were omitted, or only ſlightly noticed in my opening, becauſe they did not exiſt, or were not deemed poſſible objects of blame or cavil. In purſuing theſe purpoſes, I ſhall conſider the proofs preciſely in the order of the facts to which they are produced.

Inſinuation of having acted unfairly by Sir Guy Carleton, overthrown by his own evidence.

Though the firſt circumſtance I took notice of in my opening, *viz.* my conduct reſpecting Sir Guy Carleton, was rather an inſinuation than an allegation againſt me, I thought it right that it ſhould be the firſt overthrown by evidence; for while it remained in any degree of force, it gave a general tinge, as it was meant to do, to my whole cauſe. I could not but expect even the virtuous prejudices of the human heart to be againſt me, whilſt it was poſſible to be conceived that in abſence of the commander in chief, to whom I had acted ſecond; whoſe attention I had conſtantly experienced; and with whoſe confidence I was then honoured; I had practiſed unmanly and adulatory intrigue to ſuperſede him in a favourite object of command.—There are few worſe modes of betraying a ſuperior officer to be found upon the records of diſhonour; and whoever reflects upon the degree of odium with which the moſt palliated acts of that ſpecies have been received by mankind, will not wonder at or condemn my impatience, in applying my firſt queſtions to Sir Guy Carleton to that particular object. Clear as my juſtification ſtood by the letter formerly referred to, (No. II.) I ſhall be forgiven for obtaining, though with ſome redundancy, a full and ſatisfactory confirmation of my innocence, from the verbal teſtimony of the party whom I was ſuppoſed to have injured.

See Sir Guy Carleton's evidence, qu. 1, 2, 3.

It may be proper here to obſerve, that the abovementioned aſperſion, to which I have ſo often adverted, and at which I have ſtrove in vain for due terms to expreſs my indignation, was not the only one caſt upon me reſpecting Sir Guy Carleton. When impartial and candid men revolted at the inſinuation of my treachery, my preſumption and inſolence (a leſſer but ſtill a calumnious charge) was pointed out in that part of the paper (No. III.) that treats of the force to be left in Canada, and the diſpoſition of it. I am pleaſed with the queſtions in the croſs examination of Sir Guy Carleton, marking the preſcribed diſtribution of the troops, *&c.* (38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43.) becauſe that enquiry affords me an opportunity of juſtifying myſelf in a point which I have not taken notice of before. The poſts, and the troops which I imagined would be neceſſary to occupy them, were ſpecified merely to ſhew that the number of 3000 was indiſpenſibly requiſite for the defence of the province. The whole of that detail concurred with General Carleton's requiſitions for reinforcement, and with my reaſoning upon thoſe requiſitions; and when I aſſert, as I now do, that I never preſumed to ſuggeſt the neceſſity or propriety of forming a detail of poſts, (thus given for information)

Aſperſion from the paper, No. III. refuted.

information) into preciſe orders for the general upon the ſpot, I am ſure the ſecretary of ſtate will no more contradict that aſſertion than he has done any other I have made.

When in the ſame paper I confidentially communicated my reaſons for preferring certain corps to others, I was actuated by the ſame principle of offering every opinion that could conduce to make the intended ſervice effectual. I thought it a juſt claim in an arduous undertaking, to have my own choice of the troops; and I am perſuaded Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of me, either that claim, or a ſubſequent one in the ſame paper, of being held free from any imputation of delay, till I ſhould be clear of the province of Quebec. With an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carleton, I thought it a precaution fully juſtifiable, to ſecure myſelf againſt others, in the numerous and complicated departments under him, who might be found leſs equitable than he is.

No. III.

Apology for ſpecifying corps.

I know I have before complained of the production of theſe ſecret communications; but after ſo many precedents as the laſt Seſſion furniſhed, of withholding parts of correſpondences from Parliament, upon the plea that they might affect individuals, the noble Lord's ſilence upon thoſe complaints, gives me a right ſtill to comment upon the ſiniſter purpoſes that are to be aſcribed to the production of that paper at length, rather than by extract. Thoſe purpoſes were various; but it muſt be confeſſed one, and only one, good effect may reſult from a review of them, viz. It may ſerve as a ſalutary caution to any officer, who ſhall for the future be admitted into conſultation with the ſame miniſter, how he commits himſelf by an opinion of men and things.

The next point that I entered upon previouſly to my narrative, was the tenor of my orders, and I believe it was generally expected that the noble Lord would have taken ſome notice of the fact I alledged, *that every diſcretionary latitude which I had propoſed was eraſed, while the plan was in his hand.* As his Lordſhip had ſo much commented upon the nature of peremptory orders, as a *general* queſtion, in my abſence, it would have been fair in him to have reaſoned upon them after that important and deciſive circumſtance was laid open.

Remarkable circumſtance reſpecting the conſtruction to be put upon my orders.

The general idea *of forcing a way to Albany*, which the army at its outſet conceived, by reaſoning upon the apparent principles of the campaign, without participation of the letter of the orders is clear, from the general tenor of the evidence. I wiſhed, it is true, to have heard more copiouſly the ſentiments of Sir Guy Carleton, becauſe he had full participation of the orders. From the temper and judgment that always direct his conduct, he declined giving an opinion at the bar upon what might become a queſtion in the Houſe. But I have ſince (upon requeſt) received his permiſſion to publiſh a letter from him to me, dated ſoon after the Convention of Saratoga,

The general opinion of the army upon forcing away to Albany.

toga, which is in the Appendix No. X. and with this reference I close my review of the prefatory matter which I laid before the Committee.

Review of the first Period.

Most of the circumstances stated in my Narrative respecting the first period of the campaign, were, from their nature, to be established by written testimony; and the papers, No. VII. and VIII. in the Appendix, were added to those before produced for that purpose; but the returns of the troops, No. XI, are moreover authenticated by the proper official authority, the adjutant general, and the detail of the artillery, by the Major of brigade in that department.

Strength of the army.

From the evidence of the latter, is also confirmed all that I advanced respecting the opinion and recommendation of Major General Philips, for the proportion of artillery employed; for the moderate quantity of it, comparatively with the principles and practice of other services, and for the great expected use of artillery in the country where we were to act.

Proportion of artillery. Evidence of Capt. Blomfield, from quest. 4. to 9.

Had these opinions been merely speculative, the intelligence of the persons from whom they came would have given them sufficient authority. But fortunately they are verified by facts; for it appears from a multitude of evidence, that the enemy made the true use of local advantages: they fortified every pass or proper post: the nature of the country, and the necessity of keeping the banks of rivers, made it impossible to turn those posts: had I wanted therefore artillery, I could not have proceeded any given ten miles, but at a heavy expence of my best troops. When it was found that I was provided with that forcible arm, the enemy invariably quitted their entrenchments, either to retreat, or fight upon ground where they supposed artillery could be least effectually employed. I am to thank the honourable member, whatever his intentions might have been, who by his cross examination placed the expediency of carrying the train I did, in so clear a view.

The uses of it. Captain Blomfield from question 10 to 17. Evidence of Lord Balcarras, from question 14. to 19. Lord Balcarras's cross examination, quest. 93, 94.

The only remaining fact of the first period to which verbal evidence is applicable, viz. The impossibility of following the enemy further than they were followed in their precipitate retreat from Ticonderoga, is established by Lord Balcarras, and by Lord Harrington.

Lord Balcarras, quest. 8. Lord Harrington, question 4.

Review of the second Period.

In entering upon the evidence which respects the first transaction of the second period, viz. the march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward, I cannot help

March from Skenesborough to Fort Edward.

obſerving how much of the blame imputed to me has been occaſioned by miſrepreſentation from perſons whoſe buſineſs it was to decry my actions; and by uncommon miſtakes in the geography of the country by thoſe to whom my actions were miſrepreſented. By the croſs examination of Lord Balcarras it muſt be ſuppoſed, that the perſons who ſuſpected I erred in not taking the route by *South Bay* after the ſucceſs at Ticonderoga, did not know where *South Bay* was. They ſeem equally ignorant of the ſituation of *Pitch-pine Plains*, by the queſtion immediately following the former one; and it muſt have been a ſurpriſe to the enquirers to find that the route which they were inclined to approve, was preciſely that which the main body of the army took under me in perſon, and with ſuch effect, as to come up with the rear of the enemy and drive them from their fortified poſt at Skeneſborough, with the loſs on their part of five armed veſſels and all the reſt of their water-craft.

Miſtakes in geography.

Lord Balcarras, queſt. 90.

Queſtion 91.

But it may be ſaid, this part of the croſs-examination, though incomprehenſible in point of geography, ſtill applied to the queſtion taken notice of in my narrative, viz. "Whether it would not have been more expedient to return to Ticonderago, and "take the route by Lake George, than to proceed, as I did, by the Pitch Pine Plains "to Fort Edward?"

I ſhall not recapitulate the various motives I have before ſtated in ſupport of that preference, having publickly in my favour the opinion of an officer ſo enlightened in military ſcience, and ſo well acquainted with the country as Sir Guy Carleton;* and never having heard a difference of opinion in any other officer of a like deſcription, to reſt much more upon a ſubject ſo ſupported by reaſoning and by ſucceſs, might be conſtrued an attempt to divert the attention of my examiners from points leſs defenſible. I therefore ſhall only add two ſhort remarks; the one, that the fact of gaining conſiderable time by allotting the whole ſervice of the water-craft to the tranſport of proviſion and ſtores over Lake George, inſtead of employing great part of it for the tranſport of the troops is inconteſtably proved by the evidence of Captain Money and Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton: the other, that to have reached Fort Edward with the troops ſooner than the 29th of July (the day that the firſt embarkation of proviſions arrived at Fort George) would not only have been uſeleſs, but alſo highly impolitic; becauſe the ſubſiſtence of the troops at Fort Edward, before the arrival of that embarkation, muſt have been brought by land carriage through much difficult road all the way from Fort Anne, when, on the contrary, by remaining in the neighbourhood of Skeneſborough till the paſſage of Lake George was effected, excluſively of the conſiderations of covering the removal of the hoſpital of Huberton, and alarming the Connecticut by the poſition of General Reideſel's corps, the army was commodiouſly ſupplied by water-carriage.

Sir Guy Carleton, queſt. 9, 10.

Conſiderable time gained by the army taking the route to Fort Edward by land.

Captain Money, queſt. 4 to queſt. 11. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, queſt. 23.

* See alſo the map of country.

The

The next circumſtance for examination, according to the order of the Narrative, is the tranſport of the magazines of proviſions, &c. from Fort George; and it is highly incumbent upon me to ſhew the difficulties of that operation, becauſe, if they were avoidable, it muſt be acknowledged one of the principal grounds upon which I vindicate the plan of the expedition to Bennington will fail me.

The charges brought againſt the Lt. General's conduct at this part of the campaign.

But I am perſuaded, every candid examiner will firſt indulge me in a ſhort pauſe. It will be recollected, that this is the only part of the campaign upon which the noble Lord has laid his finger, as judging it productive of the ſubſequent events. The croſs-examination had already been preſſed upon the ſame ideas. Such want of knowledge of the nature of tranſport in that country has been betrayed; ſo much prepoſſeſſion of unneceſſary delays has appeared; ſuch emphaſis of queſtion has attended every circumſtance of my conduct at this period, that I ſhall ſtand acquitted of prolixity, if I preface the application of the ſubſequent evidence by a more comprehenſive and complete ſurvey of the difficulties and anxieties of my ſituation than I thought was neceſſary before.

Survey of his difficulties and anxieties

Feeding the army.

The combination of arrangement for feeding the army might, in fact, be ſtated to have extended even to Ireland; for ſome part of the ſupply depended upon the victualling fleet which was prepared in that country, according to my requiſition before I left London, and had not reached Quebec when the army took the field. The tedioufneſs of the navigation from Quebec to the mouth of the Sorel need not be again deſcribed. The next embarraſſment was to manage the conveyance for that part of the ſupply which came from Montreal, and which was much the greateſt, without interfering with the tranſport which with equal neceſſity was to be expedited up the Saint Lawrence to Lake Ontario, for the ſervice of Colonel St. Leger's expedition, and the immenſe ſtores (then neceſſarily upon the move alſo) for the winter maintenance of the upper country. To theſe might be added a liſt of chances and inconveniences, incident to the carrying places between Chamblée and Saint John's; the uncertaintainty afterwards of the paſſage over Lake Champlain, and Lake George; the laborious and ſlow operations of drawing the boats over the iſthmus which divides the two Lakes. Theſe together make a ſyſtem of embarraſſments and diſappointments hardly to be conceived by thoſe who have not experienced them.

But although the whole of this arrangement (the furniſhing the upper country excepted) was made under my direction, I have been content to date my difficulties from the lodgement of the ſupplies at Fort George; and I have touched the other parts only to ſhew more perſpicuouſly the unfairneſs of judging of an American campaign upon European ideas. How zealouſly ſoever a general, in ſuch an undertaking as mine, may be ſerved by the chiefs of departments (and much praiſe is due from

from me upon that ſcore) for one hour he can find to contemplate *how he ſhall fight his army, he muſt allot twenty to contrive how to feed it.*

Behaviour of the Indians.

The behaviour of the Indians is a circumſtance too material to be paſſed over in a review of the anxieties in this part of the campaign. I had diſcerned the caprice, the ſuperſtition, the ſelf-intereſtedneſs of the Indian character from my firſt intercourſe, even with thoſe nations which are ſuppoſed to have made the greateſt progreſs towards civilization: I mean with thoſe called the domiciliated nations near Montreal. I had been taught to look upon the remote tribes who joined me at Skeneſboroug, as more warlike; but a very little time proved that, with equal depravity in general principle, their only pre-eminence conſiſted in ferocity. The hopes I had placed in their wild honour, and in the controul of their conductors, which, as I ſtated before, at firſt had been promiſing, were ſoon at an end; and their ill-humour and mutinous diſpoſition were manifeſt ſoon after my arrival at Fort Edward. The apparent cauſes of their change of temper were the reſentment I had ſhewn upon the murder of Miſs Macrea, and the reſtraints I had laid on their diſpoſition to commit other enormities; but I never doubted that their evil paſſions were fomented, and their defection completed by the cabals of the Canadian interpreters. Rapacity, ſelf-intereſt, and preſumption are the characteriſtics of theſe men, with ſome few exceptions. The acquiſition of the Indian language has uſually been a certain fortune to a man with an artful head and a convenient conſcience.

Lord Harrington from queſt. 6 to 23.

To check the old practices of peculation in theſe men, Sir Guy Carleton, with great judgment, had given the ſuperintendency of the Indian department to Major Campbell and Captain Frazer, gentlemen of the higheſt integrity. The Britiſh officers employed ſolely in the military conduct of that department, were alſo ſelected with equal propriety. The interpreters had from the firſt regarded with a jealous eye a ſyſtem which took out of their hands the diſtribution of Indian neceſſaries and preſents; but when they found the plunder of the country, as well as that of the government, was controuled, the profligate policy of many was employed to promote diſſention, revolt, and deſertion.

St. Luc.

I take this occaſion to acquit Monſieur St. Luc of any ſuſpicion of his being concerned in theſe factions; but I believe he diſcerned them. He certainly knew that the Indians pined after a renewal of their accuſtomed horrors; and that they were become as impatient of his controul as of all other, though the pride and intereſt of authority, and the affection he bore to his old aſſociates, induced him to cover the real cauſes under various frivolous pretences of diſcontent, with which I was daily tormented, but to which I conſtantly attended: and though I differed totally with Saint Luc in opinion upon the efficacy of theſe allies, I invariably took his advice in the management

management of them, even to an indulgence of their moſt capricious fancies, when they did not involve the diſhonour of the King's ſervice and the diſgrace of humanity. The council of the 4th of Auguſt was held at his preſſing inſtance; and in that council, to my great aſtoniſhment (for he had given me no intimation of the deſign) the tribes with which he was moſt particularly connected, and for whom he interpreted, declared their intention of returning home, and demanded my concurrence and aſſiſtance. The embarraſſment of this event was extreme. By acquieſcing, I voluntary relinquiſhed part of my force that had been obtained with immenſe charge to government, that had created high expectation at home and abroad, and that indeed my own army was by no means in condition to diſpenſe with; becauſe, depending upon the ſuppoſed aſſiſtance of this much over-valued race for ſcouts and outpoſts, and all the leſſer, but neceſſary ſervices, for giving due repoſe to the camp, the Britiſh light-infantry had been trained to higher purpoſes: they were deſtined to lead in the general and deciſive combats I expected in the woods, and could not be ſpared, or riſked, or harraſſed, without palpable conſequences of the moſt diſagreeable kind.

Lord Harrington's qu. laſt referred to.

On the contrary, I was convinced a cordial reconciliation with the Indians was only to be effected by a renunciation of all my former prohibitions and an indulgence in blood and rapine: I had not a friend in the department in whom I could confide except Major Campbell, Captain Frazer, and the other Britiſh officers: their ignorance of the languages, and the very probity of their characters, rendered them of no weight in Indian councils. An anſwer, nevertheleſs, was to be made upon the moment; and the part I took was to give a firm refuſal to their propoſition, and to adhere to the controuls I had before eſtabliſhed; but, with a temperate repreſentation of the ties of faith, of generoſity, and honour, to join every other argument conſiſtent with thoſe principles which I could deviſe, to perſuade and encourage them to continue their ſervices.

This ſpeech appeared to have the deſired effect. The tribes neareſt home affected to ſeparate from the others, and only preſſed for permiſſion to return in parties to gather in their harveſt, propoſing to relieve each other; which was granted. Some of the remote tribes alſo ſeemed to retract their propoſitions, and profeſſed a zeal for the ſervice; but the deſertion took place the next day by ſcores, loaded with ſuch plunder as they had collected; and it continued from day to day, till ſcarce a man that had joined at Skeneſborough remained. This whole tranſaction, I aver, was before the plan of Bennington was formed. It appears ſo from the evidence produced upon the croſs examination by the gentlemen to whom I am obliged upon ſo many occaſions, for elucidating different ſubjects; and the preciſe date could have been

Lord Harrington's qu. laſt referred to. & ib. qu. 87.

further

further ſupported by a memorandum of Sir Francis Clerke; but I thought that reference ſuperfluous in a matter ſo notorious.

That Monſieur St. Luc, anxious for the credit of his favourite troops, and invited by the propenſity he found in the miniſter to liſten to any whiſpered intelligence, in contradiction to that he received from the General himſelf; that, under theſe temptations, that wily partizan ſhould miſplace dates, and confound cauſes, neither ſurpriſes nor offends me. With this expoſition of fact, I leave him in full poſſeſſion of his petulancy reſpecting my military talents; and am concerned at no effect of his comments or communications, in the miniſter's cloſet or in the news-papers,* except as they may have tended to ſupport the general ſyſtem of deception which has ſo long and ſo fatally influenced his Majeſty's adviſers. The Indian principle of war is at once odious and unavailing; and if encouraged, I will venture to pronounce, its conſequences will be ſeverely repented by the preſent age, and univerſally abhorred by poſterity.

German troops.

But to proceed to the ſurvey of other difficulties of the time. Great attention was due to the management of the German troops.

The mode of war in which they were engaged was entirely new to them; temptations to deſert were in themſelves great, and had been enhanced and circulated among them by emiſſaries of the enemy with much art and induſtry. Jealouſy of predilection in the allotment of poſts and ſeparate commands ever ſubſiſts among troops of different ſtates; and a ſolid preference of judgment in the commander in chief often appears a narrow national partiality.

Character of M.G. Reideſel.

I confeſs I was much aſſiſted in maintaining cordiality in an army thus compoſed, by the frank, ſpirited, and honourable character I had to deal with in Major General Reideſel;—a character which was very early impreſſed upon my mind, and which no trials of intricacy, danger, and diſtreſs, has ſince effaced; but addreſs was ſtill requiſite to ſecond his zeal, and to diffuſe it through the German ranks; and I ſtudied to throw them into ſituations that might give them confidence in themſelves, credit with their prince, and alacrity in the purſuit of an enterpriſe, which, when its difficulties were conſidered, in fact required enthuſiaſm.

The Canadian troops.

Other parts of the alliance, though not liable to ſuſpicion of treachery, like the Indians, nor of conſequence to be ſo much attended to as the Germans, nevertheleſs had their perplexities. The Canadians, were officered by gentlemen of great

* One of thoſe comments Lord George Germain thought proper to ſtate, in a ſpeech in the Houſe of Commons. His Lordſhip gave me a character in the words uſed by Mr. St. Luc, in a converſation between them.—"Il eſt brave, mais lourd comme un Allemand."

The letter alluded to was addreſſed to me from Canada, after Mr. St. Luc's voyage from England. I do not know to whom the duplicate was addreſſed, but he certainly was a perſon of diligence; for it appeared in the news-papers the ſame day I received the original.

condition in their country, but were not to be depended upon. Inſtead of the enterpriſing and daring ſpirit which diſtinguiſhed the character of that people under the French government, was ſubſtituted a longing after home, the effect of diſuſe of arms and long habits of domeſtic enjoyments; and this diſeaſe *(mal de payz)* is carried in them to a greater proverbial extreme than in any other people to whom the term is more commonly applied.

It was neither eaſy to keep theſe people together, nor to ſupport the ideas of reſpect which the enemy entertained of them from the remembrance of the former war. The only manner of effecting the latter purpoſe was to ſhew them occaſionally at a diſtance, but rarely to commit them upon parties where they were likely to fall in with the beſt claſſes of the Rangers oppoſed to us: perhaps there are few better in the world than the corps of Virginia Riflemen, which acted under Colonel Morgan.

Provincial corps.

The Provincial Corps, of which I had two in embryo, and ſeveral detached parties, were yet a heavier tax upon time and patience. They were compoſed of profeſſed Loyaliſts, many of whom had taken refuge in Canada the preceding winter, and others had joined as we advanced. The various intereſts which influenced their actions rendered all arrangement of them impracticable. One man's views went to the profit which he was to enjoy when his corps ſhould be complete; another's, to the protection of the diſtrict in which he reſided; a third was wholly intent upon revenge againſt his perſonal enemies; and all of them were repugnant even to an idea of ſubordination. Hence the ſettlement who ſhould act as a private man, and who as an officer, or in whoſe corps either ſhould be, was ſeldom ſatisfactorily made among themſelves; and as ſurely as it failed, ſucceeded a reference to the Commander in Chief, which could not be put by, or delegated to another hand, without diſſatisfaction, encreaſe of confuſion, and generally a loſs of ſuch ſervices as they were really fit for, *viz.* ſearching for cattle, aſcertaining the practicability of routes, clearing roads, and guiding detachments or columns upon the march.*

Other critical embarraſſments.

Such were the embarraſſments of my mind, added to the many neceſſary avocations of command purely military. It will likewiſe be remembered that Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was, at this time, before Fort Stanwix: every hour was pregnant with critical events. The candid and unprejudiced, reflecting upon ſuch a ſituation, will check the readineſs of their cenſure: far be it from me to contend that I did not commit many errors: I only hope to have proved, that they are not thoſe

* I would not be underſtood to infer, that none of the Provincials with me were ſincere in their loyalty; perhaps many were ſo. A few were of diſtinguiſhed bravery, among which it would be unjuſt not to particularize Mr. Fiſtar, who fell at Bennington, and Capt. Sherwood, who was forward in every ſervice of danger to the end of the campaign. I only maintain that the intereſts and the paſſions of the revolted Americans concenter in the cauſe of the Congreſs; and thoſe of the Loyaliſts break and ſubdivide into various purſuits, with which the cauſe of the King has little or nothing to do.

which

which have yet been ſpecifically pointed at, and whatever blame may be imputable to me in other inſtances, my late examiners are not juſtly intitled to triumph on any of their diſcoveries.

Expedition to Bennington.

And now for the expedition to Bennington as it ſtands upon evidence.

The queſtions upon the croſs examination are ſo explanatory of the hints which fell from the noble Lord afterwards, that one would almoſt imagine the hints were originally deſigned to precede. It will be regular for me, therefore, to conſider them in that manner, and, from the whole I am to collect, that the faults meant to be eſtabliſhed are, that I employed Germans to ſound the diſpoſition of a country in which no Germans reſided: that the mounting dragoons was unneceſſary: that the range given to the expedition was too great: that it was not originally deſigned for Bennington: that the force was inadequate.

Faults ſuppoſed.

Fault of employing Germans, Lord Harrington, queſt. 90. 91. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, q. 134 to 137.

In regard to the firſt of theſe charges, relative to the employment of Germans, it would be waſte of time to add to the full anſwer given by Lord Harrington. Colonel Kingſton has anſwered the queſtion reſpecting the mounting the dragoons; and moreover it will be remembered, that the collecting horſes was by no means confined to that ſervice. They were requiſite for carrying the baggage of the army, as expreſſed in the inſtructions to Colonel Baume, to the amount of 1500. This circumſtance may have ſtruck ſome gentlemen, as confirming the idea that the baggage attending the army was of enormous bulk. I requeſt a ſuſpence of judgment upon this article, till I come to the proper place of explanation; and I revert to the part of the charge which ſeems of moſt importance, viz. the extent of the march, as deſcribed in the Inſtructions, compared with the ſtrength of the detachment, &c.

See the Inſtructions and all other papers reſpecting Bennington. No. IV.

It can hardly eſcape obſervation, what ſtrength to my defence upon this point may be derived from advocates who were not expected to appear in my behalf. For I take ſupport from the noble Lord himſelf, and all who have believed in his late aſſertions, or adhered to his favourite doctrines, by pleading that I undertook the expedition to Bennington upon report, ſtrengthened by the ſuggeſtion of *perſons of long experience and reſidence in America*; *who had been preſent on the ſpot when the rebellion broke out*; and whoſe information had been much reſpected by the adminiſtration in England; *that the friends to the Britiſh cauſe were as five to one*, and that they *wanted only the appearance of a protecting force to ſhew themſelves*. Some criticiſers upon the adequacy of the force I employed, may deſert the cauſe of the noble Lord; but will *He* maintain, that a recruit of force from the enemy's country was a wild expectation, when the recruiters, provincial colonels, governors, land proprietors, and popular leaders of the party who glory in the deſignation of Tory, were upon the ſpot, and perſonally intereſted in the levies? *He* muſt ſurely ſtand forth my advocate in this point, or entirely forget the reaſoning he held to Sir William

The ground of the undertaking to Bennington ſupported by the doctrine of Lord G. Germain.

liam Howe, when without the advantages of ſuch recruiters; againſt the belief of the General himſelf; unprepared to repair the diſappointment, if diſappointment enſued, in a meaſure of ſo much more magnitude, and ſo much leſs real encouragement, *He* referred to that expedient of recruiting from the enemy, what he had not ſtrength to ſupply from the national troops.*

This I muſt inſiſt is an unanſwerable defence, with reſpect to the noble Lord, and thoſe who think with him; for it is ſtrict and poſitive coincidence with their opinions, paſt and preſent—and if I ſaid it will be ſo with thoſe to come, my prophecy would be authorized by the conviction and triumph which Mr. Galway's evidence, reſpecting the loyalty of the Americans, ſeemed to produce in the parties to whom I allude.

But in due reſpect to other judges, it is incumbent upon me to ſtate a more ſerious defence.

As Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton cannot prove juridically that the rough draft of the deſign which ended the affair of Bennington was the ſame which was delivered by General Reideſel, and I am unwilling upon memory to incur a poſſibility of miſtake, even in an immaterial circumſtance that reſpects an abſent friend, I am content it ſhould be conſidered as an uncertaintainty, and I drop all uſe that could be drawn from the original compoſition. It will fully anſwer my purpoſe to adhere to the bare aſſertion which I am ſure will never be contradicted, that Major General Reideſel originally conceived an expedition for the purpoſe of mounting his dragoons, and ſupplying the troops in general with baggage-horſes; that I thought his idea might be extended to much greater uſe, and that the plan was conſidered, amended, and enlarged, in concert with him. Therefore upon the abſtract ground and reaſon of the meaſure, I might urge, that it was ſupported by naked military principle, according to the ſentiments of a general of great natural talents, and long ſervice under the firſt maſters of the age. It is proved, that the ſame ſentiments were ratified by the full approbation of Major General Phillips, an officer of ſimilar deſcription, to whom the plan was communicated; and if a ſingle part of the ſame plan, mentioned to be at firſt diſapproved by Brigadier General Frazer, continued to be ſo after explanation, that diſapprobation did not appear. Indeed the utmoſt that can be drawn from the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel

Lieut. Col. Kingſton's queſt.

* In a letter from Lord George Germain to Sir William Howe, dated May 28, 1777, after acknowledging that the force for the campaign would be ſhort of the General's requiſitions, is the following paragraph.

"If we may credit the accounts which arrive from all quarters, relative to the good inclinations of "the inhabitants, there is every reaſon to expect that your ſucceſs in Penſylvania will enable you to "raiſe from among them ſuch a force as may be ſufficient for the interior defence of the province, "and leave the army at liberty to proceed to offenſive operations."

The whole of the letter, from which the above is an extract, is curious, and may be ſeen in the Parliamentary Regiſter, No. 68.

King-

Kingſton, or any other witneſs, amounts to no more than an implied wiſh in the Brigadier to have conducted the expedition at the head of his diſtinct corps. It was the fact. Devoted to glory and prodigal of life; earneſt for the general ſucceſs of the campaign, and particularly anxious for every plan adopted by the man he loved, he grudged a danger or care in other hands than his own. It was not envy or diſparagement of the German troops, but zeal and impatience for employment, that influenced his predilection for the Britiſh. I honoured the principle, while I reſtrained it; and I reſerved his ardour and judgment for a ſecond movement, which required thoſe qualities much more than the expedition to Bennington did, according to any intelligence or appearance of things at the time. It will be obſerved from the evidence, that the whole of Brigadier Fraſer's corps was thrown over the river, and actually poſted at the opening of the plain near Saratoga, when Col. Baume marched; and the deſign was, upon the firſt news of Baume's ſucceſs, to have puſhed that corps to take poſſeſſion of the heights near Stillwater, and to have intrenched there, till the army and the proviſion could have joined, by which means the whole country on the weſt ſide the river, to the banks of the Mohawk, would have been our own.

But moreover it is to be obſerved, that Major General Reideſel was far from being ignorant, as has been ſuggeſted, of the nature of the country, or the profeſſions of the inhabitants. He was juſt returned from commanding a detached corps at a conſiderable diſtance from the main army, in the very heart of the country from which the enemy's force at Bennington was afterwards ſupplied. He ſpoke the Engliſh language well; he was aſſiſted by many natives of the beſt information.

It is evident, that the brave but deceived officer who commanded the detachment, was induced to deviate from the cautions preſcribed in the inſtructions. A plan drawn by an engineer upon the ſpot is added to the evidence produced to the committee, to ſhew more clearly where that deviation happened. It appears alſo in proof, that the meaſures taken to relieve Colonel Baume, upon the news of his difficulty, were the moſt ſpeedy that could be uſed, and would have been timely, had not Colonel Brieman's march been more tardy than could have been ſuppoſed poſſible. I take the fact as ſtated in his own account, without impeaching his credit with regard to the obſtacles he deſcribes. But as a farther vindication of the intelligence and principle upon which the original ſtrength of the detachment was framed, and the mere accident which made even error poſſible, I requeſt admiſſion for the proof of a new fact which I did not know it was in my power to bring, till after Captain Money had left the bar of the Houſe of Commons; and as I was precluded from calling him a ſecond time, by the abrupt cloſe of the proceedings, I had no other way of laying it before the public, than by ſtating the queſtion in writing,

Lord Harrington's q. 28 to 31.

writing, and requiring his authority to publiſh the anſwer, which I obtained, and they are as follows:

Q. Do you know any circumſtance reſpecting an unexpected reinforcement received by the rebels at Bennington near the time of the action?

A. "A few days after I was priſoner in the rebel camp, ſome of their officers "told me, that it was a providential circumſtance, that General Starks was coming "through Bennington with 1200 militia of the New-Hampſhire Grants, to join "their main army near Albany, for the guard on the proviſion at Bennington did "not amount to more than 400 men; and that on his hearing of a detachment of "our army being only four or five miles from him, he with the guard, and what "militia could be collected in the neighbourhood, attacked and defeated the de-"tachment, as well as the reinforcement that were on their march to join them. "The rebel officers alſo informed me, and I have ſeen accounts that agree with "what I then heard, that during the action General Starks was 'luckily' joined "by Colonel Warner with a conſiderable body of men. I have frequently heard "our officers ſay that were in this action, that had Colonel Baume retreated four "miles, and recroſſed the river he paſſed the day before, and taken poſt there, "when he found by information he could not proceed, and had wrote for a rein-"forcement, he would have met Colonel Breiman coming to his aſſiſtance, and "would not have riſqued the loſs of his corps, which by his inſtructions were ſo "ſtrongly recommended, as not even to riſque a conſiderable loſs. This, Sir, is "as nearly as poſſible the anſwer I ſhould have given had the queſtion been aſked "me in the Houſe of Commons.—J. Money."

This piece of evidence will ſerve to ſhew that it was not the ſucceſs of the rebels at Bennington that animated the militia to aſſemble, and march in the cauſe of the Congreſs; and he muſt be of ſteady faith indeed in American loyalty who can ſuppoſe much of it really exiſted in the country of the Hampſhire Grants (howſoever it had been affected and profeſſed) when he reflects, not only that General Starks and Colonel Warner were not oppoſed in collecting their men, though my army, then in a tide of ſucceſs, were near at hand; but alſo that not a loyaliſt was found earneſt enough to convey me intelligence.

It will likewiſe appear, from this piece of evidence, when compared with the map of the country and the diſpoſition of the troops, that had not the accidental paſſage of the detachments under Starks and Warner been exceedingly critical, it could not have availed.—Forty-eight hours ſooner, they would have joined General Gates; and he would hardly have detached them, or any other part of his force, back to Bennington, even though he had heard of a movement to my left; becauſe he muſt have known that the whole of Fraſer's corps lay ready to march rapidly upon him from my right.

right.—Forty-eight hours later, the blow would have been ſtruck; and the ſtores, conſiſting of live cattle, and flower, with abundant carriages to convey it, would have been out of reach.

Another reflection will be apt to ariſe in ſpeculative minds upon this ſubject, viz. on what nice chances depends the reputation of an officer who acts under ſelfiſh and ungenerous employers! Such men not only with-hold the fair protection that would ariſe from an explanation of his motives, but are the firſt to join the cry of the uninformed multitude, who always judge by events. Thus every plan receives a colouring in the extreme; and is denominated (often with equal injuſtice) a fatal error or a brilliant enterprize.

Croſs-examination of Lord Harrington, q. 89.

But it ſtill may be ſaid, the expedition was not originally deſigned againſt Bennington. I really do not ſee to what it could tend againſt me, if that ſuppoſition were in a great degree admitted. That ſome part of the force was deſigned to act there, will not be diſputed by any who read Colonel Baume's inſtructions, and conſult the map. The blame or merit of the deſign altogether, muſt reſt upon the motives of expediency; and it is of little conſequence whether the firſt and principal direction was againſt Bennington, or Arlington, or any other diſtrict, as my intelligence might have varied reſpecting the depoſits of corn and cattle of the enemy. At the ſame time I muſt obſerve it is begging the queſtion, to argue that Bennington was not the real, original object, becauſe Bennington was not mentioned in the draft of inſtructions. A man muſt indeed be void of military and political addreſs, to put upon paper a critical deſign, where ſurprize was in queſtion, and every thing depended upon ſecreſy. Though it were true, that I meant only Bennington, and thought of nothing leſs than the progreſs of the expedition, in the extent of the order, I certainly would not now affirm it, becauſe I could not prove it; and becauſe it would ſeem, that I ſearched for remote and obſcure juſtification, not relying upon that which was manifeſt; but ſurely there is nothing new or improbable in the idea, that a general ſhould diſguiſe his real intentions at the outſet of an expedition, even from the officer whom he appointed to execute them, provided a communication with that officer was certain and not remote.

This review of the affair of Bennington, tho' long, I truſt will not be deemed miſplaced; and from the different parts of it, I think, will clearly be eſtabliſhed the few following aſſertions.

1ſt. That the deſign upon Bennington was juſtified by the circumſtances of the time.

2d. That there was no reaſon to ſuppoſe the force of the enemy there greater than what the detachment was adequate to defeat.

3d. That when the force was diſcovered to be greater, the ill conſequences would have been avoided had not Colonel Baume deviated from his inſtructions, by committing

ting his regular force in the woods inſtead of fortifying a poſt in the open country, and exploring the woods only with the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials, ſupported by Captain Fraſer's corps, who were complete maſters of ſuch buſineſs.

4th. That after Colonel Baume had committed that error, it would have been retrieved had Colonel Brieman's reinforcement accompliſhed their march in the time they ought to have done.

5th. That the ſtrength of the enemy was merely accidental.

And, as a final obſervation, I will add, that when a miniſter ſtates a common accident of war, independent of any general action, unattended with any loſs that could affect the main ſtrength of the army, and little more than the miſcarriage of a foraging party, to have been fatal to a whole campaign, of which he had directed the progreſs and apportioned the force, he makes but an ill compliment to his own judgment.

Difficulty of forming a magazine after the diſappointment at Bennington. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, q. 24 to 31.

The next claſs of proofs in regular progreſſion, applies to the difficulty of bringing forward a magazine of proviſion, after the diſappointment of obtaining live ſtock and flower at Bennington. It has been ſhewn, by the evidence of Captain Money, Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton, and the authentic memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke, that early in the month of Auguſt it was no eaſy taſk to ſupply the daily conſumption of the army. Our powers were afterwards, in ſome degree, encreaſed by the arrival of more contract horſes, acquiſitions of more ox-teams from the country, and the great vigilance exerted in the departments of the quarter-maſter-general and inſpector, whoſe aſſiſtants had been augmented.

A minute inveſtigation of this operation I am ſenſible will be thought dry, and perhaps unneceſſary, by general readers—they will paſs it over—but there are thoſe who have laid much ſtreſs upon a waſte of time, and who take delight in tracing the ſmall parts of a ſubject with ſcrupulous exactneſs. With ſuch it is my duty, as a perſon on my defence, to enter into detail, and I will lay my ground in the queſtion put to Captain Money in his croſs-examination and his anſwer.

Q. Why did the Army remain from the 16th of Auguſt to the 13th of September "before they croſſed the Hudſon's-River to engage the Rebels at Stillwater?"

A. "To bring forward a ſufficient quantity of proviſions and artillery, to enable the "General to give up his communication."

Capt. Money, q. 20; and for the general account of the efforts uſed ſee the ſame evidence from q. 12 to 25.

With all the powers of conveyance poſſible to be muſtered, Captain Money computes, (and his computation tallies nearly with the table formed by the Commiſſary-General) that five days proviſion, viz. four for forming the magazine and one for daily conſumption, was the moſt that could be conveyed at once.

To bring this to an average I will aſſume only two days for accidents of weather, roads, fatigue of cattle, breaking of carriages, and other common diſappointments; this is much leſs time than according to the evidence might be allowed, and upon This computation it would take ten days to convey the magazine to Fort Edward only.

The

The ſtage from thence to the encampment and intended depoſitary muſt not be computed by diſtance but by impediments. The rapids of the river and the different carrying-places have been deſcribed by the witneſſes, and it reſults that this ſtage was much longer in point of time than the former one. It was not poſſible to keep the tranſports going at both ſtages together for the ten days mentioned, becauſe there were not boats in the river ſufficient for more than the daily ſupply; nor could they have been conveyed there in that time by any poſſible means, for theſe reaſons; the boat carriages, which were of a conſtruction ſimilar to timber carriages uſed in England, were only twelve in number, and each carriage employed ſix horſes or four oxen to draw it; and could any other means of draft for boats over land have been contrived, or cattle have been ſupplied from the artillery, or any other department, all would have been uſeleſs; becauſe the boats themſelves, to a greater amount than thoſe above ſpecified, were wanting till after the whole of the proviſion tranſport between Ticonderoga and Fort George, upon which they were employed, was finiſhed, and it had barely kept pace ſo as to ſupply the land tranſport between Fort George and Fort Edward.

I deſire only an allowance of fifteen days for the carriage over the ſecond ſtage, and it will thus take, in the whole, twenty-five days to form the magazine alone.

I claim no additional allowance of time for conveying one hundred boats, at leaſt, through the difficulties of land and water, in the two ſtages, but compriſe that labour among the reſt of the laſt fifteen days. It muſt be nevertheleſs obſerved, that even this number was ſhort of what was wanting, and, to ſave time, all the artificers were employed in building ſcouls (fourteen of which were finiſhed during the tranſport) to make water craft, in the whole ſufficient to carry the magazine forward, after the communication ſhould be at an end. The new caulking the boats, though indiſpenſibly neceſſary to great part of them, after paſſing the lakes loaded, and afterwards being ſhaken and damaged by land carriage, is another work which I throw into the laſt fifteen days of the tranſport, or into the ſubſequent four days, which muſt at the leaſt be allotted for loading the magazine, and arranging the order of its proceeding both in reſpect to navigation and defence. This was committed to very expert naval officers, and was matter of no trivial concern, or eaſy execution.

The whole buſineſs, according to the above repreſentation and calculation, both which are founded upon evidence, would have taken twenty-nine days: twenty-ſeven only were employed, viz. from Auguſt the 16th to September the 13th. The exertions in fact, outwent the calculation; and I challenge the moſt minute ſpeculatiſts, to try the time and the powers we poſſeſſed, by every poſſible diſtribution of carriages and cattle, different from that which was practiſed, and I will venture to ſay none will be found leſs dilatory.

It appears clearly in proof, that no impediment to this tranſport was occaſioned by the interference of the artillery; but it has been implied by ſome queſtions in the croſs

examinations, that if the artillery did not interfere with the tranſport, the tranſport ought to have interfered with the artillery, and that by appropriating their horſes to the proviſion train, much time might have been ſaved.

It might be a ſufficient anſwer, that the artillery, for the reaſons I have before aſſigned was not to be diſpenſed with, and conſequently the horſes were to be preſerved: but I beſides have ſhewn, that they could not have been of uſe to the tranſport of the boats; and to ſatisfy every ſcruple, and to ſhew how miſtaken they are who ſuppoſe an advantage was to be obtained by the employment of artillery horſes to convey proviſions, I now offer to their reflection the additional fact, that they could have been of no avail, becauſe we had neither carts nor pack-ſaddles, more than were in uſe already.

Lieut. Col. Kingſton, q. 5 to 8 inclu-ſive, and from 122 to 130.

That the baggage of the army was an impediment to the tranſport, is another accuſation clearly confuted by the united evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton and Captain Money.*

Having thus ſhewn that the tranſport of proviſion and other ſtores, for about thirty days, was effected in the ſhorteſt time poſſible, it now becomes neceſſary to examine the

* In juſtice to the officers who are ſuppoſed to have diſobeyed orders, in reſpect to the bulk of it, it may be neceſſary to take ſome notice (and this is the proper place) of the error of making that ſuppoſition upon the directions given to Colonel Baume for procuring 1300 horſes for that ſpecific uſe. I believe the loweſt allowance of bat horſes ever made to an army was as follows:

To a field officer	3 per battalion	6
A captain	2 do.	12
A ſubaltern	1 do.	16
A ſurgeon and mate	2 do.	2
A chaplain	1 do.	1
A quartermaſter	1 do.	1
For carrying the company's tents, two horſes to each company	do.	16
Total per battalion		54

N. B. This calculation was made upon eight companies to a battalion, in which two field officers companies are included.

The horſes for the five Britiſh battalions of the line, upon calculation, amount to	270
General Fraſer's corps, reckoned to be equal to four battalions	216
Five German battalions at 70 horſes per battalion, that being the difference in proportion to their ſtrength	350
Breyman's corps	100
Total for the regiments of the regulars	936

STAFF.

Two major generals	12
Four brigadiers	16
Britiſh quarter maſter general, and his aſſiſtants	12
German ditto	12
The hoſpital	30
Total of ſtaff	82

IRREGU-

the queſtion, which has been very much canvaſſed in print, and by the croſs examination, appears to have made impreſſion upon ſome gentlemen; whether this preparation might not have been diſpenſed with, and the army have reached Albany by a rapid march, the ſoldiers carrying upon their backs a ſufficiency of proviſion to ſupport them during the time.

Queſtion made, whether the army might not have proceeded to Albany without ſtores?

It is very natural for men of all deſcriptions, to apply the idea of a rapid march to a diſtance of fifty miles, for it is not more meaſuring in a ſtreight line from Fort Edward to Albany, and it will be proper to conſider the principle and practibility of ſuch march, with reſpect to two diſtinct periods, the one before, the other after the attempt upon Bennington.

Idea of a rapid march.

With reſpect to the firſt, it will be remembered, that in the ſtate the roads then were, and with the reſources then to be employed, no proviſion before-hand was attainable. Therefore, to have brought the plan of a rapid advance within the compaſs of a poſſibility, the operation muſt have begun by marching the whole rapidly backward, in order to load the men with their packs of proviſions. How the troops, zealous as they were, would have reliſhed a ſtep ſo uncommon in its nature, and productive of ſo much unexpected fatigue, particularly how the Germans would have been ſo perſuaded of the neceſſity as to have undertaken it with good will, cannot be aſcertained.

But theſe doubts apart, it remains to be conſidered, how the troops were to paſs two very large rivers, the Hudſon and the Mohawk, without previous proviſion for a bridge, or water-craft for conveying large bodies at once. Every conceſſion a ſanguine projector can deſire ſhall be made upon this point alſo; the contrivance of rafts, bound together by twigs and ſtrips of bark, as in fact was practiſed at this very period for the paſſage of Fraſer's corps over Hudſon's River, ſhall be admitted equally practicable for the whole army; and in argument be it truſted to chance to paſs the Mohawk in the ſame way; or ſhould it fail, let recourſe be had to the ford, which is known to be practicable, *except after heavy rains*, near Schenectady, about fifteen miles from the mouth of the river.

Theſe conceſſions granted, we will ſuppoſe the army on the bank of the Hudſon's River, where they afterwards paſſed it.

The idea of a rapid march will of courſe be exempt from all thought of perſonal incumbrances (proviſion exempted) and the ſoldier will ſtand repreſented in the imagination, trim and nimble as he is ſeen at an exerciſe in an Engliſh encamp-

IRREGULARS.

Canadians Indians, and Provincials	200
Artificers	50
Total of irregulars	250
Recapitulation of the whole diſtribution	1268

ment—Indeed it is neceſſary he ſhould be conſidered in that form; for nothing can be more repugnant to a project of rapidity, than the ſoldier's load, were he to carry all the articles belonging to him in a campaign.*

But it may be ſaid, and with truth, that troops are uſually relieved from a conſiderable part of this burthen, and many examples of this relief may be brought from the general cuſtom of ſervice, and from many movements of General Howe's army in particular—nay more, it was a frequent practice of the very army in queſtion, to march free from knapſacks and camp equipage. The Wigwam, or hut conſtructed of boughs, may be made a very wholſome ſubſtitute for a tent; and when victual can be cooked before-hand, even the camp kettle for an expeditious march may be laid aſide. All theſe examples are admitted: but they all imply conveniencies for the ſeveral articles to follow, and to be brought up in due time. In our caſe they muſt have been loſt irrecoverably.

Will it be argued, that ſome medium might have been deviſed? And although it were impoſſible, conſiſtently with the idea of rapidity, to carry forward more proviſion than for bare ſuſtenance during the march, yet carts might have been found ſufficient to carry the men's knapſacks, and camp kettles, and other indiſpenſible articles? This ſuppoſition would betray a great ignorance of the country. From Saratoga to Albany there is only one road practicable for wheel carriage. There are many places where by deſtroying the bridges over deep gullies which diſcharge themſelves into the main river, a paſſage would be rendered impoſſible, not only for a wheel carriage, but a horſe. There are others where the road is bounded by the river on one ſide, and by almoſt perpendicular aſcents covered with wood on the other. Here the very ſhort work of felling a few trees would ſtop all paſſage. The expence of time to remove theſe obſtructions, or to make new roads, would have brought famine. All notion, therefore, of conveying any articles more than could be carried upon men's ſhoulders muſt ceaſe. The notion of artillery, even the ſmalleſt pieces, muſt alſo ceaſe of courſe, not even a little ammunition-tumbril could have found its way.—An eaſy ſacrifice to the theoriſts, who have maintained the inutility of artillery: but any officer who has ſeen the ground of this ſuppoſed march, would point out a dozen paſſes, not to ſpeak of the paſſage of the Mohawk, where, ſtrengthened with abattis and ſuch other works as the rebels are expert in making in a very few hours, five hundred militia would ſtop for a time, ten times their number of the beſt troops in the world who had not artillery to aſſiſt them.

* They conſiſt of a knapſack, containing his bodily neceſſaries, a blanket, a haverſack with proviſions, a carteen, a hatchet, and a fifth ſhare of the general camp equipage belonging to his tent. Theſe articles (reckoning the proviſion to be for four days) added to his accoutrements, arms, and ſixty rounds of ammunition, make a bulk totally incompatible with combat, and a weight of about ſixty pounds.

Having

Having ſtated theſe objections to the principle of a rapid march, let us now, from the knowledge that has been ſince obtained of circumſtances, conſider what would have been the certain conſequences of the attempt.

Thoſe who are acquainted with the capricious workings of the tempers of men, will not wonder at the difficulty of prevailing upon a common ſoldier in any exigency to huſband his proviſions. In a ſettled camp, the young ſoldier has very ſhort fare on the fourth day after delivery: but upon a march in bad weather and bad roads, when the weary foot ſlips back at every ſtep, and a general curſe is provoked at the weight that cauſes the retardment, he muſt be a patient veteran, and of much experience in ſcarcity, who is not tempted to throw the whole contents of the haverſack into the mire. He feels the preſent incumbrance grievous—Want is a day remote.—"Let the General find a ſupply: it is the King's cauſe and the General's intereſt—he will never let the ſoldier be ſtarved."

This is common reaſoning in the ranks. I ſtate it for thoſe who have not ſeen fatiguing ſervice, and may have a judgment to form upon it. It need not be applied to the preſent conſideration; for had the march taken place at the time it ought to have done, upon the principle of the defenders of that ſcheme, the time that Fraſer's corps firſt paſt the river upon the bridge of rafts, waſte would only have conſpired to accompliſh in *three days* a ruin that with the beſt huſbandry would have been inevitable in *ſix:* for the ſame fall of rain which it has been ſhewn in evidence actually carried away the bridge a very few days after it was conſtructed, neceſſarily made the ford of the Mohawk for an advance, and every ford of the Hudſon's River for a return, impaſſable. It hardly need be noticed, that a flood muſt have made any uſe of rafts, could they have been timely obtained, equally impracticable. The army, therefore, would have become victims to famine, without a blow, or a ſingle effort of the enemy. Saratoga muſt have been the anticipated ſcene of ſurrender, without other conditions than the mercy of ſuſtenance; the whole force of Mr. Gates would have been looſe to co-operate with Mr. Waſhington, with the fineſt ſeaſon of the campaign before them; and the General of the northern army, without a ſhadow of profeſſional defence, and precluded from the plea uſually ſo perſuaſive, that he fought hard before he failed, muſt have met the cenſure of his Sovereign and a juſtly offended country, with none to ſupport him but the preſent advocates of a rapid march. Could his dependence have been ſure even upon them? Would they not rather have adhered to their oppoſite and original ſyſtem (for ſtrange as it is, the ſame men have ſupported both) and have aſſerted, that it was extreme raſhneſs to croſs the Hudſon's River at all?

If what I have ſaid in objection to the principle and practicability of a rapid march to Albany, previous to the attempt upon Bennington, has weight, very little need be added on the ſubject afterwards, becauſe every objection will multiply upon

on the mind of the moſt curſory obſerver. I ſhall only call the attention to a very few eſſential circumſtances. The enemy was in force; a proof of his being ſo is, that Mr. Gates quitted his poſition behind the Mohawk, which was his ſtrongeſt, and advanced to Stillwater. The force found at Bennington upon the march from the Hampſhire Grants to the main army, proved the vigour and alacrity of the enemy in that country. The circumſtances of the action at Bennington eſtabliſhed a yet more melancholy conviction of the fallacy of any dependence upon ſuppoſed friends. The noble Lord has ſaid, that "I never deſpaired of the campaign before the affair of Bennington; that I had no doubt of gaining Albany in as ſhort a time as the army (in due condition of ſupply) could accompliſh the march." I acknowledge the truth of the aſſertions in their fulleſt extent; all my letters at the time ſhew it. I will go further, and in one ſenſe apply with the noble Lord the epithet "fatal" to the affair of Bennington. The knowledge I acquired of the profeſſors of loyalty was "fatal," and put an end to every expectation from enterprize unſuſtained by dint of force. It would have been exceſs of frenzy to have truſted for ſuſtenance to the plentiful region of Albany. Had the march thither been practicable in all reſpects, and even unoppoſed, (which nobody will think would have been the caſe) the enemy finding the Britiſh army unſupplied, would only have had to compel the Tories to drive the cattle and deſtroy the corn or the corn mills, and the convention of Albany inſtead of Saratoga muſt have followed. Would the Tories have riſen? Why did they not riſe round Albany and below it, at the time they found Mr. Gates's army increaſing by ſeparate and diſtinct parties from remote diſtances? They were better qualified by their ſituation to catch the favourable moment than I was to adviſe it. Why did they not riſe in that populous and as ſuppoſed well affected diſtrict, the German Flats, at the time St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix? A critical inſurrection from any one point of the compaſs within diſtance to create diverſion, would probably have ſecured the ſucceſs of the campaign.

Col. St. Leger's letter. No. V.

But to revert to the encreaſe of reaſons againſt a rapid march after the affair of Bennington. It was then alſo known, that by the falſe intelligence reſpecting the ſtrength of Fort Stanwix, the infamous behaviour of the Indians, and the want of the promiſed co-operation of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. St. Leger had been obliged to retreat. The firſt plauſible motive in favour of hazardous haſte, the facilitating his deſcent of the Mohawk, was thus at an end. The proſpect of finding the enemy diſperſed it has before been ſhewn was over.

The impoſſibility of preſerving a communication was alſo evident. Was the army to have proceeded to action without hoſpital ſtores, as well as without victual? The general who carries troops into fire without precautions to alleviate the certain conſequences, takes a ſure ſtep to alienate the affections, and deſtroy the ardour of the

the ſoldier—he exacts more than human ſpirit can furniſh. Men need not be habituated to fields of battle to be convinced of this truth. Let the mind reſt for a moment on the objects which will riſe within it after the mention of action, and then reflect, there is not a mattraſs for broken bones, nor a cordial for agony and faintneſs. They who talk of theſe rapid marches, ſuppoſe no oppoſition, or no ſuffering in conſequence of oppoſition. The hundreds of wounded men to be cruelly abandoned (if the reſt could be prevailed upon to abandon thoſe whoſe caſe might the next day be their own) make no part of the conſideration of theſe gentlemen of precipitate imaginations. But officers who are reſponſible to God and their country for the armies they conduct, cannot ſo eaſily overlook ſuch objects; and muſt be patient at leaſt till a few hundred beds, and a proper proportion of medicine and chirurgical materials, can be brought up for troops that are to fight as well as to march.

The conſideration of rapid movement has run into much length: the ſtreſs laid upon it in the croſs-examination, was the cauſe. I beg leave very ſhortly to recapitulate the principal points, and ſhall then diſmiſs it to the public judgment, without great apprehenſion of having it renewed even in ſpeculation.

Had a proper ſtore of live cattle been obtained by the expedition to Bennington, (and by the bye it will be remembered, that had the loyaliſts of the country been really of the number and deſcription repreſented, that acquiſition might have been made without an action) all the carriages might have been appropriated ſolely to the conveyance of flour, hoſpital accommodations, entrenching tools, and other abſolute neceſſaries; and a rapid march to Albany might have been hazarded.

After the expedition to Bennington had failed of that great purpoſe, had a garriſon for Ticonderoga been attainable from Canada, and the force then at Ticonderoga been brought forward, to eſtabliſh a poſt of communication, and ſecure a paſſage of the river by a fortified bridge, and redoubts upon the heights which every where command the river, on one ſhore or the other, a forced march might ſtill have been juſtifiable, becauſe a retreat was ſecure: but, diveſted of both theſe reſources, a rapid movement muſt inevitably have led to rapid ruin.

Having gone through all the material points previous to the 13th of September, and ſhewn, I truſt, by diſtinct evidence, as well as reaſoning, the expediency of the march from Skeneſborough to Fort Edward; the principle of the expedition to Bennington; the cauſe of its failure; the efforts uſed to bring forwards the proviſion and neceſſary ſtores, and the impracticability of proceeding without thoſe ſtores; the attention of the reader will now be carried to a review of the meaſure of paſſing the Hudſon's River on that day.

Review of the meaſure of paſſing the Hudſon's River.

I entered pretty fully, in my Narrative, into the principles which then actuated me; and I ſhall not enlarge upon them. I have only to requeſt every man who has

has been led to doubt whether I was required by duty, ſituation, the voice of the army, and the voice of reaſon, to advance and fight, to follow the conſideration of thoſe principles, with a reviſal of the applicable part of the verbal evidence, and I will then venture further to appeal to their judgment, whether, inſtead of being required, I was not compelled, by the ſtate of things, to act as I did; even independently of the peremptory tenor of my orders, which, confident in the ſtrength of my caſe, I have purpoſely omitted, upon this occaſion, to reconſider.

Lord Balcarras's queſt. 3 and 4, 21 to 28, 30 to 32. Lord Harrington's, 32 to 37. Capt. Money, 56, 61, and 65 to 68. Brigadier Fraſer's ſentiments.

In regard to the point ſo much agitated in this country, though with no foundation whatever from any thing that happened in America, Brigadier Fraſer's ſentiments upon this meaſure of paſſing the Hudſon's River, it would be trifling with the patience of the reader to recapitulate and point the evidence to a matter which I do not believe there is a man ſo prejudiced as now to diſpute, viz. that that officer joined in opinion and impatience with the reſt of the army. But though the falſehoods ſo groſsly and ſo long impoſed upon the public, reſpecting this matter, are no more, it may not be unworthy curioſity to explore their origin and trace their progreſs.

Progreſs of the falſehoods propagated.

It is not difficult to diſcern that the ſuſpicion of difference of opinion in the army, upon the meaſure of paſſing the Hudſon's River, aroſe from the paragraph in my public letter from Albany to the Secretary of State, wherein I ſay that I had called no council upon that ſubject, but had acted upon my own judgment of the peremptory tenor of my orders.

That a man, chief in authority, ſhould take entirely upon himſelf a meaſure of doubtful conſequence, and upon mere principle preclude himſelf from any future means of ſhifting or dividing the blame that might enſue, appeared incredible at Whitehall: the greater part of that political ſchool concluded the profeſſion of ſuch candour muſt be a fineſſe, and that, in fact, the General had not communicated with his officers, becauſe he knew opinions would have been againſt him.

When little minds think they have got a clue of littleneſs it is wonderful with what zeal and dexterity they purſue and improve it. Correſpondence and intelligence were not wanting; diſappointed jobbers, diſcarded ſervants, diſſatisfied fugitives of every ſort, ſpies, tale-bearers, and ſycophants, whom it is to the honour of a General to have his enemies, and a diſgrace to Office to encourage, abounded in town; and the primary idea once given, it was carried forward by very ready aſſiſtance, and even logical deduction.——As thus:

The General declares in his diſpatch, he called no man into council upon the meaſure of paſſing the Hudſon's River: *Therefore*, his officers differed in opinion upon the expediency of advancing.

To differ in opinion upon that expediency, they muſt conſtrue his orders not to be peremptory: *Therefore*, he ſtands ſingle in the interpretation he put upon his orders.

If

If his officers ſaw that he was unadviſedly and deſparately leading his army to death, they would certainly remonſtrate: *Therefore*, they remonſtrated.

The remonſtrance would naturally be made to him by ſuperior officers: *Therefore*, the concluſion follows; Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Fraſer actually made a remonſtrance againſt paſſing the Hudſon's River.

General Reideſel, who was next in rank to General Phillips, ſeems to have been forgotten. He was probably overlooked in the eagerneſs to get at General Fraſer, on whoſe name the important ſtreſs was laid, and for two palpable reaſons; the one, that his name ſtood high in the public eſtimation, and greatly as it deſerved ſo to ſtand, perhaps it acquired, upon this intended uſe, more juſtice from ſome quarters than it would otherwiſe have received.

The ſecond and more prevalent reaſon was, that Brigadier General Fraſer was dead.

Thus then ſtood the aſſertion when I arrived in England: "*Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Fraſer remonſtrated againſt paſſing the Hudſon's River, which movement was the cauſe of all the ſubſequent misfortunes.*" And having traced this falſehood to its maturity, it now may be equally curious to follow its decline.

After my arrival in England, the friendſhip, and general conformity of ſentiment between General Phillips and me became more known. He was alive, and might poſſibly ſoon return. His name was therefore withdrawn from the remonſtrance, and reſerved, in caſe he did not return, to give colour to a ſecond falſehood,* then kept back, but ſince produced as one of the laſt efforts of malignity in the courſe of the late enquiry.

The firſt public occaſion that offered was ſeized by me to pledge my honour upon the whole ſtory of diſagreement of opinion being falſe; and I dared any man to produce a letter or a ſentence, from Brigadier Fraſer or any other officer, to authoriſe a ſuſpicion of its being true. Lieutenant General Fraſer, upon the ſame occaſion in the Houſe of Commons, voluntarily and generouſly entered into my juſtification, upon the authority of his correſpondence with his late relation, and the knowledge of his general ſentiments.

The falſehood was immediately ſo far weakened, that the word *Remonſtrance* was changed into *Opinion*. "*Brigadier Fraſer's opinion was againſt paſſing the Hudſon's River*;" and thus it remained, now and then aſſiſted and cheriſhed, when it was very languid, by a whiſper, "*that there were ſtill letters to be produced*," till the late enquiry took place; and the evidence of Lord Balcarras, Lord Harrington,

* That General Phillips offered to conduct a part of the army from Saratoga to Ticonderoga. See this falſehood refuted, in the evidence of Lord Balcarras, Col. Kingſton, &c.

Colonel Kingſton, &c. gave the death blow to the laſt ſtruggling efforts of that calumny. The raſhneſs of paſſing the Hudſon's River was obliterated; every comment upon that *fatal* ſtep was ſuddenly dropt, as if the river had ſunk under ground; the charge, with the full accompaniment of General Fraſer's diſapprobation, remonſtrance, &c. &c. was ſhifted; the miniſter was as nimble as his confederates, and exclaimed upon the *fatality* of the expedition to Bennington.

And here I ſhall finally reſt the ſupport I have been ſo anxious to derive from that grave which has been ranſacked by my adverſaries for evidence againſt me. As a ſoldier I avow a pride in having poſſeſſed Brigadier Fraſer's eſteem. As a defendant I am ſenſible I have dwelt upon it to a fault. The precedent of a Chief in Command ſuffering the comments of an inferior to be a teſt of his actions, requires an apology to my profeſſion. It lies in the eminence of my friend's character. His approbation gave a grace to my defence, and I was impatient to confute the calumny that would have robbed me of it; but to admit that it was neceſſary for my acquittal would be to countenance and forward the moſt pernicious and preposterous doctrine that ever was practiſed to miſlead the public, and to betray the ſervice.

The comments of an inferior officer no proper teſt of a ſuperior's conduct.

When a miniſter or his confederates lean upon private report, table talk, and half ſentences, to depreciate an officer they dare not themſelves accuſe, it is a feebleneſs of vengeance that, in its firſt aſpect, is contemptible in the extreme; but it calls for our indignation when we extend our view to its principle and effects. They operate to the very inverſion of due patronage, and the abſolute extinction of every idea upon which command ought to be beſtowed, or can efficaciouſly be exerciſed; they tend to encourage officers to be ſpies and informers; to render camps and fleets, properly the reſidence of harmony and honour, the ſeats of ſuſpicion, diſcord, faction, treachery, and mutiny.

The diverſity and importance of the matter brought to review in the period of the campaign I am now cloſing, has led to greater length than I was aware of; but I cannot diſmiſs it without one reference, addreſſed to ſuch of the examiners of my conduct as have inſiſted upon the tardineſs of the northern army.

Comparative view of the campaigns in 1759 and 1777.

The reference I would plead is to a campaign in the ſame country, memorable for having been conducted by an officer whoſe example muſt be acknowledged, at this juncture, to be of ſplendid and peculiar authority; I mean the campaign of Lord Amherſt, in the year 1759.

The great points of the war in America that year were to divide the enemy's force, and at the ſame time to direct the ſeveral operations with ſuch concurrence, that, though ſeparate and remote, they ſhould aſſiſt each other. The firſt objects of the army

army to which I allude were to reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and the ultimate and moſt important one was to effect a junction with Mr. Wolfe before Quebec.

Thus far there is great ſimilarity between the plans of the two campaigns, except that the points from which the armies marched, and to which they were deſtined, were exactly reverſed.

In the Spring, 1759, the army, then aſſembled at Albany, took the field as early as the ſeaſon would admit: but ſuch were the natural impediments of the country, that though ſupported by the unanimous zeal of the inhabitants, and furniſhed with abundant ſupplies of draft cattle, carriages, water-craft, and every other neceſſary; the ſeveral departments well directed, and no enemy to oppoſe the march, the General (Lord Amherſt) was not able to commence the attack of Ticonderoga till the 7th of July, when the enemy abandoned that poſt, and retreated to Crown Point.

The diſtance from Albany to Fort George is between ſixty and ſeventy miles, the paſſage over Lake George to Ticonderoga about forty miles.

The General had reaſon to believe that Crown Point would be given up at his approach as precipitately as Ticonderoga had been. He did not, however, reach it, a diſtance of thirteen miles, and water-carriage at will, till the 14th of Auguſt.

Was it at that time aſked by the miniſter or his adherents, what was the army doing not to purſue a flying enemy?——Not to purſue when the whole country behind was their own, and magazines, baggage, hoſpitals, and every other neceſſary, might follow at leiſure, and in ſecurity! When it was foreſeen an encreaſe of fleet was to be conſtructed at Crown Point, to obtain the ſuperiority over the enemy upon Lake Champlain, and conſequently that every day's delay, in becoming maſter of that poſt, riſked the campaign!

Although theſe enquiries were not then ſuggeſted to the public, an anſwer to them has been given, greatly to the honour of the General, in a very impartial hiſtory of that time. "The army was employed in repairing the fortifications at "Ticonderoga; and the General took his meaſures with the ſame care as if he ex-"pected an obſtinate defence, and attempt to ſurpriſe him on his march."

The enemy actually did abandon Crown Point on the approach of the General, the 14th of Auguſt; and, as ſoon as in poſſeſſion of that poſt, he ſet about fortifying it as he had done Ticonderoga. The time conſumed in that operation, and in building new veſſels, brought it to the middle of October before the General could embark upon the Lake. A ſuſpence, undoubtedly, of great anxiety; for the great end of the campaign, the junction of the two armies, upon which the reduction of all Canada was thought to depend, was unattained.

But did the miniſter or his adherents *then* cavil at the tardineſs of that army?—Enterpriſing, ſanguine, and impetuous, as was the character of that miniſter's coun-

councils, there was not leſs energy in his protection. The nation, not a party, were his adherents; and his word was a *fiat* of fame. He beſtowed emphatic praiſes on his General; and a failing campaign became part of that baſis, from which he has aſcended to the high honours he now deſervedly poſſeſſes.

It would be great preſumption, and it is far from being intended, to draw any parallels or inferences from the campaigns of 1759 and 1777, except ſuch as merely apply to conſumption of time under ſimilar circumſtances. In other points the pretenſions of the reſpective Generals may be as different as their fortunes; or, to make a much clearer diſtinction, and a yet ſtronger contraſt, as wide aſunder as the auſpices under which they ſerved, thoſe of Mr. Pitt and of Lord George Germain.

Obſervations, &c. reſpecting the third Period.

" A ſeries of hard toil, inceſſant effort, ſtubborn action, till diſabled in the col-
" lateral branches of the army, by the total defection of the Indians, and the deſer-
" tion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, ſome individuals excepted;
" diſappointed in the laſt hope of any timely co-operation from other armies; the
" regular troops reduced, by loſſes from the beſt parts, to 3500 fighting men, not
" 2000 of which were Britiſh; only three days proviſions, upon ſhort allowance,
" in ſtore; inveſted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat
" remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains com-
" manding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced
" to open a treaty with Major General Gates, &c."

Appenix, No. XIV. Such was the ſummary of affairs given in my letter from Albany to the ſecretary of ſtate. At the time it was written, I little expected to have occaſion for any other teſtimony of my actions; and it has therefore been ſuppoſed, that I gave them a colouring more ſpecious than exact. This is the ſtage of my defence in which I am deſirous to bring that matter to judgment; and I have quoted the above paſſage, expreſsly to lead the attention of every examiner to the whole of that letter. Let it now be conſidered, unitedly with my late narrative, and both be compared in detail with the evidence—I am bold to ſtake my cauſe upon the iſſue—And reſting upon theſe references, my comments upon this period, though it is the moſt important, will be ſhorter than upon either of the former: the proofs alſo are more collected, and the matters controverted or ſtarted in croſs-examination are fewer.

The firſt remark I have to make is, that while the managers of the miniſter's cauſe have never admitted a doubt of the reality of thoſe movements in the campaign, with the propriety of which their ingenuity promiſed them even a colourable cauſe of cavil, they have had the addreſs, when any little ſkill and conduct were generally acknowledged, to call the exiſtence of ſuch movements into queſtion. I cannot make this remark more pertinently than at preſent, when the march of the army,

army, preceding the action of the 19th of September, is in its due place the object of notice—" A pretty combination of columns and deployments compoſed at Al-" bany, and very fit for a Gazette." This ſort of language I believe moſt perſons have heard, who have converſed with the dependents or runners of office, and it will be my excuſe for ſubmitting to the judgment of my profeſſion a plan of the movement. It will ſhew in ſome degree the difficulties that the nature of the country oppoſed to a combined march of columns; and at the ſame time the diſadvantage (I might ſay the certain defeat) that muſt have been ſuſtained, had the army been only in one column upon the ground where it was attacked, or had the combination of the other columns, thoſe of General Fraſer in particular, been leſs exact to the point of time in which it was expedient they ſhould arrive and form.

March to the enemy on the 19th of Sept. Plan IV.

To prove that this march was not *compoſed* at Albany, I refer to ſeveral witneſſes, but particularly to the Earl of Harrington. His ſituation, as my aid-de-camp, gave him a general knowledge of a movement, that an officer employed in the execution of a ſingle part of it could not have acquired. It will be conſidered by all who know the qualities of my noble friend, as very honourable to the diſpoſitions of that day, that they are ſo circumſtantially retained in ſo diſtinguiſhing a mind; and for my own part, I cannot commit them to military judgment under a better truſt than the accuracy of his deſcription.

Lord Balcarras, queſt. 33, 34. Maj. Forbes, queſt. 3 to 7. Lord Harrington's queſt. 38 to 42 incluſive.

I ſhall not therefore detain the reader an inſtant longer from a ſubject ſo worthy his attention, as the evidence reſpecting the behaviour of the troops in the enſuing events of that day.

Few actions have been characterized by more obſtinacy in attack or defence. The Britiſh bayonet was repeatedly tried ineffectually. Eleven hundred Britiſh ſoldiers, foiled in theſe trials, bore inceſſant fire from a ſucceſſion of freſh troops in ſuperior numbers, for above four hours; and after a loſs of above a third of their numbers (and in one of the regiments above two thirds) forced the enemy at laſt. Of a detachment of a captain and forty-eight artillery men, the captain and thirty-ſix were killed or wounded. Theſe facts are marked by a concurrence of evidence that no man will diſpute. The tribute of praiſe due to ſuch troops will not be wanting in this generous nation; and it will as certainly be accompanied with a juſt portion of ſhame to thoſe who have dared to depreciate or ſully valour ſo conſpicuous—who have their ears open only to the prejudice of American cowardice; and having been always loud upon that courtly topic, ſtifle the glory of their countrymen to maintain a baſe conſiſtency.

Action of 19th Sept.

Lord Harrington's queſt. 43 to 49 incluſive. Lord Balcarras, 35 to 39. Capt. Money, 26 to 30. Maj. Forbes, 8 to 10. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 57 to 67.

It will be obſervable from the accounts of the killed and wounded, that the loſs of officers in all the actions of the campaign was proportionably much greater than that of the private men: and as this obſervation applies particularly to the action we are conſidering, it may not be improper to account for it in this place.

The

Reaſon of the diſproportion of killed and wounded.

The enemy had with their army great numbers of markſmen, armed with rifle-barrel pieces: theſe, during an engagement, hovered upon the flanks in ſmall detachments, and were very expert in ſecuring themſelves, and in ſhifting their ground. In this action, many placed themſelves in high trees in the rear of their own line, and there was ſeldom a minute's interval of ſmoke in any part of our line without officers being taken off by ſingle ſhot. *

It will naturally be ſuppoſed, that the Indians would be of great uſe againſt this mode of fighting. The example of thoſe that remained after the great deſertion proved the contrary, for not a man of them was to be brought within the ſound of a rifle ſhot. The Canadians were formerly very expert in ſervice of this nature; but beſides the change in their military character, which I noticed before, their beſt officer was killed early in the action, which event caſt a general damp upon the corps. A few of the Provincials were ſerviceable: but the beſt men I had to oppoſe as markſmen, were the German chaſſeurs, though their number was ſo ſmall, as not to be one to twenty of the enemy.

Proceedings of the army after the action.

The croſs-examination upon the proceedings of the army after this action will ſhew the folly there would be in bringing a military cauſe to a parliamentary enquiry, upon the preſumption that any parts of it would be left unexamined. The very want of practical knowledge in the enquirers renders them more inquiſitive, and much more tenacious of doubts and ſurmiſes, than they would otherwiſe be: for inſtance; I do not believe that with an army exhauſted by a long and ſevere action, and deprived of an uncommon portion of officers, the queſtion of attacking the enemy next morning would have occurred to any man of profeſſional judgment: that enemy too in a poſition of which no further knowledge could be obtained than that it was covered by an intrenchment and abattis, and the approach to be made through a thick wood, without any avenue cut, or a ſingle poſt fortified to ſecure a retreat, or to cover the magazine, which afforded the only poſſible means of ſubſiſtence.

Croſs-examination of Lord Balcarras, queſt. 98 to 100. Ditto of Lord Harrington, 50 and 106. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 68. Maj. Forbes, 19. Capt. Money, 32. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 69 to 76. Lord Harrington, 56. Lord Balcarras, queſt. 200.

Equally remote would be the thoughts of military men from attacking a few days after, when it appeared I had received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, informing me of a diverſion ſo powerful as an attack upon Fort Montgomery to be undertaken as at that very time.

The queſtions relating to the enemy having their baggage packed, if that circumſtance was meant as an indication that they meant to retreat, is another proof how

* Capt. Green, aid de camp to Major General Phillips, was ſhot through the arm by one of theſe markſmen as he was delivering me a meſſage. I learned, after the convention, from the commanding officer of the rifle men, that the ſhot was meant for me; and as the captain was ſeen to fall from his horſe, it was for ſome hours believed in the enemy's army that I was killed. My eſcape was owing to the captain happening to have a laced furniture to his ſaddle, which made him miſtaken for the general.

little

little the queſtioners knew of ſervice. It does not appear in evidence how the fact was: but no officer will diſpute, that if the enemy had not only packed their baggage, but actually conveyed it to the other ſide the river, they would have acted conformably to the general practice of ſervice when action is expected; and to no circumſtance of ſervice more than to that when it is reſolved to diſpute a poſt to the laſt extremity.

Upon the whole of my ſituation at that time, I am ſo confident that it was the part of an officer to fortify and wait events, that I am only further intent to prove that I fortified properly, the nature of the ground and my ſeveral purpoſes conſidered. Upon this principle I ſubmit the plan annexed. It will alſo ſhew the nature of the ground between the two armies, and ſerve to explain the difficulties the witneſſes expreſs of taking a view of the enemy's left: but it will be conſidered, that beſides theſe apparent obſtacles to a near approach, the enemy abounded in militia, which ſupplied out-poſts and ſcouts, that could by no means be driven in without making the army liable to a general action. Plan No. V.

As for any other intelligence than what could be obtained by eye-ſight it was generally contradictory, always imperfect; the deſerters were often ſuſpicious, the priſoners very few. I never ſaw any inſtance of ſervice where it was ſo difficult to obtain information. Among people ſpeaking the ſame language with ourſelves, and many of them profeſſing the moſt favourable diſpoſitions, ſcarcely any could be prevailed upon, by rewards or principle, to riſk his perſon for the purpoſe of intelligence.

In regard to the croſs-examination, reſpecting the time neceſſary for the conſtruction of the redoubts and other works, I neither thought it worth while to conteſt it at the time, nor ſhall I conteſt it now, though nothing would be more eaſy than to ſhew that there was a great deal of neceſſary labour which the queſtions did not lead to, and conſequently the witneſſes could not with propriety enter into the explanation of them. But what makes the conſumption of time to me immaterial is, that I place my juſtification upon the expediency of waiting the co-operation from Sir Henry Clinton. It is in proof, that I received a letter from him the day after the action of the 19th, * informing me that he meditated an attack upon Fort Montgomery as at that very time. And as I have already ſaid, that I ſhould have thought it the part of madneſs to have riſked an attack upon the enemy, in the weak ſtate of my army, for ſome time after the late action, and under the expectation of ſo powerful a diverſion; ſo ſhould I have deferred it longer, even after being recruited from the hoſpital, on account of the ſame expectation, and the further chance of the reinforcement of Colonel St. Leger's corps, and perhaps a convoy of provi-

* The original letter is in my poſſeſſion, but could not be produced without diſcovering a ſecret mode of conveying intelligence that it might be improper to make public.

ſions

ſions from Ticonderoga: ſo far am I from conceiving the paſt delay blameable, that I acknowledge the meaſure of the 7th of October was precipitated by ſome days, by the forage being become ſo ſcarce, that a ſupply could only be obtained by a movement of the army.

If any perſons have ſuppoſed, that what has been called the inactive ſtate of the army at this period was a ſtate of reſt, they are as much miſtaken as they would be if they ſuppoſed it in any other circumſtance comfortable. From the 20th of September to the 7th of October, the armies were ſo near, that not a night paſſed without firing, and ſometimes concerted attacks upon our advanced picquets; no foraging party could be made without great detachments to cover it; it was the plan of the enemy to harraſs the army by conſtant alarms, and their ſuperiority of numbers enabled them to attempt it without fatigue to themſelves.

Alert ſituation of the army from 20th Sept. to 7th Oct.

By being habituated to fire, our ſoldiers became indifferent to it, and were capable of eating or ſleeping when it was very near them: but I do not believe either officer or ſoldier ever ſlept during that interval without his cloaths, or that any general officer, or commander of a regiment, paſſed a ſingle night without being upon his legs occaſionally at different hours, and conſtantly an hour before day-light.

Lord Balcarras, 46, &c. Lord Harrington, 57, &c. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 77, &c. Capt. Money, 35 to 48 See alſo Plan V.

The circumſtances in general of the action of the 7th of October ſtand in that arragement in the evidence of the Earl of Balcarras, Earl of Harrington, Lieut. Col. Kingſton, and Captain Money, and have been ſo little controverted by croſs-examination, that any length of comment upon them is unneceſſary. I will only obſerve, that the movement of the enemy under General Arnold, mentioned in my Narrative, is confirmed as far as circumſtantial teſtimony can confirm it, by Captain Money. And if there can be any perſons, who, after conſidering that circumſtance, and the poſitive proof of the ſubſequent obſtinacy, in the attack upon the poſt of Lord Balcarras, and various other actions of that day, continue to doubt, that the Americans poſſeſs the *quality* and *faculty* of fighting (call it by whatever term they pleaſe) they are of a prejudice that it would be very abſurd longer to contend with.

But though comments upon this part of the evidence may be ſpared, the remembrance of what I perſonally underwent cannot ſo eaſily be ſuppreſſed; and I am ſure I ſhall not outgo the indulgence of the candid, if in delineating ſituations ſo affecting, I add feelings to juſtification. The defence of military conduct is an intereſting point of profeſſional honour; but to vindicate the heart, is a duty to God and to ſociety at large.

Few conjunctures in the campaign I nave been deſcribing, few, perhaps, upon military record, can be found ſo diſtinguiſhed by exigencies, or productive of ſuch critical and anxious calls upon public character, and private affection, as that which now took place.

At

In the firſt place, the poſition of the army was untenable, and yet an immediate retreat was impoſſible; not only from the fatigue of the troops, but from the neceſſity of delivering freſh ammunition and proviſions. Lord Balcarras, 52.

The loſſes in the action were uncommonly ſevere. Sir Francis Clarke, my aid-de-camp, had originally recommended himſelf to my attention by his talents and diligence: as ſervice and intimacy opened his character more, he became endeared to me by every quality that can create eſteem. I loſt in him an uſeful aſſiſtant, an amiable companion, an attached friend: the ſtate was deprived by his death, of one of the faireſt promiſes of an able general.

The fate of Colonel Ackland, taken priſoner, and then ſuppoſed to be mortally wounded, was a ſecond ſource of anxiety—General Fraſer was expiring.

In the courſe of the action, a ſhot had paſſed through my hat, and another had torn my waiſtcoat. I ſhould be ſorry to be thought at any time inſenſible to the protecting hand of Providence; but I ever more particularly conſidered (and I hope not ſuperſtitiouſly) a ſoldier's hair-breadth eſcapes as incentives to duty, *a marked renewal of the truſt of Being*, for the due purpoſes of a public ſtation; and under that reflection to loſe our fortitude, by giving way to our affections; to be diverted by any poſſible ſelf-emotion from meeting a preſent exigency with our beſt faculties, were at once diſhonour and impiety.

Having therefore put aſide for a time my private ſenſations, it has been ſhewn that I effected an entire change in the poſition of the army before day-light. The plan will ſhew the new ground taken up. Early in the morning of the 8th, General Fraſer breathed his laſt—and with the kindeſt expreſſions of his affection, his laſt requeſt was brought me, that he might be carried without parade by the ſoldiers of his corps to the great redoubt, and buried there. The whole day of the 8th of October was correſpondent to this inauſpicious beginning. The hours were meaſured by a ſucceſſion of immediate cares, encreaſing doubts, and melancholy objects. The enemy were formed in two lines. Every part of their diſpoſition, as well as the repeated attacks upon Lord Balcarras's corps, and the cannonade from the plain, kept the troops in momentary expectation of a general action. During this ſuſpenſe, wounded officers, ſome upon crutches, and others even carried upon hand-barrows by their ſervants, were occaſionally aſcending the hill from the hoſpital tents, to take their ſhare in the action, or follow the march of the army. The generals were employed in exhorting the troops. Lord Balcarras, 53. Lord Harrington, 66. Plan, No. VI. State of things on the 8th. Lord Harrington, 67, &c.

About ſun-ſet the corpſe of General Fraſer was brought up the hill, attended only by the officers who had lived in his family. To arrive at the redoubt, it paſſed within view of the greateſt part of both armies. General Phillips, General Reideſel, and myſelf, who were ſtanding together, were ſtruck with the humility of the proceſſion: Gen. Fraſer's funeral.

They who were ignorant that privacy had been requeſted, might conſtrue it neglect. We could neither endure that reflection, nor indeed reſtrain our natural propenſity to pay our laſt attention to his remains. The circumſtances that enſued cannot be better deſcribed than they have been by different witneſſes.* The inceſſant cannonade during the ſolemnity; the ſteady attitude and unaltered voice with which the chaplain officiated, though frequently covered with duſt, which the ſhot threw up on all ſides of him; the mute but expreſſive mixture of ſenſibility and indignation upon every countenance: theſe objects will remain to the laſt of life upon the minds of every man who was preſent. The growing duſkineſs added to the ſcenery, and the whole marked a character of that juncture that would make one of the fineſt ſubjects for the pencil of a maſter that the field ever exhibited—To the canvas and to the faithful page of a more important hiſtorian, gallant friend! I conſign thy memory. There may thy talents, thy manly virtues, their progreſs and their period, find due diſtinction; and long may they ſurvive;——long after the frail record of my pen ſhall be forgotten.

Night march of the 8th.

The reflections ariſing from theſe ſcenes gave place to the perplexities of the night. A defeated army was to retreat from an enemy fluſhed with ſucceſs, much ſuperior in front, and occupying ſtrong poſts in the country behind. We were equally liable upon that march to be attacked in front, in flank, or rear. The diſpoſition of march had been concerted as much as circumſtances would admit; and it was executed by the officers and the troops in general with a preciſion that experience in critical ſituations can only teach. The baggage, which could only move in one column, and in a narrow road, fell into the confuſion which it is impoſſible for caution to guard againſt in the dark, becauſe a ſingle accident of an overturn or a broken wheel, or even the ſtupidity or drunkenneſs of a driver, may ſtop and often confuſe the motion of the whole line. Care was taken that no ſuch accident ſhould break the order of the troops, and orders were ſent to Major General Phillips, who commanded the rear guard, in caſe he was attacked, to pay attention only to the main object of covering the troops; or, if occaſion were, of taking a poſition to give them time to form.

Lord Harrington, 70, and from 112 to 118.

Continuance of the march on the 9th.

At day-break the next morning the army had reached very advantageous ground, and took a poſition in which it would have been very deſirable to receive the enemy. A halt was neceſſary to refreſh the troops, and to give time to the bateaux, loaded with proviſions, which had not been able to keep pace with the troops, to come a-breaſt. A portion of proviſions was delivered alſo from the bateaux, not without apprehenſion that that delivery might be the laſt: for there were parts of the river in which the boats might be attacked from the other ſide to great advantage, notwithſtanding the correſpondent movement of the army.

* Particularly Lieutenant Colonel Kingſton, 85.

The

The above purpoſes being effected, the army proceeded in very ſevere weather, and through exceeding bad roads.

Beſides the continuation of difficulties and general fatigue, this day was remarkable for a circumſtance of private diſtreſs too peculiar and affecting to be omitted. The circumſtance to which I allude is Lady Harriet Ackland's paſſage through the enemy's army, to attend her wounded huſband, then their priſoner.

Extraordinary occurrence of private diſtreſs.

The progreſs of this lady with the army could hardly be thought abruptly or ſuperfluouſly introduced, were it only ſo for the purpoſe of authenticating a wonderful ſtory.—It would exhibit, if well delineated, an intereſting picture of the ſpirit, the enterprize, and the diſtreſs of romance, realized and regulated upon the chaſte and ſober principles of rational love and connubial duty.

Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 131 to 133.

But I beg leave to obſerve beſides, that it has direct reference to my ſubject, to ſhew what the luxuries were with which (as the world has been taught to believe) the army was encumbered; what were the accommodations prepared for the *two thouſand women* that are gravely ſuppoſed, in the croſs examination, to have followed with the baggage. An idea ſo prepoſterous, as well as falſe, would have been a fitter ſubject for deriſion than refutation, but that it was maliciouſly intended; not, I am confident, by the member who aſked the queſtions, but by the perſons who impoſed upon him, to effect by prejudice what they deſpaired of effecting by fact.—Not content with cavilling at our pretenſions of having *fought* hard, they would not allow the army even the claim upon the good-nature of the nation, of having *fared* hard for its ſervice.

I ſhall however conſider part of this ſtory as ſo far unconnected with the immediate buſineſs I was upon (purſuing the line of evidence upon the retreat to Saratoga) as to give it in the margin. It may well ſtand by itſelf; and I venture to think that this one example of patience, ſuffering, and fortitude, will be permitted to paſs without cenſure or obloquy. *

When

* Lady Harriet Ackland had accompanied her huſband to Canada in the beginning of the year 1776. In the courſe of that campaign ſhe had traverſed a vaſt ſpace of country, in different extremities of ſeaſon, and with difficulties that an European traveller will not eaſily conceive, to attend, in a poor hut at Chamblée, upon his ſick bed.

In the opening of the campaign of 1777 ſhe was reſtrained from offering herſelf to a ſhare of the fatigue and hazard expected before Ticonderoga, by the poſitive injunctions of her huſband. The day after the conqueſt of that place, he was badly wounded, and ſhe croſſed the Lake Champlain to join him.

As ſoon as he recovered, Lady Harriet proceeded to follow his fortunes through the campaign, and at Fort Edward, or at the next camp, ſhe acquired a two-wheel tumbril, which had been conſtructed by the artificers of the artillery, ſomething ſimilar to the carriage uſed for the mail upon the great roads of England. Major Ackland commanded the Britiſh grenadiers, which were attached to General Fraſer's corps; and conſequently were always the moſt advanced poſt of the army. Their ſituations were often ſo alert, that no perſon ſlept out of their cloaths. In one of theſe ſituations a tent,

When the army was upon the point of moving after the halt deſcribed, I received a meſſage from Lady Harriet, ſubmitting to my deciſion a propoſal (and expreſſing an earneſt ſolicitude to execute it, if not interfering with my deſigns) of paſſing to the camp of the enemy, and requeſting General Gates's permiſſion to attend her huſband.

Though I was ready to believe (for I had experienced) that patience and fortitude, in a ſupreme degree, were to be found, as well as every other virtue, under the moſt tender forms, I was aſtoniſhed at this propoſal. After ſo long an agitation of the ſpirits, exhauſted not only for want of reſt, but abſolutely want of food, drenched in rains for twelve hours together, that a woman ſhould be capable of ſuch an undertaking as delivering herſelf to the enemy, probably in the night, and uncertain of what hands ſhe might firſt fall into, appeared an effort above human nature. The aſſiſtance I was enabled to give was ſmall indeed; I had not even a cup of wine to offer her; but I was told ſhe had found, from ſome kind and fortunate hand, a little rum and dirty water. All I could furniſh to her was an open boat and a few lines, written upon dirty and wet paper, to General Gates, recommending her to his protection.

tent, in which the major and Lady Harriet were aſleep, ſuddenly took fire. An orderly ſerjeant of grenadiers, with great hazard of ſuffocation, dragged out the firſt perſon he caught hold of. It proved to be the major. It happened, that in the ſame inſtant ſhe had, unknowing what ſhe did, and perhaps not perfectly awake, providentially made her eſcape, by creeping under the walls of the back part of the tent. The firſt object ſhe ſaw, upon the recovery of her ſenſes, was the major on the other ſide, and in the ſame inſtant again in the fire, in ſearch of her. The ſerjeant again ſaved him, but not without the major being very ſeverely burned in his face and different parts of the body. Every thing they had with them in the tent was conſumed.

This accident happened a little time before the army paſſed the Hudſon's River. It neither altered the reſolution nor the chearfulneſs of Lady Harriet; and ſhe continued her progreſs, a partaker of the fatigues of the advanced corps. The next call upon her fortitude was of a different nature, and more diſtreſsful, as of longer ſuſpenſe. On the march of the 19th, the grenadiers being liable to action at every ſtep, ſhe had been directed by the major to follow the route of the artillery and baggage, which was not expoſed. At the time the action began ſhe found herſelf near a ſmall uninhabited hut, where ſhe alighted. When it was found the action was becoming general and bloody, the ſurgeons of the hoſpital took poſſeſſion of the ſame place, as the moſt convenient for the firſt care of the wounded. Thus was this lady in hearing of one continued fire of cannon and muſketry, for four hours together, with the preſumption, from the poſt of her huſband at the head of the grenadiers, that he was in the moſt expoſed part of the action. She had three female companions, the Baroneſs of Reideſel and the wives of two Britiſh officers, Major Harnage and Lieutenant Reynell; but in the event their preſence ſerved but little for comfort. Major Harnage was ſoon brought to the ſurgeons, very badly wounded; and a little time after came intelligence that Lieutenant Reynell was ſhot dead. Imagination will want no helps to figure the ſtate of the whole groupe.

From the date of that action to the 7th of October, Lady Harriet, with her uſual ſerenity, ſtood prepared for new trials! and it was her lot that their ſeverity encreaſed with their numbers. She was again expoſed to the hearing of the whole action, and at laſt received the ſhock of her individual misfortune, mixed with the intelligence of the general calamity, the troops were defeated, and Major Ackland, deſperately wounded, was a priſoner.

The day of the 8th was paſſed by Lady Harriet and her companions in common anxiety, not a tent, nor a ſhed being ſtanding, except what belonged to the Hoſpital, their refuge was among the wounded and the dying.

Mr. Brudenell, the chaplain to the artillery (the ſame gentleman who had officiated ſo ſignally at General Fraſer's funeral) readily undertook to accompany her, and with one female ſervant, and the major's valet-de-chambre (who had a ball which he had received in the late action then in his ſhoulder) ſhe rowed down the river to meet the enemy. But her diſtreſſes were not yet to end. The night was advanced before the boat reached the enemy's out-poſts, and the centinel would not let it paſs, nor even come on ſhore. In vain Mr. Brudenell offered the flag of truce, and repreſented the ſtate of the extraordinary paſſenger. The guard, apprehenſive of treachery, and punctilious to their orders, threatened to fire into the boat if it ſtirred before day-light. Her anxiety and ſuffering were thus protracted through ſeven or eight dark and cold hours; and her reflections upon that firſt reception could not give her very encouraging ideas of the treatment ſhe was afterwards to expect. But it is due to juſtice at the cloſe of this adventure to ſay, that ſhe was received and accommodated by General Gates with all the humanity and reſpect that her rank, her merits and her fortunes deſerved.

Let ſuch as are affected by theſe circumſtances of alarm, hardſhip and danger, recollect, that the ſubject of them was a woman; of the moſt tender and delicate frame; of the gentleſt manners; habituated to all the ſoft elegancies, and refined enjoyments, that attend high birth and fortune; and far advanced in a ſtate in which the tender cares, always due to the ſex, become indiſpenſibly neceſſary. Her mind alone was formed for ſuch trials.

Arrival of the army at Saratoga. Lord Harrington, 71, &c. Lord Balcarras, 57, &c.

I now return to the army, which arrived in the night at Saratoga, in ſuch a ſtate of fatigue, that the men for the moſt part had not ſtrength or inclination to cut wood and make fires, but rather ſought ſleep in their wet cloaths upon the wet ground under the continuing rain, and it was not till after day-light that the artillery and the laſt of the troops paſt the Fiſh Kill, and took a poſition upon the heights and in the redoubts formerly conſtructed.

Interval between the arrival at Saratoga and ſigning the convention.

The interval between taking that poſition, and the concluſion of the treaty, is the ſolemn criſis in which I conſider myſelf as peculiarly accountable to my country. And if all the circumſtances mentioned by me, in my own vindication, in my Letters, or my Narrative, are not eſtabliſhed, and many of them ſtrengthened by poſitive proof; if every ſurmiſe of a ſurrender on my part, while there was a poſſibility of avoiding it by fight, by manœuvre, or by retreat, is not done away; if even in the laſt extremity, it does not appear I was ready and forward to prefer death to diſhonour; if the evidence I have adduced is not clear, diſtinct, and direct to theſe points, the public odium, piercingly as it affects a ſenſible breaſt, would be far ſhort of the puniſhment I deſerve.

I cannot but conſider it as one encouragement under this appeal, and it is no ſmall one, that though very few parts of my preceding conduct have eſcaped the ſcrutiny of croſs-

croſs-examination, not a material tranſaction of this criſis has been controverted or glanced at. I beg leave to recapitulate the tranſactions upon which I rely.

Lord Harrington, 74 to 76. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 86. See the plan.

It is proved by the evidence of the Earl of Harrington and Colonel Kingſton, that the enemy was poſted on the eaſt ſide the river to guard the ford.

Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 91 92.

It is further proved by the evidence of Lieut. Col. Kingſton, that in concert with the general officers, it was determined to try a night march on the eaſt ſide the river, abandoning the baggage; and that the attempt was prevented by the impoſſibility attending the delivery of neceſſary proviſion. The ſame witneſs goes on to ſhew, that the next day it was evident, that had the delivery been poſſible, the attempt would ſtill have failed, for we then received intelligence of the enemy being previouſly in poſſeſſion, in force, of the country on both ſides the river between us and Fort Edward.*

Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 93, 94, 95.

While the army was lying day and night upon their arms, "in anxious hope of "ſuccour from our friends, or as the next deſirable expectation, an attack from "the enemy,"† I cannot omit obſerving from the ſame evidence (that of Colonel Kingſton) how near the laſt expectation was being accompliſhed. It would be improper to pronounce poſitively what would have been the iſſue: but I requeſt the attention of my military readers to the plan of the ground, as an argument of the probability of ſucceſs. The diſpoſition of the enemy being to paſs the Fiſh-Kill in different columns, and to make their great effort upon the plain, they muſt have formed under the fire of all our park artillery, within reach of grape-ſhot, a croſs fire from the artillery and muſketry of the intrenched corps upon the hill, and the muſketry of the 20th regiment, which was at eaſy diſtance to be ſupported by the Germans, in front; added to this would have been the advantage, which though always wiſhed for we never had attained, of a charge upon an open plain. I am perſuaded the general judgment will go with me when I lament the accident that prevented the enemy's deſign (when ſo far advanced in it, as actually to have paſſed the river with one column) as one of the moſt adverſe ſtrokes of fortune in the whole campaign.

Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 88, 89, 90.

See the plan. No. VII.

Lord Harrington, 84, 85, 86. Lord Balcarras, from 60 to the end. Maj. Forbes, 22 to 29. Lord Balcarras, 64.

The ſtate of things after this diſappointment is given by the Earl of Harrington: "It was as bad as poſſible; the numbers of the army were few, their proviſions "ſhort, their poſition not a good one, owing to the nature of the country." This ſtate is corroborated by the evidence of the Earl of Balcarras and Major Forbes, with the additional circumſtance, that there was not a ſpot to be found in the whole poſition which was not expoſed to cannon or rifle ſhot.

* It was alſo in contemplation to force a way back to Albany, had the enemy in the diſtribution of their poſts weakened their right, ſo as to have made the effort poſſible. See Lord Harrington's evidence.

† Letter from Albany to the ſecretary of ſtate.

The

The minutes of the firſt council of war prove the unanimity of opinion for opening the treaty; and it is proved by the evidence of Colonel Kingſton, that the force of the enemy was actually greater, and their poſition ſtronger, than the intelligence I had received and laid before the council of war repreſented them. Appendix, No. XV. Lieut. Col. Kingſton, 91, &c.

It is proved by the fulleſt evidence, that the terms firſt propoſed by the enemy were inſtantly and unanimouſly rejected by the council of war as diſhonourable. Maj. Forbes, 31 to 34. Lord Balcarras, 65 to 73.

The ſame unanimity in approving the terms I propoſed and obtained, is equally inconteſtably eſtabliſhed.

And laſtly, two papers are produced, and authenticated beyond a poſſibility of cavil, the one General Gates's return ſigned by himſelf, ſhewing the effective ſtrength preſent of the rebel army; the other, the minutes of the laſt council of war, ſhewing, that even ſupported as I was by the unanimity of the former councils, in opening and conducting the treaty, I was repugnant to the ſigning of it, upon a ſlight hope entertained of a remote relief—(a hope ariſing from ſome intelligence received in the night of Sir Henry Clinton's moving up the North River) and gave my voice againſt a majority accordingly; that I at laſt thought myſelf compelled to yield to the majority upon "the uncertainty of the intelligence, and the improbability "of General Clinton's motions being effectual if true; upon the doubts entertained "of ſome part of the troops, if the negotiation of the treaty ceaſed, and of a greater "part for want of bodily ſtrength, if deſperate enterprizes were to be afterwards "undertaken; and laſtly, upon the reflection that a miſcarriage of ſuch enterpriſes "muſt be fatal to the whole army, and that even a victory could not ſave it." Appendix, No. XVI. Appendix, No. XVII. See alſo Lord Balcarras, 130, 131, 132.

To this maſs of evidence, appoſite and direct to every fact eſſential to my juſtification, I beg leave to add the opinion of the army, that the terms obtained were better than the ſituation of things gave us a right to expect. For a proof that ſuch was their opinion, I refer to the teſtimony of Lord Balcarras. Lord Balcarras. Lord Harrington.

A fair judgment upon recent events is hardly to be expected, eſpecially while many prejudices are alive. It will be allowed me to aſſume, what no one has ever ventured to deny, that there may be a combination of circumſtances under which an army may be juſtified in treating with an enemy. That the army under my command was under ſuch circumſtances at Saratoga is alſo generally acknowledged: but what is not denied to me from my own ſituation, is attempted to be withheld, by ſome, on account of the quality of the enemy. They ſuggeſt that there ſhould be no treaty with rebels. It is unneceſſary in anſwer to have recourſe to hiſtory. I will not take defence from treaties between Spain, the haughtieſt power of the world, and the arch-rebel the great Prince of Orange; nor between Charles the Firſt and the arch-rebels the Engliſh Parliament (for ſuch in both inſtances they were called) I need only refer to the examples exiſting at that time in America, Reflections upon the convention.

and ſince much improved on at home. My ſuperior officer in America, with the approbation of government, had treated upon different occaſions with General Waſhington. The Britiſh government in its higheſt collective authority, the King in Parliament, has ſince commiſſioned five members of that Parliament, the one a peer, the others of eminent ſtation in military and civil capacities, to *treat with* rebels, I had almoſt ſaid to *ſue* to rebels for peace, by the ſurrender of almoſt every principle for the maintenance of which they had proſecuted the war.

Thus highly juſtified in treating with rebels, I am at a loſs to diſcover by what poſſible mode of defence I could have acquitted myſelf to God or my country, when the brave and intelligent officers of my army unanimouſly reſolved, upon military principle, precedent and reaſon, that the treaty was expedient, and the terms honourable, if I had delivered them up to certain deſtruction, or even to be priſoners at diſcretion.

If the informed and diſpaſſionate part of mankind ſhould agree in ſentiment with the unanimous voice of the army, upon the convention of Saratoga, ſurely to impute to it the final loſs of the army is too palpable an injuſtice long to remain upon the minds of the moſt prejudiced. The convention expreſsly preſerved the army for the ſervice of the ſtate. According to that convention a truce was made during the war, between that army and the enemy, in America, and it now might have been acting againſt the Houſe of Bourbon in any other part of the world. The army was loſt by the non-compliance with the treaty on the part of the Congreſs; and that violation of faith no man will ever be found to juſtify.

I will not decide how far it was encouraged in America, by the perſuaſion that the miniſtry of Britain had neither power nor ſpirit to redreſs the wrong; and that they had ſunk the nation ſo low, in point of reſpect, that the world would overlook, where ſhe was concerned, an action that would have excited, in any other caſe, univerſal cenſure and indignation. But whatever motives the Congreſs may have had, the tameneſs and ſilence with which the Britiſh miniſters have borne this outrage, is aſtoniſhing. That men ſo conſtant and ſo prodigal in their anger againſt the Congreſs, as never before to have failed in expreſſing it, even in caſes where it bordered upon being ridiculous, ſhould on a ſudden become cold and mute, and dead to feeling, in a caſe where reſentment was juſtly founded, can hardly be accounted for, except upon the principle that it was better to ſuppreſs the juſteſt cenſure upon a power they deteſted, than that even a particle of unmerited odium ſhould be wanting to load the man whom they were reſolved to depreſs.

CONCLUSION.

I AM not aware that in the preceding Review of Evidence I have neglected any part eſſential to my defence. I do not reckon as ſuch, that part which applies to the management of the public purſe. The calumny deſigned to wound me upon that head was too groſs to ſucceed: it periſhed in its birth, and ſcorn is the only ſentiment excited by the remembrance of its momentary exiſtence. In regard to the more plauſible objections pointed againſt my conduct, I have not only endeavoured to meet them in the croſs-examination, but have ſearched for them in every place where I could ſuppoſe them to originate or be entertained. If ſome have eſcaped, I ſhall ſtand excuſed, when it is recollected how they have grown and changed from one ſhape to another, and that it has never been my fortune to be confronted with an avowed and regular accuſer—I deſpair of ever being ſo: but I deſire it to be underſtood, that although I am earneſt in this mode of defence, I am ſo far from declining another, that I ſhall think it one very happy circumſtance of the paſt enquiry, if any thing contained in it ſhould have effect hereafter to produce an enquiry by court-martial.

It would not be an ungrateful taſk to follow the defence of the campaign with a detail of the occurrences which happened between the time of ſigning the convention and my leaving America. Many of them would be found curious; and the cares and perplexities in which I bore a principal and moſt painful part, would create a new intereſt in the minds of my friends: but I do not think myſelf at liberty, upon the plan I laid down at my outſet, to enter into matter where no blame is imputed or implied. If my proceedings during that interval deſerve any credit, I am content with that teſtimony of it, which I may aſſume from the ſilence of my enemies.

I have not the ſame reaſons for paſſing over the tranſactions in which I have been engaged ſince my return to England, becauſe blame, and of a very atrocious nature, *has* been imputed to me. But as the principal of theſe tranſactions are already before the public, I ſhall mention them very briefly; and merely to introduce connectedly ſuch further thoughts upon them as could not with propriety be ſtated upon any former occaſion.

Immediately after my arrival, a board of general officers was appointed to enquire into the cauſes of the failure of the expedition from Canada. This enquiry was made the foundation of an order againſt my appearing at court.

The board reported, that they could not take cognizance of me being under parole—the prohibition from the King's preſence nevertheleſs ſtill remained in force.

I had recourſe to parliament for enquiry; and openly, and repeatedly, and ſtrenuouſly called upon the miniſters to join iſſue with me before that tribunal. Objection was taken againſt immediate enquiry, becauſe Generals Sir Guy Carleton and Sir William Howe who might be parties were abſent; but it was evidently the diſpoſition of the houſe, that an enquiry ſhould be inſtituted the enſuing ſeſſion.

I pledged myſelf zealouſly to proſecute that meaſure; I accuſed miniſters of injurious treatment towards myſelf; and it became my duty, upon occaſions with which my own affairs had no connection, to expreſs deeper reſentments of their conduct towards the public.

In this ſtate of things parliament was prorogued on the *3d of June*. On the *5th of June*, I received the firſt order to repair to Boſton as ſoon as I had tried the Bath waters. The order and my anſwer, repreſenting the hardſhip of being ſent back unheard, and the ſecond conditional order, with entire ſlight of my repreſentations, are too well known to require repetition: but there are two circumſtances attending the dates of theſe orders with which I was not acquainted till long after, and which have never yet been taken notice of.

The one is, that at the very time I was told that my preſence was *material*, and (as the ſecond letter from the ſecretary at war expreſſed) of *ſo much importance to the troops detained priſoners in New England*, that it muſt not be diſpenſed with—at that very time, it was determined to ratify the convention, according to the requiſition of the Congreſs; and to tranſmit the ratification through other hands, and without any participation with me, or employment of me, in carrying it to a concluſion. It was very poſſible, the troops might have been ſailed for England before I had reached America, had I even complied as early as the condition of either order could poſſibly be conſtrued to preſcribe. But at all events, the circumſtance could not but ſerve to mark *to me* the true intent and meaning of the order beyond a poſſibility of miſtake—*that it was an order of vindictive puniſhment*; and my preſence with the troops, if I reached America in time, was *material* and *important* to mark to *them* the degree of diſgrace to which I was reduced. The terms are a mockery, and an inſult upon common ſenſe, if applied, in the ſituation in which I was placed, to the ſervice of the King, or the conſolation of the troops. Such a diſplay of vengeance might indeed be intended to apply to their prudence, and to act as a caution and warning how at their return they ſhould ſupport a General under the extremity of the King's diſpleaſure.*

The other circumſtance attending theſe dates is not leſs remarkable, viz.

* In times when the maintenance of the conſtitution in its purity is the ruling principle of an adminiſtration, the King's name is introduced by office only to denote an act of the executive part of the ſtate. In times when an adminiſtration mean to rule by the influence of monarchy, the language of office is to connect the royal perſon with the act, and to give him attributes of paſſion and diſpleaſure, from which in his political character he is held exempt. I diſclaim language and ideas ſo unconſtitutional and diſreſpectful, and never mean to allude to my Sovereign perſonally, but in acts of juſtice and mercy.

The

The determination of changing the nature of the war, as afterwards declared by the commiſſioners in America, muſt have been taken at this time.

I am very much diſinclined to believe, that the conſideration of my perſon as a proper victim upon that occaſion was ever regularly and formally debated in the cabinet: but I cannot think it uncharitable to the individual adviſer of the Crown, whoever he was, who could project ſuch an order, to ſuppoſe, that if upon the firſt exerciſe of *the extremes of war* on the one ſide, and in the ardour of retaliation on the other, it had ſo happened, that an object ſo well to be ſpared as an obnoxious and diſgraced Lieutenant General, had opportunely preſented itſelf to the enemy's rigour, and had been detained in their priſons, the order for the voyage would not have been thought, by that individual, quite thrown away. Detention, with or without the troops, of a troubleſome and bold complainant, could not be immaterial or unimportant to ſuch a perſon, and the order was of an import

" —To make aſſurance double ſure—
" And take a bond of fate—
" That he might tell pale-hearted Fear it lied."

The living preſence of an injured man is, perhaps, more offenſive and inſupportable to the ſight of a mean injurer, that the ſpectre of him would be after death.

But to return to the facts I was recapitulating.

I remained under the conditional order in England.

The enſuing ſeſſion, the parliamentary enquiry now laid before the public took place. It ended, as has been ſtated, in July, 1779.

In September, I received a ſevere reprimand, a denial of a court-martial, and a prohibition of ſerving my country in its exigence, though other officers preciſely in my ſituation were employed—I reſigned.

The blame laid upon me for the part I took in theſe tranſactions is, that intemperately and factiouſly I engaged in oppoſition; that I was guilty of diſobedience to the King's orders; and it has been added in a late publication, that even my defence of my conduct is a libel upon the King's government.

I think I have perceived, that the firſt part of theſe charges, a raſh engagement in oppoſition, is not combated by ſome who wiſh me well ſo ſtrenuouſly as other imputations have been. It may poſſibly have appeared to friendly and prudential obſervers, as a palliating plea for a reſtitution to favour upon ſome future occaſion, to have to ſay, that I had acted upon the ſudden impulſe of paſſion; and the ſequel might be, that I had repented, and would offend no more.

Without doubting the kindneſs which ſuggeſts theſe excuſes, I have been impelled by principles too forcible, and have taken my part too decidedly, to look for a reſource in thoſe or any other ſubterfuges. It would be inconſiſtent and diſhonourable in me to withhold a public declaration upon this occaſion, in addition

to thoſe I have made upon others, that I engaged in reſiſtance to the meaſures of the court upon mature reflection; that after collecting in my mind all the lights upon men and things which my experience and obſervation could furniſh, I believed that the conſtitution of England was betrayed: and neither blaming or ſuſpecting any men who conceived different opinions, and acted upon them, I thought it a point of time in which a man believing as I did was called upon to ſacrifice to his country. The teſt of this motive, it is true, muſt reſt between God and my conſcience: but let it not be ſuppoſed that I acted blindly—the path of intereſt, a broad and beaten track, lay clearly before me from the time I arrived in England. Supple joints, and an attentive eye, always giving way to power, on one ſide, and ſometimes puſhing my friends into the dirt on the other, would have carried me ſafely through. I even believe, that the adviſer of the letters I lately alluded to would rather have ſeen me in that track, than in the other which he preſcribed for me acroſs the Atlantic.

As little would I be ſuppoſed to want diſcernment of the path I took: for the barefaced preferences, rewards and puniſhments held forth for parliamentary conduct, were among the moſt glaring parts of the ſyſtem I had contemplated. And it was impoſſible to doubt, that as a delinquent *there*, I ſhould be preſſed both by art and vengeance to the end the enemies I had provoked foreſaw—the loſs of my profeſſion and the impoveriſhment of my fortune. I truſt it will be an innocent revenge on my part, to ſhew them I can bear my condition firmly; and that I am incapable of redeeming what I have loſt, were it ever in my option, by the diſavowal of a ſingle principle I have profeſſed.

I come now to the ſecond charge, diſobedience of orders; and in a point that ſo nearly touches the very eſſence of military character, I truſt I ſhall not treſpaſs upon the patience of the reader, if I treat it a little more at large than I have done in my correſpondence with the ſecretary at war.

I admit that ſubordination and implicit obedience, as applied to the operation of arms, are primary principles in the military ſyſtem. An army is a mere name without them. The officer who heſitates to meet certain death upon command, deſerves to receive it from the hand of the executioner.

But there are poſſible exceptions to theſe general principles, eſpecially out of the field, in the moſt abſolute ſervices; and in the Britiſh ſervice they are known and marked, and co-exiſtent with the military eſtabliſhment itſelf, in the mutiny act, which confines obedience to legal commands. An army muſt again be garbled like the army of Cromwell (which God avert!) before an order could be executed, like that of Cromwell, for garbling the parliament.

A high ſpirit will contract the limits of obedience ſtill more; with illegal, he will reject diſhonourable commands; and he will follow the reaſoning I have already premiſed, and ſtate it as a maxim thus: *he who obeys at the expence of fortune,*

tune, comfort, health and life, is a ſoldier; he who obeys at the expence of honour is a ſlave.

But I may be aſked by ſome diſciplinarians, who is to be the judge in theſe nice definitions of obedience? It is uncommon military doctrine, I may be told, to reaſon upon the King's orders—I confeſs it is ſo. Since the reign of James the Second, in the Britiſh ſervice it never has been neceſſary. We have been uſed in this age, to ſee the King's name give wings and inſpiration to duty. Diſcipline, in this country, has been raiſed upon perſonal honour—a firmer baſis than fear or ſervility ever furniſhed: and the miniſter who firſt ſhakes that happy confidence; who turns military command to political craft; who dares to uſe his gracious Sovereign's name as an engine of ſtate, to glut his own anger, or to remove his own fears, he is amongſt the worſt enemies to that Sovereign. But ſhould his purpoſes go further (a conſideration of far greater magnitude to the public) and ſhould it be ſeen that the royal name was brought forth for the *diſcipline* of parliament, the miniſter ſo uſing it would be not only an enemy to his Sovereign, but a traitor to the conſtitution of the ſtate.

I will cloſe the defence of my principles reſpecting military ſubordination by reference to an anecdote well authenticated and not very remote.

An officer in a neighbouring nation, for ſome error he had committed in a day of battle, received a blow from his prince who commanded in perſon. The officer drew a piſtol, and his firſt movement was to point it at his maſter; but the next (and it was inſtantaneous) was to turn the muzzle, and diſcharge the ball into his own heart. Though my caſe differs both in the provocation and the conſequence, in many circumſtances my conduct may juſtly be ſupported upon the ſame principle. I receive an affront that a liberal ſpirit cannot endure; and in a name, againſt which no perſonal reſentment can be purſued, nor indeed entertained: but a ſuicide of my profeſſional exiſtence (if I may be allowed the phraſe) is preferable to the ſtate in which the affront placed me. In one inſtance only I renounce the parallel—God forbid I ſhould be thought, even in a burſt of paſſion, to have pointed at my Sovereign! It was not from his hand I received the blow.

I ſhall ſolicit the reader's attention very little further: but I feel the neceſſity of repeating my application to the candour of the public, both as a writer and an appellant. Defence, and imputation of blame to others, are naturally interwoven in my cauſe: it required a more diſtinct conception, and an abler hand than mine, to keep them always apart, and open to ſeparate view. In ſome parts my defence may be weakened by this deficiency of ſkill: but I have no right to offer the ſame excuſe for ſuffering any blame to reſt upon others beyond what I thought myſelf juſtified to ſupport.

Upon this principle, I think it juſt, at taking leave of the ſecretary of ſtate for the American department, briefly to enumerate the only facts and propoſitions re-

ſpecting the plan of the expedition from Canada, that I think clearly maintainable againſt him.

Firſt fact. It is clear that the plan of a junction of the greater part of the forces in Canada with the army of Sir William Howe, was formed in the year 1776, when Sir William Howe was in full ſucceſs; when his whole force was in the neighbourhood of New York, or in the Jerſies, and Mr. Waſhington was beaten, and at the weakeſt.

Second fact. This plan of a junction was continued (and upon juſt reaſoning) in the cloſe of the year 1776, when Sir William Howe's firſt propoſal of operations for the enſuing campaign arrived. Thoſe propoſals were made upon the datum of a number of troops, ſufficient to furniſh, beſides the main army, an *offenſive* army of 10,000 men, rank and file, to act on the ſide of Rhode Iſland, by taking poſſeſſion of Providence, and penetrating from thence into the country towards Boſton; and another *offenſive* army, not leſs than 10,000, to move up the North River to Albany, excluſive of 5000 for the defence of New York.

In either of the above caſes, the plan of junction could hardly have failed of ſucceſs.

Third fact. On the 23d of February, Sir William Howe's alteration of the firſt plan was received, and he then propoſed to act with the greater part of his force on the ſide of Philadelphia, at the opening of the campaign, and to enable him ſo to do, to defer the *offenſive plan from Rhode Iſland till the reinforcements ſhould arrive*, and to deſtine only 3000 men to act *defenſively* upon the lower part of the Hudſon's River.

Fourth fact. On the 3d of March, the ſecretary of ſtate ſignified his Majeſty's entire approbation of this deviation from the plan firſt ſuggeſted.

From theſe facts ariſes my firſt propoſition, that at the time the change of plan for Sir William Howe's operations was adopted, by which no offenſive force was to remain upon the Hudſon's River, nor a diverſion probably to take place from Rhode Iſland, the plan of my operations, the ſucceſs of which would probably depend in a great degree upon co-operation and diverſion, ought to have been changed likewiſe: inſtead of that, it was enforced and made poſitive by the refuſal of the latitude I had propoſed of acting upon the Connecticut, or, in caſe of exigency, embarking the troops and effecting the junction by ſea.

Fifth fact. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir William Howe, by the ſecretary of ſtate, acquainting him, that a brigade of Britiſh and ſome companies of brigadiers and light infantry had been withdrawn from Rhode Iſland, which made the force left there merely defenſive. The ſame letter mentions the proſpects the enemy had of bringing 50,000 men into the field.

Sixth fact. I did not leave England till the beginning of April, by which time the ſecretary of ſtate muſt have known, or ought to have known, that no dependance could be placed upon reinforcements from England arriving at New York in time for Sir William Howe to reſume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diverſion from

from Rhode Iſland, or of making the force upon the Hudſon's River adequate to offenſive operation.

Hence ariſes my ſecond propoſition, that the latitude I had propoſed, or other expedients of precaution, ought then at leaſt to have been adopted: inſtead of which, I was ſuffered to ſail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements deſtined for him. The conſequence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his deſtination for Penſylvania, removed my expectation of co-operation, becauſe I was to ſuppoſe, that ſubſequent to the dates of either of thoſe letters, he would receive orders from the ſecretary of ſtate reſpecting the junction, and alſo a timely reinforcement.

Seventh fact. The ſecretary of ſtate makes no mention of the northern expedition in any of his diſpatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am perſuaded will not be conteſted, that he did not mention any orders or recommendations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aid-de-camp, or any other confidential perſon who ſailed about that time.

The firſt mention made of the neceſſity of co-operation was in the ſecretary of ſtate's letter of the 18*th of May*, wherein his Lordſhip "*Truſts that whatever he* [*Sir William Howe*] *may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.*"

The propoſition clearly juſtified by theſe facts is, that if the ſecretary of ſtate had thought proper to ſignify the King's expectation of a co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in conſiſtency he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army, and in time for him to have made a new diſpoſition: but inſtead of that, this very material injunction was not diſpatched till it was almoſt phyſically impoſſible it ſhould have any effect. And ſo indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the 16th of Auguſt, at a diſtance from Hudſon's River too great for any detachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been ſpared; and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended to ſtrengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later ſtill—too late (as it has been ſhewn) to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual ſupport.

Indeed the conduct of the ſecretary of ſtate, in inſerting this paragraph, in his letter of the 18th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly it would have been timely, ſeems ſo prepoſterous, that it can only be explained by one fact. It tranſpired about that time, that Sir William Howe's army was deſtined for Penſylvania, and people who had conſidered the force of the enemy to be collected from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known

(though

(though I cannot aſcertain the date) that an officer of very great ability, and a perfect knowledge in the country through which I was to paſs, as ſoon as he heard no diſpoſition was made for a ſupport from New York, foretold to the ſecretary of ſtate, or his near friends, the fall of my army. Under this apprehenſion it might appear to the ſecretary of ſtate a proper caution, that an expectation of co-operation ſhould exiſt under his hand.

If plans ſo inconſiſtently formed, and managed by the ſecretary of ſtate with ſo much ſeeming confidence, as to miſlead his generals, and ſo much real reſerve as to deſtroy them, ſhould be defended by that infatuated belief then entertained of the inability of the enemy to reſiſt, I ſhould beg leave to ſtate, as one propoſition more, that after the experience of their actions at Trenton, and many other places, and the intelligence of their new levies received from Sir William Howe, ſuch confidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more pernicious one than any I have ſtated.

Thus much for the noble Lord in his public capacity. What ſhare of the perſecution I have ſuſtained (more than I have directly expreſſed in different parts of my defence) are imputable to his private councils, is not within my knowledge: but if in ſpeaking of my perſecutors in general, I may be thought ſometimes to have uſed ſtrong terms, I have only to ſay, that having advanced no fact which I am not able and reſolved to maintain, I have not felt myſelf called upon, in applying thoſe facts for any further attention, than to preſerve the language of a gentleman, which is an attention due to myſelf as well as to the public. It is open and manly enmity alone that unites reſpect with reſentment.

I wiſh I could as eaſily apologiſe for all the other faults with which this undertaking abounds as a compoſition. At a time when ſo many pens are employed, I muſt not expect to be ſpared. I ſhall treat with ſilent reſpect any comments that are fairly founded and delivered with liberality; and with contempt, equally ſilent, the common invectives of the political preſs. This appeal is not to reſt upon literary criticiſm, or party diſputation, but upon the broad equity of my country. I know that prejudice and malice will vaniſh before the man who dares to ſubmit his actions to that teſt—If acquitted *there*, I feel I am not degraded; and I have not a ſenſation within my breaſt which does not at the ſame time aſſure me, I cannot be unhappy.

J. BURGOYNE.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Hertford-Street, *1ſt* January, 1777. No. I.

My Lord,

MY phyſician has preſſed me to go to Bath for a ſhort time, and I find it requiſite to my health and ſpirits to follow his advice: but I think it a previous duty to aſſure your Lordſhip, that ſhould my attendance in town become neceſſary, relatively to information upon the affairs of Canada, I ſhall be ready to obey your ſummons upon one day's notice.

Your Lordſhip being out of town, I ſubmitted the above intentions a few days ago perſonally to his Majeſty in his cloſet; and I added, "That as the arrangements for the next campaign might poſſibly come under his royal contemplation before my return, I humbly laid myſelf at his Majeſty's feet for ſuch active employment as he might think me worthy of."

This was the ſubſtance of my audience, on my part. I undertook it, and I now report it to your Lordſhip in the hope of your patronage in this purſuit; a hope, my Lord, founded not only upon a juſt ſenſe of the honour your Lordſhip's friendſhip muſt reflect upon me, but alſo upon a feeling that I deſerve it, in as much as a ſolid reſpect and ſincere perſonal attachment can conſtitute ſuch a claim.

I leave in the hands of Mr. D'Oyley ſuch of the memorandums confided to me by General Carleton as require diſpatch, ſhould your Lordſhip think proper to carry them into execution.

I alſo leave in that gentleman's hands the copy of an application relative to boats for the artillery, and which I take the liberty to ſubmit to your Lordſhip as well worthy of conſideration, upon the ſuppoſition that the enemy ſhould arm upon Lake George, and that any operation ſhould be adviſeable by that route.

I likewiſe leave the diſpoſition of winter quarters, which I received by the laſt ſhip from Canada. I find no diſpatch is come to your Lordſhip by that occaſion, and I conceived thoſe papers might be of uſe.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord, &c.

J. Burgoyne.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain *to Sir* Guy Carleton, *dated* Whitehall, 22*d* Auguſt, 1776. No. II.

THE rapid ſucceſs of his Majeſty's arms, in driving the rebels out of Canada, does great honour to your conduct, and I hope ſoon to hear that you have been able to purſue them acroſs the lakes, and to poſſeſs thoſe poſts upon the frontiers which may effectually ſecure your province from any future inſult.

His Majeſty, in appointing you commander in chief of his forces in Canada, was pleaſed to extend your commiſſion to the frontiers of his provinces bordering thereupon, wiſely foreſeeing, that it might be neceſſary for the compleating your plan of operations, that you ſhould march your army beyond the limits of your own government. I truſt, before this letter reaches you, that you will, by your ſpirit and activity, have cleared the frontiers of Canada of all the rebel forces, and will have taken the proper meaſures for keeping poſſeſſion of the lakes. That ſervice being performed, his Majeſty commands me to acquaint you, that there ſtill remains another part of your duty to be undertaken, which will require all your abilities and the ſtricteſt application, the reſtoring peace, and the eſtabliſhing good order and legal government in Canada. It is an object of the greateſt importance to this country, the difficulties attending it are immenſe; but his Majeſty depends upon your zeal, and upon your experience, for carrying it into execution. His Majeſty, ever anxious for the happineſs of his ſubjects, commands me to inform you, that no time ſhould be loſt in beginning ſo important a work, and that you do therefore return to Quebec, detaching Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, or ſuch other officer as you ſhall think moſt proper, with that part of your forces which can be ſpared from the immediate defence of your province, to carry on ſuch operations as ſhall be moſt conducive to the ſucceſs of the army acting on the ſide of New-York; and that you direct the officer ſo detached to communicate with and put himſelf, as ſoon as poſſible, under the command of General Howe, you will order ſuch artillery as you ſhall judge neceſſary to proceed with this detachment; and as a great quantity of heavy cannon and military ſtores were ſent, upon the ſuppoſition that Quebec might have been in the hands of the rebels, you will, upon requiſition from General Howe, ſupply him with ſuch cannon and ſtores as may not be wanted for the protection of Canada.

No. III. *Thoughts for conducting the War from the Side of* Canada.

By Lieutenant-General Burgoyne.

WHEN the laſt ſhips came from Quebec, a report prevailed in Canada, ſaid to have been founded upon poſitive evidence, that the rebels had laid the keels of ſeveral large veſſels at Skeneſborough and Ticonderoga, and were reſolved to exert their utmoſt powers, to conſtruct a new and formidable fleet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exertions, in ſuch a degree as to imagine the King's troops will be prevented paſſing Lake Champlain early in the ſummer, but will ſuppoſe the operations of the army to begin from Crown Point.

But as the preſent means to form effectual plans is to lay down every poſſible difficulty, I will ſuppoſe the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga; the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thouſand men.

I will ſuppoſe him alſo to occupy Lake George with a conſiderable naval ſtrength, in order to ſecure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take meaſures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of Skeneſborough, by fortifying the ſtrong ground at different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight

weight of artillery with it, and by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though he ſhould not have power or ſpirit finally to reſiſt, its progreſs.

The enemy thus diſpoſed upon the ſide of Canada, it is to be conſidered what troops will be neceſſary, and what diſpoſition of them will be moſt proper to proſecute the campaign with vigour and effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean excluſively of the troops left for the ſecurity of Canada) ought not to conſiſt of leſs than eight thouſand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thouſand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thouſand or more ſavages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcement and the victuallling ſhips may all be ready to ſail from the Channel and from Corke on the laſt day of March. I am perſuaded that to ſail with a fleet of tranſports earlier, is to ſubject government to loſs and diſappointment. It may reaſonably be expected that they will reach Quebec before the 20th of May, a period in full time for opening the campaign. The roads, and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running off of the ſnows, are in common years impracticable ſooner.

But as the weather long before that time will probably have admitted of labour in the docks, I will take for granted that the fleet of laſt year, as well bateaux as armed veſſels, will be found repaired, augmented, and fit for immediate ſervice. The magazines that remain of proviſion, I believe them not to be abundant, will probably be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblée.

I conceive the firſt buſineſs for thoſe entruſted with the chief powers, ſhould be to ſelect and poſt the troops deſtined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military ſtores and proviſion with all poſſible diſpatch, in which ſervice the abovementioned troops, if properly poſted, will greatly aſſiſt; and to draw the army deſtined for operation to cantonments, within as few days march of St. John's as conveniently may be. I ſhould prefer cantonments at that ſeaſon of the year to encampment, as the ground is very damp, and conſequently very pernicious to the men, and more eſpecially as they will have been for many months before uſed to lodgings, heated with ſtoves, or between decks in ſhips; all theſe operations may be put in motion together, but they ſeverally require ſome obſervation.

I ſhould wiſh that the troops left in Canada, ſuppoſing the number mentioned in my former memorandum to be approved, might be made as follows.

	Rank and File.
The 31ſt regiment, Britiſh, excluſive of their light company of grenadiers — — — —	448
Maclean's corps — — — —	300
The 29th regiment — — — —	448
The ten additional companies from Great Britain —	560
Brunſwic and Heſſe Hanau to be taken by detachments or complete corps, as Major General Reideſel ſhall recommend, leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons compleat —	650
Detachments from the other Britiſh brigades, leaving the grenadiers and light infantry complete and ſquaring the battalions equally — — —	600
	3006

My reaſon for ſelecting the 31ſt regiment for this duty is, that when I ſaw it laſt it was not equally in order with the other regiments for ſervices of activity.

I propoſe the 29th regiment as it is not at preſent brigaded.

I propoſe Maclean's corps, becauſe I very much apprehend deſertion from ſuch parts of it as are compoſed of Americans, ſhould they come near the enemy.

In Canada, whatſoever may be their diſpoſition, it is not ſo eaſy to effect it.

And I propoſe making up the reſidue by detachment, becauſe by ſelecting the men leaſt calculated for fatigue or leaſt accuſtomed to it, which may be equally good ſoldiers in more confined movements and better provided ſituations, the effective ſtrength for operation is much greater and the defenſive ſtrength not impaired.

I muſt beg leave to ſtate the expeditious conveyance of proviſion and ſtores from Quebec, and the ſeveral other depoſitaries, in order to form ample magazines at Crown Point, as one of the moſt important operations of the campaign, becauſe it is upon that which moſt of the reſt will depend. If ſailing veſſels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay them two months before they paſs the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter's Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon, and they are only to be obviated by having a quantity of ſmall craft in readineſs to work with oars. From the mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblée, rowing and tacking is a ſure conveyance if ſufficient hands are found. From Chamblée to St. Thereſe (which is juſt above the Rapids) land-carriage muſt be uſed, and great authority will be requiſite to ſupply the quantity neceſſary.

A buſineſs thus complicated in arrangement, in ſome parts unuſual in practice, and in others perhaps difficult, can only be carried to the deſired effect by the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and conſonant opinion of the governor; and though the former are not to be doubted, a failure in the latter, vindicated, or ſeeming to be vindicated, by the plauſible obſtructions that will not fail to be ſuggeſted by others, will be ſufficient to cruſh ſuch exertions as an officer of a ſanguine temper, entruſted with the future conduct of the campaign, and whoſe perſonal intereſt and fame therefore conſequentially depend upon a timely out-ſet, would be led to make.

The aſſembly of the ſavages and the Canadians will alſo entirely depend upon the governor.

Under theſe conſiderations, it is preſumed, that the general officer employed to proceed with the army will be held to be out of the reach of any poſſible blame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furniſhed with the propoſed ſupplies.

The navigation of Lake Champlain, ſecured by the ſuperiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines ſo eſtabliſhed as to make the execution certain, I would not loſe a day to take poſſeſſion of Crown Point with Brigadier Fraſer's corps, a large body of ſavages, a body of Canadians, both for ſcouts and works, and the beſt of our engineers and artificers well ſupplied with intrenching tools.

The brigade would be ſufficient to prevent inſult during the time neceſſary for collecting the ſtores, forming magazines, and fortifying the poſts; all which ſhould be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to Ticonderoga;

roga; to ſuch a degree I mean as may be ſuppoſed to be effected in time of tranſporting artillery, preparing faſcines, and other neceſſaries for artillery operations; and by keeping the reſt of the army back during that period, the tranſport of proviſions wil be leſſened, and the ſoldiers made of uſe in forwarding the convoys.

But though there would be only one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it does not follow that the enemy ſhould remain in a ſtate of tranquility. Corps of ſavages, ſupported by detachments of light regulars, ſhould be continually on foot to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of general officers and engineers, and to obtain the beſt intelligence of their ſtrength, poſition, and deſign.

If due exertion is made in the preparations ſtated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the ſummer, and it will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

The next meaſure muſt depend upon thoſe taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe's whole forces ſhould act upon Hudſon's River, and to the ſouthward of it, and that the only object of the Canada army be to effect a junction with that force, the immediate poſſeſſion of Lake George would be of great conſequence, as the moſt expeditious and moſt commodious route to Albany; and ſhould the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort ſhould be tried, by throwing ſavages and light troops round it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should thoſe efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skeneſborough might be attempted, but conſiderable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be eaſily choaked up and rendered impaſſable, and at beſt there will be neceſſity for a great deal of of land carriage for the artillery, proviſion, &c. which can only be ſupplied from Canada. In caſe of ſucceſs alſo by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be neceſſary to leave a chain of poſts, as the army proceeds, for the ſecurities of your communication, which may too much weaken ſo ſmall an army.

Leſt all theſe attempts ſhould unavoidably fail, and it become indiſpenſibly neceſſary to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outſet ſhould be provided with carriages, implements, and artificers, for conveying armed veſſels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

Theſe ideas are formed upon the ſuppoſition, that it be the ſole purpoſe of the Canada army to effect a junction with General Howe, or after co-operating ſo far as to get poſſeſſion of Albany and open the communication to New-York, to remain upon the Hudſon's River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the ſouthward.

But ſhould the ſtrength of the main American army be ſuch as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode Iſland remaining there during the winter, and acting ſeparately in the ſpring, it may be highly worthy conſideration, whether the moſt important purpoſe to which the Canada army could be employed, ſuppoſing it in poſſeſſion of Ticonderoga, would not be to gain the Connecticut River.

The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon that river, oppoſite to Charles Town, is about ſixty miles, and though to convey artillery and proviſion ſo far by land would be attended with difficulties, perhaps more than

than thoſe above ſuggeſted, upon a progreſs to Skeneſborough, ſhould the object appear worthy, it is to be hoped reſources might be found; in that caſe it would be adviſeable to fortify with one or two ſtrong redoubts the heights oppoſite to Charles Town, and eſtabliſh poſts of ſavages upon the paſſage from Ticonderoga to thoſe heights, to preſerve the communication, and at the ſame time prevent any attempt from the country above Charles Town, which is very populous, from moleſting the rear or interrupting the convoys of ſupply, while the army proceeded down the Connecticut. Sould the junction between the Canada and Rhode Iſland armies be effected upon the Connecticut, it is not too ſanguine an expectation that all the New England provinces will be reduced by their operations.

To avoid breaking in upon other matter, I omitted in the beginning of theſe papers to ſtate the idea of an expedition at the outſet of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oſwego to the Mohawk River, which, as a diverſion to facilitate every propoſed operation, would be highly deſirable, provided the army ſhould be reinforced ſufficiently to afford it.

It may at firſt appear, from a view of the preſent ſtrength of the army, that it may bear the ſort of detachment propoſed by myſelf laſt year for this purpoſe; but it is to be conſidered that at that time the utmoſt object of the campaign, from the advanced ſeaſon and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unleſs the ſucceſs of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater nnmbers were neceſſary than for thoſe firſt operations. The caſe in the preſent year differs; becauſe the ſeaſon of the year affording a proſpect of very extenſive operation, and conſequently the eſtabliſhment of many poſts, patroles, &c. will become neceſſary. The army ought to be in a ſtate of numbers to bear thoſe drains, and ſtill remain ſufficient to attack any thing that probably can be oppoſed to it.

Nor, to argue from probability, is ſo much force neceſſary for this diverſion this year, as was required for the laſt; becauſe we then knew that General Schuyler with a thouſand men, was fortified upon the Mohawk. When the different ſituations of things are conſidered, viz. the progreſs of General Howe, the early invaſion from Canada, the threatening of the Connecticut from Rhode Iſland, &c. it is not to be imagined that any detachment of ſuch force as that of Schulyer can be ſupplied by the enemy for the Mohawk. I would not therefore propoſe it of more (and I have great diffidence whether ſo much can be prudently afforded) than Sir John Johnſon's corps, an hundred Britiſh from the ſecond brigade, and an hundred more from the 8th regiment, with four pieces of the lighteſt artillery, and a body of ſavages; Sir John Johnſon to be with a detachment in perſon, and an able field officer to command it. I ſhould wiſh Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger for that employment.

I particularize the ſecond brigade, becauſe the firſt is propoſed to be diminiſhed by the 31ſt regiment remaining in Canada, and the reſt of the regiment drafted for the expedition being made alſo part of the Canada force, the two brigades will be exactly ſquared.

Should it appear, upon examination of the really effective numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not ſufficient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair proſpect of ſucceſs, the alternative remains of embarking the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junction with General Howe by ſea, or to be employed ſeparately

rately to co-operate with the main deſigns, by ſuch means as ſhould be within their ſtrength upon other parts of the continent. And though the army, upon examination of the numbers from the returns here, and the reinforcements deſigned, ſhould appear adequate, it is humbly ſubmitted, as a ſecurity againſt the poſſibility of its remaining inactive, whether it might not be expedient to entruſt the latitude of embarking the army by ſea to the commander in chief, provided any accidents during the winter, and unknown here, ſhould have diminiſhed the numbers conſiderably, or that the enemy, from any winter ſucceſs to the ſouthward, ſhould have been able to draw ſuch forces towards the frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground with ſuch precaution, as to render the intended meaſure impracticable or too hazardous. But in that caſe it muſt be conſidered that more force would be required to be left behind for the ſecurity of Canada, than is ſuppoſed to be neceſſary when an army is beyond the lakes; and I do not conceive any expedition from the ſea can be ſo formidable to the enemy, or ſo effectual to cloſe the war, as an invaſion from Canada by Ticonderoga. This laſt meaſure ought not to be thought of, but upon poſitive conviction of its neceſſity.

Hertford-Street, Feb. 28th, 1777. J. BURGOYNE.

Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain *to General* Carleton, *dated* Whitehall, 26*th* March, 1777. No. IV.

MY letter of the 22d Auguſt, 1776, was intruſted to the care of Captain Le Maitre, one of your aid-de-camps; after having been three times in the Gulph of St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it impoſſible to make his paſſage to Quebec, and therefore returned to England with my diſpatch; which, though it was prevented by that accident from reaching your hands in due time, I nevertheleſs think proper to tranſmit to you by this earlieſt opportunity.

You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that as ſoon as you ſhould have driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majeſty's pleaſure that you ſhould return to Quebec, and take with you ſuch part of your army as in your judgment and diſcretion appeared ſufficient for the defence of the province; that you ſhould detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne, or ſuch other officer as you ſhould think moſt proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer ſo detached to proceed with all poſſible expedition to join General Howe, and to put himſelf under his command.

With a view of quelling the rebellion as ſoon as poſſible, it is become highly neceſſary that the moſt ſpeedy junction of the two armies ſhould be effected; and therefore, as the ſecurity and good government of Canada abſolutely require your preſence there, it is the King's determination to leave about 3000 men under your command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diverſion on the Mohawk River.

As this plan cannot be advantageouſly executed without the aſſiſtance of Canadians and Indians, his Majeſty ſtrongly recommends it to your care, to furniſh both expe-

expeditions with good and ſufficient bodies of thoſe men; and I am happy in knowing that your influence among them is ſo great, that there can be no room to apprehend you will find it difficult to fulfil his Majeſty's expectations.

In order that no time may be loſt in entering upon theſe important undertakings, General Burgoyne has received orders to ſail forthwith for Quebec; and that the intended operations may be maturely conſidered, and afterwards carried on in ſuch a manner as is moſt likely to be followed by ſucceſs, he is directed to conſult with you upon the ſubject, and to form and adjuſt the plan as you both ſhall think moſt conducive to his Majeſty's ſervice.

I am alſo to acquaint you, that as ſoon as you ſhall have fully regulated every thing relative to theſe expeditions (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you will be as expeditious as the nature of the buſineſs will admit) it is his Majeſty's pleaſure that you detain for the Canada ſervice

The 8th regiment, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk	460
Battalion companies of the 29th and 31ſt regiments — —	896
Battalion companies of the 34th, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk — — —	348
Eleven additional companies from Great Britain — —	616
Detachments from the two brigades — —	300
Detachments from the German troops — —	650
Royal Highland emigrants — —	500
	3770

You will naturally conclude that this allotment for Canada has not been made without properly weighing the ſeveral duties which are likely to be required. His Majeſty has not only conſidered the ſeveral garriſons and poſts which probably it may be neceſſary for you to take, *viz.* Quebec, Chaudiére, the diſaffected pariſhes of Point Levi, Montreal, and poſts between that town and Oſwegatche, Trois Rivieres, St. John's, Sele aux Noix, La Prairie, Vergere, and ſome other towns upon the ſouth ſhore of St. Lawrence, oppoſite the iſle of Montreal, with poſts of communication to St. John's, but he hath alſo reflected that the ſeveral operations which will be carrying on in different parts of America muſt neceſſarily confine the attention of the rebels to the reſpective ſcenes of action, and ſecure Canada from external attacks, and that the internal quiet which at preſent prevails is not likely to be interrupted, or if interrupted, will ſoon be reſtored by your influence over the inhabitants; he therefore truſts that 3000 men will be quite ſufficient to anſwer every poſſible demand.

It is likewiſe his Majeſty's pleaſure that you put under the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne

The grenadiers and light infantry of the army (except of the 8th regiment and the 24th regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier General Fraſer — —	1568
Firſt brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21ſt, and 47th regiments, deducting a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada	1194
Second brigade, battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d regiments, deducting 50 from each corps to remain as above —	1194
Carried over	3956

Brought over	3956
All the German troops, except the Hanau chaſſeurs, and a detachment of 650,	3217
The artillery, except ſuch parts as ſhall be neceſſary for the defence of Canada.	
	7173

Together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought neceſſary for this ſervice; and after having furniſhed him in the fulleſt and compleateſt manner with artillery, ſtores, proviſions, and every other article neceſſary for his expedition, and ſecured to him every aſſiſtance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to paſs Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the moſt vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himſelf under the command of Sir William Howe.

From the King's knowledge of the great preparations made by you laſt year to ſecure the command of the lakes, and your attention to this part of the ſervice during the winter, his Majeſty is led to expect that every thing will be ready for General Burgoyne's paſſing the lakes by the time you and he ſhall have adjuſted the plan of the expedition.

It is the King's further pleaſure that you put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger,

Detachment from the 8th regiment	100
Detachment from the 34th regiment	100
Sir John Johnſon's regiment of New York	133
Hanau chaſſeurs	342
	675

Together with a ſufficient number of Canadians and Indians; and after having furniſhed him with proper artillery, ſtores, proviſions, and every other neceſſary article for his expedition, and ſecured to him every aſſiſtance in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the Mohawk River to Albany, and put himſelf under the command of Sir William Howe.

I ſhall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the firſt packet; but you will nevertheleſs endeavour to give him the earlieſt intelligence of this meaſure, and alſo direct Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the ſame, that they may receive inſtructions from Sir William Howe. You will at the ſame time inform them, that, until they ſhall have received orders from Sir William Howe, it is his Majeſty's pleaſure that they act as exigencies may require, and in ſuch manner as they ſhall judge moſt proper for making an impreſſion on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience; but that in ſo doing, they muſt never loſe view of their intended junctions with Sir William Howe as their principal objects.

In caſe Lieutenant General Burgoyne or Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger ſhould happen to die, or be rendered, through illneſs, incapable of executing thoſe great truſts, you are to nominate to their reſpective commands, ſuch officer or officers as you ſhall think beſt qualified to ſupply the place of thoſe whom his Majeſty has in his wiſdom at preſent appointed to conduct theſe expeditions.

No. V. *Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General* Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Quebec, May 14, 1777.

[Private.]

My Lord,

I TAKE the opportunity of a veſſel diſpatched by Sir Guy Carleton to England, to inform your Lordſhip of my arrival here the 6th inſtant. And though my preſent ſituation, as acting under a ſuperior upon the ſpot, may make an official correſpondence unneceſſary, I cannot perſuade myſelf I ſhall not appear guilty of impropriety in aſſuming the honour of a private and confidential one, relatively to the objects of my deſtination.

From my preſent information, I have reaſon to expect the preparations for opening the campaign to be very forward on our part. Due exertions were uſed in the courſe of the winter, and the uncommon mildneſs of the weather greatly favoured them, to convey proviſions to Chamblé and St. John's. One large victualler arrived after I left the St. Lawrence laſt November; all reſidues of other victuallers have been collected; I am in hopes of finding a ſufficiency of proviſion to enable me to croſs the Lake Champlain at leaſt, without the arrival of the Corke fleet. I hope alſo to find artillery ſtores enough to feel the pulſe of the enemy at Ticonderoga. Should their ſituation and reſolution be ſuch as to make great artillery preparations requiſite, I ſhall certainly be under the neceſſity of waiting at Crown Point the arrival of the ordnance ſhips from England. A good body of the Indians I am aſſured are ready to move upon the firſt call, and meaſures are taking for bringing them forthwith to proper redezvous.

I cannot ſpeak with ſo much confidence of the military aſſiſtance I am to look for from the Canadians. The only corps yet inſtituted, or that I am informed can at preſent be inſtituted, are three independent companies of 100 men each, officered by Seigneurs of the country, who are well choſen; but they have not been able to engage many volunteers. The men are chiefly drafted from the militia, according to a late regulation of the legiſlative council. Thoſe I have yet ſeen afford no promiſe of uſe of arms—aukwark, ignorant, diſinclined to the ſervice, and ſpiritleſs. Various reaſons are aſſigned for this change in the natives ſince the time of the French government. It may partly be owing to a diſuſe of arms, but I believe principally to the unpopularity of their Seigneurs, and to the poiſon which the emiſſaries of the rebels have thrown into their minds. Should I find the new companies up the country better compoſed, or that the well affected parties can be prevailed upon to turn out volunteers, though but for a ſhort occaſion, as they did laſt year, I ſhall move Sir Guy to exert further meaſures to augment my numbers.

The army will fall ſhort of the ſtrength computed in England; the want of the camp equipage, cloathing, and many other neceſſary articles, will cauſe inconvenience; I am nevertheleſs determined to put the troops deſtined for my command immediately in motion; and, aſſiſted by the ſpirit and health in which they abound, I am confident in the proſpect of overcoming difficulties and diſappointments.

Having ſettled all meaſures with Sir Guy Carleton, both for this purpoſe and for the expeditious tranſport of the ſtores as they may arrive, and having already diſpatched inſtructions to Captain Lutwidge, who commands the fleet upon Lake Cham-

Champlain, to ſecure the navigation, in which I clearly ſee he will find no trouble, I ſhall proceed in perſon this afternoon for Montreal, and from thence make my final arrangements for purſuing the King's orders.

I ſhould think myſelf deficient in juſtice and in honour, were I cloſe my letter without mentioning the ſenſe I entertain of General Carleton's conduct; that he was anxiouſly deſirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is eaſily to be diſcerned; but his deference to his Majeſty's deciſion, and his zeal to give effect to his meaſures in my hands, are equally manifeſt, exemplary, and ſatisfactory. I ſhall take every poſſible means to tranſmit to your Lordſhip an account of my proceedings from time to time, and have the honour to be, with perfect reſpect,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

J. BURGOYNE.

P. S. I have mentioned nothing of intelligence concerning the enemy, concluding that Sir Guy Carleton will tranſmit the material part of it, and in a manner more full than in my power to do. I underſtand they have laboured hard to ſtrengthen Ticonderoga, and threaten a vigorous reſiſtance there, and that they have built ſome veſſels on Lake George, as your Lordſhip may remember I had foreſeen.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Montreal, May 19, 1777. Second No. V.

MY LORD,

I HAD the honour to write to your Lordſhip the day I left Quebec, having reaſon to imagine this letter may reach that place in time to be diſpatched with my former one, I cannot omit the occaſion to inform your Lordſhip, that the hopes I expreſſed of being able to put the troops in motion without waiting the arrival of the fleets from England and Ireland, are confirmed.

The only delay is occaſioned by the impracticability of the roads, owing to late extraordinary heavy rains, and this difficulty will be ſpeedily removed, by exerting the ſervices of the pariſhes as ſoon as the weather clears. In the mean time, I am employing every means that water carriage will admit for drawing the troops and ſtores towards their point. I truſt, I ſhall have veſſels ſufficient to move the army and ſtores together, and in that caſe, will take poſt at once, within ſight of Ticonderoga, and only make uſe of Crown Point for my hoſpital and magazine.

A continuation of intelligence from different ſpies and deſerters, confirms the deſign of the enemy to diſpute Ticonderoga vigorouſly. They are alſo building bow-gallies at Fort George, for the defence of that Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to Skeneſborough.

It is conſigned to the New England colonies, to furniſh ſupplies of men and proviſion to oppoſe the progreſs of my army, and they have undertaken the taſk, upon condition of being exempt from ſupplying Mr. Waſhington's main army.

It is my deſign, while advancing to Ticonderago, and during the ſiege of that poſt, for a ſiege I apprehend it muſt be, to give all poſſible jealouſy on the ſide of Connecticut. If I can by manœuvre lead the enemy to ſuſpect, that after the reduction of Ticonderago, my views are pointed that way, the Connecticut forces will be

very cautious of leaving their own frontier, and I may gain a ſtart that may much expedite and facilitate my progreſs to Albany.

Your Lordſhip may reſt aſſured, that, whatever demonſtration I may endeavour to impoſe on the enemy, I ſhall *really* make no movement that can procraſtinate the great object of my orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BURGOYNE.

No. VI. *Subſtance of the Speech of Lieutenant-General* Burgoyne *to the* Indians *in Congreſs, at the Camp upon the River* Bouquet, June 21, 1777, *and their Anſwer, tranſlated.*

[*In Lieutenant-General* Burgoyne's, June 22, 1777.]

CHIEFS and WARRIORS,

THE great King, our common father, and the patron of all who ſeek and deſerve his protection, has conſidered with ſatisfaction the general conduct of the Indian tribes from the beginning of the troubles in America. Too ſagacious and too faithful to be deluded or corrupted, they have obſerved the violated rights of the parental power they love, and burned to vindicate them. A few individuals alone, the refuſe of a ſmall tribe, at the firſt were led aſtray, and the miſrepreſentations, the ſpecious allurements, the inſidious promiſes and diverſified plots, in which the rebels are exerciſed, and all of which they employed for that effect, have ſerved only in the end to enhance the honour of the tribes in general, by demonſtrating to the world, how few and how contemptible are the apoſtates. It is a truth known to you all, that theſe pitiful examples excepted, and they probably have before this day hid their faces in ſhame, the collective voices and hands of the Indian tribes over this vaſt continent, are on the ſide of juſtice, of law, and of the King.

The reſtraint you have put upon your reſentment in waiting the King your father's call to arms, the hardeſt proof, I am perſuaded, to which your affection could have been put, is another manifeſt and affected mark of your adherence to that principle of connection to which you were always fond to allude, and which it is mutually the joy and the duty of the parent to cheriſh.

The clemency of your father has been abuſed, the offers of his mercy have been deſpiſed, and his farther patience would, in his eyes, become culpable, in as much as it would withold redreſs from the moſt grievous oppreſſions in the provinces that ever diſgraced the hiſtory of mankind. It therefore remains for me, the General of one of his Majeſty's armies, and in this council his repreſentative, to releaſe you from thoſe bonds which your obedience impoſed.—Warriors, you are free—Go forth in might of your valour and your cauſe; ſtrike at the common enemies of Great-Britain and America—diſturbers of public order, peace, and happineſs—deſtroyers of commerce, parricides of the ſtate.

The circle round you, the chiefs of his Majeſty's European forces, and of the Princes his allies, eſteem you as brothers in the war; emulous in glory and in friendſhip, we will endeavour reciprocally to give and to receive examples; we know how to value, and we will ſtrive to imitate your perſeverance in enterprize, and your conſtancy to reſiſt hunger, wearineſs, and pain. Be it our taſk, from the dictates of our

our religion, the laws of our warefare, and the principles and intereſt of our policy, to regulate your paſſions when they overbear, to point out were it is nobler to ſpare than to revenge, to diſcriminate degrees of guilt, to ſuſpend the up-lifted ſtroke, to chaſtiſe, and not to deſtroy.

This war to you, my friends, is new; upon all former occaſions in taking the field you held yourſelves authorized to deſtroy wherever you came, becauſe every where you found an enemy. The caſe is now very different.

The King has many faithful ſubjects diſperſed in the provinces, conſequently you have many brothers there; and theſe people are the more to be pitied, that they are perſecuted, or impriſoned, wherever they are diſcovered, or ſuſpected, and to diſſemble, is, to a generous mind, a yet more grievous puniſhment.

Perſuaded that your magnanimity of character, joined to your principles of affection to the King, will give me fuller controul over your minds, than the military rank with which I am inveſted, I enjoin your moſt ſerious attention to the rules which I hereby proclaim for your invariable obſervation during the campaign.

I poſitively forbid bloodſhed, when you are not oppoſed in arms.

Aged men, women, children, and priſoners, muſt be held ſacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict.

You ſhall receive compenſation for the priſoners you take, but you ſhall be called to account for ſcalps.

In conformity and indulgence to your cuſtoms, which have affixed an idea of honour to ſuch badges of victory, you ſhall be allowed to take the ſcalps of the dead, when killed by your fire, and in fair oppoſition; but on no account, or pretence, or ſubtlety, or prevarication, are they to be taken from the wounded, or even dying; and ſtill leſs pardonable, if poſſible, will it be held, to kill men in that condition, on purpoſe, and upon a ſuppoſition, that this protection to the wounded, would be thereby evaded.

Baſe lurking aſſaſſins, incendiaries, ravagers, and plunderers of the country, to whatever army they may belong, ſhall be treated with leſs reſerve; but the latitude muſt be given you by order, and I muſt be the judge of the occaſion.

Should the enemy, on their part, dare to countenance acts of barbarity towards thoſe who may fall into their hands, it ſhall be yours alſo to retaliate; but till ſeverity ſhall be thus compelled, bear immoveable in your hearts this ſolid maxim, it cannot be too deeply impreſſed, that the great eſſential reward, worthy ſervice of your alliance, the ſincerity of your zeal to the King your father, and never-failing protector, will be examined, and judged upon the teſt only of your ſteady and uniform adherence to the orders and counſels of thoſe to whom his Majeſty has intruſted the direction and the honour of his arms.

Anſwer from an old Chief of the Iroquois.

I ſtand up in the name of all the nations preſent, to aſſure our father, that we have attentively liſtened to his diſcourſe, We receive you as our father, becauſe when you ſpeak, we hear the voice of our great father beyond the great lake.

We rejoice in the approbation you have expreſſed of our behaviour.

We have been tried and tempted by the Boſtonians; but we have loved our father, and our hatchets have been ſharpened upon our affections.

In

In proof of the ſincerity of our profeſſions, our whole villages able to go to war, are come forth. The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone remain at home.

With one common aſſent we promiſe a conſtant obedience to all you have ordered, and all you ſhall order; and may the Father of Days give you many and ſucceſs.

No. VII. *Copy of a Letter from General* Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Skeneſborough, July 11th, 1777.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordſhip, that the enemy, diſloged from Ticonderoga and Mount Independant, on the 6th inſtant, and were driven, on the ſame day, beyond Skeneſborough on the right, and to Humerton on the left, with the loſs of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed veſſels and bateaux, the greateſt part of their baggage and ammunition, proviſion, and military ſtores, to a very large amount.

This ſucceſs has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid. I ſubjoin ſuch a detail of circumſtances as the time will permit; and for his Majeſty's further information, I beg leave to refer your Lordſhip to Captain Gardner, my aid de camp, whom I thought it neceſſary to diſpatch with news ſo important to the King's ſervice and ſo honourable to the troops under my command.

Journal of the late principal Proceedings of the Army.

Having remained at Crown-Point three days to bring up the rear of the army, to eſtabliſh the magazines and the hoſpital, and to obtain intelligence of the enemy, on the

30th June. I ordered the advanced corps, conſiſting of the Britiſh light infantry and grenadiers, the 24th regiment, ſome Canadians and Savages, and ten pieces of light artillery, under the command of Brigadier General Fraſer, to move from Putnam Creek, where they had been encamped ſome days, up the weſt ſhore of the lake to Four-Mile-Point, ſo called from being within that diſtance off the fort of Ticoderoga. The German reſerve, conſiſting of the Brunſwick chaſſeurs, light infantry and grenadiers under Lieutenant Colonel Breyman were moved at the ſame time to Richardſon's farm, on the eaſt ſhore, oppoſite to Putnam Creek.

1ſt July. The whole army made a movement forward. Brigadier Fraſer's corps occupied the ſtrong poſt called Three-Mile-Point, on the weſt ſhore; the German reſerve the eaſt-ſhore oppoſite: the army encamped in two lines, the right wing at the Four-Mile-Point, the left wing nearly oppoſite, on the eaſt ſhore.

The Royal George, and Inflexible frigates, with the gun-boats, were anchored at this time juſt without the reach of the enemy's batteries, and covered the lake from the weſt to the eaſt ſhores. The reſt of the fleet had been ſome time without guns, in order to aſſiſt in carrying proviſions over Lake Champlain.

The enemy appeared to be poſted as follows. A brigade occupied the old French lines on the height to the north of the fort of Ticonderoga. Theſe lines were in good repair, and had ſeveral intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the north-weſt flank, and were further ſuſtained by a block-houſe. They had, farther to

their left, a poſt at the ſaw-mills, which are at the foot of the carrying-place to Lake George, and a block-houſe upon an eminence above the mills, and a block-houſe and hoſpital at the entrance of the lake.

Upon the right of the lines, and between them and the old fort, there were two new block-houſes and a conſiderable battery cloſe to the water edge.

It ſeemed that the enemy had employed their chief induſtry, and were in the greateſt force upon Mount Independence, which is high and circular, and upon the ſummit, which is Table Land, was a ſtar fort, made of pickets, and well ſupplied with artillery, and a large ſquare of barracks within it. The foot of the hill, on the ſide which projects into the lake, was intrenched and had a ſtrong abbattis cloſe to the water. This intrenchment was lined with heavy artillery, pointed down the lake flanking the water battery, above deſcribed, and ſuſtained by another battery about half way up the hill. On the weſt ſide the hill runs the main river, and in its paſſage is joined by the water which comes down from Lake George. The enemy had here a bridge of communication, which could not at this time be reconnoitred. On the eaſt ſide of the hill the water forms a ſmall bay, into which falls a rivulet after having encirculed in its courſe part of the hill to the ſouth eaſt. The ſide to the ſouth could not be ſeen, but was deſcribed as inacceſſible.

About nine in the morning a ſmoke was obſerved towards Lake George, and the Savages brought in a report that the enemy had ſet fire to the further block-houſe and had abandoned the ſaw-mills, and that a conſiderable body were advancing from the lines towards a bridge upon the road which led from the ſaw-mills towards the right of the Britiſh camp. A detachment of the advanced corps was immediately put in march, under the command of Brigadier Fraſer, ſupported by the ſecond brigade and ſome light artillery, under the command of Major General Phillips, with orders to proceed to Mount Hope, which is to the north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy's poſition, and to take advantage of any poſt they might abandon or be driven from. The Indians under Captain Fraſer, ſupported by his company of markſmen, were directed to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Fraſer's line of march, and endeavour to cut off the retreat of the enemy to their lines; but this deſign miſcarried through the impetuoſity of the Indians, who attacked too ſoon, and in front; and the enemy were thereby able to retire with the loſs of one officer and a few men killed, and one officer wounded. Major General Phillips took poſſeſſion of the very advantageous poſt of Mount Hope this night, and the enemy were thereby entirely cut off from all communication with Lake George. July 2.

Mount Hope was occupied in force by General Fraſer's whole corps. The firſt Britiſh brigade, and two entire brigades of artillery. The ſecond brigade, Britiſh, encamped upon the left of the firſt, and the brigade of Gall, having been drawn from the eaſt ſhore to occupy the ground where Fraſer's corps had originally been; the line became compleat, extending from Three-Mile-Point to the weſtermoſt part of Mount Hope; on the ſame day, Major General Reideſel encamped on the eaſt ſhore in a parallel line with Three-Mile-Point, having puſhed the reſerve forward near the rivulet which encircles Mount Independence. The enemy cannonaded the camps of Mount Hope and of the German reſerve during moſt part of this day, but without effect. July 3.

The army worked hard at their communications and got up the artillery, tents, baggage and proviſions; the enemy at intervals continued the cannonade upon the camps, which was not in any inſtance returned. July 4.

The

The Thunderer Radeau, carrying the battering train and ſtores, having been warped up from Crown Point, arrived this day, and immediately began to land the artillery.

5th July. Lieutenant Twiſs, the commanding engineer, was ordered to reconnoitre Sugar Hill, on the ſouth ſide of the communion from Lake George into Lake Champlain, which had been poſſeſſed in the night by a party of light infantry. It appeared at firſt to be a very advantageous poſt, and it is now known that the enemy had a council ſome time ago upon the expediency of poſſeſſing it; but the idea was rejected, upon the ſuppoſition that it was impoſſible for a corps to be eſtabliſhed there in force. Lieutenant Twiſs reported this hill to have the entire command of the works and buildings both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the diſtance of about 1400 yards from the former, and 1500 from the latter; that the ground might be levelled ſo as to receive cannon, and that the road to convey them, though difficult, might be made practicable in twenty-four hours. This hill alſo commanded, in reverſe, the bridge of communication; ſaw the exact ſituation of their veſſels; nor could the enemy, during the day, make any material movement or preparation, without being diſcovered, and even having their numbers counted,

It was determined that a battery ſhould be raiſed on Sugar Hill for light twenty-four pounders, medium twelves, and eight-inch howitzers. This very arduous work was carried on ſo rapidly that the battery would have been ready the next day.

It is a duty in this place to do ſome juſtice to the zeal and activity of Major General Phillips, who had the direction of the operation, and having mentioned that moſt valuable officer, I truſt it cannot be thought a digreſſion to add, that it is to his judicious arrangements and indefatigable pains, during the general ſuperintendency of preparation which Sir Guy Carleton entruſted to him in the winter and ſpring, that the ſervice is indebted for its preſent forwardneſs. The prevalence of contrary winds and other accidents having rendered it impoſſible for any neceſſaries prepared in England for the opening of the campaign, yet to reach the camp.

6th July. Soon after day-light an officer arrived expreſs, on board the Royal George, where in the night I took up my quarters, as the moſt centrical ſituation, with information from Brigadier Fraſer that the enemy were retiring, and that he was advancing with his picquets, leaving orders for the brigade to follow as ſoon as they could accoutre, with intention to purſue by land. This movement was very diſcernible, as were the Britiſh colours, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the fort of Ticonderoga. Knowing how ſafely I could truſt to that officer's conduct, I turned my chief attention to the purſuit by water, by which route I underſtood one column were retiring in two hundred and twenty bateaux, covered by five armed gallies.

The great bridge of communication, through which a way was to be opened, was ſupported by twenty-two ſunken piers of large timber, at nearly equal diſtances; the ſpace between were made of ſeparate floats, each about fifty feet long, and twelve feet wide, ſtrongly faſtened together by chains and rivets, and alſo faſtened to the ſunken piers. Before this bridge was a boom, made of very large

large pieces of timber, faſtened together by rivetted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and an half ſquare.

The gun-boats were inſtantly moved forward, and the boom and one of the intermediate floats were cut with great dexterity and diſpatch, and Commodore Lutwidge, with the officers and ſeamen in his department, partaking the general animation, a paſſage was formed in half an hour for the frigates alſo, through impediments which the enemy had been labouring to conſtruct ſince laſt autumn.

During this operation Major General Reideſel had paſſed to Mount Independence, with the corps, Breyman, and part of the left wing. He was directed to proceed by land, to ſuſtain Brigadier Fraſer, or to act more to the left, if he ſaw it expedient ſo to do.

The 62d regiment Britiſh, and the Brunſwick regiment of Prince Frederick, were ſtationed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in the place of the parties of Fraſer's brigade, which had been left in poſſeſſion of the artillery and ſtores, and the reſt of the army was ordered to follow up the river as they could be collected, without regard to the place in the line.

About three in the afternoon I arrived with the Royal George and Inflexible; and the beſt ſailing gun-boats at South Bay, within three miles of Skeneſborough, at which latter place the enemy were poſted in a ſtockaded fort, and their armed gallies in the falls below.

The foremoſt regiments, viz. the 9th, 20th, and 21ſt, were immediately diſembarked, and aſcended the mountains with the intention of getting behind the fort, and cutting off the retreat of the enemy; but their precipitate flight rendered this manœuvre ineffectual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their courſe to Skeneſborough Falls, where the armed veſſels were poſted. Captain Carter, with part of his brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and with ſo much ſpirit, that two of the veſſels very ſoon ſtruck; the other three were blown up, and the enemy having previouſly prepared combuſtible materials, ſet fire to the fort, mills, ſtorehouſes, bateaux, &c. and retired with the detachment left for that purpoſe, the main body having gone off when the troops were aſcending the mountain. A great quantity of proviſions and ſome arms were here conſumed, and moſt of their officers' baggage was burnt, ſunk, or taken. Their loſs is not known; about 30 priſoners were made, among which were two wounded officers.

During theſe operations upon the right, Brigadier General Fraſer continued his purſuit to Caſtletown till one o'clock, having marched in a very hot day from four o'clock in the morning till that time. Some ſtragglers of the enemy were picked up, from whom the Brigadier learned that their rear guard was compoſed of choſen men, and commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their beſt officers. During the time that the men were refreſhing, Major General Reideſel came up, and arrangements for continuing the purſuit having been concerted, Brigadier Fraſer moved forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms, in an advantageous ſituation, three miles nearer the enemy.

At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about five his advanced ſcouts diſcovered the enemy's centries, who fired their pieces and joined the main body. The Brigadier obſerving a commanding ground to the left of his light infantry, immediately ordered it to be poſſeſſed by that corps; and a conſiderable body of the enemy attempting the ſame, they met. The enemy were driven back 7th July.

to their original poſt; the advanced guard under Major Grant was by this time engaged, and the grenadiers were advanced to ſuſtain them, and to prevent the right flank from being turned. The Brigadier remained on the left, where the enemy long defended themſelves by the aid of logs and trees, and after being repulſed, and prevented getting to the Caſtletown road by the grenadiers, they rallied, and renewed the action; and upon a ſecond repulſe, attempted their retreat by Pitsford Mountain. The grenadiers ſcrambled up a part of that aſcent, appearing almoſt inacceſſible, and gained the ſummit before them, which threw them into confuſion; they were ſtill greatly ſuperior in numbers, and conſequently in extent, and the brigadier, in momentary expectation of the Brunſwickers, had latterally drawn from his left to ſupport his right. At this critical moment General Reideſel, who had preſſed on, upon hearing the firing, arrived with the foremoſt of his columns, viz. the chaſſeurs company and eighty grenadiers and light infantry. His judgment immediately pointed to him the courſe to take; he extended upon Brigadier Fraſer's left flank. The chaſſeurs got into action with great gallantry, under Major Barner. They fled on all ſides, leaving dead upon the field Colonel Francis and many other officers, with upwards of 200 men; above 600 were wounded, moſt of whom periſhed in the woods, attempting to get off, and one colonel, ſeven captains, ten ſubalterns, and 210 men were made priſoners; above 200 ſtand of arms were alſo taken.

The number of the enemy before the engagement amounted to 2000 men. The Britiſh detachment under Brigadier General Fraſer (the parties left the day before at Ticonderoga not having been able to join) conſiſted only of 850 fighting men.

The bare relation of ſo ſignal an action is ſufficient for its praiſe. Should the attack againſt ſuch inequality of numbers, before the German brigade came up, ſeem to require explanation, it is to be conſidered that the enemy might have eſcaped by delay; that the advanced guard on a ſudden found themſelves too near the enemy to avoid action without retreating; and that Brigadier Fraſer had ſuppoſed the German troops to be very near. The difference of time in their arrival was merely accidental. The Germans puſhed for a ſhare in the glory, and they arrived in time to obtain it. I have only to add, that the exertions of Brigadier Fraſer on this day were but a continuance of that uniform intelligence, activity and bravery, which diſtinguiſh his character upon all occaſions, and entitle him to be recommended, in the moſt particular manner, to his Majeſty's favour.

The officers and ſoldiers of this brigade have prevented any diſtinctions of individuals by a general and equal diſplay of ſpirit.

The country people about Skeneſborough having reported that part of the enemy were ſtill retreating, the 9th regiment was detached, with orders to take poſt near Fort Anne, and obſerve the enemy's motions. This was effected, but with great difficulty, as the roads were almoſt impracticable, and the bridges broken. The other troops were employed all that day and night in dragging fifty bateaux over the carrying place at Wood Creek, to facilitate the movement of the reſt of the firſt brigade to Fort Anne, to diſlodge the enemy.

8th July. A report was received from Lieutenant Colonel Hill (9th regiment) that the enemy had been reinforced in the night by a conſiderable body of freſh men; that he could not retire with his regiment before them, but he would maintain his ground. The two remaining regiments of the firſt brigade were ordered to quicken their

their march, and upon ſecond intelligence of the enemy, and firing being heard, the 20th regiment was ordered forward with two pieces of artillery, and Major General Phillips was ſent to take the command. A violent ſtorm of rain, which laſted the whole day, prevented the troops from getting to Fort Anne ſo ſoon as was intended; but the delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of diſtinguiſhing themſelves, by ſtanding and repulſing an attack of ſix times their number. The enemy finding the poſition not to be forced in front, endeavoured to turn it; and from the ſuperiority of their numbers that inconvenience was to be apprehended; and Lieutenant Colonel Hill found it neceſſary to change his poſition in the height of action: ſo critical an order was executed by the regiment with the utmoſt ſteadineſs and bravery. The enemy, after an attack of three hours, were totally repulſed, and fled towards Fort Edward, ſetting fire to Fort Anne, but leaving a ſaw-mill and a block-houſe in good repair, which were afterwards poſſeſſed by the king's troops.

The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedition, about thirty priſoners, ſome ſtores and baggage, and colours of the 2d Hampſhire regiment.

One unlucky accident happened, to counterbalance, in ſome degree, this ſucceſs. Captain Montgomery, an officer of great merit, was wounded early in the action, and was in the act of being dreſſed by the ſurgeon when the regiment changed ground; being unable to help himſelf, he and the ſurgeon were taken priſoners. I ſince hear he has been well treated, and is in a fair way of recovery at Albany.

The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their proviſions for two days, almoſt the whole their tents and baggage) aſſembled in their preſent poſition. The right wing occupies the heights of Skeneſborough in two lines; the right flank to the mountains, covered by the regiment of Reideſel's dragoons, *en potence*; the left to the Wood Creek. 9th and 10th July.

The Brunſwick troops under Major General Reideſel upon Caſtletown River, with Breyman's corps upon the communication of roads leading to Putney and Rutland; the regiment of Heſſe Hanau are poſted at the head of Eaſt Creek, to preſerve the communication with the camp at Caſtletown River, and ſecure the bateaux.

Brigadier Fraſer's corps is in the centre, ready to move on either wing of the army.

The ſcattered remains of the enemy are at Fort Edward, on the Hudſon's River, where they have been joined, as I am informed, by General Putnam, with a conſiderable corps of freſh troops.

Roads are opening for the army to march to them by Fort Anne, and the Wood Creek is clearing of fallen trees, ſunken ſtones, and other obſtacles, to give paſſage to bateaux for carrying artillery, ſtores, proviſions and camp equipage. Theſe are laborious works; but the ſpirit and zeal of the troops are ſufficient to ſurmount them. Some little time muſt alſo be allowed for the ſupplies of proviſions to overtake us. In the mean time all poſſible diligence is uſing at Ticonderoga to get the gun-boats, proviſion veſſels, and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route, which will afterwards be the route for the magazines; and a junction of the whole is intended at Fort Edward.

I tranſmit to your Lordſhip herewith returns of the killed and wounded, and liſts of ſuch parts of proviſions and ſtores, taken from the enemy, as could be collected in ſo ſhort a time.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Your Lordſhips, &c.

No. VIII. *Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General* Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Skeneſborough, July 11, 1777.

[Private.]

My Lord,

HAVING given your Lordſhip a detail, in my public letter of this date, of the late tranſactions, I now do myſelf the honour to ſtate to your Lordſhip, ſuch circumſtances as appear to me more proper for a private communication.

Mr. Peters and Mr. Jeſſup, who came over to Canada laſt autumn, and propoſed to raiſe battalions, one from the neighbourhood of Albany, the other from Charlotte county, are confident of ſucceſs as the army advances. Their battalions are now in embryo, but very promiſing; they have fought, and with ſpirit. Sir Guy Carleton has given me blank commiſſions for the officers, to fill up occaſionally, and the agreement with them is, that the commiſſions are not to be ſo effective, till two thirds of the battalions are raiſed. Some hundreds of men, a third part of them with arms, have joined me ſince I have penerated this place, profeſſing themſelves loyaliſts, and wiſhing to ſerve, ſome to the end of the war, ſome for the campaign. Though I am without inſtructions upon this ſubject, I have not heſitated to receive them, and as faſt as companies can be formed, I ſhall poſt the officers till a deciſion can be made upon the meaſure by my ſuperiors. I mean to employ them particularly upon detachments, for keeping the country in awe, and procuring cattle; their real uſe I expect will be great in the preſervation of the national troops: but the impreſſion which will be cauſed upon public opinion, ſhould provincials be ſeen acting vigorouſly in the cauſe of the King, will be yet more advantageous, and, I truſt, fully juſtify the expence.

The manifeſto, of which I encloſed your Lordſhip a copy in my laſt diſpatches, and herewith ſend a duplicate, has great effect where the country is not in the power of the rebels; where it is, the committees turn all their efforts to counteract it. They watch or impriſon all ſuſpected perſons, compel the people in general to take arms, and to drive the cattle, and to burn the corn, under penalty of immediate death. Great numbers have been hanged. Should theſe wretches ſucceed to make a deſert of the country, by fire and maſſacre, it will at leaſt be a pleaſing reflection, that while advantages are reaped from the clement part of the manifeſto, they, and not the King's troops, are the executioners of its threats.

Your Lordſhip will have obſerved, I have made no mention of the Indians, in the purſuit from Ticonderoga. It is not poſſible to draw them in many reſpects from the plunder of that place, and I confidentially acknowledge this is not the only inſtance in which I have found little more than a name. If, under the management of their conductors, they are indulged, for intereſted reaſons, in all the caprices and humours of ſpoiled children, like them they grow more unreaſonable and importunate upon every

every new favour; were they left to themſelves, enormities too horrid to think of would enſue, guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey.

This is the character of the lower Canadian Indians, who alone have been with the army hitherto. I am informed the Outawas, and other remote nations, who are within two days march of joining me, are more brave and more tractable; that they profeſs war, not pillage. They are under the directions of a M. St. Luc, a Canadian gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the beſt partizans the French had laſt war, and of one Langlade, the very man who projected and executed with theſe very nations the defeat of General Braddock. My firſt intention was to turn this whole corps to the Connecticut immediately, to force a ſupply of proviſions, to intercept reinforcements, and to confirm the jealouſy I have in many ways endeavoured to excite in the New England provinces; but finding that the enemy are labouring to remove their magazines from Forts George and Edward, and every where deſtroying the roads, and preparing to drive and burn the country towards Albany, I have determined to employ them, to prevent, if poſſible, by their terror, the continuance of thoſe operations. And after arriving at Albany, they may be employed to renew the alarm towards Connecticut and Boſton.

Your Lordſhip will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propoſe in my original project for the campaign, to make a real effort inſtead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, inſtead of my right, I ſhould have little doubt of ſubduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion originated.

If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I ſtill hope this plan may be adopted from Albany; in the mean while my utmoſt exertions ſhall continue, according to my inſtructions, to force a junction.

I have ſent ſome Indians through the woods, in the hope of their reaching St. Leger, with the account of my progreſs; now is the critical time for his puſh upon the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all the country round Fort Stanwix is in alarm: but I imagine it proceeds from the appearance of ſome Savages detached by Colonel Butler, not apprehending St. Leger can be got quite ſo forward.

Camp near Saratoga, Auguſt 20, 1777. Second No. VIII.

To Lord George Germaine.

My Lord,

IN my laſt diſpatch (a duplicate of which will be incloſed herewith) I had the honour to inform your Lordſhip of the proceedings of the army under my command to the 30th of July.

From that period to the 15th of Auguſt every poſſible meaſure was employed to bring forward bateaux, proviſions, and ammunition from Fort George to the firſt navigable part of Hudſon's River, a diſtance of eighteen miles, the roads in ſome parts ſteep, and in others wanting great repair. Of the horſes furniſhed by contract in Canada not more than a third part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable

to

to neglect, but to the natural accidents attending ſo long and intricate a combination of land and water carriage. Fifty team of oxen, which had been collected in the country through which I had marched, were added to aſſiſt the tranſport; but theſe reſources together were found far inadequate to the purpoſes of feeding the army, and forming a magazine at the ſame time. Exceeding heavy rains augmented the impediments. It was often neceſſary to employ ten or twelve oxen upon a ſingle bateau; and after the utmoſt exertions for the fifteen days above ſtated, there were not above four days proviſion before hand, nor above ten bateaux in the river.

Intelligence had reached me that Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix, which was defended. The main army of the enemy oppoſed to me was at Stillwater, a place between Saratoga and the mouth of the Mohawk.

A rapid movement forward appeared to be of the utmoſt conſequence at this period. The enemy could not have proceeded up the Mohawk without putting themſelves between two fires, in caſe Colonel St. Leger ſhould have ſucceeded; and at beſt being cut off by my army from Albany. They muſt either therefore have ſtood an action, have fallen back towards Albany, or have paſſed the Hudſon's River, in order to ſecure a retreat to New England, higher up. Which ever of theſe meaſures they had taken, ſo that the King's army had been enabled to advance, Colonel St. Leger's operations would have been aſſiſted, a junction with him probably ſecured, and the whole country of the Mohawk opened. To maintain the communication with Fort George during ſuch a movement, ſo as to be ſupplied by daily degrees at a diſtance, continually increaſing, was an obvious impoſſibility. The army was much too weak to have afforded a chain of poſts. Eſcorts for every ſeparate tranſport would have been a ſtill greater drain; nor could any have been made ſo ſtrong as to force their way through ſuch poſitions as the enemy might take in one night's march from the White Creek, where they had a numerous militia. Had the enemy remained ſupine, through fear or want of comprehending ſo palpable an advantage, the phyſical impoſſibility of being ſupplied by degrees from Fort George was ſtill in force, becauſe a new neceſſity of land carriage for nine miles ariſes at Stillwater; and in the proportion that carriages had been brought forward to that place, the tranſport muſt have ceaſed behind.

The alternative therefore was ſhort; either to relinquiſh the favourable opportunity of advancing upon the enemy, or to attempt other reſources of ſupply.

It was well known that the enemy's ſupplies in live cattle, from a large tract of country, paſſed by the route of Mancheſter, Arlington, and other parts of the Hampſhire Grants, to Bennington, in order to be occaſionally conveyed from thence to the main army. A large depoſit of corn and of wheel carriages was alſo formed at the ſame place, and the uſual guard was militia, though it varied in numbers from day to day. A ſcheme was formed to ſurpriſe Bennington. The poſſeſſion of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their diſtant magazines, and to have acted with energy and diſpatch: ſucceſs would alſo have anſwered many ſecondary purpoſes.

Lieut. Col. Baume, an officer well qualified for the undertaking, was fixed upon to command. He had under him 200 diſmounted dragoons of the regiment of Riedeſel, Captain Fraſer's markſmen, which were the only Britiſh, all the Canadian volunteers, a party of the Provincials who perfectly knew the country, 100 Indians, and two light pieces of cannon; the whole detachment amounted to abo ut 500 men. The inſtructions were poſitive to keep the regular corps poſted while thel ight troops felt their

their way, and not to incur the danger of being ſurrounded, or having a retreat cut off.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its ſucceſs, the army moved up the eaſt ſhore of Hudſon's River. On the 14th, a bridge was formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps paſſed and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant Colonel Breyman's corps were poſted near Batten Kill, and upon intelligence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were ſtronger at Bennington than expected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, conſiſting of the Brunſwick grenadiers, light infantry and chaſſeurs, were ſent forward to ſuſtain him.

It ſince appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete his march undiſcovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles ſhort of Bennington, by many people profeſſing themſelves to be Loyaliſts. A provincial gentleman of confidence who had been ſent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was ſo incautious as to leave at liberty ſuch as took the oath of allegiance.

His credulity and their profligacy cauſed the firſt misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed without ſufficient knowledge of the ground. His deſign was betrayed; the men who had taken the oaths were the firſt to fire upon him; he was attacked on all ſides. He ſhewed great perſonal courage, but was overpowered by numbers.

During this time Lieutenant Colonel Breyman was upon the march through a heavy rain; and ſuch were the other impediments ſtated in that officer's report, of bad roads, tired horſes, difficulties in paſſing artillery, carriages, &c. that he was from eight in the morning of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the following day making about twenty-four miles.

He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three ſeveral heights; but was too late to ſuccour Colonel Baume, who was made priſoner, and a conſiderable part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant Colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, beſides two which had been loſt by Lieutenant Colonel Baume. The Indians made good their retreat from the firſt affair, as did Captain Fraſer, with part of his company, and many of the Provincials and Canadians.

The loſs, as at preſent appears, amounts to about 400 men, killed and taken in both actions, and twenty-ſix officers, moſtly priſoners; but men who were diſperſed in the woods drop in daily. A correct return ſhall be tranſmitted to your Lordſhip the firſt opportunity.

This, my Lord, is a true ſtate of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, becauſe in many inſtances they were counterbalanced by ſpirit. The enemy will of courſe find matter of parade in the acquiſition of four pieces of cannon: but that apart, they have ſmall cauſe of exultation; their loſs in killed and wounded being more than double to ours, by the confeſſion of their priſoners and deſerters, and of many inhabitants who were witneſſes to the burial of their dead.

The chief ſubject of regret on our ſide, after that which any loſs of gallant men naturally occaſions, is the diſappointment of not obtaining live cattle, and the loſs of time in bringing forward the magazines.

This

This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown over the Hudſon's River, oppoſite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts having been carried away by the ſwell of water after the late continual rains. When enabled to move, nothing within my ſcale of talent ſhall be left unattempted to fulfil his Majeſty's orders, and I hope circumſtances will be ſuch, that my endeavours may be in ſome degree aſſiſted by a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,

Your Lordſhip's

moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

(Signed.) J. BURGOYNE.*

No. IX. *Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General* Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated Camp, near* Saratoga, Auguſt 20, 1777.

[Private.]

MY LORD,

I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any ſiniſter events. I am perſuaded your Lordſhip will give me credit for partaking every ſentiment that your Lordſhip, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this conteſt, can feel.

In regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to add to the public account, that if ever there was a ſituation to juſtify enterprize and exertion, out of the beaten track of military ſervice, it was that in which I found myſelf. Had I ſucceeded, I ſhould have effected a junction with St. Leger, and been now before Albany. And I flatter myſelf, I need only mention thoſe views, to ſhew that in hazarding this expedition I had the ſoundeſt principles of military reaſoning on my ſide, viz. that the advantages to be expected from ſucceſs were in a great degree ſuperior to the evils that could attend miſcarriage. The ſecondary purpoſes, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the affections of the country; to complete the Provincial corps, many recruits for which were unable to eſcape from their villages without a force to encourage and protect them; and to diſtract the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jealouſy towards New England.

Major General Reideſel has preſſed upon me repeatedly the mounting his dragoons, the men were animated with the ſame deſire, and I conceived it a moſt favourable occaſion to give into their ideas and ſolicitations, becauſe in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favourite purpoſe, they neceſſarily would effect the greater purpoſe of my own. The reſt of the troops were ſelected from ſuch as would leaſt weaken the ſolid ſtrength of the army, in caſe of ill ſucceſs; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occaſion for them in more important actions.

The original detachment could not have been made larger without opening roads, and other preparations of time, nor ſhould I have thought it juſtifiable to expoſe the beſt troops to loſs upon a collateral action. Had my inſtructions been followed, or could Mr. Breyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twelve hours out of the two and thirty, ſucceſs would probably have enſued, misfortune would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the preſent criſis, to mark theſe circumſtances to the public ſo ſtrongly as I do in confidence to your Lord-

* The letter that follows, No. 9, is alſo materially referrable to No. 8.

Lordſhip; but I rely, and I will venture to ſay I expect, becauſe I think juſtice will warrant the expectation, that while, for the ſake of public harmony, that neceſſary principle for conducting nice and laborious ſervice, I colour the faults of the execution, your Lordſhip will, in your goodneſs, be my advocate to the King, and to the world, in vindication of the plan.

The conſequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effect upon the ſtrength or ſpirits of the army; but the proſpect of the campaign in other reſpects, is far leſs proſperous than when I wrote laſt. In ſpite of St. Leger's victory, Fort Stanwix holds out obſtinately. I am afraid the expectations of Sir J. Johnſon greatly fail in the riſing of the country. On this ſide I find daily reaſon to doubt the ſincerity of the reſolution of the profeſſing loyaliſts. I have about 400, but not half of them armed, who may be depended upon; the reſt are trimmers, merely actuated by intereſt. The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congreſs, in principle and in zeal; and their meaſures are executed with a ſecrecy and diſpatch that are not to be equalled. Wherever the King's forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four thouſand aſſemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their ſubſiſtence, &c. and, the alarm over, they return to their farms. The Hampſhire Grants in particular, a country unpeopled and almoſt unknown in the laſt war, now abounds in the moſt active and moſt rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering ſtorm upon my left. In all parts the induſtry and managment in driving cattle, and removing corn, are indefatigable and certain; and it becomes impracticable to move without portable magazines. Another moſt embarraſſing circumſtance, is the want of communication with Sir William Howe; of the meſſengers I have ſent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the reſt arrived. The ſame fate has probably attended thoſe diſpatched by Sir William Howe; for only one letter is come to hand, informing me that his intention is for Penſylvania; that Waſhington has detached Sullivan, with 2500 men to Albany; that Putnam is in the Highlands, with 4000 men. That after my arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy muſt guide mine; but that he wiſhed the enemy might be driven out of the province before any operation took place againſt the Connecticut; that Sir Henry Clinton remained in the command in the neighbourhood of New-York, and would act as occurrences might direct.

No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour: the highlands have not even been threatened. The conſequence is, that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now ſtrongly poſted near the mouth of the Mohawk-River, with an army ſuperior to mine in troops of the Congreſs, and as many militia as he pleaſes. He is likewiſe far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French ſhips which got into Boſton.

Had I a latitude in my orders, I ſhould think it my duty to wait in this poſition, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly ſecure, till ſome event happened to aſſiſt my movement forward; but my orders being poſitive to "force a junction with Sir William Howe," I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than ſhall be neceſſary to collect twenty-five days proviſion, and to receive the reinforcement of the additional companies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain. The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indiſpenſible neceſſity, becauſe from the hour I paſs the Hudſon's River and proceed towards Albany, all

ſafety of communication ceaſes. I muſt expect a large body of the enemy from my left will take poſt behind me. I have put out of the queſtion the waiting longer than the time neceſſary for the foregoing purpoſes, becauſe the attempt, then critical, depending on adventure and the fortune that often accompanies it, and hardly juſtifiable but by orders from the ſtate, would afterwards be conſummately deſperate. I mean my Lord, that by moving ſoon, though I ſhould meet with inſurmountable difficulties to my progreſs, I ſhall at leaſt have the chance of fighting my way back to Ticonderoga, but the ſeaſon a little further advanced, the diſtance encreaſed, and the march unavoidably tardy, becauſe ſurrounded by enemies, a retreat might be ſhut by impenetrable bars or the elements, and at the ſame time no poſſible means of exiſtence remain in the country.

When I wrote more confidently, I little foreſaw that I was to be left to purſue my way through ſuch a tract of country, and hoſts of foes, without any co-operation from New-York; nor did I then think the garriſon of Ticonderoga would fall to my ſhare alone, a dangerous experiment would it be to leave that poſt in weakneſs, and too heavy a drain it is upon the life-blood of my force to give it due ſtrength.

I yet do not deſpond.—Should I ſucceed in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a ſtate to ſubſiſt my army, I ſhall think no more of a retreat, but at the worſt fortify there and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I ſubmit my actions to the breaſt of the King, and to the candid judgment of my profeſſion, when all the motives become public; and I reſt in the confidence, that whatever deciſion may be paſſed upon my conduct, my good intent will not be queſtioned.

I cannot cloſe ſo ſerious a letter without expreſſing my fulleſt ſatisfaction in the behaviour and countenance of the troops, and my compleat confidence that in all trials they will do whatever can be expected from men devoted to their King and country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BURGOYNE.

P. S. Upon re-peruſing this letter, I am apprehenſive that the manner in which I have expreſſed myſelf, reſpecting the reinforcement being only upon Lake Champlain, may ſeem ambiguous.—I do not mean to impute the delay to any thing but accidents, nor do I mean to conteſt Sir Guy Carleton's reaſoning upon not complying with my requiſitions to garriſon Ticonderoga, I only lament it.

No. X.

Copy of a Letter from Sir William Howe *to Lieutenant General* Burgoyne, *dated* New-York, July *the* 17*th*, 1777.

DEAR SIR,

I have received yours of the ſecond inſtant on the 15th, have ſince heard from the rebel army of your being in poſſeſſion of Ticonderoga, *which is a great event, carried without loſs.* I have received your two letters, *viz.* from Plymouth and Quebec, your laſt of the 14th May, and ſhall obſerve the contents. There is a report of a meſſenger of yours to me having been taken, and the letter diſcovered in a double wooden canteen, you will know if it was of any conſequence; nothing of it has tranſpired to us. I will obſerve the *ſame rules* in writing to you, as you propoſe, in your letters

letters to me. Washington is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan with about 2500 men, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Pensylvania, where I expect to meet Washington, but if he goes to the northward contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you.

After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide yours; but my wishes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before any operation takes place in Connecticut. Sir Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will act as occurences my direct. Putnam is in the highlands with about 4000 men. Succes be ever with you.

Yours, &c.

WILLIAM HOWE.

Sir Guy Carleton's *Letter.**

Second No. X.

Quebeck, November 12, 1777.

SIR,

I received your letter of the 20th of October, with your public dispatches by Captain Craig, the 5th instant, and heartily condole with you upon the very disagreeable accounts they contain, all which I sincerely lamented, both on the public account and your own.

This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will in future prevent ministers from pretending to direct operations of war, in a country at three thousand miles distance, of which they have so little knowledge as not to be able to distinguish between good, bad, or interested advices, or to give positive orders in matters, which from their nature, are ever upon the change; so that the expedience or propriety of a measure at one moment, may be totally inexpedient or improper in the next.

Having given over all hopes of being relieved this fall. I determined upon sending home Captain Foy, to furnish his Majesty's confidential servants, and my successor, with the best information in my power, of the state of affairs in this province, that they may form the better judgment of what they have to do.

I am, &c.

Army from Canada *under Lieutenant General* Burgoyne.

No. XI.

Total Rank and File, 1st of July, 1777. [*Sick included.*]

British.				British.			
9th regiment		—	542	53d	—	—	537
20th	—	---	528	62d	—	—	541
21st	—	—	538	Grenadiers and light infantry companies from 29th, 31st, and 34th regiments		—	329
24th	—	—	528				
47th	—	—	524				
		Carried over	2660			Carried over	4067

* This letter, which was never printed before, only regards the view of the evidence, page 96.

	Brought over	4067
Left in Canada out of the above		343
British. Total	—	3,724
Germans, 1st July	3727	
Left in Canada	711	
For the campaign, Germans		30,16
Regular troops, total	—	6,740
Garrison left out of the above at Ticonderoga.		
British rank and file	462	
German rank and file	448	
		910
To force a passage to Albany		5,830
1st July, British artillery	—	257
German artillery	—	100
Bat men, servants, &c. in the above.		
Recruits under Lieut. Nutt	—	154
Canadians	— —	148
Indians never more than	500	

Before Septemb. fell off to	90
Provincials at most —	682
1st October, no more than	456

In September the additional companies joined near Fort Miller, in all — — 300

Regulars killed, wounded, and prisoners in the campaign, 1777.

		Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.	Total
British.					
	Officers	26	47	19	
	Serjeants	15	33	14	
	Drummers	3	5	6	
	R. & File	207	549	449	1285
Germans.					
	Officers	10	16	29	
	Serjeants	12	28	59	
	Drummers	1	8	18	
	R. & File	141	225	575	941

No. XII. *First Application from Major General* Phillips *relative to Horses. Dated* Montreal, June 4, 1777.

SIR,

I TAKE the liberty of informing your Excellency, that there has yet been no arrangement made for marching the field artillery by land, should the corps of troops upon an expedition under your command in the course of the campaign quit the lakes Champlain and George, and the rivers.

I have, upon the strictest information which could be procured, reason to believe, that neither carriages nor horses will be to be had nearer than Albany, should the route of your army be that way, and even in that country, it will necessarily require a considerable time before any can be got; all which must necessarily delay the operations of the campaign, after the reduction of Ticonderoga. I therefore submit to your Excellency's consideration whether horses and such ammunition-carriages as may be wanted should not be procured for the service of the campaign, for the field artillery attached to the corps of troops your Excellency is to command this campaign?

I have the honour to be Sir,

With the greatest respect,

Your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

M. PHILLIPS, Major General,

commanding the royal artillery in Canada.

His Excellency
Lieutenant General Burgoyne.

Copy

Copy of a Letter to Major General Phillips, *reſpecting Horſes. Dated* Montreal, June 4, 1777.

SIR,

I have the honour of your letter of this day's date, informing me that no arrangement has yet been made for moving the field artillery by land; and that upon the beſt information you can obtain, neither carriages nor horſes can be procured on the other ſide Lake Champlain nearer than Albany.

In conſequence of this repreſentation, I have to requeſt you, to give in your opinion upon the mode of procuring horſes and carriages from this country, combining the conſiderations of diſpatch, ſufficiency, œconomy towards government, and I wiſh to know the opinion as ſoon as poſſible.

I am with trueſt regard, Sir,

Your obedient humble ſervant,

J. BURGOYNE, Lieutenant-General.

Major-General Phillips.

Extracts of Letters from Major General Phillips, *&c.*

Extract of a Letter from Major General Phillips *to Lieutenant General* Burgoyne.

Montreal, June 5, 1777.

I HAVE the honour of your Excellency's letter to me of yeſterday, in anſwer to one I wrote on the ſubject of the field-artillery being ſupplied with horſes, &c. &c.

You are pleaſed, Sir, to order me to give an opinion upon the mode of procuring horſes and carriages from this country, combining the conſideration of diſpatch, ſufficiency, and œconomy towards government.

There are but two modes of procuring horſes for the ſervice, ſuppoſing the country is not to furniſh them upon Corvées, the one is by purchaſing of horſes upon the account of government, the other by contract.

The firſt of theſe modes has always appeared to me difficult, uncertain, and full of openings for every ſpecies of impoſition, and the expence uncertain.—Government muſt truſt various people to buy horſes, and in this country it will not be poſſible to procure any perſons who will not immediately purſue the views of gaining money to themſelves with a conſideration for the King's ſervice. Add to this, that it will become ſuch a charge, that many commiſſaries muſt be appointed, and various other officers of that ſort, &c, which being a mixture of inſpectors into the purchaſes of horſes, and neceſſarily alſo at times the being purchaſers, it will be difficult ever to aſcertain the price, and ſeldom that the goodneſs of horſes can be depended on.

I have ſeen in my ſervice this mode attempted, but it has to my knowledge failed. I muſt allow, that could it be carried into execution complete, it would be the cheapeſt for government: but taking into conſideration the various impoſitions which will ariſe, and that the ſetting out on a plan of this nature will require a very large ſum of money,

ney, perhaps from 20,000l. to 30,000l. to be intruſted into various hands, I freely give it as my opinion that it is not a perfect plan. The contracting for a certain number of horſes at a fixed price for the hire by day reduces the whole to a very ſimple, and therefore generally a certain plan. It depends in the ſetting out, by making as cheap, as fair, and juſt a bargain on the part of government as can be. And being ſo made, that the military and civil officers do their duty, by attending to the receiving of horſes only as they are fitting for ſervice. The contractor has his intereſt ſo directly connected with fulfilling his contract, as upon failure it ceaſes, that he will exert all means to do it, and the care of government will be that it be done honeſtly and compleatly.

I have thus obeyed your Excellency's orders, and given an opinion which I ſubmit entirely to your conſideration.

Extract of a Letter to Nathaniel Day, *Eſq. Commiſſary General, &c. dated* Montreal, *June 4th*, 1777.

I BEG the favour of you to calculate what number of horſes and carriages (ſuppoſing them ſuch as are in common uſe in Canada) will be ſufficient for conveying by land thirty days proviſion for 10,000 men, together with about 1000 gallons of rum, and you will pleaſe to make me your report as ſoon as poſſible.

Extract of a Letter to Sir Guy Carleton.

Montreal, June 7, 1777.

HAVING had the honor to repreſent to your Excellency the neceſſity of being provided with a certain number of horſes and carriages for the artillery, victual, and other indiſpenſible purpoſes of the army, when it ſhall be obliged to quit the borders of the lakes and rivers; and having underſtood from your Excellency that ſuch proviſion could not be made by the ordinary methods of corvée, and that if propoſed without compulſion upon the country the effect would be precarious, dilatory, and expenſive; I have the honour now to lay before your Excellency propoſals for contracts for an expeditious ſupply of horſes for the artillery, and 500 carts, with two horſes each, for the other purpoſes.

I am too ignorant of the prices of the country to offer any judgment upon the reaſonableneſs of theſe propoſals; nor have I any long acquaintance with Mr. Jordan, or other motive for wiſhing him the preference, if other perſons can be found equally capable, reſponſible, and expeditious. I have only thus far interfered, upon a conviction, after conſidering the route the King's orders direct, and taking all poſſible methods of information upon the ſupply to be expected as we proceed, that to depend upon the country altogether would be to hazard the expedition.

Your Excellency will obſerve, that in order to ſave the public expence as much as poſſible, I have reduced this requiſition much below what would be adequate to the ſervice, and I mean to truſt to the reſources of the expedition for the reſt; 500 carts will barely carry fourteen days proviſions at a time, and Major General Phillips means to

to demand as few horſes as poſſible, ſubject to whatever future augmentations future ſervices may require; the preſent number wanted will be about 400; there will then remain unprovided for (for expeditious movement) the tranſport of bateaux from Lake George to Hudſon's River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and many other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency to point out to you.

Extract of a Letter to General Harvey.

Montreal, May 19, 1777.

YOU have permitted me, as formerly, to write to you confidentially. I take the firſt conveyance to renew a correſpondence ſo pleaſing and honourable to myſelf, and that may, in ſome caſes, become beneficial to the public ſervice. It ſhall never be employed but to convey truths, to do juſtice to facts and perſons, and to ſecure myſelf in the continuance of an eſteem ſo valuable to me as yours againſt appearances and miſrepreſentations.

I have reaſon to be exceedingly ſatisfied with all that has been done, and with moſt things that are doing: exertions have been made during the winter, which was remarkably favourable, in all the departments, and preparations are very forward; thoſe that have been committed to the directions of General Phillips have been executed with a diligence, preciſion, and foreſight, that entitle him to the fulleſt praiſe. The troops are in a ſtate of health almoſt unprecedented, and their ſpirits and general improvement are equally objects of great pleaſure and promiſe. To this agreeable repreſentation I have the happineſs to add, that Sir Guy Carleton has received me and the orders I brought in a manner that, in my opinion, does infinite honour to his public and private character.

That he ſhould have wiſhed for the lead in active and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has ſome cauſe of reſentment for the general tenor of treatment he has received from ſome of the miniſters is diſcernible; but neither his diſappointment nor his perſonal feelings operate againſt his duty; and I am convinced he means to forward the King's meaſures, entruſted to my hands, with all the zeal he could have employed had they reſted in his own.

My intention is, during my advance to Ticonderoga, and ſiege of that poſt, for a ſiege I apprehend it muſt be, to give all poſſible jealouſy on the ſide of Connecticut. If I can by manœuvre make them ſuſpect that after the reduction of Ticonderoga my views are pointed that way, it may make the Connecticut forces very cautious of leaving their own frontiers, and much facilitate my progreſs to Albany. I mention this intention only to Lord George and yourſelf, and I do it leſt from any intelligence of my motions that may reach England indirectly, it ſhould be ſuppoſed I have ſuffered myſelf to be diverted from the main object of my orders. The King and his Majeſty's miniſters may reſt aſſured that whatever demonſtrations I may endeavour to impoſe upon the enemy, I ſhall really make no movement that can procraſtinate my progreſs to Albany.

One thing more occurs. I had the ſurpriſe and mortification to find a paper handed about at Montreal, publiſhing the whole deſign of the campaign, almoſt as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State's letter. My own caution

tion has been ſuch that not a man in my own family has been let into the ſecret. Sir Guy Carleton's, I am confident, has been equal; I am therefore led to doubt whether imprudence has not been committed from private letters from England, and wiſh you would aſk my friend D'Oyley, to whom my very affectionate compliments, whether there is any perſon within the line of miniſterial communication that he can ſuſpect to be ſo unguarded? It is not of great conſequence here, except as far as regards St. Leger's expedition; but ſuch a trick may be of moſt prejudicial conſequence in other caſes, and ſhould be guarded againſt.

Extract of a Letter to General Harvey.

Camp on the River Bouquet, near Lake Champlain, June 22, 1777.

I HAVE had to contend againſt wet weather that rendered the roads almoſt impracticable at the carrying places, and conſequently the paſſage of the bateaux and exceedingly dilatory, beſides a great deal of contrary wind. Indeed the combination of land and water movement, bad roads, inactivity and ſometimes diſobedience in the country, and a thouſand other difficulties and accidents, unknown in other ſervices, diſconcert all arrangements. I do not mention this upon my own account, as I do not hold myſelf reſponſible for delays within the province of Canada; but I mention it to do juſtice to others, who, I really think, have infinite merit in overcoming the obſtructions we have met with, and who ought to be juſtified againſt ſome acquaintances of yours and mine, who travel acroſs a map very faſt, and are very free in their comments, when others, who have ten times their knowledge and reſources, do not anſwer their predictions and expectations.

I have been exceedingly diſtreſſed in regard to the brigadiers of this army. Sir Guy Carleton, the day I took leave of him, put into my hands an extract of a letter from the Secretary at War, approving the appointment of thoſe gentlemen, but obſerving, that whenever any of them ſhould *lead their brigades out of the province of Canada, in order to join the troops under General Howe*, there would be a neceſſity for their command ceaſing as brigadiers, &c.

Were this to be put in execution, according to the letter of the order, and the geographical limits of Canada, and ſuppoſing Major General Phillips at the ſame time to be employed ſolely in the artillery, I ſhould find myſelf at the head of an army to undertake a ſiege, and afterwards purſue objects of importance, and poſſibly of time, without a ſingle intermediate Britiſh officer between the Lieutenant General, commanding *pro tempore* in chief, and a Lieutenant Colonel. It would be prepoſterous and impertinent in me to ſay one word more to you as an officer, upon the impoſſibility of methodizing or conducting ſuch an army with ſuch a total deficiency of ſtaff. Had Lord Barrington condeſcended to have communicated his intentions to me in London, I think I could have convinced him of the impropriety. As it is, I muſt conclude that the ſpirit of the order goes only to prevent thoſe gentlemen bearing a higher rank and pay than ſenior lieutenant colonels ſerving in the ſame army; and that therefore there can be no fault in keeping it dormant till the junction takes place. In other words, I look upon mine to be the Canada army till ſuch time as I am in communication with General Howe, ſo as to make part of his force, and conſequently without

without meaſuring degrees north and ſouth, that the arrangements made in Canada, and approved of by the King, remain in force till that time.

I am perſuaded, my dear General, you will ſupport me in this liberty, if ſuch it is to be called, not only as the abſolute order and method of the ſervice depends upon it, but alſo to avoid to theſe gentlemen, who have really great merit, the vexation and the ridicule of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour of that very ſervice, with a view to which their appointment was originally made. I think I can anſwer, that the junction made, and the reaſons for reverting to their former ranks, become obvious, they will ſubmit to his Majeſty's pleaſure without a murmur.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne *to General* Harvey.

Head Quarters, Skeneſborough, July 11, 1777.

THE mere compliment of ſervice I have given to the troops in orders, and in the relation deſigned for the Gazette, is not doing them ſufficient juſtice. It is a duty in me further, through you, and I know I ſhall impoſe a pleaſing taſk on you, to aſſure the King that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp as in action.

After what I have publicly mentioned of Fraſer I am ſure I need not preſs you in his favour. I cannot but feel confident in the hope that his Majeſty's grace will find its way through all obſtacles to prevent ſo diſcouraging a circumſtance as the return of this gallant officer to the mere duty of lieutenant colonel, at the head of one battalion, after having given aſcendancy to the King's troops, and done honour to his profeſſion, by the moſt ſpirited actions in critical periods of two ſucceſſive campaigns.

You will obſerve, Sir, both in the public letter and in the order of battle, which Captain Gardner will put into your hands, that Major General Phillips is occaſionally employed ſeparately from the ſtrict line of his department. This does not proceed from inattention to the explanation of his Majeſty's pleaſure two years ago; but from abſolute neceſſity. The ſtaff being compoſed without any Britiſh major general, Brigadier Fraſer being poſted where he is of infinite uſe, at the head of the advanced corps, the ſervice would ſuffer in the moſt material degree if the talents of General Phillips were not ſuffered to extend beyond the limits of the artillery, and I hold myſelf fully juſtified in continuing the great uſe of his aſſiſtance under this extenſion, by what I underſtand to be the ſignification of the King's pleaſure to Sir Guy Carleton, viz. *That this meaſure muſt not be made a precedent*, but not forbidding it during the preſent exigency.

I flatter myſelf the King will be ſatisfied with the diligence uſed in taking the field, as well as with the ſubſequent operations; if not, my diſappointment can only proceed from my own deficiency in ſtating the embarraſſments I found, notwithſtanding previous preparations and cordial aſſiſtances. Remote ſituations of the troops, currents, winds, roads, want of materials for caulking the veſſels, inactivity and deſertion of the Canadian corvées, were all againſt me. A great difficulty lay in providing horſes and carriages for the bare tranſport of proviſions and tents, when we ſhould arrive at Fort George, or any other place where the army ſhould have no reſource of water carriage. I found an active, and I think a reaſonable contractor, who ſupplied this neceſſity at a much cheaper rate than it could have been done any other way.

I incloſe a copy of the contract to the treaſury, to which I refer you. You will obſerve that I have limited the number to the mere indiſpenſible purpoſes of proviſions and tents, truſting to the country for the further aſſiſtance of officers baggage and the other attirail of an army. Experience already ſhews me that I judged right in not truſting to the country for more; for had this precaution been omitted, I ſhould be bound faſt to the ſpot where I am, or obliged to return by water to Ticonderoga.

I avow alſo to you my advice to General Carleton to grant commiſſions to two provincial battalions, to be raiſed from Albany and Charlotte County, by a Mr. Jeſſup and a Mr. Peters, upon condition that the commiſſions ſhould not take place till two thirds of the corps ſhould be effective, provincial corps, acting zealouſly in the King's cauſe, muſt have great impreſſion upon public opinion, and will, beſides, in fact be of ſingular uſe to the eaſe and preſervation of the regular troops.

Upon this principle, therefore, I have not heſitated further to receive and to pay ſuch loyaliſts as have come in with their arms ſince the ſucceſs of Ticonderoga, and wiſh to be employed. Though I have not power to grant commiſſions, I poſt the officers, and form them into companies till the meaſure can be decided by thoſe who have more authority.

I hope all theſe articles of expence will meet with the ſupport of your opinion; and have only to add, that as no job ſhall be done myſelf, ſo will I uſe all efforts to prevent ſuch being done by others.

I am indiſpenſibly obliged to wait ſome time on this poſition, to clear roads and make bridges, which is great labour in this country, and to bring up a ſtock of proviſion, and alſo to give time to the gun-boats, bateaux, and proviſion veſſels to be put into Lake George to ſcour that lake, and ſecure the future route of the magazines. I propoſe to poſſeſs Fort Edward at the ſame time that the force is ready to move down the lake, by which means, if the enemy do not evacuate Fort George, the garriſon muſt inevitably be caught. In the mean while I have ordered Reideſel to make roads, reconnoitre the country, and make all other poſſible feints of a march to the Connecticut, and by ſome other meaſures I hope to give alarms that way.

INSTRUCTIONS for Lieutenant Colonel Baume, *on a ſecret expedition to the Connecticut River.*

Amendments made by Gen. Burgoyne.

[*The eraſures were made by Gen. Burgoyne.**]

THE object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to diſconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount the Reideſel's dragoons, to compleat Peters's corps, and to obtain large ſupplies of cattle, horſes, and carriages.

The ſeveral corps, of which the incloſed is a liſt, are to be under your command.

The

* The eraſures are printed in Italics, and the amendments in the oppoſite column.

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

The troops muſt take no tents, and what little baggage is carried by officers muſt be on their own bat horſes.

You are to proceed *by the route* from Batten Kill to Arlington, and take poſt there, *ſo as to ſecure the paſs from Manchester. You are to remain at Arlington* till the detachment of the Provincials, under the command of Captain Sherwood, ſhall join you from the ſouthward.

You are then to proceed to Manchester, where you will take poſt ſo as to ſecure the paſs of the mountains on the road from Manchester to Rockingham; from hence you will detach the Indians and light troops to the northward, toward Otter Creek. On their return, and alſo receiving intelligence that no enemy is in force *in the neighbourhood of Rockingham* (1) you will proceed by the road over the mountains to Rockingham, where you will take poſt. This will be the moſt diſtant part on the expedition. (2)

You are to remain there *as long as neceſſary to fulfil the intention of the expedition from thence* (3) and you are afterwards to deſcend *by* the *Connecticut* River to Brattlebury, and from that place, by the quickeſt march, you are to return by the great road to Albany.

During your whole progreſs your detachments are to have orders to bring in to you all horſes fit to mount the dragoons under your command, or to ſerve as bat horſes to the troops, *they are likewiſe to bring in* (4) ſaddles and bridles as can be found. (5)

Your parties are likewiſe to bring in waggons and other convenient carriages, with as many draft oxen as will be neceſſary to draw them and all cattle fit for ſlaughter (milch cows excepted) which are to be left for the uſe of the inhabitants.

(1) *upon the Connecticut River,*

(2) *And muſt be proceeded upon with caution, as you will have the defile of the mountains behind you, which might make a retreat difficult; you muſt therefore endeavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy's militia in the neighbouring country.*

Should you find it may with prudence be effected.

(3) *while the Indians and light troops are detached up the river.*

(4) *together with as many.*

(5) *The number of horſes requiſite, beſides thoſe neceſſary for mounting the regiment of dragoons, ought to be* 1300. *If you can bring more for the uſe of the army it will be ſo much the better.*

tants. Regular receipts, in the form hereto ſubjoined, are to be given in all places where any of the abovementioned articles are taken, to ſuch perſons as have remained in their habitations, and otherwiſe complied with the terms of General Burgoyne's manifeſto; but no receipts to be given to ſuch as are known to be acting in the ſervice of the rebels. (6).

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

(6.) *As you will have with you perſons perfectly acquainted with the abilities of the country, it may perhaps be adviſeable to tax the ſeveral diſtricts with the portions of the ſeveral articles, and limit the hours for their delivery; and ſhould you find it neceſſary to move before ſuch delivery can be made, hoſtages of the moſt reſpectable people ſhould be taken, to ſecure their following you the enſuing day. All poſſible means are to be uſed to prevent plundering.*

As it is probable that Captain Sherwood, who is already detached to the ſouthward, and will join you at Arlington, will drive in a conſiderable quantity of cattle and horſes to you, you will therefore ſend in this cattle to the army, with a proper detachment from Peters's corps, to cover them, in order to diſencumber yourſelf; but you muſt always keep the regiments of dragoons compact.

The dragoons themſelves muſt ride, and take care of the horſes of the regiment. Thoſe horſes which are deſtined for the uſe of the army muſt be tied together by ſtrings of ten each, in order that one man may lead ten horſes. You will give the unarmed men of Peters's corps to conduct them, and inhabitants whom you can truſt. You muſt always take your camps in good poſition; but at the ſame time where there is paſture, and you muſt have a chain of centinels round your cattle and horſes when grazing.

Colonel Skeene will be with you as much as poſſible, in order to aſſiſt you with his advice, to help you to diſtinguiſh the good ſubjects from the bad, to procure you the beſt intelligence of the enemy, and to chuſe thoſe people who are to bring me the accounts of your progreſs and ſucceſs.

When you find it neceſſary to halt for a day or two, you muſt always entrench the camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order never to riſk an attack or affront from the enemy.

As

Amendments by General Burgoyne.

You will uſe all poſſible means to make the country believe that the troops under your command are the advanced corps of the army, and that it is intended to paſs the Connecticut on the road to Boſton. You will likewiſe *have it inſinuated* (7) that the main army from Albany is to be joined at Springfield by a corps of troops from Rhode Iſland.

You will ſend off occaſionally cattle or carriages, to prevent being too much incumbered; and will give me as frequent intelligence of your ſituation as poſſible.

It is highly probable that the corps under Mr. Warner, now ſuppoſed to be at Mancheſter, will retreat before you; but ſhould they, contrary to expectation, be able to collect in great force, and poſt themſelves advantageouſly, it is left to your diſcretion to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any conſiderable loſs be hazarded on this occaſion.

Should any corps be moved from Mr. Arnold's main army, in order to intercept your retreat, you are to take as ſtrong a poſt as the country will afford, and ſend the quickeſt intelligence to me, and you may depend on my making ſuch a movement as ſhall put the enemy between two fires, or otherwiſe effectually ſuſtain you.

It is imagined the progreſs of the whole of this expedition may be effected in about a fortnight, but every movement of it muſt depend upon your ſucceſs in obtaining ſuch ſupply of proviſions as will enable you to ſubſiſt for your return to the army, in caſe you can get no more. (8)

All perſons acting in committees, or any officers acting under the directions of Congreſs, either civil or military, are to be made priſoners.

As you will return with the regiment of dragoons mounted, you muſt always have a detachment of Captain Fraſer's or Peters's corps in front of the column, and the ſame in the rear, in order to prevent your falling into an ambuſcade when you march through the woods.

(7) *inſinuate*

(8) *And ſhould not the army be able to reach Albany before your expedition ſhould be compleated, I will find means to ſend you notice of it, and give your route another direction.*

Batten Kill, 12th *Auguſt*, 1777.

SIR,

I HAD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, by a man ſent yeſterday evening by Colonel Skeene to head-quarters, of the ſeveral corps under my command being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next morning at five o'clock; the corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when I received a letter from Brigadier General Fraſer, ſignifying your Excellency's order to poſt the corps advantageouſly on Batten Kill, till I ſhould receive freſh inſtructions from your Excellency; the corps is now encamped at that place, and wait your Excellency's orders. I will not trouble you, Sir, with the various reports which ſpread, as they ſeem rather to be founded on the different intereſts and feelings of the people who occaſion them.

I have the honour to be, moſt reſpectfully,
Your Excellency's moſt obedient and humble ſervant,
F. BAUME.

The reinforcement of fifty chaſſeurs, which your Excellency was pleaſed to order, joined me laſt night at eleven o'clock.

General Burgoyne.

Cambridge, 13th *Auguſt*, 1777.

SIR,

IN conſequence of your Excellency's orders I moved this morning at four o'clock, with the corps under my command; and after a march of ſixteen miles arrived at Cambridge at four in the evening. On the road I received intelligence of forty or fifty of the rebels being left to guard ſome cattle. I immediately ordered thirty of the provincials and fifty ſavages to quicken their march, in hopes to ſurprize them. They took five priſoners in arms, who declared themſelves to be in the ſervice of the Congreſs; yet the enemy received advice of our approach, and abandoned the houſe they were poſted in. The provincials and ſavages continued their march about a mile, when they fell in with a party of fifteen men, who fired upon our people, and immediately took to the woods with the greateſt precipitation. The fire was quick on our ſide, but I cannot learn if the enemy ſuſtained any loſs. A private of Captain Sherwood's company was the only one who was ſlightly wounded in the thigh. From the many people who came from Bennington they agree that the number of the enemy amounted to 1800. I will be particularly careful, on my approach at that place, to be fully informed of their ſtrength and ſituation, and take the precautions neceſſary to fulfil both the orders and inſtructions of your Excellency.

I cannot aſcertain the number of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they have not been as yet collected. A few horſes have been alſo brought in, but am ſorry to acquaint your Excellency that the ſavages either deſtroy or drive away what is not paid for with ready money. If your Excellency would allow me to purchaſe the horſes from the ſavages, ſtipulating the price, I think they might be procured cheap, otherwiſe they ruin all they meet with, their officers and interpreters not having it in their power to controul them. Your Excellency may depend on

on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my ſucceſs there: praying my reſpectful compliments to General Reideſel,

I am, moſt reſpectfully, Sir,
Your moſt obedient and humble ſervant,
F. BAUME.

P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as follows.

George Duncan, John Bell,
David Slarrow, Matt. Bell.
Samuel Bell,

Hugh More, a noted rebel ſurrendered himſelf yeſterday evening.
The expreſs left Cambridge at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of Auguſt.

SIR, *Sancoick, 14th Auguſt, 1777, 9 o'clock.*

I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I arrived here at eight in the morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in poſſeſſion of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their uſual way fired from the buſhes, and took their road to Bennington; a ſavage was ſlightly wounded; they broke down the bridge which has retarded our march above an hour, they left in the mill about ſeventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, 1000 buſhels of wheat, 20 barrels of ſalt, and about 1000l. worth pearl and pot aſh. I have ordered thirty provincials and an officer to guard the proviſion and the paſs of the bridge. By five priſoners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are ſuppoſed to leave it on our approach; I will proceed ſo far to-day as to fall on the the enemy to-morrow early, and make ſuch diſpoſition as I think neceſſary from the intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed; the ſavages cannot be controuled, they ruin and take every thing they pleaſe.

I am,
Your excellency's moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
F. BAUME.

Beg your excellency to pardon the hurry of this letter, it is wrote on the head of a barrel.

General Burgoyne.

Inſtructions to Colonel Skeene, *upon the expedition to Bennington.*

SIR,

I requeſt the favour of you to proceed with Lieutenant Colonel Baume, upon an expedition of which he has the command, and which will march this evening, or to-morrow morning.

The objects of his orders are to try the affections of the country; to diſconcert the councils of the enemy; to mount the regiment of Reideſel dragoons; to compleat Lieutenant Colonel Peters's corps, and to procure a large ſupply of horſes for the uſe of the troops, together with cattle and carriages.

The

The route marked for this expedition is to Arlington and Manchester, and in case it should be found that the enemy is not in too great force upon the Connecticut river, it is intended to pass the mountains to Rockingham, and descend the river from thence to Brattlebury. Some hours before the corps marches for Arlington, Colonel Peters with all his men are to set forward for Bennington, and afterwards are to join at Arlington.

Receipts are ordered to be given for all horses and cattle taken from the country.

Lieutenant Colonel Baume is directed to communicate to you the rest of his instructions, and to consult with you upon all matters of intelligence, negotiation with the inhabitants, roads, and other means depending upon a knowledge of the country for carrying his instructions into execution.

I rely upon your zeal and activity for the fullest assistance, particularly in having it understood in all the country through which you pass, that the corps of Lieutenant Colonel Baume is the first detachment of the advanced guard, and that the whole army is proceeding to Boston, expecting to be joined upon the route by the army from Rhode Island.

I need not recommend to you to continue the requisites of the service with every principle of humanity in the mode of obtaining them; and it may be proper to inform the country that the means to prevent their cattle and horses being taken for the future, will be to resist the enemy when they shall presume to force them, and drive them voluntarily to my camp.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

J. BURGOYNE.

CALCULATION

CALCULATIONS of the Number of Carts that will carry Provisions for the following Number of Men.

Number of Men for	1 Day.	2 Days.	3 Days.	4 Days.	5 Days.	6 Days.	7 Days.	8 Days.	9 Days.	10 Days.	11 Days.	12 Days.	13 Days.	14 Days.	15 Days.	16 Days.	17 Days.	18 Days.	19 Days.	20 Days.	30 Days.	60 Days.	90 Days.
10,000 Men Carts	38	75	113	150	188	226	263	300	338	375	413	452	490	526	564	600	638	678	716	750	1125	2250	3375
5000 Men Carts	19	38	57	75	94	113	132	150	169	188	207	226	245	263	282	300	319	339	358	375	563	1125	1688
4000 Men Carts	15	30	45	60	75	90	105	120	135	150	165	180	195	210	225	240	255	270	285	300	450	900	1350
3000 Men Carts	12	23	34	45	57	68	79	90	102	113	124	135	147	158	169	180	192	203	214	225	338	676	1014
2000 Men Carts	8	15	23	30	38	45	53	61	68	75	83	90	98	105	113	120	128	135	143	150	225	450	675
1000 Men Carts	4	8	12	15	19	23	27	31	35	39	42	45	49	53	57	60	64	68	72	75	113	226	339
500 Men Carts	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	21	23	25	27	29	30	32	34	36	38	57	113	171

The above Table made, allowing 3 pounds weight to the Ration and 800 pounds to the Cart Load.

NATHANIEL DAY, Commissary General.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, *to Sir* Guy Carleton, *dated Head-Quarters, at Skeneſborough Houſe, 11th July,* 1777.

I REQUEST your Excellency to take into conſideration the expediency of ſupplying from Canada, a garriſon for Ticonderoga.

My communication will widen ſo much as I proceed, the drain upon the army for poſts will be ſo conſiderable, not to ſpeak of detachments and ſafe-guards to protect and to awe the country, that if that firſt diminution is not replaced, my effective ſtrength may become inadequate to the ſervices intended. My preſent intelligence is that Putnam is collecting an army to oppoſe me at Saratoga. Fort Edward is alſo talked of to ſuſtain a ſiege.

Your excellency will, I am ſure, agree with me that Ticonderoga, or ſome other fortified poſt on the South part of Lake Champlain, ought to be conſidered on the frontiers of the province of Canada. I am aware of the difficulties that ariſe from the manner in which the Secretary of State's orders are penned; but I ſubmit to your Excellency, whether, under the principle laid down in the beginning of the order, and afterwards repeated, *that* 3000 *men were held ſufficient for the defence of that province*, you would not be juſtified in ſparing for the purpoſe of this garriſon, the overplus of the 3000 that may remain after compleating my army.

And notwithſtanding the corps for the Canada ſervice are preciſely named by the Secretary of State, I would further ſubmit whether, upon my preſſing requiſition, the garriſon might not juſtifiably be furniſhed by detachment, even though there was no overplus, under the following words of the order; *after having ſecured to him,* (Lieutenant General Burgoyne) *every aſſiſtance which it is in your power to afford and procure.* Your Excellency's zeal for the ſervice and favour towards me, will be better interpreters for the latitude I propoſe, than any thing I can further ſuggeſt; my preſent purpoſe, Sir, is to get a ſufficient number of gun-boats upon the Lake George to ſcour that lake as expeditiouſly as poſſible, to ſupport them with a proper force to attack Fort George on that ſide, while with the main of the army as ſoon as refreſhed and ſupplied, I attack Fort Edward from hence, and therebycut off the communication from Albany to Fort George, and conſequently prevent the ſuccour or retreat of that garriſon.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, *to Sir* Guy Carleton, *Head-Quarters, near Fort Anne, July 29th* 1777.

THE conſtruction your excellency puts upon the orders of the Secretary of State, is too full and deciſive for me to preſume to trouble you further upon the ſubject of a garriſon for Ticonderoga from Canada, I muſt do as well as I can, but I am ſure your Excellency, as a ſoldier, will think my ſituation a little difficult. A breach into my communication muſt either ruin my army entirely, or oblige me to return in force to reſtore, which might be the loſs of the campaign. To prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and Fort George muſt be in very reſpectable ſtrength, and I muſt beſides have poſts at Fort Edward and other carrying-places. Theſe drains added to common accidents and loſſes of ſervice, will neceſſarily render me very inferior in

point

point of numbers to the enemy, whom I muſt expect always to find ſtrongly poſted. I aſk pardon for dwelling ſo much upon this ſubject, and have only to add my requeſt to your Excellency to forward the additional companies as expeditiouſly as may be.

Copy of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's *Letter to Colonel* Baume.

Near Saratoga, Auguſt 14, 1777. *Seven at Night.*

SIR,

THE accounts you have ſent me are very ſatisfactory, and I have no doubt of every part of your proceeding continuing to be the ſame.

I beg the favour of you to report whether the road you have paſſed is practicable, and if ſo, if it is convenient for a conſiderable corps with cannon.

Should you find the enemy too ſtrongly poſted at Bennington, and maintaining ſuch a countenance as may make an attack imprudent, I wiſh you to take a poſt where you can maintain yourſelf till you receive an anſwer from me, and I will either ſupport you in force, or withdraw you.

You will pleaſe to ſend off to my camp, as ſoon as you can, waggons, and draft cattle, and likewiſe ſuch other cattle as are not neceſſary for your ſubſiſtence.

Let the waggons and carts bring off all the flour and wheat they can that you do not retain for the ſame purpoſe. This tranſport muſt be under the charge of a commiſſion officer.

I will write you at full to-morrow in regard to getting horſes out of the hands of the ſavages.

In the mean time any you can collect from them, fit to mount the regiments, at a low price, ſhall be allowed.

I am with great eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

J. BURGOYNE.

Colonel St. Leger's *Account of Occurrences at* Fort Stanwix. No [illegible],

A MINUTE detail of every operation ſince my leaving La Chine, with the detachment entruſted to my care, your Excellency will permit me to reſerve to a time of leſs hurry and mortification than the preſent, while I enter into the intereſting ſcene before Fort Stanwix, which I inveſted the 3d of Auguſt, having previouſly puſhed forward Lieutenant Bird of the King's reigment, with thirty of the King's troops and two hundred Indians, under the direction of Captains Hare and Wilſon, and the chiefs Joſeph and Bull, to ſeize faſt hold of the lower landing-place, and thereby cut off the enemy's communication with the lower country.—This was done with great addreſs by the lieutenant, though not attended with the effect I had promiſed myſelf, occaſioned by the ſlackneſs of the Meſſaſagoes. The brigade of proviſion and ammunition boats I had intelligence of, being arrived and diſembarked before this party had taken poſt.

The fourth and fifth were employed in making arrangements for opening Wood Creek (which the enemy, with the indefatigable labour of one hundred and fifty men, for fourteen days, had moſt effectually choaked up) and the making a temporary road from Pine Ridges upon Fiſh Creek, ſixteen miles from the fort, for a preſent ſupply of proviſion and the tranſport of our artillery: the firſt was effected by the diligence and zeal of Captain Bouville, aſſiſted by Captain Harkimer of the Indian department, with one hundred and ten men, in nine days; while Lieutenant Lundy, acting as aſſiſtant quarter-maſter general, had rendered the road in the worſt of weather, ſufficiently practicable to paſs the whole artillery and ſtores, with ſeven days proviſion, in two days.

On the 5th, in the evening, intelligence arrived by my diſcovering parties on the Mohawk River, that a reinforcement of eight hundred militia, conducted by General Herkimer, were on their march to relieve the garriſon, and were actually at that inſtant at Oriſka, an Indian ſettlement, twelve miles from the fort. The garriſon being appriſed of their march by four men, who were ſeen enter the fort in the morning, through what was thought an impenetrable ſwamp, I did not think it prudent to wait for them, and thereby ſubject myſelf to be attacked by a ſally from the garriſon in the rear, while the reinforcement employed me in front. I therefore determined to attack them on the march, either openly or covertly, as circumſtances ſhould offer. At this time, I had not two hundred and fifty of the King's troops in camp; the various and extenſive operations I was under an abſolute neceſſity of entering into, having employed the reſt; and therefore, could not ſend above eighty white men, rangers and troops included, with the whole corps of Indians. Sir John Johnſon put himſelf at the head of this party, and began his march that evening at five o'clock, and met the rebel corps at the ſame hour the next morning. The impetuoſity of the Indians is not to be deſcribed on the ſight of the enemy (forgetting the judicious diſpoſition formed by Sir John, and agreed to by themſelves, which was, to ſuffer the attack to begin with the troops in front, while they ſhould be on both flanks and rear) they ruſhed in, hatchet in hand, and thereby gave the enemy's rear an opportunity to eſcape. In relation to the victory, it was equally complete, as if the whole had fallen; nay more ſo, as the two hundred who eſcaped only ſerved to ſpread the panic wider; but it was not ſo with the Indians; their loſs was great (I muſt be underſtood Indian computation, being only about thirty killed, and the like number wounded, and in that number ſome of their favourite chiefs and confidential warriors were ſlain.) On the enemy's ſide, almoſt all their principal leaders were ſlain. General Herkimer has ſince died of his wounds. It is proper to mention, that the four men detached with intelligence of the march of the reinforcement, ſet out the evening before the action, and conſequently the enemy could have no account of the defeat, and were in poſſeſſion only, of the time appointed for their arrival; at which, as I ſuſpected, they made a ſally with two hundred and fifty men towards Lieutenant Bird's poſt, to facilitate the entrance of the relieving corps, or bring on a general engagement, with every advantage they could wiſh.

Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to cut in upon their rear, while they engaged the lieutenant. Immediately upon the departure of Captain Hoyes, having learned that Lieutenant Bird, miſled by the information of a cowardly Indian, that Sir John was preſſed, had quitted his poſt to march to his aſſiſtance, I marched the

the detachment of the King's regiment, in ſupport of Captain Hoyes, by a road in ſight of the garriſon, which, with executive fire from his party, immediately drove the enemy into the fort, without any further advantage than frightening ſome ſquaws and pilfering the packs of the warriors which they left behind them. After this affair was over, orders were immediately given to compleat a two-gun battery, and mortar beds, with three ſtrong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in caſe of another attempt, to relieve the garriſon by their regimented troops, to march out a larger body of the King's troops.

Captain Lernoult was ſent with 110 men to the lower landing place, where he eſtabliſhed himſelf with great judgment and ſtrength, having an encloſed battery of a three-pounder oppoſed to any ſally from the fort, and another to the ſide of the country, where a relief muſt approach; and the body of his camp deeply entrenched and abbatiſed.

When by the unabating labour of officers and men (the ſmallneſs of our numbers never admitting of a relief, or above three hours ceſſation for ſleep or cooking) the batteries and redoubts were finiſhed, and new cheeks and axle-trees made for the ſix-pounders, thoſe that were ſent being reported rotten and unſerviceable.

It was found that our cannon had not the leaſt effect upon the ſod-work of the fort, and that our royals had only the power of teizing, as a ſix-inch plank was a ſufficient ſecurity for their powder magazine, as we learnt from the deſerters. At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to act as aſſiſtant engineer, propoſed a converſion of the royals (if I may uſe the expreſſion) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feaſability of this meaſure ſtriking me very ſtrongly, the buſineſs was ſet about immediately, and ſoon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating with the deſired effect but the diſtance, their chambers being too ſmall to hold a ſufficiency of powder. There was nothing now to be done but to approach the town by ſap to ſuch a diſtance that the rampart might be brought within their portice, at the ſame time all materials were preparing to run a mine under their moſt formidable baſtion.

In the midſt of theſe operations intelligence was brought in by our ſcouts, of a ſecond corps of 1000 men being on their march. The ſame zeal no longer animated the Indians; they complained of our thinneſs of troops and their former loſſes. I immediately called a council of the chiefs; encouraged them as much as I could; promiſed to lead them on myſelf, and bring into the field 300 of the beſt troops. They liſtened to this, and promiſed to follow me, and agreed that I ſhould reconnoitre the ground propereſt for the field of battle the next morning, accompanied by ſome of their chief warriors, to ſettle the plan of operations. When upon the ground appointed for the field of battle, ſcouts came in with the account of the firſt number ſwelled to 2000; immediately after a third, that General Burgoyne's army was cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches, with 3000 men. It was at this moment I began to ſuſpect cowardice in ſome, and treaſon in others; however I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the aſſiſtance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnſon, and the influence of the ſuperintending colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them to meet the enemy. A council, according to their cuſtom, was called, to know their reſolutions, before the breaking up of which I learned that 200 were already decamped. In about an hour they

they inſiſted that I ſhould retreat, or they would be obliged to abandon me. I had no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who could do nothing without them, to yield to their reſolves; and therefore propoſed to retire at night, ſending on before my ſick, wounded, artillery, &c. down the Wood Creek, covering them by our line of march.

This did not fall in with their views, which were no leſs than treacherouſly committing ravage upon their friends, as they had loſt the opportunity of doing it upon their enemies. To effect this they artfully cauſed meſſengers to come in, one after the other, with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels; one and the laſt affirmed that they were within two miles of Captain Lernoult's poſt. Not giving entire credit to this, and keeping to my reſolution of retiring by night, they grew furious and abandoned; ſeized upon the officers' liquor and cloaths, in ſpite of the efforts of their ſervants; and became more formidable than the enemy we had to expect. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernoult's poſt, retiring with the troops in camp to the ruined fort called William, in the front of the garriſon, not only to wait the enemy, if they thought proper to ſally, but to protect the boats from the fury of the ſavages, having ſent forward Captain Hoyes, with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the place where Bull Fort ſtood, to receive the troops who waited the arrival of Captain Lernoult. Moſt of the boats were eſcorted that night beyond Canada Creek, where no danger was to be apprehended from the enemy. The creek at this place bending from the road, has a deep cedar ſwamp between. Every attention was now turned to the mouth of the creek, which the enemy might have poſſeſſed themſelves of by a rapid march by the Oneyda Caſtle. At this place the whole of the little army arrived by twelve o'clock at night, and took poſt in ſuch a manner as to have no fears of any thing the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o'clock next morning, when the boats which could come up the Creek arrived, or rather that the raſcally part of all nations of the Indians would ſuffer to come up; and proceeded acroſs Lake Oneyda to the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learnt that ſome boats were ſtill labouring down the creek, after being lightened of the beſt part of their freight by the Meſſaſagoes. Captain Lernoult propoſed, with a boat full of armed men, to repaſs the lake that night, to relieve them from their labour, and ſupply them with proviſion. This tranſaction does as much honour to the humanity as to the gallantry of this valuable officer.

On my arrival at the Onondago Falls I received an anſwer to my letter from your Excellency, which ſhewed, in the cleareſt light, the ſcenes of treachery that had been practiſed upon me. The meſſenger had heard indeed on his way that they were collecting the ſame kind of rabble as before, but that there was not an enemy within forty miles of Fort Stanwix.

Soon after my arrival here I was joined by Captain Lernoult, with the men and boats he had been in ſearch of. I mean immediately to ſend off, for the uſe of the upper garriſon, all the overplus proviſion I ſhall have, after keeping a ſufficiency to carry my detachment down, which I mean to do with every expedition in my power the moment this buſineſs is effected, for which purpoſe I have ordered here the ſnow. The ſloop is already gone from this with her full lading.

Officers

Officers from each corps are ſent to Montreal to procure neceſſaries for the men, who are in a moſt deplorable ſituation from the plunder of the ſavages, that no time may be loſt to join your army.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Sir, your Excellency's moſt obedient,
Oſwego, Aug. 27, 1777. and moſt faithful ſervant,
BARRY ST. LEGER.

His Excellency General Burgoyne.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated at* Albany, 20*th* October, 1777. No. XIV.

MY LORD,

NO poſſibility of communication with your Lordſhip having exiſted ſince the beginning of September, at which time my laſt diſpatch was ſent away, I have to report to your Lordſhip the proceedings of the army under my command from that period: a ſeries of hard toil, inceſſant effort, ſtubborn action; till diſabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians; the deſertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, ſome individuals excepted; diſappointed in the laſt hope of any timely co-operation from other armies; the regular troops reduced by loſſes from the beſt part to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were Britiſh; only three days proviſions upon ſhort allowance in ſtore; inveſted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major General Gates.

Your Lordſhip will ſee, by the papers tranſmitted herewith, the diſagreeable proſpect which attended the firſt overtures; and when the terms concluded are compared, I truſt that the ſpirit of the councils I have mentioned, which under ſuch circumſtances dictated inſtead of ſubmitting, will not be refuſed a ſhare of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of theſe events, I think it a duty of juſtice, my Lord, to take upon myſelf the meaſure of having paſſed the Hudſon's River, in order to force a paſſage to Albany. I did not think myſelf authoriſed to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the ſeaſon of the year admitted no alternative.

Proviſions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other neceſſary ſtores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army paſſed the Hudſon's River on the 13th and 14th of September, and incamped on the heights, and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater.

The whole army made a movement forward, and incamped in a good poſition in a place called Dovacote. 15th.

It being found that there were ſeveral bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of ſtrong detachments, and the ſame opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country. 16th.

The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon advantageous ground about four miles from the enemy. 17th.

The enemy appeared in conſiderable force to obſtruct the further repair of bridges, and with a view, as it was conceived, to draw on an action where artillery could not be 18th.

be employed. A ſmall loſs was ſuſtained in ſkirmiſhing, but the work of the bridges was effected.

Sept. 19. The paſſages of a great ravine, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in the following order.

Brigadier General Fraſer's corps, ſuſtained by Lieutenant Colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit, in order to paſs the ravine commodiouſly, without quitting the heights, and afterwards to cover the march of the line to the right. Theſe corps moved in three columns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The Britiſh line led by me in perſon paſſed the ravine in a direct line ſouth, and formed in order of battle as faſt as they gained the ſummit, where they waited to give time to Fraſer's corps to make the circuit, and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the commands of Major General Phillips, and Major General Reideſel, kept the great road and meadows near the river in two columns, and had bridges to repair, to be equally ready to proceed. The 47th regiment guarded the bateaux.

The ſignal guns, which had been previouſly ſettled to give notice of all the columns being ready to advance, having been fired between one and two o'clock, the march continued. The ſcouts and flankers of the column of the Britiſh line were ſoon fired upon from ſmall parties but with no effect. After about an hour's march, the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they ſoon rallied and were ſuſtained.

On the firſt opening of the wood I formed the troops. A few cannon-ſhot diſlodged the enemy at a houſe from whence the picquets had been attacked, and Brigadier General Fraſer's corps had arrived with ſuch preciſion in point of time, as to be found upon a very advantageous height on the right of the Britiſh.

In the mean time the enemy, not acquainted with the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon the right, and being checked by the diſpoſition of Brigadier General Fraſer, countermarched, in order to direct their great effort to the left of the Britiſh.

From the nature of the country, movements of this ſort, however near, may be effected without a poſſibility of their being diſcovered.

About three o'clock the action began by a very vigorous attack on the Britiſh line, and continued with great obſtinacy till after ſunſet. The enemy being continually ſupplied with freſh troops, the ſtreſs lay upon the 20th, 21ſt, and 62d regiments, moſt parts of which were engaged near four hours without intermiſſion; the 9th had been ordered early in the day to form in reſerve.

The grenadiers and 24th regiment were ſome part of the time brought into action, as were part of the light infantry, and all theſe corps charged with their uſual ſpirit.

The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's corps, were alſo of ſervice; but it was not thought adviſable to evacuate the heights where Brigadier General Fraſer was poſted otherwiſe than partially and occaſionally.

Major General Phillips upon firſt hearing the firing found his way through a difficult part of the wood to the ſcene of action, and brought up with him Major Williams and four pieces of artillery, and from that moment I ſtood indebted to that gallant and judicious ſecond, for inceſſant and moſt material ſervices, particularly for reſtoring the action in a point which was critically preſſed by a great ſuperiority of fire, and to which he led up the 20th regiment at the utmoſt perſonal hazard.

Major

Major-General Riedeſel exerted himſelf to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery.

Juſt as the light cloſed, the enemy gave ground on all ſides, and left us completely maſters of the field of battle, with the loſs of about five hundred men on their ſide, and, as ſuppoſed, thrice that number wounded.

The darkneſs preventing a purſuit, the priſoners were few.

The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier-General Fraſer took his poſition in the beginning of the day with great judgment, and ſuſtained the action with conſtant preſence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-General Hamilton was the whole time engaged and acquitted himſelf with great honour, activity and good conduct.

The artillery in general was diſtinguiſhed, and the brigade under Captain Jones, who was killed in the action, was conſpicuouſly ſo.

The army lay upon their arms the night of the 19th, and the next day took a poſition nearly within cannon ſhot of the enemy, fortifying their right, and extending their left to the brow of the heights, ſo as to cover the meadows through which the great river runs, and where their bateaux and hoſpitals were placed. The 47th regiment, the regiment of Heſſe Hanau, and a corps of Provincials incamped in the meadows as a further ſecurity.

It was ſoon found that no fruits, honour excepted, were attained by the preceding victory, the enemy working with redoubled ardor to ſtrengthen their left: their right was already unattackable.

On our ſide it became expedient to erect ſtrong redoubts for the protection of the magazines and hoſpital, not only againſt a ſudden attack, but alſo for their ſecurity in caſe of a march to turn the enemy's flank.

A meſſenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton with a letter in cypher, informing me of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the date of his letter, which was the 12th inſtant. This was the only meſſenger of many that I apprehend were diſpatched by Sir William Howe, and him that had reached my camp ſince the beginning of Auguſt. He was ſent back the ſame night to inform Sir Harry of my ſituation, and of the neceſſity of a diverſion to oblige General Gates to detach from his army, and my intention to wait favourable events in that poſition, if poſſible, to the 12th of October. September 21.

In the courſe of the two following days, two officers in diſguiſe, and other confidential perſons, were diſpatched by different routes with verbal meſſages to the ſame effect, and I continued fortifying my camp and watching the enemy, whoſe numbers increaſed every day.

I thought it adviſable on the 3d of October to diminiſh the ſoldiers' ration in order to lengthen out the proviſions, to which meaſure the army ſubmitted with the utmoſt chearfulneſs. The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly foreſeen, as was the dilemma, ſhould the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty ſuch an army as General Gates's to operate againſt Sir William Howe.

This conſideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as poſſible, and I reaſoned thus. The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at firſt to be *hazarded*. Circumſtances might require it ſhould be *devoted*. A critical junction of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Waſhington might poſſibly decide the fate of

of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the loſs of my retreat to Canada could only be a partial misfortune.

In this ſituation things continued till the ſeventh, when no intelligence having been received of the expected co-operation, and four or five days for our limited ſtay in the camp only remained, it was judged adviſable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to diſcover whether there were any poſſible means of forcing a paſſage ſhould it be neceſſary to advance, or of diſlodging him for the convenience of a retreat, but alſo to cover a forage of the army which was in the greateſt diſtreſs on accouut of the ſcarcity.

A detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops with two twelve pounders, two howitzers, and ſix ſix-pounders, were ordered to move, and were commanded by myſelf, having with me Major-General Phillips, Major-General Reideſel, and Brigadier-General Fraſer.

The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadier-General Hamilton and Specht, the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier General Gall; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front conſiſted of more than double their numbers, it was not poſſible to augment the corps that marched, beyond the numbers above ſtated.

I formed the troops within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy's left, and Captain Fraſer's rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had orders to go by ſecret paths in the woods to gain the enemy's rear, and by ſhewing themſelves there to keep them in a check.

The further operations intended, were prevented by a very ſudden and rapid attack of the enemy on our left, where the Britiſh grenadiers were poſted to ſupport the left wing of the line. Major Acland at the head of them ſuſtained the attack with great reſolution; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a ſecond line to the flank, where the ſtreſs of the fire lay. The right was at this time engaged, but it was ſoon obſerved that the enemy were marching a large corps round their flank to endeavour cutting off their retreat. The light infantry and part of the 24th regiment which were at that poſt were therefore ordered to form a ſecond line, and to ſecure the return of the troops into camp. While this movement was proceeding the enemy puſhed a freſh and ſtrong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which, overpowered by a great ſuperiority, gave way, and the light infantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick movement to ſave that point from being entirely carried, in doing which, Brigadier-General Fraſer was mortally wounded.

The danger to which the lines were expoſed becoming at this moment of the moſt ſerious nature, orders were given to Major-General Phillips and Reideſel to cover the retreat, while ſuch troops as were moſt ready for the purpoſe, returned for the defence of them. The troops retreated hard preſſed, but in good order; they were obliged to leave ſix pieces of cannon, all the horſes having been killed, and moſt of the artillery-men, who had behaved as uſual with the utmoſt bravery under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had ſcarcely entered the camp when it was ſtormed with great fury, the enemy ruſhing to the lines under a ſevere fire of grape-ſhot and ſmall arms.

The poſt of the light infantry under Lord Balcarras aſſiſted by ſome of the line, which threw themſelves by order into the intrenchments, was defended with great ſpirit, and the enemy led on by General Arnold was finally repulſed, and the General wounded; but unhappily the intrenchments of the German reſerve, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Breymann, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be recovered, they never were ſo, and the enemy by that misfortune gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the action.

Under the diſadvantages thus apparent in our ſituation, the army was ordered to quit the preſent poſition during the night and take poſt upon the heights above the hoſpital.

Thus by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new diſpoſition. This movement was effected in great order and without loſs, though all the artillery and camp were removed at the ſame time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy in their new poſition the whole day of the 8th.

Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right, and no means could prevent that meaſure but retiring towards Saratoga. The army began to move at nine o'clock at night, Major-General Reideſel commanding the van-guard, and Major-General Phillips the rear.

This retreat, though within muſquet-ſhot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the army, was made without loſs, but a very heavy rain and the difficulties of guarding the bateaux which contained all the proviſions, occaſioned delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga till the night of the 9th, and the artillery could not paſs the fords of the Fiſh-kill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, between five and ſix hundred, were diſcovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudſon's River at our approach, and joined a body poſted to oppoſe our paſſage there.

It was judged proper to ſend a detachment of artificers under a ſtrong eſcort to repair the bridges and open a road to Fort-Edward on the weſt ſide of the river. The 47th regiment, Captain Fraſer's markſmen, and Mackoy's Provincials, were ordered for that ſervice, but the enemy appearing on the heights of the Fiſh-kill in great force, and making a diſpoſition to paſs and give us battle: the 47th regiment and Fraſer's markſmen were recalled; the Provincials left to cover the workmen at the firſt bridge run away upon a very ſlight attack of a ſmall party of the enemy, and left the artificers to eſcape as they could, without a poſſibility of their performing any work.

During theſe different movements the bateaux with proviſions were frequently fired upon from the oppoſite ſide of the river, and ſome of them were loſt, and ſeveral men were killed and wounded in thoſe which remained.

The attacks upon the bateaux were continued, ſeveral were taken and retaken, but their ſituation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it was found impoſſible to ſecure the proviſions any otherwiſe than by landing them and carrying them upon the hill: this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty. October 11.

The poſſible means of further retreat were now conſidered in councils of war, compoſed of the general officers, minutes of which will be tranſmitted to your Lordſhip.

The only one that ſeemed at all practicable was, by a night march to gain Fort-Edward with the troops carrying their proviſion upon their backs; the impoſſibility of repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the queſtion, it was propoſed to force the ford at Fort-Edward, or the ford above it. Before this attempt could be made, ſcouts returned with intelligence that the enemy were intrenched oppoſite theſe fords, and poſſeſſed a camp in force on the high ground between Fort-Edward and Fort-George with cannon. They had alſo parties down the whole ſhore to watch our motions, and poſts ſo near to us, upon our own ſide of the water as muſt prevent the army moving a ſingle mile undiſcovered.

The bulk of the enemy's army was hourly joined by new corps of militia and volunteers, and their numbers together amounted to upwards of 16,000 men. Their poſition, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was from the nature of the ground unattackable in all parts.

In this ſituation the army took the beſt poſition poſſible and fortified, waiting till the 13th at night, in the anxious hope of ſuccours from our friends, or the next deſirable expectation, an attack from our enemy.

During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part, even rifle-ſhot and grape-ſhot came into all parts of the line, though without any conſiderable effect.

At this period an exact account of the proviſions was taken, and the circumſtances ſtated in the opening of this letter became compleat.

The council of war was extended to all the field officers and captains commanding corps of the army, and the event enſued which I am ſure was inevitable, and which, I truſt, in that ſituation was honourable, but which it would be ſuperfluous and melancholy to repeat.

After the execution of the treaty, General Gates drew together the force that had ſurrounded my poſition, and I had the conſolation to have as many witneſſes as I have men under my command, of its amounting to the numbers mentioned above.

During the events ſtated above, an attempt was made againſt Ticonderoga by an army aſſembled under Major General Lincoln, who found means to march with a conſiderable corps from Huberton undiſcovered, while another column of his force paſſed the mountains between Skeneſborough and Lake George, and on the morning of the 18th of September a ſudden and general attack was made upon the carrying place at Lake George, Sugar Hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence. The ſea officers commanding the armed ſloop ſtationed to defend the carrying place, as alſo ſome of the officers commanding at the poſts of Sugar Hill and at the Portage were ſurpriſed, and a conſiderable part of four companies of the 53d regiment were made priſoners; a block-houſe, commanded by Lieutenant Lord of the 53d, was the only poſt on that ſide that had time to make uſe of their arms, and they made a brave defence till cannon taken from the ſurpriſed veſſel was brought againſt them.

After ſtating and lamenting ſo fatal a want of vigilance, I have to inform your Lordſhip of the ſatisfactory events which followed.

The enemy having twice ſummoned Brigadier General Powell, and received ſuch anſwer as became a gallant officer entruſted with ſo important a poſt, and having tried during the courſe of four days ſeveral attacks, and being repulſed in all, retreated without having done any conſiderable damage.

Brigadier General Powell, from whoſe report to me I extract this relation, gives great commendations to the regiment of Prince Frederick, and the other troops ſta-

tioned

tioned at Mount Independence. The Brigadier alſo mentions with great applauſe the behaviour of Captain Taylor of the 21ſt regiment, who was accidentally there on his route to the army from the hoſpital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who with the artificers in arms defended an important battery.

On the 24th inſtant, the enemy, enabled by the capture of the gun-boats and bateaux which they had made after the ſurpriſe of the ſloop, to embark upon Lake George, attacked Diamond Iſland in two diviſions.

Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment, had been poſted at that iſland from the time the army paſſed the Hudſon's River, as a better ſituation for the ſecurity of the ſtores at the ſouth end of Lake George than Fort George, which is on the continent, and not tenable againſt artillery and numbers, The enemy were repulſed by Captain Aubrey with great loſs, and purſued by the gun-boats under his command to the eaſt ſhore, where two of their principal veſſels were retaken, together with all the cannon. They had juſt time to ſet fire to the other bateaux, and retreated over the mountains.

I beg leave to refer your Lordſhip for further particulars to my aid-de-camp, Lord Peterſham, and I humbly take occaſion to recommend to his Majeſty's notice that nobleman, as one endued with qualities to do important ſervices to his country in every ſtation to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign in particular, his behaviour has been ſuch as to entitle him to the fulleſt applauſe, and I am confident his merit will be thought a ſufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the *eclat* and ſort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate diſpatches.

I have only to add, my Lord, a general report of the killed and wounded; I do not give it correct, the hurry of the time and the ſeparation of the corps having rendered it impoſſible to make it ſo. The Britiſh officers have bled profuſely and moſt honourably; thoſe who remain unwounded have been equally forward, and the general officers from the mode of fighting have been more expoſed than in other ſervices. Among the reſt of this ſtation, I have had my eſcapes. It depends upon the ſentence his Majeſty ſhall paſs upon my conduct; upon the judgment of my profeſſion, and of the impartial and reſpectable parts of my country, whether I am to eſteem them bleſſings or misfortunes.

I have the honour to be,

(Signed.) J. BURGOYNE.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne *to Lord* George Germain, *dated* Albany, 20*th* October, 1777. Second No. XIV.

[*Private, by Lord* Peterſham.]

MY LORD,

I HAVE little to add to my public letter reſpecting the courſe of unſucceſsful events, therein detailed. I reſt my confidence in the juſtice of the King and his councils, to ſupport the General they thought proper to appoint to as arduous an undertaking, and under as poſitive a direction, as perhaps a cabinet ever framed. It will, I am ſure, be remembered, my Lord, that a preference of exertions was the only latitude given me, and that to force a junction with Sir William Howe, or at leaſt a paſſage to Albany, was the principle, the letter, and the ſpirit of my orders.

Indeed

Indeed the appearances at the time I paſſed the Hudſon's-River, though ſubject to doubt in ſome inſtances, as I then wrote your Lordſhip, were upon a general view, ſuch as I am perſuaded would have rendered inaction cenſurable, had my orders, inſtead of being peremptory, been diſcretionary. Promiſes of the profeſſing loyaliſts were not then brought to the teſt; the ſpirit of the enemy, in combat againſt regular Britiſh troops, had only been tried at Ticonderago, at Huberton, at Skeneſborough, and Fort Anne; in all which places it had failed; the total diſappointment of effectual co-operation, could not be foreſeen or ſuppoſed; and ſure I am, had I then made ſuppoſition that any thing like what has happened, might have happened, and remained cautiouſly poſted, no exertion attempted, my conduct would have been held indefenſible by every claſs and diſtinction of men in government, in the army, and in the public.

The expediency of advancing being admitted, the conſequences have been honourable misfortunes. The Britiſh have perſevered in a ſtrenuous and bloody progreſs. Had the force been all Britiſh, perhaps the perſeverance had been longer; but as it was, will it be ſaid, my Lord, that in the exhauſted ſituation deſcribed, and in the jaws of famine, and inveſted by quadruple numbers, a treaty which ſaves the army to the ſtate, for the next campaign, was not more than could have been expected? I I call it ſaving the army, becauſe if ſent home, the ſtate is thereby enabled to ſend forth the troops now deſtined for her internal defence; if exchanged, they become a force to Sir William Howe, as effectually, as if any other junction had been made.

I ſhould now hold myſelf unjuſtifiable if I did not confide to your Lordſhip, my opinion, upon a near inſpection, of the rebel troops. The ſtanding corps which I have ſeen, are diſciplined. I do not hazard the term, but apply it to the great fundamental points of military inſtitution, ſobriety, ſubordination, regularity and courage. The militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot leſs ſerviceable in woods. My conjectures were very different after the affair of Ticonderago, but I am convinced they were deluſive; and it is a duty to the ſtate to confeſs it.

The panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of ſhort duration; the enthuſiaſim is extenſive and permanent.

It is a juſtice to Major General Phillips, to inform your Lordſhip, that when the criſis of our ſituation at Saratoga arrived, he very handſomely offered to hazard his perſon by making a circuit through the woods, and attempt to throw himſelf into Ticonderago, to defend that place, ſhould it be the object of the enemy to endeavour the retaking it.

In regard to myſelf, I am ſunk in mind and body; but while I have a faculty of either, it ſhall be exerted for the King's ſervice. I ſhall wait in the neighbourhood of Boſton, the orders of Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BURGOYNE.

Minutes

Minutes of a Council of War, held on the Heights of Saratoga, Oct. 12. No. XV.

PRESENT.

Lieutenant General BURGOYNE, Major General PHILIPS,
Major General REIDESEL, Brigadier General HAMILTON.

THE Lieutenant General ſtates to the council the preſent ſituation of affairs.

The enemy in force, according to the beſt intelligence he can obtain, to the amount of upwards of 14,000 men, and a conſiderable quantity of artillery, are on this ſide the Fiſh-kill, and threaten an attack. On the other ſide the Hudſon's River, between this army and Fort Edward, is another army of the enemy, the numbers unknown; but one corps, which there has been an opportunity of obſerving, is reported to be about 1500 men. They have likewiſe cannon on the other ſide the Hudſon's River, and they have a bridge below Saratoga church, by which the two armies can communicate.

The bateaux of the army have been deſtroyed, and no means appear of making a bridge over the Hudſon's River, were it even practicable from the poſition of the enemy.

The only means of retreat, therefore, are by the ford at Fort Edward, or taking the mountains in order to paſs the river higher up by rafts, or by any other ford which is reported to be practicable with difficulty, or by keeping the mountains, to paſs the head of Hudſon's River, and continue to the weſtward of Lake George all the way to Ticonderoga; it is true, this laſt paſſage was never made but by Indians, or very ſmall bodies of men.

In order to paſs cannon or any wheel carriages from hence to Fort Edward, ſome bridges muſt be repaired under fire of the enemy from the oppoſite ſide of the river, and the principal bridge will be a work of fourteen or fifteen hours; there is no good poſition for the army to take to ſuſtain that work, and if there were, the time ſtated as neceſſary, would give the enemy on the other ſide the Hudſon's River an opportunity to take poſt on the ſtrong ground above Fort Edward, or to diſpute the ford while General Gates's army followed in the rear.

The intelligence from the lower part of Hudſon's River is founded upon the concurrent reports of priſoners and deſerters, who ſay it was the news in the enemy's camp, that Fort Montgomery was taken; and one man, a friend to government, who arrived yeſterday, mentions ſome particulars of the manner in which it was taken.

The proviſions of the army may hold out to the 20th; there is neither rum nor ſpruce beer.

Having committed this ſtate of facts to the conſideration of the council, the General requeſts their ſentiments on the following propoſitions.

1ſt. To wait in the preſent poſition an attack from the enemy, or the chance of favourable events.

2d. To attack the enemy.

3d. To retreat repairing the bridges as the army moves for the artillery, in order to force the paſſage of the ford.

4th. To retreat by night, leaving the artillery and the baggage; and ſhould it be found impracticable to force the paſſage with muſquetry, to attempt the upper ford, or the paſſage round Lake George.

5th. In

In caſe the enemy, by extending to their left, leave their rear open, to march rapidly for Albany.

Upon the firſt propoſition reſolved, that the ſituation would grow worſe by delay, that the proviſion now in ſtore not more than ſufficient for the retreat, ſhould impediments intervene, or a circuit of country become neceſſary; and as the enemy did not attack when the ground was unfortified, it is not probable they will do it now, as they have a better game to play.

The ſecond unadviſable and deſperate, there being no poſſibility of reconnoitering the enemy's poſition, and his great ſuperiority of numbers known.

The third impracticable.

The fifth thought worthy of conſideration by the Lieutenant-General, Major-General Phillips, and Brigadier-General Hamilton; but the poſition of the enemy yet gives no opening for it.

Reſolved, that the fourth propoſition is the only reſource, and that to effect it, the utmoſt ſecrecy and ſilence is to be obſerved; and the troops are to be put in motion from the right in the ſtill part of the night, without any change in the diſpoſition.

N. B. It depended upon the delivery of ſix days proviſion in due time, and upon the return of ſcouts, who had been ſent forward to examine by what route the army could probably move the firſt four miles undiſcovered, whether the plan ſhould take place on that day, or on the morrow.

The ſcouts on their return reported, that the enemy's poſition on the right was ſuch, and they had ſo many ſmall parties out, that it would be impoſſible to move without our march being immediately diſcovered.

Minutes and Proceedings of a Council of War, conſiſting of all the general Officers and Field Officers, and Captains commanding Corps, on the Heights of Saratoga, October 13.

THE Lieutenant-General having explained the ſituation of affairs, as in the preceding council, with the additional intelligence, that the enemy was intrenched at the fords of Fort Edward, and likewiſe occupied the ſtrong poſition on the Pine-plains between Fort George and Fort Edward, expreſſed his readineſs to undertake at their head any enterpriſe of difficulty or hazard that ſhould appear to them within the compaſs of their ſtrength or ſpirit. He added, that he had reaſon to believe a capitulation had been in the contemplation of ſome, perhaps of all, who knew the real ſituation of things; that upon a circumſtance of ſuch conſequence to national and perſonal honour, he thought it a duty to his country, and to himſelf, to extend his council beyond the uſual limits; that the aſſembly preſent might juſtly be eſteemed a full repreſentation of the army; and that he ſhould think himſelf unjuſtifiable in taking any ſtep in ſo ſerious a matter, without ſuch a concurrence of ſentiments as ſhould make a treaty the act of the army, as well as that of the general.

The firſt queſtion therefore he deſired them to decide was, Whether an army of 3500 fighting men, and well provided with artillery, were juſtifiable, upon the principles of national dignity and military honour, in capitulating in any poſſible ſituation?

Reſolved,

Reſolved, nem. con. in the affirmative.

Queſtion 2. Is the preſent ſituation of that nature?

Reſolved, nem. con. That the preſent ſituation juſtifies a capitulation upon honourable terms.

The Lieutenant-General then drew up the meſſage, marked No. 2, and laid it before the council. It was unanimouſly approved, and upon that foundation the treaty opened.

October 14. Major Kingſton having delivered the meſſage marked No. 2. returned with the propoſals marked No. 3, and the council of war being aſſembled again, the Lieutenant-General laid the propoſals before them, when it was reſolved unanimouſly to reject the 6th article, and not to admit of it in any extremity whatever.

The Lieutenant-General then laid before the council the anſwers to Major-General Gates's propoſals, as marked in the ſame paper, together with his own preliminary propoſals, which were unanimouſly approved of.

October 15. The council being aſſembled again, Major-General Gates's anſwers to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's propoſals were laid before them, whereupon it was reſolved, that they were ſatisfactory, and a ſufficient ground for proceeding to a definitive treaty.

No. 2. *Major* Kingſton *delivered the following Meſſage to Major-General* Gates, October 14.

AFTER having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited ſome days, in his preſent poſition, determined to try a third conflict againſt any force you could bring to attack him.

He is appriſed of the ſuperiority of your numbers, and the diſpoſition of your troops to impede his ſupplies, and render his retreat a ſcene of carnage on both ſides. In this ſituation he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himſelf juſtifiable by eſtabliſhed principles and precedents of ſtate, and of war, to ſpare the lives of brave men upon honourable terms. Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne would propoſe a ceſſation of arms during the time neceſſary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in any extremity, he and his army mean to abide.

No. 3. *Major-General* Gates's *Propoſals; together with Lieutenant-General* Burgoyne's *Anſwers.*

I. General Burgoyne's army being exceedingly reduced by repeated defeats, by deſertion, ſickneſs, &c. their proviſions exhauſted, their military horſes, tents, and baggage, taken or deſtroyed, their retreat cut off, and their camp inveſted, they can only be allowed to ſurrender priſoners of war.

Anſwer. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's army, however reduced, will never admit that their retreat is cut off, while they have arms in their hands.

II. The officers and ſoldiers may keep the baggage belonging to them. The generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged.

III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conducted by the moſt convenient route to New England, marching by eaſy marches, and ſufficiently provided for by the way.

Anſwer. This article is anſwered by General Burgoyne's firſt propoſal, which is here annexed.

IV. The officers will be admitted on parole; may wear their ſide-arms, and will be treated with the liberality cuſtomary in Europe, ſo long as they, by proper behaviour, continue to deſerve it; but thoſe who are apprehended having broke their parole, as ſome Britiſh officers have done, muſt expect to be cloſe confined.

Anſwer. There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under the deſcription of breaking parole, this article needs no anſwer.

V. All public ſtores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horſes, &c. &c. muſt be delivered to commiſſaries appointed to receive them.

Anſwer. All public ſtores may be delivered, arms excepted.

VI. Theſe terms being agreed to and ſigned, the troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne's command may be drawn up in their encampments, where they will be ordered to ground their arms, and may thereupon be marched to the river ſide, to be paſſed over in their way towards Bennington.

Anſwer. This article inadmiſſible in any extremity. Sooner than this army will conſent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will ruſh on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.

VII. A ceſſation of arms to continue till ſun-ſet, to receive General Burgoyne's anſwer.

(Signed)

HORATIO GATES.

Camp at Saratoga, Oct. 14.

Major Kingſton met the Adjutant-General of Major-General Gates's army, October 14th, at ſun-ſet, and delivered the following meſſage:

If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 6th article, the treaty ends at once.

The army will to a man proceed to any act of deſperation, rather than ſubmit to that article.

The ceſſation of arms ends this evening.

No. XVI.

No. XVI.

RETURN of the Army of the United States, commanded by Major General *Gates*, Camp at *Saratoga*, *October* 16, 1777.

Brigades.	*Officers present.*														*Non-commissioned.*		*Rank and File.*					
	Commissioned.								*Staff.*													
	Brigadiers.	*Colonels.*	*Lieutenant Colonels.*	*Majors.*	*Captains.*	*First Lieutenants.*	*Second Lieutenants.*	*Enſigns.*	*Chaplains.*	*Adjutants.*	*Quarter Maſters.*	*Pay Maſters.*	*Surgeons.*	*Mates.*	*Serjeants.*	*Drums and Fifes.*	*Preſent fit for Duty.*	*Sick preſent.*	*Sick abſent.*	*On Command.*	*On Furlough.*	*Total.*
Brigadier General Nixon's	1	3	4	3	27	25	28	24	1	4	4	2	4	3	104	52	1257	55	87	73	9	1481
Poor's	1	2	5	4	24	23	26	28	1	3	3	4	3	5	110	50	1132	48	64	61	11	1316
Learned's	1	4	3	4	26	21	23	30	1	4	3	3	2	4	121	54	1498	57	51	44	8	1658
Glover's	1	3	5	4	30	26	23	27	1	3	4	4	4	3	120	58	1776	69	94	86	23	2048
Paterſon's	1	4	3	4	28	22	24	26	0	3	3	2	3	4	108	49	1255	61	77	53	12	1458
Warner's	1	5	4	3	24	27	22	26	0	4	2	3	2	3	96	40	1572	95	83	68	32	1850
Stark's	1	3	3	4	27	30	24	22	0	3	4	2	4	2	101	48	220	25	32	1919	7	1303
Bailey's	1	4	4	2	28	26	22	24	0	2	2	1	2	3	93	37	897	30	23	148	13	1011
Whipple's	1	3	2	4	24	27	23	25	1	4	3	2	3	2	104	49	112	18	21	897	27	1075
Brickett's	1	2	4	3	26	23	27	30	0	2	2	1	1	2	83	37	776	21	37	31	4	869
Fellows's	1	4	2	4	22	26	24	28	0	3	4	2	3	4	113	51	132	40	31	884	10	1097
Woolcut's	1	3	2	3	20	23	21	25	0	2	3	1	2	1	96	47	843	27	34	38	7	949
Ten Brock's	0	4	2	3	24	22	27	30	0	2	4	2	1	3	105	44	987	54	65	553	14	1673
Artilleriſts	0	0	1	1	6	5	5	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	22	12	438	17	25	8	2	490
Cavalry	0	0	1	3	8	6	7	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	16	8	321	5	7	12	1	346
Total	12	44	45	49	344	332	326	345	5	42	44	30	37	43	1392	636	13216	622	731	3875	180	18624

N. B. Excluſive of the numbers in the above Return, there are, the upper ſtaff of the army, the bateau-men, the artificers, and followers of the camp.

Colonel Morgan's corps of rifle-men, and the light-infantry, are included in the brigades.

(Signed.) HORATIO GATES, Major General.

No. XVII. *Extracts from the Minutes of the laſt Council of War, excepting the names of the officers, and the notes they gave.*

QUESTION.

General Gates having, in anſwer to General Burgoyne's meſſage, given a ſolemn affirmation on his honour, that no detachment has been made from his army during the negociation of the treaty, is the treaty, in its preſent ſituation, binding on this army, or is the general's honour engaged for the ſigning it?

[Here follow the names of the officers as they voted.]

The lieutenant general's opinion being clear, that he is not bound by what has paſſed, he would not execute the treaty upon the ſole conſideration of the point of honour, notwithſtanding the reſpectable majority againſt him.

He is likewiſe far from being convinced that this army, by great exertions and by great enduring in point of proviſions, might not yet be relieved; but he is compelled to yield on the following conſiderations.

The treaty was generally thought a moſt advantageous one before the intelligence arrived. That intelligence is refuted, and ocular demonſtration of its falſity pledged as far as relates to General Gates's force; the other parts are only founded on hearſay, and not to be depended upon.

Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the diſtance is ſuch as to render any relief from him improbable during the time our proviſions could be made to laſt.

- - - - - - - - declares his poſt untenable, and ſays, if this convention is not ſigned, he apprehends there will be conſiderable deſertion.

- - - - - - - - ſays he thinks the 47th regiment not to be depended on.

- - - - - - - - is of the ſame opinion.

- - - - - - - - thinks the 62d regiment is diſheartened by the ſituation of their poſt, and not equal to their former exertions.

Several officers think the men in general ſeem to have got the convention in their heads as deſirable.

Many of the beſt officers are abſent by ſickneſs and wounds from all the corps.

Though the other officers at the head of the Britiſh corps think they can anſwer for the ſpirit of their men, if attacked on their preſent ground, it is evident the moſt ſanguine do not think any part of the army in that elevation and alacrity of ſpirit neceſſary for undertaking deſperate enterprizes.

To break off the treaty now renders a future renewal of it hopeleſs, as our condition muſt every hour grow worſe.

A defeat is fatal to the army. A victory does not ſave it, as they have neither proviſions to advance nor retreat againſt an enemy who by experience we know are capable of rallying at every advantageous poſt.

And that the life and property of every provincial and dependant of this army depends upon the execution of this treaty.

POSTSCRIPT

POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX.

[Though the following Letters are not referred to in any Part of the Defence, it is hoped they will not be deemed ſuperfluous.]

Extract of a Letter from Major General Phillips, *to Lieutenant General* Burgoyne, *dated* Cambridge, September 29, 1778.

My Dear Sir,

THE Boſton news papers, have given extracts from Engliſh and New York papers, wherein you are mentioned; your arrival, your ſpeeches in parliament; and a variety of other matters concerning you. I do not always give credit to news papers, and therefore, the publiſhers at Boſton will excuſe me, if in the inſtance of news I do not give them, in my opinion, more veracity than I allow the news compilers at London.

I will not plague you about our ſituation, as you will know it, by my aſſuring you it is almoſt exactly as you left us; ſo no more about it. The troops here depend upon you their chief, in whatever may relate to them; their intereſt; their honour. It is not doubted but you will exert yourſelf, that the officers may gain preferment in common, with other parts of the army. That you will have the goodneſs to exert yourſelf in behalf of their ſituation, reſpecting the very great expence of living, and endeavour to procure the allowance of forage money. And in ſhort, that you will uſe all your powers of perſuaſion and intereſt for theſe troops, which have ſerved under you with zeal, and with honour; and endeavour, by ſerving their ſituation and promoting their honour, to alleviate misfortunes which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, and which they ſuffer, however, with reſignation aud patience. I am moſt perfectly convinced of your affectionate, I will ſay your grateful regard for us all; and I leave myſelf and the troops to your friendly care; to your humanity; to your honour.

You cannot expect a letter of entertainment; I have not even a power of making it one of intelligence. It ſhall be however, a letter of perfect ſincerity, and in the fulleſt ſenſe of it I profeſs to be,

My dear Sir,

Your very ſincere Friend, and faithful Servant,

(Signed) W. PHILLIPS.

P. S. I encloſe you the Copy of a Memorial to the Secretary at War, I am ſure you will aſſiſt it.

Copy

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne *to Lord* Amherſt, *incloſing the Memorial referred to in the above, dated* November 6, 1778.

My Lord,

THE heavy misfortune I ſuſtain in being precluded the King's preſence, touches me in no point more nearly, than in the prevention of doing juſtice to the various and extenſive merits of the army I had the honour to command. That the conſequences of my ſuppoſed, or real errors, ſhould involve pretenſions and intereſts of ſo many gallant officers is a painful reflection; and it can only be alleviated by the trueſt ſenſe of the truſt to be repoſed in your Lordſhip, for the general protection of the ſervice. The incloſed memorial was accompanied with expreſſions of reliance, in the name of the whole army, upon my efforts to ſupport it. The officers in New England little conceive my preſent ſituation: I take the firſt opportunity to tranſmit their cauſe to your Lordſhip's happier auſpices, with this ſolemn declaration, which I have mentioned upon different public occaſions, and which I can omit no occaſion to repeat, that there is not a Britiſh officer who ſerved under me during the campaign of 1777, to whom I can impute blame; that the inſtances are very numerous wherein particular diſtinction is due; and as a body, they have a claim to my ſincereſt reſpect for their zeal in the King's ſervice, and to my utmoſt gratitude for their attention to me perſonally.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

J. Burgoyne.

FINIS.


ADVERTISEMENT.

In Plan IV. the third and fourth poſitions of the army in the engagement of 19th of September may appear upon a curſory view to want preciſion. The inequalities of the ground could not be diſtinctly marked upon ſo ſmall a ſcale; and the continual ſhift of the poſitions of ſeparate corps, as they were attacked by corps of the enemy, which frequently, from the thickneſs of the wood, they did not ſee, made it equally difficult to mark regularly the poſition of the whole at any one time.

The poſition of the armies on the 8th of September in Plate V. requires alſo ſome explanation. From the ſmallneſs of the ſcale, the poſition of the enemy could only be ſhewn upon the plain near the river; but it is to be obſerved, it extended over the ground of General Burgoyne's former encampment, and in front of the redoubts upon the hill.


N. B. The papers reſpecting the expedition to Bennington, referred to by miſtake, under No. IV. page 103, will be found in the Appendix under No. XII. after Lieutenant Colonel Baume's inſtructions.

The account of the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, referred to alſo, by miſtake, under No. V. will be found in the Appendix under No. XIII.


Road from Northampton
A
A
A
B
B
B
C
C
C
B
C



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POSITION of the DETACHMENT
under
LIEUT.T COL.L B.AUM,
at
WALMSCOCK near BENNINGTON
Shewing the Attacks *of the* Enemy
on the 16.th August 1777.
Drawn by Lieut.t Durnford *Engineer.*
Engraved by W.m Faden 1780.

POSITION of the DETACHMENT
under
LIEUT.T COL.L B.AUM,
at
WALMSCOCK near BENNINGTON
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on the 16.th August 1777.
Drawn by Lieut.t Durnford *Engineer.*
Engraved by Wm. Faden 1780.

Road from Saratoga

Hosack River

Road to Bennington

References.

A. *Reidesel's Dragoons.*

B. *Rangers.*

C. *American Volunteers.*

D. *German Grenadiers.*

E. *Chaſseurs.*


F. *Houses, Poſts of Canadians*

G. *Bodies of the Enemy.*

SCALE of 200 Paces to an Inch.

20 30 40 50 60 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

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PLAN of the ENCAMPMENT
and POSITION of the ARMY under
HIS EXCELL.Y L.t GENERAL BURGOYNE
at SWORDS HOUSE
on Hudson's River near Stillwater
on Sept.r 17.th with the Positions of that part of the Army
engaged on the 19.th Sept.r 1777.

Drawn by W. C. Wilkinson *L.t 62.d Reg.t Ass.t Engr.*

Engraved by Wm Faden.

Scale of 1200 Yards.

100 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

London, published as the Act directs, by W. Faden, Charing Cross, Feb.y 1.st 1780.

HUDSON'S RIVER

Third and Fourth Positions of that Part of the Army engaged on the 19th of September

Route of the Advanced Corps to Freemans Farm

Route of the Left Column to Freemans Farm

Burgoynes Camp from the 17th to the 19th of September

General

Swords House

Jagers Company

German Grenadiers

Chasseurs Battalion

Reitz

Speckt

Breymans Intrenchments

Hanau

6 Companies of the 47th

Route from Saratoga

the 20th

the 62d

the 21st

the 9th

British Grenadiers

the 47th

Royal Artillery

the 1st

Light Infantry

Advanced Corps

Brit. Grenadiers

Brit. Light Infantry

British Regulars

British Light Infantry

American Volunteers

Riflemen

Savages

Brit. Rangers

Hessian Grenadiers

PLAN of the ENCAMPMENT and POSITION of the ARMY under HIS EXCELL.Y L.T GENERAL BURGOYNE

at SWORDS HOUSE

on Hudson's River near Stillwater

on Sept.r 17.th with the Positions of that part of the Army engaged on the 19.th Sept.r 1777.


Drawn by W. C. Wilkinson *L.t 62.d Reg.t Ass.t Eng.r*

Engraved by W.m Faden.

Scale of 1200 Yards.

100 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

London, published as the Act directs, by W. Faden, Charing Cross, Feb.y 1.st 1780.



London, published as the Act

PLAN of the ENCAMPMENT and POSITION of the ARMY under HIS EXCELL.Y L.T GENERAL BURGOYNE at BRÆMUS HEIGHTS on Hudson's River near Stillwater, on the 20.th Sept.r with the Position of the Detachment &c. in the Action of the 7.th of Oct.r & the Position of the Army on the 8.th Oct.r 1777.

Drawn by W.C Wilkinson L.t 62 Reg.t Aff.s Eng.r

Engraved by Wm Faden.

Scale of 1200 Yards

100 200 400 600 800 1200

ENEMY'S CAMP at Stillwater.

Road to Albany

HUDSON'S RIVER

Intrenchment which was only begun

Columns of the Enemy

March of the Enemy

ACTION of the 7.th of October

British Light Infantry

Brig.r G.l Frazers Second Position to cover the Retreat

Lord Balcarras

Brig.d G.l Frazers Camp

British Grenadiers

British Light Infantry

Royal Artillery

Genl Burgoynes Camp

Head Quarters

from Sept.r 20.th to Octob.r 7.th

Col.o Breymann

Advanced Corps

Genl Burgoyne's Army on the 8.th of Octob.r

London, published as the Act directs by W.Faden, Charing Cross, Feb.y 1.st 1780.

ARMY under L.T GEN.L BURGOINE took at SARATOGA

remained till THE CONVENTION was signed.


graved by W.m Faden.



PLAN OF THE POSITION which the ARMY under L.T GEN.L BURGOINE took at SARATOGA

on the 10.th of September 1777, and in which it remained till THE CONVENTION was signed.

Engraved by W.m Faden.



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